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Abstract 
The PhD thesis presents a semi-quantitative methodology, developed to increase the 
efficacy of Land Use Planning related to the Management of risks, in particular as far as it 
concerns multiple risks impinging on the same territory (Multi-risks).  
At the moment, each risk is managed through a dedicated sectorial plan, having its proper 
procedures and scale, and the only “meeting point” for these plans – at least in Italy - are 
the Municipal city plans. The Municipalities have to implement the contents related to the 
various risks and directly intervene on the territory, but the lack of linkage and coordination 
between the plans and the authorities in charge often makes the emergency management 
and LUP less effective towards the achievement of a real safety of territories. In addition, 
the actual legislative framework does not face the possible consequences of risk 
interactions. 
In this context, the objective of the thesis was to develop a simple risk pre-screening tool, 
expressly designed for local planners, able to point out the areas more exposed to risks and 
risks interactions, in order to better address the distribution of the municipal resources for 
further studies and interventions. The local planners that, especially in Italy, have a central 
role for the risk management of the territory, became the central point for the proposed 
framework, assuming the role of evaluators, and then decision-makers. 
The methodology was developed taking into account the existing experimental frameworks 
developed for Multi-risks and NaTech events. Both qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies were settled in the last years, however the scales and the complex 
approaches proposed collide with the objectives of this PhD thesis. In fact, few 
methodologies were elaborated for little scales, and frequently the application of 
quantitative multi-risk methodologies at a local scale encountered difficulties related to 
data availability; in addition, all the methodologies require the involvement of experts of 
several disciplines. These aspects, in particular considering the scarce financial resources 
of Municipalities, risk to limit the awareness of the importance of a multi-risk approach for 
LUP planners.     
Therefore, a semi-quantitative approach, based on an index scale from 0 to 3 onwards was 
developed for a direct use from Municipal technicians; the proposed scale is applied to 
measure both the impact of the risks and risk interaction. The methodology is composed 
by 4 steps: 1) characterization of the risks; 2) assignation of the ratings to the risks; 3) 
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assessment of binary risk interactions; 4) assessment of the compatibility and planning 
phase. Each step is accompanied by GIS mapping. 
Steps 1 and 2) Risk characterization and rating. The users (local planners) are required to 
describe the main territorial risks according to 3 macro-categories: Historical Events, 
Protection Measures and Strengthening Effects. The macro-categories help in majorly 
focus on the different aspects of the risks, in particular those that could enhance its final 
impact, or that could have been neglected in the existing plans. Each macro-category is 
evaluated and rated on the basis of a dedicated guide, developed on the basis of literature 
data.  
Step 3) Risk interaction. The impact of one risk on another one (binary interaction) is 
assessed in the areas where risks overlay, thanks to a weighted average sum of the values 
of their macro-categories. An excel table for the application of the formula was developed. 
The calculation of the interaction vales can be also executed directly through GIS.   
Step 4) Compatibility. Territorial and environmental vulnerabilities are classified in 
compliance with E.R.I.R. national and regional regulations. Then, the compatibility is 
assessed on the basis of an “alarm threshold”; when highly vulnerable territorial or 
environmental elements fall down in areas where the risks macro-categories or risks 
interaction are above 2,5, a potential incompatibility is detected. The Municipalities will 
have to focus here further studies, and then possible interventions: a collection of the 
possible actions, extracted from existing Guidelines and Manuals was drafted to guide this 
process. 
An optional step for the compatibility assessment was added to provide the Municipalities 
with an indicative mapping of the spatial consequences of the interactions involving 
industrial plants. This is the only step of the methodology that could presents difficulties 
for not expert users, because it entails the use of two modelling software (ALOHA and 
HSSM), that simulates the consequences of the releases. 
The methodology was tested on two Italian case-studies, two Municipalities affected by 
multiple types of risks which could interact. Both the territories were connoted by low 
levels of risk, however the application of the methodology highlighted possible unforeseen 
problems deriving from the interactions, that currently are not described in any existing 
sectorial or local plan. Once that the areas more exposed are identified, ad-hoc 
investigations and actions can be settled to address the problem, on the basis of a guide-
line. 
The proposed approach demonstrated to be able in identifying and bring multi-risks aspects 
to the attention of the decision makers; in this way, they have a simple guide to risk that 
can be integrated with the existing planning instruments to improve the quality of decisions 
related to risks. Furthermore, local administrators recover a more active role, increasing 
their awareness about the contents and information of the sectorial plans, but also exploiting 
their major direct knowledge of the territory. This approach tried to fill two different 
existing gaps: on one side, the absence of an official and recognized legislation on Multi-
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risks; on the other side, the difficulties for non-risk experts to effectively use the Multi-risk 
and NaTech experimental methodologies developed so far now. 
The framework developed for this PhD thesis can be easily adapted to LUP procedures of 
other countries, through a re-construction of the tables that guide the risk-rating; the simple 
index scale can be easily managed by different types of users. Being the methodology a 
risk pre-screening, it can be useful in every context in which it is necessary to acquire more 
information about multi-risks and their consequences, to better define future actions and 
drive the application of quantitative methodologies. Some further steps could strengthen 
and promote the use of the methodology: 
1) Development of the guidelines for rating for other territorial risks, defining the 
levels for the three macro-categories in cooperation with experts of each specific 
discipline (landslide, volcanic risk, sea risk etc.) 
2) Strengthening of the approach in relation to the local extreme events caused by 
climate change, with a wider local data collection and definition of the phenomena.  
3) Enhancement of the representation of the spatial consequences. At the moment the 
simulations related to the interactions were essentially focused on industrial assets; 
however, a major involvement of experts of other disciplines could allow to set 
tools and instruments to analyze and study the consequences of all the types of 
interaction, creating an all-inclusive and more powerful tool.  
4) Strengthening of the approach in relation to the vulnerability analysis, in order to 
evaluate the different aspects of susceptibility presented by the vulnerable 
elements, and trying to settle possible solutions to enhance the resilience.  
5) Developing a participative process to improve the application of the methodology 
among the Municipalities, to reinforce the cooperation between the users and 
external authorities. In this context, also the adoption of a Multi-criteria Decision 
Analysis (MCDA) could be useful, to better guide and support the choice of the 
possible planning actions, as proposed by (Nivolianitou & Papazoglou, 2014) for 
LUP around Seveso plants.  
6) Integrating the methodologies with procedures related not only to structural 
interventions, but also to emergency management, i.e. taking into account the 
guidance for flood disaster management with the use of AHP by (Nivolianitou & 
Synodinou, 2015). 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Foreword 
The present research has its starting point in the candidate’s previous experiences in the field 
of E.R.I.R. drafting, an instrument for the safe planning around Seveso plants1. The problem 
of Land Use Planning related to hazardous industrial plants was explicitly addressed by the 
EU Seveso directives, and implemented in Italy with the Ministerial Decree DM 09/05/2001, 
executive decree of the Legislative Decree 334/1999.  
The Municipalities with a Seveso plant within their territory are committed to draft the 
E.R.I.R. plan (Elaborato Tecnico per il Rischio di Incidente Rilevante – Technical Plan for 
major risk accidents) for a safe integration of their urban functions with the existing plants. 
The application of E.R.I.R. evidenced some shortcomings related to the environmental 
aspects, and to the analysis of the interaction of the industrial risks with natural risks, as later 
discussed in Paragraph 1.2.2, t.  
However, the Municipalities not only implement in their City plans the indications about 
industrial risks; they have to cope with seismic risk, flood, volcanic risk etc.; furthermore, 
they are the first authority in charge for emergency interventions.  
Therefore, the starting questions for this thesis were: have the Municipalities sufficient tools 
to grant a safe management of the territory? Is it possible to improve them, introducing multi-
risks aspects? 
                                                 
1 Seveso plant = plant detaining a quantity of hazardous substances equal or overcoming the thresholds 
defined by the Annex I of the EU Directive 2012/18/UE (Seveso III). 
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The following paragraphs aim at providing a general framework of the legislative situation 
in Italy, in relation to industrial risk and natural risks, highlighting the main problems related 
to the current management; in the end, the main objectives of the research are presented.     
1.2 E.R.I.R.  
In Italy, the national criteria for Land Use Planning (L.U.P.) related to major accidents dated 
back to 2001, with the Ministerial Decree DM 09/05/2001. A new Seveso Directive 
2012/18/EU, and a new Legislative Decree (no. 105/2015) were issued, but the new 
Guidelines for L.U.P., mentioned in the article 22, have not been issued yet. According to 
DM 09/05/2001, Regions, Provinces, and most of all Municipalities, are the authorities in 
charge for the definition of minimum criteria to grant the safety around Seveso plants. 
Regions and Provinces have the function of guidance and supervision, while the direct 
fulfilment of the prevention and protection measures for the safeguard and safe planning of 
the areas around Seveso plants is a direct competence of the Municipalities, which have to 
draft the E.R.I.R. plan. The scopes of this planning instrument are: the identification of the 
environmental and territorial vulnerabilities, the assessment of the compatibility of Seveso 
installations, and finally the introduction of binding areas around them. 
1.2.1 Procedure  
A short summary of E.R.I.R. steps is here provided; in particular, the procedure adopted in 
Piedmont Region is presented. The Guidelines attached to Piedmont Regional Decree 17/377 
(Regione Piemonte, 2010) gave the Municipalities more detailed indications with respect to 
the national law; they can be considered one of the most accurate regional regulation in the 
field of safe planning around Seveso plant. 
According to (Regione Piemonte, 2010), the drawing up of E.R.I.R. consists of three 
different phases:  
a) The data collection related to Seveso plants and other industries, and to territorial and 
environmental receptors;  
b) The evaluation of the territorial and environmental compatibility;  
c) The planning phase. 
a) The data collection: identification and characterization both of the 
environmental/territorial vulnerabilities and of the industrial network. It entails a constant 
interaction between the various municipality offices, and the analysis of Regional and 
Provincial Strategic Plans, thematic plans and maps with reference to water, hydrogeological 
instability, architectonic and landscape protection sites, and Emergency plans and Safety 
Reports of the plants.  
Seveso plants are characterized through their Safety Reports and Notifications, which point 
out the relevant accidental scenarios. In addition, (Regione Piemonte, 2010) required to 
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investigate non-Seveso installations that could represent a risk: the Municipalities should 
include in E.R.I.R. plan the so-called Sub-threshold Seveso plants, which hold an amount of 
hazardous substances equal or higher than 20% of the thresholds established for each 
category of substances by the Legislative Decree 334/1999, Annex I - Parts I and II.  Both 
the Sub-threshold plants and the other activities are under no obligation to declare the 
substances stored, therefore the quantity of hazardous substances, the storage type, the 
manufacturing process, the prevention and protection measures adopted, and the transport 
modalities of the hazardous goods are determined through a questionnaire. The collection of 
these data can create some problems, as the companies are not so accustomed to Seveso 
regulations and frequently have difficulty with the compilation of the questionnaire.   
As far as it concerns the territorial and environmental receptors, the Municipalities have to 
classify as vulnerable territorial elements all the areas, buildings and infrastructures connoted 
by a significant presence of people. Six decreasing levels of vulnerability are defined by the 
D.M. 09/05/2001, depending on the population density or on the number of people, the 
attendance, and the mobility capacity, as detailed in Table 14. 
In relation to the environmental vulnerabilities, (Regione Piemonte, 2010) provided a more 
detailed list with respect to that of the D.M. 09/05/2001; it includes protected natural areas, 
areas suffering from hydrogeological instability, historical-environmental-landscape areas of 
high value, zones with high vulnerability aquifers, etc. These environmental receptors should 
be grouped into two categories: “Extreme environmental vulnerability” elements and 
“Relevant environmental vulnerability” elements. 
b) The territorial and environmental compatibility: in this phase, the data from the industries 
are crossed with those relative to the territorial and environmental vulnerabilities, and the 
interaction between industrial activities and urban functions, the road conditions and the 
environmental characteristics of the examined area are evaluated case by case.  
For the territorial compatibility, both the D.M. 09/05/2001 and (Regione Piemonte, 2010) 
require to overlay the damage areas of each Seveso plant onto the territorial vulnerable 
categories identified during the previous data collection stage. A matrix defined by the D.M. 
09/05/2001 reports the territorial categories compatible with each level of damage (Elevated 
Lethality, Start of Lethality, Irreversible Damage and Reversible Damage), on the basis of 
the probability of occurrence of the analyzed scenario.  
For non-Seveso activities, which do not have risk analysis, (Regione Piemonte, 2010) 
introduced an indicative methodology for the compatibility, based on the type of stored 
substances. A specific buffer zone of potential damage is associated to the main hazardous 
substance detained (i.e. toxic substances = 1500 m., flammable substances = 500 m.), then a 
judgment of “very critical/critical/not critical” is assigned to each plant, depending on the 
territorial and environmental vulnerable elements falling into the potential damage buffer.  
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Both the D.M. 09/05/2001 and Piedmont regional guidelines provide about the 
environmental compatibility more generic procedures; the first only distinguishes two 
possible environmental consequences, significant damage and severe damage, based on the 
time requested for a complete recovery of the previous situation. A plant causing a potential 
severe damage is not compatible.  
Piedmont region considered the D.M. 09/05/2001 approach of difficult application; 
therefore, it proposed for the environmental compatibility a judgment of criticality, based on 
the type of substance stored, the foreseen accidental events (energetic, toxic or with 
environmental effects), and the vulnerable environmental elements. Seveso plants and 
Seveso sub-thresholds plants located in Extreme environmental vulnerable area are 
considered “Very critical”; all the other plants, except those whose protective and 
management measures make unlikely a potential environmental scenario, are considered 
“critical”. In the Relevant vulnerable areas, if the vulnerable elements are underground 
aquifers with Very high/High vulnerability; groundwater recharge areas; areas with water 
table depth < 3 m., Seveso plants and Seveso sub-thresholds plants detaining substances 
hazardous for the environment shall be considered “Very critical”; in the other cases, Seveso 
plants are only “critical”.   
As far as it concerns the environmental compatibility, the Turin Province guidelines for 
E.R.I.R. drafting provide a more precise approach, which will be explained further on. 
 c) Planning: Piedmont Guidelines defined precise criteria for the planning stage, imposing 
the definition of two concentric areas of respect, named “Exclusion area” and “Observation  
area”,  around the Seveso activities and the “critical” or “very critical” activities.  
The two areas are drawn up starting from the border of the plant: the exclusion area is a 
binding area, which can be of 100, 200 or 300 m, depending on the level of criticality 
assigned to the plant. The observation area must extend to at least 500 m from the plant 
boundary, and correspond to the area identified in the Emergency Plan for the management 
of emergencies related to the accidental events.  
In the exclusion area, modifications that involve an increase in the anthropic load, 
introducing urban functions belonging to categories A and B are not admitted. In the 
observation area, management measures relative to the control of the traffic conditions in 
case of an accident can be applied, but no land-planning bonds are imposed. 
In the end, (Regione Piemonte, 2010) allows the Municipalities to decide specific additional 
protection measures in the exclusion areas, in order to mitigate the impact on the environment 
and on the already existing buildings. For instance, the Municipality can impose to the plant 
owners the building of perimeter walls, the waterproofing of the yards and the building of 
settling tanks, and so on.  
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1.2.2 Shortcomings  
Even though Piedmont Region established very detailed Guidelines for E.R.I.R. drafting, the 
practical application, developed in cooperation with several Municipalities, still evidenced 
some shortcomings, in part related to the lack of technical skills of the Municipalities in 
comparison to the level of knowledge required by the E.R.I.R., but most of all concerning 
the environmental aspects.   
On one side, the assessment of the environmental compatibility remains less clear than that 
for the territorial compatibility and do not generate specific binding provisions. On the other 
side, the entire E.R.I.R. procedure neglects the possible influence of the natural elements and 
events on the Seveso plants (shown in Figure 1), even if the particular physiognomy of the 
Italian territory could massively favour this interaction. In fact, the major part of the nation 
is characterized by a high seismic risk, many areas have been interested by huge floods, and 
Italy is connoted by extended coastal zones. The land available for urban development was 
very limited and caused the creation of a jumble of residential and industrial zones, a massive 
urban expansion that complicates the relationship with natural events, increasing their 
dangerousness.  
 
The inclusion of possible NaTech2 interactions in E.R.I.R. is also impeded by reasons related 
to the probability of occurrence. These events are connoted by high impact and very low 
probability, but unfortunately, Italian Seveso regulations allow the plant owners to not 
develop scenarios for events whose probability of occurrence is below 10-6. D.M. 09/05/2001 
established compatibility criteria also for these extremely rare events, but since E.R.I.R. 
plans are entirely based on the contents of the risk assessment of the Safety reports and 
Notifications provided by the plants, in the end NaTech events are mostly neglected. 
 
Figure 1: Mutual influence of anthropic and natural elements 
  
                                                 
2 NaTech = natural disasters triggering technological disasters 
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Therefore, in Italy neither Land Use policies nor Seveso regulations deal with the possible 
interaction between industrial and natural hazards: as highlighted also by (Galderisi et al, 
2008), these risks are generally handled separately.  
1.3 Sectorial risk plans and emergency plan 
As anticipated, the direct land use management in Italy is delegated to Municipalities, that 
implement, in their City Plan and in the Emergency Plan, the provisions of the superordinate 
sectorial risk plans. The City Plan norms urban and land functions, adapting the needs of 
urban development to the natural specificities of the territory (geomorphological, 
hydrological, etc.). The Emergency Plan provides a survey on the state of conservation of 
the territory based on existing risk analysis and on superordinate plans indications; it then 
set up the operational activities, the materials, capacities and means needed to deal with 
possible emergencies. The following paragraphs provide an insight of the sectorial plans 
related to earthquake and flood, of the Emergency Plan, and of the criticalities observed at a 
local level. 
1.3.1 Flood and Earthquake 
1) SEISMIC RISK: The Italian Seismic legislation is composed by two national laws, the 
Ordinanza OPCM 3519 (Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri, 2006) and the Ministerial 
Decree D.M. 14th January 2008, which introduced the NTC Norme Tecniche per le 
Costruzioni – Technical standards for buildings (Ministero delle Infrastrutture, 2008). The 
Ordinanza OPCM 3519 proposed a classification in four zones, based on the values of Peak 
Ground Acceleration (PGA), with a 10% excess probability in 50 years, calculated for rigid 
soils3 (see Table 1). 
Table 1:  OPCM 3519 4 seismic zone classification 
SEISMIC 
ZONE 
PGA 4 
1 PGA > 0.25 
2 0.15 < PGA < 0.25 
3 0.05 < PGA < 0.15 
4 PGA ≤ 0.05 
The NTC were adopted later, in compliance with the CEN Structural Eurocodes, and 
imposed to architects and engineers to assess the specific seismic risk related to each new 
                                                 
3 The 4 seismic zones calculation and mapping is provided by the INGV - Istituto Nazionale di 
Geofisica e Vulcanologia. 
4  Peak ground acceleration on rigid soil with a 10% excess probability in 50 years 
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construction, by evaluating the specific response spectres of the construction itself in relation 
to the kind of soil, the life-time of the building, etc. 
After the adoption of NTC, the 4 seismic zones defined by the Ordinanza OPCM 3519 
remained only as an administrative indication for the Regions aimed at identify the territories 
with a potential higher risk, while the in-depth assessment of the seismic risk was delegated 
to the single building scale, through the application of the NTC Norme Tecniche per le 
Costruzioni.  
Therefore, currently no effective information on seismic risk is available at an intermediate 
scale: Municipalities know their general seismic class, but no in-depth analysis is provided 
on the actual distribution of the seismic risk on the territory. The classification into 4 seismic 
zones is based on the parameter of a rigid soil, that is a too general and not conservative 
condition if applied at a local scale, where the quality of soil deeply influences the seismic 
behaviour. On the other side, the analysis required by NTC (response spectres to take into 
account the characteristics of the soil) is punctual and cannot define areas connoted by 
homologous features.  
In addition, NTC can ensure to a new construction/building a good level of protection against 
earthquakes, but most part of the buildings and constructions in Italy are older than NTC, 
and were built in absence of any analysis on the soil conditions. Even if NTC established 
some criteria for the seismic adaptation and improvement of existing buildings, they can be 
imposed only if an intervention on the building itself is programmed and consequently 
requested to the Municipality. 
In 2009, the Civil Protection issued the Guidelines “Indirizzi e criteri per la microzonazione 
sismica”, aimed at introducing new practices to assess the reactions of the different types of 
soil under a seismic solicitation. In fact, it was observed that the same ground acceleration 
could produce completely different effects, depending on the local characteristics of soil, so 
that a correct estimation of the seismic behaviour (micro-zoning) of the soil was interpreted 
as key element to identify the real priorities both for emergency and planning interventions. 
A multi-level approach for micro-zoning was defined: 
- The First level is a preparatory study for the successive steps, based on pre-existing data, 
and has the scope to identify inside the territory of a Municipality the soils which present 
homogeneous characteristics, and which could be affected by instability or amplification 
effects. 
- The Second level, the proper Micro-zoning study, provides a semi-quantitative 
assessment of the amplification related to each type of soil identified.  
- The third level is related to specific areas which need more in-depth analysis. 
 
After the L’Aquila earthquake of 6th April 2009, the Italian government approved a National 
Risk Plan for seismic risk (Legge no. 77/2009, art. 11), that required the micro-zoning studies 
at least for the most dangerous areas, mainly located in the Appennine zone (1877 
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Municipalities). An annual fund was assigned to contribute to the draft of microzoning but, 
until 2015, only 779 Municipalities had prepared the studies, introducing an instrument able 
to fill the gap of the intermediate scale.  
According to (Protezione Civile, 2009), the Regions are the authorities in charge to organize 
and plan the development of the micro-zoning studies on their territory: they usually use the 
generic seismic classes to identify the areas where a micro-zoning study is overriding. 
Therefore, generally, the priority for 2nd and 3rd micro-zoning level studies is reserved to 
Municipalities classified in Classes 1 and 2; these levels require further technical and 
financial efforts, and can be partially financed with the funds made available by the Piano 
nazionale per la prevenzione del rischio sismico. The 1st micro-zoning level could be 
required to Municipalities located in Classes 3 and 4, as one of the accompanying studies for 
the draft of the City Plan.  
An extensive adoption of the micro-zoning studies, at least of those belonging to the 1st level, 
would be able to represent that local in-deth analysis that is currently missing for the Italian 
Municipalities. 
2) FLOOD AND LANDSLIDE RISK: The National law 183/89, integrated by law 253/90, 
conferred the soil conservation to new authorities created on purposes: River basin 
authorities (Autorità di bacino). In 1998, the decree D.P.C.M. 29th September 1998 imposed 
to the Basin authorities the draft of plans expressly dedicated to the assessment of the 
hydrogeological risks at river basin scale, named P.A.I. - Piano per l’Assetto idrogeologico, 
Hydrogeological-setting plan.  
P.A.I. adopted a simplified approach for the risk estimation, based on qualitative methods; 
the analyses were conducted in areas in which floods and landslides events were historically 
proved. Floods hazards were organized on 3 categories with different probabilities, while for 
landslide hazards the information provided by other National Research institutes were 
collected and reported. Four levels of risk were identified, depending on the potential 
damages to different types of target (see Table 2 below).   
Table 2: D.P.C.M. 29th of September 1998, Flood hazards, and Risk categories 
FLOOD HAZARDS categories RISK LEVELS (Floods and landslides) 
A 
HIGH PROBABILITY 
FLOODS, return time ≤ 20-
50 years 
R1 low 
Negligible social, economic and environmental 
damages  
. B 
MEDIUM PROBABILITY 
FLOODS, return time ≤ 100-
200 years 
R2 
medium 
Minor damages to buildings, infrastructures and 
people, which don’t affect people and building 
safety, and economic activities development 
C 
LOW PROBABILITY 
FLOODS, return time ≤ 300-
500 years 
R3 
high 
Possible damages to people safety, structural 
damages to buildings and infrastructures, which 
affect socio-economic activities. Relevant 
damages to the environment  
  R4 
very 
high 
Death and severe injuries to people, severe 
damages to buildings, infrastructure and 
environment, loss of socioeconomic activities. 
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P.A.I. plans studied and imposed specific buffer zones to the main rivers basins; these 
binding areas were expanded by Regions and Provinces, that included in the risk analysis 
also minor water courses. Finally, the local City Plans were committed to integrate all these 
indications, establishing specific requirements for the compatibility of the urban functions. 
As already highlighted for seismic risk, the most problematic situations were related to 
existing buildings in condition of incompatibility, for which no specific binding tools were 
provided.  
Recently, the described framework was changed by the Legislative Decree 49/2010: in 
compliance with 2007/60/CE Directive, it required to create new plans and maps for the 
Management of Flood Risks, involving for the first time in their draft the Civil Protection, 
and therefore dealing with aspects of Emergency Planning. The Basin authorities have 
produced the new Maps for the Flood Risk, which recover P.A.I. information with the aim 
to homogenise their representation at a national level. An example of these new plans is the 
P.G.R.A - Piano di Gestione del rischio alluvioni, Plan for the flood risk management, 
recently issued by the Po basin authority (A.D.B.Po, 2015); the flood buffer zones identified 
by the existing P.A.I. and other plans were led back to 3 new flood scenarios (High, medium 
and low probability). The return times corresponding to these flood scenarios are reported in 
Table 3 and  Table 4 below, extracted from (A.D.B.Po, 2014).  
Table 3: Po basin authority, summary of the flood risk elements 
FLOOD RISK ELEMENT Authority in charge for 
surveys Code Description 
RP Main hydrographic network  Basin authorities 
RSCM Secondary hydrographic network of hills and mountains  Regions 
RSP Secondary hydrographic network of flat lands (RSP) 
Regions and Consortia for 
water management 
ACL Lake coastal areas  
Regions and Consortia for 
lakes regulation 
ACM Sea coastal areas  Regions 
Table 4: Po basin authority, flood scenarios 
Flood directive 
Dangerous
ness 
Return times of each flood element (yrs) 
Flood 
Scenario 
Return 
time (yrs) 
RP 
RSCM 
(P.A.I. 
legend) 
RSP ACL ACM 
High 
likelihood (H) 
20-50 
frequent 
P3 high 10-20 
Ee, Ca, 
RME 
20-50 
> 50 15 10 
Medium 
likelihood (M) 
100-200 
infrequent 
P2 medium 100-200 
Eb, Cp 
100-200 
50-200 100 100 
Low 
likelihood or 
extreme event 
scenario (L) 
> 500 rare  
or max. 
registered 
impact 
P1 low 500 
Em, Cn 
300-500 
- 
Max.regi
stered 
impact 
> 100 
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1.3.2. Emergency  
The National law no. 225/1992, later modified by the National law 100/2012, introduced for 
all the Italian Municipalities the obligation to draft an Emergency plan for their territory, 
aimed at preventing the risks and coordinating the emergency operations. According to a 
survey realized in September 2016 by the Civil protection, it resulted that 80% of the Italian 
municipalities is now provided with an Emergency plan. However, the contents could deeply 
vary from a Region to another, and from Municipality to Municipality; in addition, in some 
cases the Emergency plans showed a serious inefficacy in preventing and managing the risks 
(i.e. during Genova’s multiple floods).   
As for industrial risk, each Region is responsible for the implementation of studies and 
programmes aimed at managing possible risks and prevent consequent damages, and 
therefore for the draft of specific Guidelines for the Municipal Emergency Plans.  
Usually, a Municipal emergency plan should identify the major risks and vulnerabilities 
present on the territory, then evaluate the most dangerous risk scenarios, in order to define 
tools and actions for the emergency management. Each regional Guideline defined its proper 
method for the risk identification, however, the contents of the sectorial plans are often 
assumed as basis for the risk scenarios. Since 2007, a national Guideline (Presidenza del 
Consiglio dei Ministri, 2007) is available in relation to the assessment of fire risk, to be 
evaluated with a speedy method, and of hydrogeological risk (based on the P.A.I. 
provisions). For the seismic risk, some online instruments for the drafting of the scenarios 
are available on the website of the Civil Protection 
http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/it/rischio_sismico.wp .  
Nevertheless, many Emergency Plans have already been prepared on the basis of different 
indications, provided by each Region: i.e. Piedmont stated with the Regional Law n. 44/2000 
that all the Municipalities should prepare and adopt a Municipal or Inter-Municipal Civil 
Protection Plan, publishing dedicated Guidelines in 2004 (Regione Piemonte, 2004). 
According to these Piedmont guidelines, plans should include: 
 general information about the territory and its characteristics (Territorial analysis);  
 an accurate risk scenario analysis for each possible risk as precondition of each 
following provisional or operational action (Risk scenarios, considering different types 
of hazards and vulnerabilities);  
 a verification of the present structures, capacities and resources (Organization and 
resources), on the basis of which an adequate configuration for emergencies can be 
configured (Emergency procedures, Capacity building, communication and training).  
Turning back to the Emergency plan contents, their final objective should be in agreement 
with the UN/ISDR (2009) definition for disaster risk management (also known as emergency 
management): “the systematic approach of using administrative decisions, organization, 
operation skills and capacities to implement policies, strategies and coping capacities of the 
society to lessen the impacts of natural hazards and related environmental and technological 
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disasters. This comprises all forms of activities, including structural and non-structural 
measures to avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) adverse effects of 
hazards”.  
However, the Italian Emergency Plans do not include recommendations for the 
implementation of structural mitigations able to contain and/or prevent disasters, but only 
work as a basis for rescuing operations only, while the planning actions are left to other tools. 
Furthermore, it has to be added that, once again, the issue of the interaction between the risks 
is not faced in the Emergency plan.   
1.3.3. Shortcomings 
The analysis of the different territorial risks in a separate way, with different procedures, 
timings, methodologies, do not allow to the Municipalities to have a clear and updated 
concept of the actual dangers that threaten their territory. In particular, the implementation 
of the seismic, industrial and hydrogeological provisions at a local scale is characterized by 
the following critical issues: 
• A correct application of the indications of the sectorial plans could be sometimes 
affected or delayed by lack of financial and technical resources; external o partial 
interests could compromise contents and provisions of the City plans; 
• Information and analysis contained in larger scale plans could become obsolete in the 
period between the release of the sectorial Plan and its integration in the City plans. 
Therefore, the state of the territory reported in the sectorial plans in some cases does not 
reflect any more the actual situation.  
• Sectorial plans provide prescriptions and recommendations on how to reduce and 
contain related risks, but their effectiveness is rarely direct, because only Municipalities 
can impose bindings on the territory through the City Plans, and these are mainly related 
to regulate new constructions. Supra-local legislation does not provide Municipalities 
proper means to be able to intervene on ascertained high-risk situations, or cases of 
incompatibilities between risks and existing urban functions. 
As far as it concerns the local scale tools, the City Plan and the Emergency Plan, it can be 
observed that even if they share the same basic indications, they are not mutually linked in 
the matter of long-term risk management: one is specifically related to the territory and the 
other to the emergency, without establishing common preventive structural measures that 
could contribute to reduce risk and prevent emergency. Both the plans implement measures 
related to the risks present in the territory, however they do not consider the possible risk 
increase related to the risk interactions.   
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1.4 The proposed solution 
Considering the above-mentioned difficulties, the present research was focused on the 
development of a new methodology, able to jointly take into account, and analyse for 
preventive and planning purposes: 
 The main risks on the Municipal territory 
 The main environmental and territorial vulnerabilities 
 The interaction between the risks and their impact. 
The objective was to define a quick and easy to use methodology that the Municipalities 
could directly use without need of intermediations, in order to spare money and time. The 
proposed methodology was not intended as a replacement of the existing plans, but as an all-
inclusive “Rapid guide to the risk”, aimed at immediately highlighting the most threatened 
areas, in order to allow the Municipalities to proceed with further analysis and interventions 
on specific points of the territory. All this information should be inserted from the beginning 
in a GIS tool, that returns an immediate and easy to read overlapping of the different thematic 
layers (vulnerabilities and risks), able to show in a simple way the main zones of possible 
risks interaction. 
In order to develop the methodology, firstly a literature review related to the Multi-risk 
approaches and NaTech methods was carried on, as better explained in next chapter. It should 
be noticed that even if, recently, many research projects at national and European level were 
developed to identify and produce methodologies able to take into account and manage the 
different types of risk, until now no one of these approaches was ratified by a law. Also, not 
many reference methodologies at local scale are yet available, and the approaches and data 
used at a larger scale for the vulnerability analysis and risk analysis result not adequate and 
too general to be effective at a minor scale. In example, in Italy are usually adopted the 
statistical data released by ISTAT for the estimation the vulnerability related to the 
population, but they cannot show the distribution of population and its density inside the 
territory of a Municipality.  
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The scheme reported below show the steps of the methodology proposed, later explained in 
Chapter 3. 
 
 
 
STEP 1 
Risk characterization 
and ratings assignation 
  
Vulnerability 
characterization  
(D.M 09/0572001) 
       
STEP 2 
Assessment of the 
binary risk interactions 
and multiple risk 
interactions 
    
       
STEP 3 
(optional) 
Assessment of the 
spatial consequences of 
the interactions 
involving industrial 
risks 
    
       
STEP 4 
  Compatibility 
assessment 
  
    
       
STEP 5   
In-depth studies and 
planning 
  
 
Figure 2: Scheme of the proposed methodology 
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Chapter 2 
Literature review 
2.1 Overview 
The present chapter aims at providing an overview of the main practices related both to 
Multi-risk and NaTech assessment, trying to better define the basis of the research approach. 
 As far as it concerns Multi-Risk, several risks can affect the population, the environment, 
the material assets and infrastructures of any inhabited area of our planet; they are generated 
by very different sources, both natural and anthropogenic, and acquire a major impact in case 
of interaction, and in relation to the peculiar characteristics of the hit areas. Presumably 
because of the climatic variations in progress, it was observed in the last years a growing 
tendency in the magnitude and frequency of the natural accidental events, that is aggravated 
by the great diffusion of human settlements in hazard prone areas. 
Therefore, a growing attention was dedicated by the scientific community and also by the 
political institutions and decision-makers to the theme of Multi-risk assessment: many multi-
risk approaches were proposed worldwide and at European level to properly deal with this 
challenge, with the aim of creating tools and procedures for an improved land use planning 
and management of territory.  
A peculiar type of Multi-risk events is constituted by Na-Tech risk, intended as the risk 
produced by the combination of Natural hazards and Technological risks; according to 
(ARMONIA Project, 2006) in NaTech events, a vulnerable exposed object (an industrial 
plant or a network infrastructure) becomes a hazard itself. Also in this field, many studies 
were developed in the last decade, aimed at defining the actual incidence of NaTech 
accidents and the most vulnerable assets, but also focused on the development of 
methodologies able to insert the natural events in the current practices for industrial risk 
assessment.  
According to (Cruz et al., 2004), Na-Tech incidents are characterized by the following 
peculiarities: 
• the cause of the event is external to the industrial site, thus the prevention and mitigation 
of such events may not be managed only at a site level;  
• the extension of the natural event triggering the technological accident is wide, thus several 
equipment items may be simultaneously affected and loss of utilities may take place, leading 
to common cause failures; 
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• emergency response may be hampered or delayed by the natural event.  
According to (Cozzani, 2010), the possibility of damage to process equipment due to the 
impact of natural events is well known in industrial practice, and it is addressed through a 
design approach that foresees protection from lightning and accounts the stresses caused by 
wind, snow, and seismic events; however, the safety studies developed by the plants rarely 
include Na-Tech scenarios.  
Both for Multi-risk and NaTech assessment, many authors underlined the importance to 
predispose dedicated land-use practices; (Schmidt-Thome and Klein, 2011) consider land-
use planning as a “useful tool to protect settlements from hazard impacts”, while (Cruz et al., 
2004) considers that common land use practices could represent an extremely effective 
method for reducing the risk of Na-Tech. The restriction of development in high risk areas, 
the relocation of exposed elements, or changes in land use could be effective for Na-Tech 
risk prevention.  
However, at the moment the European legislation still have not implemented L.U.P. or risk 
assessment regulations explicitly related to the Multi-risk events.  
2.2 European legislative approach for Na-Tech and multi-
risk 
In 2011, the European Commission issued the “Risk assessment and mapping guidelines for 
Disaster Management”, aimed at providing the European governments with a common 
framework for processes and methods of the national risk assessments, and for mapping 
during prevention, preparedness and planning stages. The guidelines explicitly specified that 
national risk assessments should attempt to take into account multi-risk scenarios, therefore 
also Na-tech events, in compliance with the following procedure: 
(1) Identification of possible multi hazard scenarios, starting from a given top event and 
evaluating the possible triggering of other hazards or events leading to hazards;  
(2) Exposure and Vulnerability analysis for each individual hazard and risk within the 
different branches of the scenarios;  
(3) Risk assessment for each hazard and adverse event and for the multi-risk scenarios.  
However, the Guidelines recognized that multi-risk approaches raise several difficulties: i.e. 
the available data for different single risks may refer to different time windows, different 
typologies of impacts are used, etc., therefore comparisons and rankings can be difficult if 
not impossible. In particular, an important issue of multi-risk approach consists of the 
necessary co-ordination and interfacing between different specialized authorities and 
agencies: each one deals with specific hazards or risks without developing a complete 
overview of the knock-on, domino and cascading effects.  
The difficulty in facing the multidisciplinarity required by Multi-risk approaches is somehow 
reflected also by the corpus of regulations issued by the European Commission; in fact, in 
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spite of the increased awareness of the European institutions about the risks related to multi-
hazard interaction, each risk remain addressed by single dedicated Directives. 
2.2.1 Seveso directives 
Since this research started from E.R.I.R. planning, which is a direct emanation of the 
European Seveso directives, this paragraph is particularly focused on the contents of these 
“industrial” regulations, and their approach to Na-Tech risk and related planning practices.  
As far as it concerns Seveso II directive, an in-depth analysis was provided in 2004 by the 
JRC in the publication “State of the Art in the Na-tech Risk Management”: the authors stated 
that the Directive did not have any specific requirements for Na-tech risk management, but 
addressed it indirectly. In particular, articles 8 and 12 were considered of particular 
importance for the Na-tech risk reduction: Article 8 calls for the analysis of potential domino 
effects, while Article 12 focuses on L.U.P. According to this article, the prevention of 
chemical accidents and mitigation of their potential consequences should be taken into 
account through the establishment of land use policies, which aim is to establish appropriate 
distances between establishments, residential areas and areas of particular “natural 
sensitivity”. In any case, the authors recognized that the Directive did not introduce dedicated 
methodologies or actions that can be widely adopted to address Na-tech risk. The levels of 
preparedness on this field encountered among the European Countries were quite different 
(Cruz et al., 2004). 
The recent revision of the Seveso Directive could have constituted an occasion to introduce 
practices related to Na-Tech hazards, however the Directive 2012/18/EU, issued after 14 
years from Seveso II Directive, mainly focused on the adoption of the new system of 
dangerous goods classification (according to the REACH and CLP regulations). 
As far as it concerns Na-tech risk, no substantial evolution was introduced, both for the 
methodology for risk assessment and for the land use planning practices related to major 
accidents. Once again, 2012/18/EU Directive has some articles (7, 10 and 13) dedicated to 
L.U.P., but their content is analogous to the previous Directive: the authorities have to deal 
with domino effects and Land Use Planning around Seveso plants; the operators shall provide 
the Authorities with information about the immediate environment of the establishment. No 
further information on the interaction between natural and industrial hazards are required. 
Therefore, as previously mentioned, the current European and national legislation seemed to 
have had a slower assimilation of the Na-tech issue: natural and technological hazards are 
generally still handled separately, even if an increasing number of studies demonstrated that 
earthquakes, floods and lightning are responsible of a relevant amount of accidents in 
chemical and process installations. I.e. in 2011, the analysis of the Accident case histories 
extracted from the main European industrial-accident databases ARIA (2006), FACTS 
(2006), MARS (2008), MHIDAS (2001) and TAD (2004), as well as from the US National 
Response Centre’s (NRC) database (2008) showed that 79 records for Natech accidents were 
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triggered by earthquakes, 272 were caused by floods and 721 were triggered by lightning 
(Krausmann et al, 2011).  
2.3 Review of methodologies for multi-risk assessment 
In the last ten years, several researches and projects were dedicated to the identification of 
methodologies aimed at dealing with multi-risk, a concept that requires assuming both a 
multi-hazard and a multi-vulnerability perspective.  
While many projects particularly focused on multi-hazard identification, even if with 
different approaches, as later specified, the concept of multi-vulnerability was less 
investigated. In fact, it presents many obstacles: the level of vulnerability is related to the 
hazard analyzed, and depends on several elements: the exposure, the intrinsic characteristics 
of the element, the coping capacity etc.  
In the end, many uncertainties characterize the path of the projects developed in multi-risk 
field, both when a quantitative approach is chosen or a qualitative one is preferred: in fact, 
the great differences between the risks analyzed in terms of time-variability, of 
methodologies for risk assessment, and required data, often constitute a hard challenge for 
the authors. 
(Garcia-Aristizabal and Marzocchi, 2011) noticed that the concept of “multi-hazard” can 
assume different connotations, and this initial different interpretation lead to the development 
of very different methodologies.  The majority of the projects tends to interpret multi-hazard 
as different sources of hazard that threaten the same exposed elements (with or without 
temporal coincidence); therefore, multi-risk assessment is seen as the assessment of different 
independent hazards that threat a common area or common exposed elements.   
More rarely, the projects consider that one hazardous event can trigger other hazardous 
events (cascade effects), and concentrate their efforts in trying to define the effects of these 
triggering, domino, or cascade effects.   
(Garcia-Aristizabal and Marzocchi, 2011) signalled that the first interpretation of multi-
hazard assessment is the most common found in literature; generally, these methodologies 
begin with the identification of different hazard sources in a given region of interest, and 
evaluate the single hazards independently, on the basis of their specific assessment 
methodologies. The objective is to identify the spatial distribution of the effects of the 
different hazards and for different intensities of the hazard, and to estimate the occurrence 
probability or return period for different hazard intensities. The results, according to the scale 
of the specific problem, are generally presented as single hazard maps, layers (in a GIS 
environment), aggregated maps (overlapping all the maps), and hazard curves (for each 
hazard), where it is plotted the probability (or return period) against the intensity measure of 
the hazard. 
The main efforts within this multi-hazard perspective are addressed to the homogenization 
of the hazard assessment, in order to make different risks comparable. This ‘harmonization’ 
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process is generally conducted on the basis of the evaluation of hazards in probabilistic 
terms; or, more frequently, in a qualitative way, through indexes based on the frequency and 
/ or intensity of the hazards (projects TEMRAP, ESPON, ARMONIA).  
Sometimes, the willing of homogenization mainly aims at defining a unique “multi-hazard 
score”, but the efficacy of this type of methodology has been criticized. I.e. (Menoni et al., 
2006) considered that the concept of a unified unit of measure can result appealing for 
scientists, but it is not equally useful for planners. Emergency managers and urban and 
regional planners mostly need to understand and face the specific problems provoked by 
hazards in a given context, trying to verify the expected damage and consequences triggered 
by natural hazards, also comparing the expenses needed to prevent this or that risk.  
As far as it concerns the second methodological multi-risk approach, that considers 
interactions and/or triggering effects, it is in general a more demanding process because of 
the complexity in managing the necessary input data, and in constructing the potential hazard 
‘chains’. According to (Garcia-Aristizabal and Marzocchi, 2011), this kind of multi-hazard 
assessment implies different interpretations: 
1. The occurrence of a certain hazardous event ‘triggers’ other hazards (triggering or 
cascade effects), therefore the probability of occurrence of the triggered event changes;  
2. The simultaneous occurrence of two or more hazardous events entails changes to the 
vulnerability of the exposed elements (i.e. the probability to have a given damage), 
which at the end may be also reflected in the final risk assessment (interactions). 
A review of some of the main important Multi-risk projects at European level is provided 
below; the different possible approaches are exemplified.  
Although many different projects were examined, the major attention was reserved to those 
mainly focused on local or at least a regional scale, or to projects that provided useful 
suggestions for the definition of practices and tools which could be useful to elaborate a tool 
for the Italian municipalities. 
2.3.1 FP6 Project NARAS - 2004 
NARAS project (Natural Risk Assessment) focused on a local scale, and adopted a “multi-
hazard → triggering effects” perspective, by proposing a multi-risk assessment based on the 
definition of risk chains scenarios.  
The methodology proposed begins with the characterization of the investigated area and the 
definition of a time interval of reference. The width of this area is defined case by case, since 
the features of the zone (type and number of vulnerable territorial and environmental 
elements) and the extension of the consequences due to the events may induce to expand or 
reduce the investigated area. Then the following steps are proposed: 1) Identification of 
hazards/risk sources; 2) Characterization of adverse events and their propagation path; 3) 
Exposure and Vulnerability analysis; 4) Definition of the phenomenon intensity distribution 
(e.g. ground acceleration, pressure waves, distribution of chemical substance concentration 
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for various areas, thermal flow, etc.); 5) Identification of vulnerable elements (population at 
risk, strategic infrastructures, historical structures, buildings). 
In order to make the analyzed risks comparable, it was identified a common reference 
damage for all the single risks (i.e. a given number of casualties); the different risks were 
ranked on the basis of their probability to originate the reference damage. Then each risk 
concurred in the creation of a set of scenarios correlating adverse events from different 
sources. For each “risk scenario”, adverse events, phenomena and damage were correlated 
in a series parallel sequence of happenings through an “event-tree”. Each branch of the event 
tree was quantified through a probabilistic analysis of the “history” of the events, the 
vulnerability and the exposed values of the specified targets. In the end, a final risk was 
estimated. 
2.3.2 ESPON project - 2006 
ESPON - The Spatial Effects and Management of Natural and Technological Hazards in 
Europe has a wider scale in comparison with other projects, but it has been analyzed because 
is based on a pure qualitative approach, a choice that helped the authors in keeping under 
control the uncertainties related to the big scale of the analysis (European level).  
The scope was to spatially represent the patterns related to the distribution of the natural and 
industrial hazards in Europe, also taking into account some risks related to climate change; 
in case the risks overtook some intensity thresholds, the possible interactions were 
considered.  
The hazards included in the analysis were chosen based on a spatial principle (recurrence of 
the hazard on the same area): Natural hazards - avalanches, droughts, earthquakes, extreme 
temperature, floods, forest fires, landslides, storm surges, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, 
winter and tropical storms; Technological hazards - traffic accidents, major accident hazards 
nuclear power plants, oil processing.  
On the basis of their intensity, the hazards were classified in five classes (from very low to 
very high) and then weighted with Delphi method to establish the relevance of each hazard 
in comparison to another and obtain an integrated hazard map. This procedure allowed 
verifying that the most relevant European hazards were floods, forest fires, earthquakes and 
major technological accidents. 
The integrated risk map was obtained by superimposing the hazard map to the vulnerability 
one, drafted on the basis of the indexes assigned to 4 components of the vulnerability: 
regional GDP capita, population density, fragmented natural areas, and national GDP capita 
intended as an indicator for the coping capacity.  
As far as it concerns the risk interactions, ESPON proceeded with the draft of a Hazard 
interaction map, trying to point out the areas where high impact hazards could interact. A 
dedicated matrix analysed the possible interactions, through the attribution of the following 
values: 1 = existing influence of a hazard on the other hazard, 0 = no physical influence on 
the other hazard. 
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In case of existing vice-versa interactions (e. g. earthquakes – volcanic eruptions), these were 
counted twice. The interactions above mentioned were evaluated only for areas where the 
hazard intensities reached a range between the classes IV and V, that means High or Very 
high. 59 hazard combinations were studied across Europe: 8 possible combinations were not 
encountered in any European region (i.e. the combination of volcanic eruption and large river 
floods), while the most common hazard combination resulted major river floods – landslides: 
the hazard intensity of these two hazards was high in 146 European areas. Other common 
hazard combinations were: winter storms – storm surges (103 areas); hazards from chemical 
production plants – hazards from nuclear power plants (89 areas); droughts – forest fires (74 
areas); storm surges – landslides (52 areas); storm surges – hazards from nuclear power 
plants (41 areas); earthquakes – landslides (33 areas); and tsunamis - landslides (33 NUTS3 
areas). The interaction matrix showed on one hand the dominance of geological hazards 
(earthquakes and volcanic eruptions) in influencing other hazards, on the other hand, that 
technological hazards are the most sensitive hazards to external events. 
In the end, interaction hazard maps were drafted. They identified the areas where interactions 
of intense hazards could happen, and the number of possible combinations that can interested 
the analysed zone. However, the maps cannot represent the cumulative effects of the 
identified interactions. Indeed, ESPON authors recognized that the coincidence of different 
hazards in space and time could produce an additional hazard potential, but the difficulties 
in evaluating the physical processes as well as the unforeseeable social and political 
implications led them to avoid any changes in the weighting of hazards for the interaction 
hazard map.   
2.3.3 IPSC project - 2006  
IPSC project – Drafting of thematic maps for the vulnerability and risk had a regional focus 
and was developed in Piedmont region, with the aim of drafting maps for the vulnerability 
and risk expressly dedicated to civil protection actions. A quantitative risk approach based 
on scenarios was applied; however, the interaction between different elements was not taken 
into account, and the methodology majorly focused on how to evaluate the vulnerabilities.  
The hazards considered in the analysis were: earthquakes, hydrogeologic elements (Floods 
and landslides), forest fires and hazardous industrial plants, that are the main risks which 
interest Piedmont region. Starting from 8 possible defined scenarios (1 seismic, 2 
hydrogeological, 1 forest fire and 3 industrial), the dangerousness was characterized through 
the definition of impact areas, to which a frequency of occurrence was associated. In these 
areas, the exposure (density or number) of the following elements was evaluated: population, 
critical infrastructures, buildings, environmental and architectural heritage.  
However, in order to assess the risk, not only the exposure but also other factors composing 
the vulnerability were evaluated, like i.e. the susceptibility and the coping capacity. In the 
end, the risk related to each hazard was calculated on the basis of vulnerability functions 
expressly developed for the project.  
Risk management and land use planning for environmental and asset 
protection purposes 
21 
 
2.3.4 A mathematical generic multi risk approach  
The quantification of low probability high consequences events: a generic multi risk 
approach – an approached proposed by (Mignan et al., 2014). This methodology constitutes 
a particular approach inside the overview here provided, and it is briefly presented to give 
an idea of the variety of approaches that can be encountered in the analyzed field. The authors 
proposed a pure mathematical methodology, aiming at defining a novel, generic, multi-risk 
framework based on the sequential Monte Carlo Method (MCM), to allow for a 
straightforward and flexible implementation of hazard interactions, which may occur in a 
complex system. The goal was specifically to capture and quantify extreme low-probability–
high consequences events using inductive generalization. The authors did not define any 
specific hazard or risk interaction, but only a framework to implement any type of 
interaction, within which real interaction processes have to be abstracted to more basic 
concepts and engineering methods by-passed. The MCM was employed to generate N time 
series, each one representing a risk scenario; then the analysis allowed to identify the more 
or less probable risk paths. 
2.3.5 MATRIX project - 2011 
MATRIX project - New methodologies for multi-hazard and multi-risk assessment methods 
for Europe was an extensive European financed project, aimed at defining a framework for 
multi-risk assessment, in order to assess the expected losses deriving from significant 
interactions among the hazards.  
A three-levels approach was introduced for the draft of multi-risk assessment (Figure 3): 
1) The First Level consists of a flow chart aimed at understanding if it is required a multi-
type assessment approach, considering cascade effects and dynamic vulnerability.  
2) The Second level consists of a semi-quantitative method, based on a matrix approach 
deriving from system theory, where the mutual influence between the hazard is 
described on the basis of the following scale: 0 No interaction; 1 – Weak interaction, 2 
– Medium interaction, 3 – Strong interaction. Thanks to the values assigned, it is 
possible to estimate an interaction index; over a certain threshold of interaction index, 
it is recommended to pass to Level 3.  
3)  The Third Level consists of the quantitative multi-risk assessment, where Bayesian 
networks are employed instead of event trees to both estimate the probability of a 
triggering/cascade effect and to model the time-dependent vulnerability of a system 
exposed to multi-hazard. The authors considered that the flexible structure and the 
unique modelling techniques offered by Bayesian networks make it possible to analyze 
cascade effects through a probabilistic framework. 
A further detail is here provided in relation to the Second Level. According to the explanation 
by (Nadim and Liu, 2013): “A matrix is developed by means of the choice of a couple of 
hazards, considered as the basic components of the system (Table a). It will be followed by 
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a clockwise scheme of interaction (Table b), with the description of the mutual influence 
between different hazards (Table c). More specifically, each element of the row, which 
crosses one of the hazards in the mean diagonal, shows the influence of this hazard on the 
system, thus indicating the cause of the phenomena; whereas each element of the column, 
which crosses the same hazard analysed, shows the influence of the system on this hazard, 
thus focusing on the effect of the 24 phenomena. After the descriptions contained in the 
matrix, they are assigned numerical codes varying between 0 (No interaction) and 3 (Strong 
interaction) with intervals of 1, as a function of their degree of the interaction intensity 
(Tables d, e). Once all the hazards in the matrix are filled, it is possible to verify the degree 
of the impact of each hazard on the others and the effect from other hazards. In order to avoid 
the excessive weighting of a single hazard, the sum of the codes for the row and the column 
is considered (Figure 4)”.  
 
Figure 3: MATRIX, identification of the interactions between hazards 
 
Figure 4: MATRIX, sum of the interaction values 
For MATRIX approach, the maximum possible value for the total sum of causes and effects 
that appear in table a is 25; this number contributes to the calculation of a hazard interaction 
index, which value is the basis to verify if it is necessary or not to step into the third level of 
analysis.   
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2.3.6 ARMONIA project - 2007 
ARMONIA project - Applied multi-risk mapping of natural hazards for impact assessment 
was a European financed project, dedicate to Multi-risks assessment in relation to natural 
hazards. With respect to the other projects, it demonstrated an approach more focused on the 
planners’ needs, defining multi-risk maps aimed at addressing spatial planning procedures 
in areas prone to natural disaster, and introducing a dedicated Decision Support System. The 
objectives of the DSS were: to provide a basis for planning in areas subjected to multiple 
risks related to natural hazards; to include exposure and vulnerability assessments; to help 
planners understand the implications of uncertainties and probabilities in decisions 
concerning land-uses and location of strategic facilities.  
The scale adopted for the project was deliberately regional and local, because according to 
(Menoni et al., 2006), the analysis of available methods and legends suggested that hazard 
methodologies could produce better results at local and regional scales. However, while 
regional approaches are mainly simplified methodologies with simplified data, local 
approaches, mainly multi-risk, should be rigorous methodologies, sometimes simplified in 
the synthesis output, with rigorous data. ARMONIA kept this distinction, producing different 
methodologies for the two scales, based on semi-quantitative or quantitative procedures 
which entailed the definition of vulnerability curves and matrixes. 
The proposed approach is here reported: Step 1: identification of individual hazards for 
ARMONIA main spatial scales (strategic regional, local general, local site); Step 2: 
assessment of vulnerability functions for any individual category of natural event, having as 
input the event location, intensity or severity parameters hazard category and as output an 
average expected damage; Step 3: assessment of fragility curves when possible, for any 
individual category of hazard, obtaining the probability of damage (e.g. for seismic hazard 
the % of cracks in walls, the % of not statically safe buildings, the % of collapsing buildings) 
for a given categories of exposed elements defined by spatial planners; Step 4: analysis of 
risk for any individual category of hazard; Step 5: harmonization of different individual 
values of damage (risk), likely in terms of fragility curves (probabilities of different damages 
for the same stock), for the same return period. 
For the regional scale, the above-mentioned methodology was simplified with the 
introduction of a scale to measure the intensity of the hazards, the utilization of matrices for 
the vulnerability instead of the functions, and the development of a matrix aimed at relating 
the degree of risk with the use of territory in order to provide dedicated planning actions.     
2.3.7 PRIM - 2007 
The methodology here presented was developed and applied for the PRIM - Regional 
Integrated Program for Risk mitigation of Lombardy region.  The aim of the research was 
the realization of integrated multi-hazard and multi-risk maps, through an indicator-based 
approach, aimed at identifying hot-spots (areas at major risk) where addressing the public 
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intervention. (Regione Lombardia, 2007) clarified that the methodology proposed was 
complementary to the traditional methodologies of risk analysis, and had to be interpreted as 
first qualitative-quantitative estimation of integrated risk. On the basis of a characterization 
of the hazards and vulnerabilities based on ISTAT datasets for the latter, and on databases 
and sectorial risk plan for the first, nine major risks affecting the Lombardy Region were 
analyzed. A dedicated set of indicators was developed, in order to express the physical risk 
RF, composed by the level of hazard and by the level of vulnerabilities. The relevance of the 
indicators was weighted with the method of the budgetary allocation and Fuzzy sets. The 
total risk was then obtained by mediating the physical risk with factors expressing the coping 
capacity. 
Once obtained the 9 total risks, their respective importance was assessed through AHP 
(Analytic Hierarchy Process) method. In this way, it was possible to develop maps of 
integrate risk, able to point out the dominant risks for each zone, and a number of risk hotspot 
areas: three maps were developed, characterized by: at least 1 threat with a very high risk 
value, 10 times the regional mean, or more; at least 3 threats with medium risk value, 1.5 
times the regional mean, or more; at least 2 threats with high risk value, 3 times the regional 
mean, or more. The proposed approach can be applied with different degree of detail 
depending on the quality of the available data. This allows the application of the method 
even in case of non-homogeneous data, which is often the case for regional scale analyses. 
Moreover, it allows the integration of different risk types or metrics. 
It has to be evidenced that however, the effects of possible interactions are not taken into 
account. 
2.3.8 Shortcomings 
A large part of the approaches presented in the previous paragraph was based on quantitative 
techniques for risk analysis; the methodologies that adopted a qualitative index-approach 
were usually related to wider scales (i.e. ESPON).  
However, even if a mathematically rigorous approach to multi-risk assessment apparently 
seems the most reliable one, many authors evidenced shortcomings and difficulties that could 
severely affect its efficacy. In particular, even when the methodologies define well-structured 
theoretical frameworks for the multi-risk assessment, their application to real cases usually 
require great simplifications, mainly related to the difficulties in obtaining the detailed 
information needed.  
Some of the main criticalities of the quantitative risk assessment methodologies were 
punctually highlighted by (Garcia-Aristizabal and Marzocchi, 2011): 
1) Not many methodologies take into account the possibility of hazard interaction or 
cascade effects: the importance of the risk combinations is recognized, however very 
few projects try to quantify some basic scenarios. 
2) The fragility curves derived by intensity (of the hazardous event) vs. typology of 
exposed elements are not available for many risks analyzed. This topic can be 
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considered as one of the most significant matters to be addressed for future 
developments of multi-risk analysis, especially in high-resolution analysis (at local 
scale). 
3) Multi-risk approach implies that one or more hazard affects different categories of 
exposed elements; this produces difficulties on the definition of a common metric for 
loss assessment, and the weighting of the different categories of exposed elements.  
4) The choice of a specific kind of loss metric may present different problems and 
limitations. In fact, the effect of different hazards may have different temporal 
characteristics (e.g. the recovery of construction is not the same of that of agricultural 
land or trees). Also, different return periods, for different hazards, may pose difficulties 
to integrate the cost over a given period of time. 
2.4 NaTech impact and methodologies 
NaTech events constitute a peculiar type of multi-risk, where industrial plants or other 
facilities represent a second hazard that is activated by an external natural hazard. As 
remarked by (Chiaia et. al, 2016) this interaction produces an increment of the frequency and 
intensity of the accidental scenarios, that could reach areas not calculated and not foreseen 
inside the plants’ safety reports.  
Many authors pointed out that even if natural events are actually addressed in industrial 
safety, because national and international design standards require to address the issue of 
additional loads induced by natural events (earthquakes, wind, waves, lightning, etc), the 
procedures to include the external events in design are usually derived from those developed 
for structural integrity of residential buildings. This goes to the detriment of a real protection 
against NaTech events. In fact, i.e. for seismic stress, the main purpose of regulations like 
the Italian Technical Standards for Buildings (NTC), is to avoid the collapse of the building; 
it means that the building could endure damages until it is able to protect human life avoiding 
the complete breakdown. In an industrial field, a simple damage of the structures and 
facilities could assume a different meaning, because it can bring to loss of containment of 
hazardous materials.  
(Cozzani, 2010) stated that the need of specific requirements to enhance NaTech resilience 
is rarely recognized at design level.  
(Cozzani et al., 2010) and (Krausmann, Renni et al., 2011) developed a wide data collection 
on NaTech accidents on 5 European and 1 American accident databases, and other literature 
sources: it demonstrated that about 2–5% of industrial accidents fall inside NaTech category, 
but they can be triggered by several different natural events. The research aimed at 
identifying the main damage dynamics and consequences and, in the end, it pointed out that 
floods and lightning constitute the most frequent natural hazards triggering technological 
accidents, while seismic events have the greatest disruptive potential.  
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The following lines describe in detail, for each type of natural event, the most vulnerable 
equipment types, their modes of failure due to natural-event impact and the final accident 
scenarios.  
1) FLOOD: The problem related to floodwaters is mainly due to the additional loads 
imposed on industrial structures and facilities, both due to the compressive force caused 
by the water itself and by its high-velocity flowing.  
Structural damage (displacement, impact with floating objects, yielding of support 
structures, failure of flanges and connections, collapse) and failure of electrical 
equipment are the two main damage modes identified. Storage tanks resulted the most 
vulnerable equipment, with 74% of the equipment involved in flood-triggered accidents, 
followed by transport pipelines and pipework with 17%, while cylindrical vessels 
(condensers, separators and boilers) and compressors and pumps were involved in 5% 
and 4% of accidents. In particular, atmospheric tanks are 3 times more vulnerable than 
pressurized tanks, because of their lower structural resistance, which favours the 
collapse of the tank shell or induces tank floating or overturning. These two conditions, 
together with the displacement of equipment due to water drag, are responsible of the 
more severe and continuous releases observed. Tank collapse resulted in several cases 
in catastrophic loss of containment with instantaneous release of the complete 
inventory. However, the main cause for loss of containment observed during floods is 
the failure of connections and valves, pipework detachment, and failure of pipelines, 
which led to minor leaks of hazardous substances.  
The primary consequences of a LOC are fires, explosions, toxic dispersion, but there 
are also additional flood-related consequences, as water contamination and formation 
of hazardous substances due to violent reactions of chemicals with water. In particular, 
the most frequent final scenario is related to water contamination: in many cases, it was 
observed that the released substances stratified on and were spread by the floodwaters, 
thereby contaminating them and also spreading over wider areas. Consequently, also 
surface and ground water contamination are possible. Frequently, no dedicated 
measures are adopted in industrial sites to manage the consequences of releases 
triggered by floods, even if flood events can cause the failure of the present disposals, 
like i.e. confinement barriers as catch basins, whose content may be washed out by 
floodwater.  
2) EARTHQUAKE. The damages provoked by earthquake to industrial structures are 
mainly produced by direct shaking and soil-liquefaction effects. In 73% of the cases, 
the structural damage ended with a release of hazardous materials.  
The most vulnerable portions of the tank are the connections between shell and roof, 
shell and foundation plate, shell and supply pipes. The latter are the elements majorly 
damaged by the sloshing, that means the oscillation of the liquid inside the tank. Effects 
of the sloshing on the bottom elements of the shells are the break of connections of 
service valves and pipes, and the so-called elephant foot-buckling, which consists of a 
local bending near the base. Elephant foot-buckling could provoke the lift and 
Risk management and land use planning for environmental and asset 
protection purposes 
27 
 
overturning of the tank, if it is not anchored. The severity of the consequences of 
sloshing appears higher if the tank has a height-to-radius ratio of 0.8, and is at least 50% 
full: it.  
As far as it concerns the roofs, the presence of rigid connections can amplify the 
vibration effects, leading to the bending of the top part of the shell, and other problems 
to the roofs. Finally, tanks that are simply placed on the ground without anchoring 
systems can widely suffer the effects of the soil liquefaction.   
The most frequent final scenarios triggered by earthquakes were fires and the release of 
hazardous materials without ignition (based on the analysis of 48 case histories). In 
addition, explosions, the dispersion of toxic substances and water contamination were 
observed. 
3) LIGHTNING: Lightning strikes on equipment of storage and processing activities are 
the most common cause of accidents triggered by natural hazards. Even if lightning 
protection measures are by far more diffused than those for other natural hazards (i.e. 
grounding of tanks, installation of lightning rods), their efficiency in preventing 
lightning-triggered fires is unclear, because it was observed that tank shunts could 
generate sparks when struck by lightning. This could lead to the ignition of the 
flammable vapors on tank roofs.  
Lightning can also disrupt electrical control and safety systems and thereby cause 
dangerous process upsets.  
Once again, the storage tanks resulted the items most frequently damaged by lightning 
impact (60% of equipment involved in accidents): the atmospheric tanks, and in 
particular those with floating roofs, were the most vulnerable to lightning strikes. 
Pipework was directly involved in over 11% of lightning-triggered accidents.  
The majority of lightning-triggered accidents resulted in the release of hazardous 
materials which did not ignite or explode, but fires occurred in over a third of the 
analysed case histories, while a lower number resulted in explosions. 
The results of the accident analysis showed that:  
 atmospheric storage tanks, and in particular floating-roof tanks, are the most 
vulnerable elements in relation to all the natural hazards analysed;  
 27% of registered events interesting chemical and petrochemical industry 
(petrochemical storage, chemical industry, plastics manufacturing), 
 gasoline, oil and diesel are the hazardous substances more frequently involved in 
NaTech accidents.  These substances, extremely flammable and dangerous for the 
environment, are detained in high capacity storage tanks (up to 50,000 m3 in a single 
unit), and can therefore lead to accident scenarios with significant severity, when 
loss of containment occurs. Clearly, the ignition probability is high after the release 
of a flammable substance during an earthquake or a lightning strike, but the release 
in case of flood could also produce water contamination and consequences of the 
reaction of the substances with water. 
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 (Krausmann, Renni et al., 2011) evidenced how managing the above descripted 
NaTech risks could be difficult without targeted measures or procedures for the 
prevention or the mitigation; the latter should be particularly important for the 
existing plants located in natural-hazard-prone, where land-use-planning restrictions 
can hardly be imposed retroactively.  
An additional complication in most NaTech accidents is the downing of lifelines by 
the natural event. Emergency-response plans do not usually consider the loss of 
utilities during a natural disaster, which renders the mitigation of the accident 
difficult if not impossible.  
Even if the presented data collection considered only one climate-related event (the 
lightning), also other phenomena are able to cause problems to the industrial facilities. Heavy 
rains, storm surges and extreme temperatures, for which it was observed an increasing 
tendency in relation to climate change, can once again produce consequences particularly on 
the tanks. I.e. heavy rain can cause sinking of tank roofs, while the sites can be affected by 
insufficient water drainage or increased groundwater levels. As for the flood events, in case 
of loss of containment the presence of the water deriving from rainfalls provides a medium 
for the dispersion of the released substances.  
The extreme temperatures can also provoke damages: high temperatures could conduct to 
ignition of substances stored outside, and lead to pressure increases in storage facilities, while 
low temperatures may produce the freezing and bursting of pipes, and the ice formation can 
also damage the equipment and break pipes. 
As far as it concerns the Italian situation, unfortunately many Seveso plants result included 
in hazardous-prone areas: the particular physiognomy of the Italian territory exposes the 
plants to several natural hazards, from floods to landslides and coastal risks. (Chiaia et. al, 
2016) observed that a high number of so-called E.R.I.R. industrial plants is settled in 
correspondence of sites with medium or high seismic hazard, as shown by Table 5 , that 
shows Region by Region the amount of Seveso plants located in seismic areas. Frequently 
the installation of these plants date back to periods with a minor legislative control, both as 
far as it concerns the constraints deriving from natural risk presence, and the rules related to 
the management of hazardous substances. The absence of dedicated planning practices and 
clear procedures for the zoning led to plants located nearby residential areas, or close to 
highly vulnerable environmental zones, and/or in areas interested by hydrogeological 
frailties, seismic effects etc. 
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Table 5: Major risk plants located in seismic zones (Smanio, 2013) 
Region Total plants 
Plants in 
seismic zone 
Plants in 
seismic zone 
1 
Plants in 
seismic zone 
2 
Plants in 
seismic zone 
3 
% plants in 
seismic zone 
Abruzzo 16 10 6 3 - - 6 3 - - 37.5 30 
Basilicata 4 5 2 1 - 1 2 - - - 50 20 
Calabria 10 7 5 6 3 4 2 2- - - 50 87.5 
Campania 52 18 32 18 - - 15 5 17 13 61.5 100 
Emilia 
Romagna5 
36 93 18 3 - - 18 3 - - 50 3.2 
Friuli V. 
Giulia 
14 20 11 3 4 2 7 1 - - 78.6 15 
Lazio 33 36 24 12 - - 24 12 - - 72.7 33.3 
Liguria 10 24 1 2 - - 1 2 - - 10 8.3 
Lombardy 133 155 1 1 - - 1 1 - - 0.75 0.65 
Marche 9 7 7 7 - - 7 7 - - 77.8 100 
Molise  3 5 - 1 - - - 1 - - - 20 
Piedmont 50 53 1 1 - - 1 1 - - 2 1.9 
Puglia 23 20 - - - - - - - - - - 
Sardinia 14 28 - - - - - - - - - - 
Sicilia 37 34 37 25 1 - 36 25 - - 100 73.5 
Toscana 32 30 29 13 - - 29 13 - - 90.6 43.3 
Trentino 11 6 - - - -- - - - - - - 
Umbria 12 5 8 3 - - 8 3 - - 66.7 60 
Valle 
d’Aosta 
5 1 - - - - - - - - - - 
Veneto 52 60 2 - - - 2 - - - 3.8 - 
Italy 556 617 196 109 8 7 169 83 19 19 32.5 17.7 
 
The previous description clearly evidences the urgent need for the adoption of a NaTech 
assessment methodology to integrate Safety reports risk assessment; until now, several 
methodologies were proposed, mainly quantitative, but still a dedicated regulation is missing. 
Below, some of the most known procedures are reported; it can be noticed that all the 
approaches usually require a deep experience as risk analysts, even when they foresee the 
adoption of simplified procedures. They were usually developed to address one natural risk 
at time, and are generally restricted to some plant typologies and to the area of the plant itself, 
with the exception of the Integrated Quantitative Risk Assessment (Q.R.A.).  
2.4.1 Integrated Quantitative Risk Assessment 
The methodology of the integrated Quantitative Risk Assessment was developed by 
(Antonioni et al., 2007), (Salzano et al., 2009) (Cozzani et al., 2010), (Krausmann et al., 
2011), during 10 years; it aimed at inserting domino risk and nature-related risk in the 
                                                 
5 The seismic class classification of many municipalities of Emilia Romagna and Lombardy was 
changed after the earthquake of 2012; therefore, probably the Seveso plants included in the seismic 
zones are more than those reported. 
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conventional Q.R.A., in particular considering the impact provoked by flood, earthquakes 
and lightning.  
The identification of the possible failures of equipment triggered by a natural event, and its 
potential consequences, can suggest the plant managers the correct measures to be adopted 
to increase the resilience of the facility. I.e. at a design level, an enhanced solidity of the 
equipment or the addiction of safety barriers, together with appropriate emergency measures 
and procedures, and implementation of early-warning systems.  
Therefore, the conventional procedure for quantitative risk assessment (Q.R.A.) was 
modified and extended to include the assessment of Na-Tech events. Some steps of the 
proposed procedure follow the traditional ones, but dedicated tools for the inclusion of 
external events had to be introduced, in particular as far as it concerns the identification of 
the more frequent damage modes and the release scenarios associated to them.  
The following framework for a NaTech inclusive QRA was identified and proposed for three 
types of natural hazards: earthquake, flood and lightning.  
Step 1: characterization of the external event through a parameter representing its impact 
strength: 
 for earthquake → P.G.A.- Peak Ground Acceleration; 
 for flood → maximum water depth expected at the site, or maximum water speed;  
 for lightning → ground flash density Ng, measured in number of flashes per year and 
m2 
Step 2: identification of the relevant target equipment items, which can cause a severe 
scenario due to an escalation triggered by the natural event. Following the results of the data 
collection analysis by (Cozzani et al., 2010) and (Krausmann, Renni et al., 2011), the 
proposed procedure particularly focused on the atmospheric tanks. Reference scenarios were 
associated to each critical equipment item, as explained in the following steps.  
Step 3: identification of a limited number of possible damage modes that can be associated 
to the reference target equipment identified in step 2. The definition of damage states (DS) 
is used to calculate the consequent intensity of loss of containment: three classes of releases 
were considered for storage and process equipment, as well as for piping. 
 R1 → instantaneous release of the complete inventory (in less than 2 min) following 
severe structural damage;  
 R2 → continuous release of the complete inventory (in more than 10 min);  
 R3 → continuous release from a hole having an equivalent diameter of 10 mm.  
Later, the development of specific event trees, based on the properties of the released 
substance, identifies the NaTech reference scenarios that could be associated to the damage 
mode. The following Table 6 shows, for each type of natural hazard, the possible damage 
states and the releases associated; it is a recap of the tables reported in (Salzano et al., 2009), 
(Cozzani et al., 2010), (Renni et al, 2010). 
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Table 6: Damage modes and release states 
Impact Type of damage Definition 
Release 
mode 
Earthquake 
 
Elephant Foot Buckling 
Large axial compressive stresses due to 
beamlike bending of the tank wall 
R1 
Base uplifting 
Overturning moment may be cause a 
partial uplift of base plate; this vertical 
displacement can cause the failure of 
tank wall and/or the failure of piping 
connection 
R1 
Sloshing 
Roof or Top damage due to liquid 
movement 
R3 
Sliding 
For un-anchored tank only: the 
horizontal relative displacement 
between tank and base can cause the 
failure of I/O piping 
R2 
Collapse (Liquefaction) 
Rapid release of content due to total 
collapse of structure for the ground 
liquefaction due to earthquake 
R1 
Flood 
Slow 
submersion 
Failure of flanges and connections  R3 
Moderate 
speed 
Failure of flanges and connections  R3 
High speed 
wave 
Impact of/with adjacent vessels or 
with trailed objects 
 R1 
Shell fracture  R2 
Failure of flanges and connections  R3 
Lightning 
 
Electrical device malfunctions  - 
Explosion  n.s. 
Pipework detachment  R3 
Pool fire  R2 or R1 
 Roof fire  R1 
 
Step 4: Estimation of the damage probability. A probability of occurrence for the damage 
state identified is calculated for each equipment.  
The damage probabilities should be assessed through specific vulnerability or fragility 
models; but in literature, vulnerability functions were available only for seismic events. New 
simplified vulnerability functions were proposed both for flood and for lightning, based on 
the analysis of the accident collection and literature data.  
Step 5: Consequence analysis for the reference scenarios. It can be carried out through 
conventional models, i.e. post-event trees.  
In this phase, it is necessary to consider simultaneous occurrence of reference, due to the 
damage of more than one unit. The further steps of the analysis are related to the definition 
of the characteristics of the combined events:  Step 6: credible combinations of events; Step 
7, the frequency calculation; Step 8, the consequence assessment of each credible 
combination of reference releases (or overall final scenario).  
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Finally, the last step of the procedure consists of risk re-composition (step 9) aimed at 
assessing the additional contribution to individual and societal risk. 
The methodology above descripted was partially developed also in the field of the European 
project Integ-Risk (Krausmann et al., 2011), where a further detail was introduced to describe 
the equipment vulnerability.  Hazard indices for natural and technological events, and an 
equipment vulnerability ranking were introduced. Using this natural-hazard and 
technological-hazard classifications, vulnerability analyses for industrial equipment under 
natural-event loading was performed. 
2.4.2 AHP applied to NaTech risk 
The methodology for the assessment of NaTech seismic risk through AHP techniques was 
developed by a team of the Politecnico di Milano, as an alternative to the execution of a 
Q.R.A. procedure, with the aim of reducing the required resources in terms of time and 
expertise (Callioni, 2010), (Busini et al., 2011), (Marzo et al., 2015).  
The objective was to define a Global Key Hazard Indicator (KHIG), which could help the 
decision makers in distinguish between high-risk situations, for which it is necessary to 
undertake a Q.R.A. and to provide risk mitigation measures, and low-risk situations, 
therefore avoiding wasting of resources using unnecessary expensive methods of Risk 
Analysis. The assessment of the KHIG was based on two different indexes: the Key Hazard 
Indicator (KHI), and the Vulnerability Indicator (KVI), whose values were calculated by 
applying the hierarchies of AHP methodology, a multi-weighted criteria method that allows 
choosing between alternatives thanks to binary comparisons.  
I.e. for the assessment of KHI, the main elements that can influence the vulnerability of the 
plant with respect to earthquakes were identified and inserted in a system of AHP hierarchies, 
which represent different possible events. Three different hierarchies were structured, to 
define three KHI, representing the main potential seismic consequences on a plant: fires, 
toxic dispersion and explosion. The overall KHI was obtained from the sum of the previous 
mentioned three indexes. 
The comparisons are structured as shown in Figure 5. The alternatives, placed at the bottom 
of the hierarchy, can represent different plants, or items of a single plant; the possible impact 
on them is expressed as a normalized index of the mass which can be released following a 
seismic event.  
The process of the assessment follows the branches structured at different levels, which have 
to be compared; the elements are placed on the same level of the hierarchy if they respond 
to the same question. The comparisons are expressed as qualitative judgments that can be 
traduced in quantitative through the semantic scale of Saaty, which may allow an array of 
binary comparisons between elements belonging to the same level. Simple algebraic 
manipulations of these binary comparisons determine the weights for the various branches 
of the hierarchy.  
Risk management and land use planning for environmental and asset 
protection purposes 
33 
 
 
Figure 5: KHI index assessment 
The index KVI expresses the level of vulnerability associated to a given territory around an 
industrial plant; also in this case, AHP method is applied, and the alternatives inserted in the 
hierarchies are all the vulnerable elements. The KVI computation requires the evaluation of 
both the number of people and the number of vulnerable centers present inside 1k m and/or 
7km radius from the plant, which are the areas associated to fire/ explosion or toxic 
dispersion. Once KVI value is computed, the overall risk indicator KHIG can be estimated. 
2.4.3 NaTech risk index 
(Galderisi et al., 2008) developed a risk assessment method able to act as a supporting tool 
for land use planning strategies aimed at reducing NaTech risk in urban areas. The method 
provided planners with a NaTech risk index, useful to rank the territorial units and to single 
out the priority intervention areas. A multi attribute decision-making method, combined with 
fuzzy techniques, was proposed.  
The first step consisted of the characterization of the natural and technological hazards 
affecting the urban area; the identification of NaTech prone areas was carried out through 
the overlaying of the natural and technological hazard-prone maps.  
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Each NaTech prone area was then divided into spatial units (SUs) based on census units, 
combined with the main land uses (residential, industrial, agricultural, etc.) The SUs 
constituted the elemental units with respect to which hazard, exposure and vulnerability 
features were assessed. The authors defined criteria, parameters and procedures for 
measuring the three factors above-mentioned:   
 the parameters related to natural hazards were defined on qualitative hazard levels (high, 
medium, low), provided by the hazard analyses and maps.  
 the parameters for the industrial hazard were defined on the basis of the scenarios 
provided by the Safety Reports, selecting the ones which could had been triggered by the 
natural hazards. However, the authors recognized that these event scenarios could not be 
totally adequate to represent the effects of Na-tech events, since in Safety Report natural 
hazards are not generally taken into account as triggering factors. Thus, the ‘‘unordinary’’ 
chains of failures and damage due to natural hazards should be outlined and investigated 
through specific analyses carried out by expert risk analysts.  
 the parameters for exposure and vulnerability were defined on: type, quantity and 
relevance of elements that may be threatened by each hazardous event. The grid of 
vulnerability indicators developed within the ARMONIA Project (2006) with respect to 
several natural hazards was adopted. 
Once numerical values were assigned to the defined parameters, converting the linguistic 
values into numerical ones through fuzzy techniques, all of them were systematized and 
processed through a MADM – Multi-Attribute Decision Making system.  
The different SUs of the NaTech prone area were assumed as the ‘‘alternatives’’ of the 
MADM, while hazard, exposure and vulnerability indicators were interpreted as the 
‘‘attributes’’. An aggregate NaTech risk index can be defined through the final rating of the 
attributes.  
Different techniques can be applied for rating the attributes; nevertheless, attributes’ values 
are usually standardized for obtaining comparable values and then aggregate through 
adequate formulas. Then, the priority intervention areas can be singled out through the 
ranking order of the alternatives with respect to the NaTech risk index. 
2.4.4 RAPID-N 
The RAPID-N methodology was developed by the Joint research Centre, with the aim of 
providing a quick tool for NaTech risk assessment and mapping methodology at a regional 
level (Girgin & Krausmann, 2013). RAPID-N is basically an online software constructed on 
some risk assessment procedures, that does not entail a complete quantitative risk assessment 
(QRA). RAPID-N methodology is based on the calculation of on-site hazard parameters for 
natural hazard scenarios and on the use of fragility curves to determine damage probabilities 
at plant units (e.g. storage tanks) for different damage states. Damage states are linked to risk 
states, which define possible hazardous consequence scenarios resulting from the natural 
hazard triggered damage. Finally, the probability and severity of the potential consequences 
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are calculated by using conventional industrial accident consequence models. The structure 
of RAPID-N is based on modules, which constitute interconnected subsystems focusing on 
different aspects of NaTech risk assessment: RAPID-N consists of 4 main modules:  
 The Scientific module, that includes the property definition and estimation framework 
that is a key component of damage assessment and consequence analysis calculations. It 
also provides support for bibliographic citation, unit conversion, and GIS analysis.   
 The Natural hazards module, which provides source and site specific (on-site) natural 
hazard data.  
 The Industrial plants and units module, which covers information on industrial plants, 
their units, and hazardous substances found therein.  
 The NaTech risk assessment module, which constitutes the core module of RAPID-N. It 
covers the elements needed for performing NaTech risk assessment, such as fragility 
curves, damage states, and risk states.  
2.4.5 NaTech seismic risk assessment for oil plants 
ENI spa designated (Chiaia et al., 2016) for the development of a methodology for the 
assessment of the seismic vulnerability of oil tanks, LNG vessels and process items (like, 
e.g., cracking columns, reactors, desalters and chimneys) to be adopted in the Italian oil and 
gas refineries and deposits. The proposed approach is based on a 3-stages protocol.  
The first activity (Stage 1) is represented by the selection of the items to be analyzed on the 
basis of their risk exposure; they can be identified through classical indexes methods, 
considering the nature and quantity of the hold-up (related, e.g., to inflammability and 
environment danger), the specific process, the plant layout and the possible activation of 
domino effects.  
In the second stage, a simplified structural analysis is carried out for the selected items. 
Normally, the API650 code is used in the case of tanks, whereas the Italian and European 
building codes are adopted for process items and chimneys. The seismic loads are obtained 
through linear dynamic analyses on simplified structural models, assuming conservative 
values whenever a direct knowledge of some mechanical quantity is not available. Then, the 
state of stress and some critical displacement are computed at significant points (e.g., piping 
connections, anchorages) and an estimate of vulnerability is obtained. Combining this value 
with the seismic hazard and with the quantified potential for loss that might occur because 
of an accident, a first quantification of the seismic risk is obtained for each item.  
The third and last stage includes the direct knowledge of materials (also through 
experimental tests) and detailed structural calculations (FEM models and nonlinear 
analyses). It is developed only for items whose seismic risk is above a threshold value. 
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2.5 Discussion and proposals 
As already evidenced in this chapter, the land-use regulations demonstrated a general 
slowness in integrating practices that account for different risks; indeed, it should be said 
that so far now the importance to adopt mitigation and protection planning practices to 
address Multi-risk events was not completely recognized, partially because of the very low 
probability that connotes these events. The question of the probability of occurrence of the 
events represents a crucial node: societies and decision makers tend to focus their attention 
and resources on events that happen frequently, even if the risk associated with a rare, 
extreme event might be much greater. The intensity of attention paid to natural hazards 
mostly depends on the experiences of recent disastrous events rather than on the occurrence 
of disastrous events in a distant past or on scientific hazard assessments. The result is a 
tendency to underestimate the hazard and thus the risk presented by extreme events. (Menoni 
et al., 2006) stated that planners are generally reluctant to consider risk estimates expressed 
in probability terms, when deciding for example a residential development; especially in the 
case of potentially rare but very harmful events, planners often end up taking the risk, as they 
do not fully understand the implications of probabilities. 
Another problematic aspect related to probability is related to uncertainty: dealing with the 
exact prediction of the temporal occurrence of a hazardous event always produces 
uncertainties, which could increasingly grow for multiple hazards acting in the same 
moment, or triggering hazard-related chains. In addition, in many cases, the uncertainty in 
the risk assessment can be significantly increased by the lack of historical and technical data 
and analysis, both for hazard and most of all for vulnerability. 
Some quantitative methodologies analysed the Multi-risk probability with a rigorous 
approach based on event trees (Marzocchi et a., 2009, Cozzani et al., 2010), but (Nadim & 
Liu 2013) in their report for MATRIX project warn that “in many situations the decision-
maker in charge of risk management can identify the optimum alternative among those 
options available without doing a detailed, rigorous multi-risk analysis. One may also 
encounter situations where the gain in the accuracy of the risk estimate through a rigorous 
multi-risk analysis approach, where the interactions among the different hazards are 
explicitly accounted for, is insignificant compared to the uncertainty in the risk estimate”.  
In the end, (Menoni et al., 2006) concluded that “on one hand planners understand too little 
about risks, in the sense that they ignore many technical components that are central to well 
informed decisions; on the other hand, though, perhaps specialists in various fields studying 
risks have failed to produce results in a form that could be useful to planners”. 
With reference to the Italian situation, the national framework for land-use planning could 
represent a further obstacle for the integration of Multi-risk procedure in the common 
planning tools. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the risks are usually addressed through dedicated 
sectorial plans in charge of superior authorities, as Basin Authorities, External Agencies, 
Civil Protection, Regions, Provinces; the Municipal City Plans, that directly manage the use 
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of territory, implement the results of hazards and risk assessment studies. This planning 
structure produces two different effects: on one side, the high level of sophistication and 
precision of sectorial plans is rarely translated into likewise sophisticated local land-use 
planning tools. On the other side, even if the scale of the sectorial plans sometimes does not 
allow to reach high levels of detail for the local analyses, the knowledge patrimony that the 
local authorities have on their territory remains completely unused. (Delmonaco et al., 2006) 
observed that hazard methodologies generally produce better results at a local level, which 
become crucial in avoiding larger disasters that may involve regions far away from the area 
directly hit by an extreme event or accident. Indeed, the local managers have a deeper 
knowledge of their territory and its mechanisms, and dealing with a limited area allows them 
to carry out analysis with a higher level of precision. 
Therefore, as far as it concerns Italy, in order to have an effective integration of multi-risk 
concepts in common practices, this should start with the City plans; but the analysis at local 
level is exposed to several technical, organizational and financial difficulties, which could 
complicate the process.  
In fact, at the moment the Italian local administrations seem to be not so prepared to correctly 
manage a process of integration of multi-risk rigorous methodologies in their planning 
instruments.  
First, the approaches previously presented entail very heterogeneous competencies: beside 
the data collection on natural and technological hazards, all the methodologies require to 
have specific skills in risk assessment techniques, AHP methods and Multi-attribute decision 
making systems, G.I.S. planning. All these fields, that so far now have been separated both 
scientifically and operatively, have to be kept together and managed in an overall risk 
perspective.  
However, traditionally the local planners responsible of the City plans come from the 
architectural or, rarely, civil and building engineering sectors; the issues strictly related to 
environment, and marginally to industrial settlements, are not even directly managed by the 
Land Use department, and in any case, competencies related to risks are rarely available. The 
only case in which risk is directly faced is in relation to the Emergency Plan, which however 
recovers once again many indications from the sectorial plans. 
This organization could make difficult for the local administration even the draft of E.R.I.R. 
planning, therefore it is quite clear that the management of the multidisciplinary knowledge 
and techniques required by the multi-risk and NaTech approach here presented, also for those 
proposed as “simplified methodologies”, would require in any case a mediation role by 
experts of the sectors. However, currently the local administrations in Italy are subject to 
spending review problems, which difficulty allow them to invest in projects different from 
the everyday administration, particularly when in the end no national laws require to address 
Multi-risk problems.  
Another difficulty for an effective Multi-risk assessment is the lack of a structured and 
detailed assessment of the local vulnerabilities. In 2003, Civil Protection made an attempt to 
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identify the elements more exposed to seismic risk, requiring to the Municipalities the draft 
of Vulnerability data-sheets, at least for the strategic buildings and infrastructures. Three 
different data-sheets were structured, with different levels of detail, to better know and 
therefore reduce the earthquake effects, particularly in the Highest risk zones. However, so 
far now, and after two postponements, only the first level sheets, more generic and related to 
statistical purposes, have been compiled by all the Italian municipalities.  
As far as it concerns the other risks, no vulnerability mapping was predisposed at a national 
level, with the exception of some studies executed at local or regional level. 
The result of the mentioned situation is an overall diminution in the safety of the territory 
and in the protection of the people. Despite of the current planning systems, in Italy the 
consequences of natural hazards continue to cause victims and malfunctions, in particular as 
far as it concerns risks activated by extreme climatic conditions like intense rainfalls and 
storms.  
I.e. in the last decade, Geneva was interested by repeated severe flood events with a 
frequency of occurrence dramatically higher than the foreseen return times. Even if an 
Emergency plan was drafted, it demonstrated to be inadequate: both by the Municipality and 
the citizens long knew the major point of criticality, consisting of an underground portion of 
the Bastogne creek, but it was not analysed in the plan. The creek overflew exactly in that 
point, causing 12 deaths, and great economic damages. 
The recent tragedy of Rigopiano hotel, invested by a snow avalanche provoked by repeated 
earthquake shakes, is an emblematic case of multi-risk event connoted by a very low 
probability. After the tragedy, a hydrogeological hazard map of 1990, that evidenced the 
presence of dejection conoids in the area that generated the avalanche, was found; but this 
map had not been included in any planning and risk management instrument in force. 
Therefore, the City plan authorized the construction of the hotel in an area exposed to an 
extremely high risk of avalanches. 
Some general data that underline the particularly delicate Italian conditions can be found in 
the ISPRA Annual Environmental report (ISPRA, 2016), which shows some of the main 
risks affecting Italy and their effects. 66% of the landslides registered in Europe takes place 
in Italy, that mean 600.000 landslides per year, which in 2015 caused 12 victims and 271 
damage episodes, mainly involving the railways and road networks. At the moment in Italy, 
500 thousand people live in areas with very high landslide risk, 744 thousand people in zones 
with high landslide risk, and 1,5 million people in areas connoted by medium landslide risk.  
As far as it concerns earthquakes, Italy is the second most exposed country in Europe after 
Greece. According to (ISPRA, 2016), 10.297 Italian municipalities are located in First class 
seismic zones, equal to 5,4% of the total number of Italian local administrations; the 28% of 
the Unesco Italian sites is also located in seismic zones. 2016 was characterized by an intense 
seismic activity that hit and is still interesting the areas of the centre of Italy, already labelled 
as First class seismic risk areas (areas in which the ground acceleration registered is > 0,25, 
with the probability to overcome the registered values of more than 10% in 50 years). From 
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August 2016 to January 2017, 4 major earthquakes hit the Apennine portions of Marche, 
Abruzzo, Umbria and Lazio Regions, causing more than 300 victims and an incalculable 
damage to the artistic and cultural heritage.  
In spite of the presented data, the consumption of land continues to increase; 21.000 square 
meters of territory result already urbanized, and this exacerbates the effects of natural hazards 
and combined events. Finally, another alarming data reported by (ISPRA, 2016) is related to 
climate change: the increasing of the medium temperature registered in the last 30 years in 
Italy resulted higher than that globally registered; in particular, 2015 resulted the hottest year, 
with an increased temperature of +1,58 °C. 
The integration of Multi-risk and Na-Tech approaches in the European and national 
regulations would represent the best solution to extensively improve the land-use planning 
practices and grant a higher safety for the territories. However, a rapid change of the Italian 
regulations in that sense appears to be far. Currently, the Municipalities are still demanded 
to firstly intervene on the territory both for planning and emergency without any basics about 
Multi-risk.  
Considering the actual situation, the Municipalities should be put in the position to assume 
a more active role towards these commitments, at least being able to recognize and point out 
the main criticalities of their territory. However, if the objective is to make them more aware 
and ready to face the events related to Multi-risk and NaTech events, the proposal of complex 
approaches in this field, even if accurate and detailed, could not be the proper solution. In 
fact, the lack of the necessary technical and financial resources risks to keep any knowledge 
and improvement about Multi-risk confined inside Universities and research centers, because 
the Municipalities prefer to address their financial budget to the contingent priorities.    
 
As already proposed by other projects, which introduce multi-level strategies, maybe the 
implementation of an easy-to-use screening instrument, based on a simplified methodology 
like an index approach, would allow the Municipalities to directly understand and evaluate 
the risks and possible risk interactions that affect their territory. In accordance with the 
superior authorities, they could then define possible further actions, also including the 
adoption of more specific risk-assessment procedures.  
 
The following chapters present the methodology proposed for this screening path. Since the 
research started from E.R.I.R. shortcomings and from the lack of specific indications related 
to the relationship Industry – Natural events, the entire development of the methodology 
maintained a strong connection with the E.R.I.R. planning procedures, and particularly 
focused on the industrial risk and its implications. 
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Chapter 3 
Proposed methodology 
3.1 Methodological foreword 
The methodology proposed aims at representing a screening tool for the Municipalities, able 
to return a clear image of the points of major criticalities on the territory, also including areas 
where interactions between hazards could take place, producing unexpected consequences. 
The methodology had the objective to be as much as possible user-friendly and easy for a 
direct use by the Municipalities technicians, therefore this was the principle that guided the 
development of each step. 
As already stated in the Chapter 1, the general framework adopted for the methodology 
partially reflects that of the E.R.I.R. drafting. However, new procedures for each step were 
developed and introduced, in order to face multiple hazards and the specific need to return 
an estimation of their interaction. One of the main difference with respect to E.R.I.R. consists 
of the choice of not taking into account neither the probability of each hazard, nor the 
probability of the interactions, therefore not to proceed with a proper quantitative risk 
assessment based on probability. This choice was due to different reasons, partly related to 
the nature of the events analysed, partly due to considerations related to the purposes and 
final users of this methodology, which are summarised below for clarity purposes:  
1. Some difficulties towards the estimation of probability for NaTech and Multi-risk events 
are embedded in the current risk assessment methodologies themselves. I.e. for the 
industrial accidents, the Safety reports of the companies usually do not develop the 
analysis of the consequences - and therefore the scenarios, for events with a frequency of 
occurrence inferior to 10-6 events/year. Consequently, the land use planning developed 
with the E.R.I.R., which is based on the probability of the scenarios, in the end does not 
take into account the consequences of high impact but low probabilities events, as those 
deriving from the interactions of multiple risks. 
2. The proposed methodology had to consider not only industrial hazard, but also other 
technical and natural hazards characterized by different recurring times and 
methodologies for the probability assessment.  As remarked in Chapter 2, this step is one 
of the main issues of the Multi-risk and NaTech methodologies. Fundamentally, two 
different types of approach tried to deal with it: the adoption of a detailed Quantitative 
Multi-risk analysis, or simplified methods based on indexes, aimed at “homogenizing” 
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the risks. Even if an integrated Q.R.A. demonstrate to return better results, it also entails 
problems related to the time and costs, and still huge uncertainties can remain for the 
estimations of probabilities. 
3. The climate change is reducing the reliability of the probabilities assessed for risks 
influenced by climate, as i.e. flood and landslides. In fact, as demonstrated by the IPCC 
report on Climate Change 2014, Europe is undergoing an observed climate modification 
in relation to temperature variations and precipitations, with different consequences for 
Northern and Southern Europe (Kovats and Valentini, 2014). In particular, Italy 
(Southern Europe) underwent an increase of 1°C in the medium yearly maximum 
temperature, and a diminution of the rainy events in the last ten years; the frequency of 
extreme precipitation events passed from 2% to 4%. As specified by IPCC, “Climate 
change will increase the likelihood of systemic failures across European countries caused 
by extreme climate events affecting multiple sectors”; therefore, at the moment, i.e. the 
probabilities calculated for hazards prone to the influence of climate events could be in 
some cases considered optimistic, because they do not account for the increase frequency 
of extreme rainy events. This initial uncertainty could produce mistakes in the estimation 
of the probabilities of occurrence of the final events, even if these data are assumed as 
reliable and certain.   
4. As pointed out in Chapter 2, L.U.P. decision-makers have a singular relation with the 
concept of probability: high probability – low impact events have a great influence on the 
choices of policy-makers, but the consequences of events with minor probability are 
frequently addressed on the basis of different logics, i.e. public opinion trends, recent 
striking events etc. In the end, high impact - low probabilities events tend to be neglected; 
therefore, the elimination of the probability analysis, at least in a first screening of the 
territory, could help the decision-makers to consider more objectively the risks that 
threaten the area that they administer.  
5. The skills of the Municipal technicians have to be taken into account: they deal with land 
use planning and direct administration of the territory issues; however, rarely they are 
experts in Risk analysis. Even if, as previously stated, many authors recognized the 
validity of a quantitative risk approach applied to multi-risk scenarios, the difficulties 
related to the lack of data, required skills, time consuming, etc. could be insurmountable 
for not-expert users; maybe a simpler approach, based on the main strengths of the final 
users, could facilitate and spread the habits to include risk interaction in the planning 
practices. In any case, even if a proper probability was not calculated, still the historical 
and recent recurrence of the events was taken into account in the proposed methodology 
as an “influencing factor”, considered for the phase of Hazard characterization. 
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3.2 An index semi quantitative approach 
On the basis of the above-mentioned considerations, a semi quantitative index-approach was 
proposed, similarly to those adopted for European projects like i.e. ESPON and ARMONIA, 
which are briefly exposed below:  
 In ESPON (Schmidt-Thomé, 2006), the hazards were homogenized on the basis of an 
intensity scale divided into five classes, from very low to very high (1 to 5); however, 
due to the huge number of hazards analyzed (13), the parameters adopted for each 
hazard to express the intensity have very different contents and precision, and in most 
cases, they could not be useful for a local-scale approach. I.e., for the industrial hazard, 
the intensity scale was founded on the number of plants insisting on the areas, which is 
a parameter too general for a Municipality.  
 ARMONIA (Menoni et al., 2006) proposed a two-level approach: a simplified one for 
the regional scale, and a more detailed framework for the local one. In particular, for 
the first one, the natural hazards were rated as “Low, Medium, High” on the basis of 
intensity parameters, that were more detailed than for ESPON, as it is possible to 
observe in the following table. However, it should be said that some of these parameters 
are rarely available in the sectorial plans, like i.e. the flood depth. 
A 4 levels scale, influenced by these two experimentations, is here proposed by the 
Candidate, with the scope to evaluate both the impact of each hazard and of their interaction. 
The scale expressed in absolute value is: 
0 < I ≤ 0,99: Negligible 
1 < I ≤ 1,99: from Low to Moderate 
2 < I ≤ 2,99: from Moderate to High 
I ≥ 3 onwards: from High to very high. 
The scale is employed with a double perspective. On one side, it is used during the phase of 
hazard characterization to evaluate the hazards, through the assignation of ratings to three 
macro-categories which describe different components of the same risk. On the other side, it 
measures the possible impact of the interactions between hazards.  
A proper re-composition to obtain a unique index was not executed; in fact, from the point 
of view of the intended final users (municipal technicians), a unified unit of measure may 
not be so practical, as remarked also by (Menoni et al., 2006). On the contrary, a unique 
index, aimed at classifying the different impact of the various risks on the entire municipal 
territory, could present a problem of scale and significance: in fact, it could not point out the 
areas where the same risk assumes higher values, neither the areas more exposed to possible 
risk interactions. In the end, the identification of a unique risk index could not properly guide 
the decisions to be taken at a local scale.  
As detailed in the following paragraphs, the introduction of the macro-categories to describe 
each hazard aimed at improving the current hazard characterization, trying to bring the final 
users to examine and point out every aspect of the hazard analysed, in every portion of the 
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Municipal territory. This partition was maintained also for the compatibility assessment 
stage, where the ratings assumed by the macro-categories are taken into account, together 
with the values calculated for the interaction.  Focusing on these aspects allow the 
Municipalities to better identify the nature of the problems analysed and to better address 
them during the last phase of the methodology, dedicated to the choice of further studies and 
interventions.  
The macro-categories are effectively summed up only the during the assessment of the binary 
interaction value, where the components of each hazard are interpreted as elements 
contributing in various degrees to the final impact of the interaction. However, in this case, 
the scope is to provide the Municipalities with an esteem of the possible consequences of the 
interaction, giving them a basis to verify if carry out further studies. 
The proposed methodology is organized on the basis of the following steps: 
 STEP 1, Hazard characterization, described in the following Paragraph 3.3.  
 STEP 2, Assessment of the binary hazard interactions and multiple hazard interactions, 
described in Paragraph 3.4. 
 STEP 3 (optional), Assessment of the spatial consequences of the interactions involving 
industrial hazards, described in Paragraph 3.5. Two free modelling software were 
employed to verify possible atmospheric releases and pollution caused by the possible 
impact of natural events on Seveso plants, to help the Municipalities in improving the 
compatibility assessment. 
 STEP 4, Compatibility assessment, described in Chapter 3.6. Vulnerable territorial and 
environmental elements are identified according to national and regional guidelines for 
E.R.I.R., the compatibility is assessed on the basis of a threshold of 2,5, corresponding to 
a Medium-High impact, evaluated for the macro-categories, and the interactions. 
 STEP 5, Planning, described in Chapter 3.7. On the basis of the potential incompatibilities 
encountered, the Municipalities can proceed with further studies and quantitative 
analysis, and then settle possible interventions. Possible measures and recommendations 
provided by existing manuals and guidelines were collected and listed to guide the 
process.     
3.3 Hazard characterization 
The hazard characterization is composed by 3 phases, which should be carried out by the 
Municipalities technicians: 1) Collection of the data, analysis and maps contained in the 
existing sectorial plans, thematic studies, Emergency plans etc; 2) Organization of the 
collected information on the basis of three macro-categories (Strengthening effects, 
Historical events, Protection Measure); 3) Attribution of a rating to each macro-category of 
each hazard, in compliance with the 4-level scale. 
44 Risk management and land use planning for environmental and asset protection 
purposes 
 
3.3.1. Data collection 
An in-depth study of the sectorial plans, hydrogeological studies, surveys etc. should be the 
unavoidable basis of the proposed hazard characterization. In fact, in spite of the structural 
difficulties presented in Chapter 1, a good knowledge of the existing plans is very important 
for the local technicians and managers to reach a safer use of their territory. For each hazard 
analysed, the spatial distribution of the events, the criticalities, the intensity and any other 
important element signalled in the existing plans has to be collected and kept to be used in 
the following phase, to evaluate the effective dangerousness of the hazards insisting on the 
Municipal territory. 
For the hazards choice, very different approaches were found in the existing methodologies. 
Sometimes, a heterogeneous range of risks is taken into account, i.e. PRIM Lombardia 
included road accidents, workplace accidents, urban safety, climate, industry, 
hydrogeological elements, earthquake, and forest fires. Piedmont regional guidelines for 
Emergency Plans requested to elaborate risk scenarios for asteroids, health emergencies, 
degradation of hydric resources, dykes’ failure, technological networks, in addition to the 
most common events related to earthquake, flood, landslides and avalanches.  
On the other side, other projects like ESPON analyses a huge series of hazards too, but 
majorly related to “local” territorial causes, like avalanches, drought potential, earthquakes, 
extreme temperatures, floods, forest fires, landslides, storm surges, tsunamis, volcanic 
eruptions, winter and tropical storms, air traffic hazards, major accident hazards, nuclear 
power plants, oil production, processing, storage and transportation.  
The introduction of numerous hazards and scenarios in the analysis could complicate the 
data collection, and provoke many uncertainties that in the end reduce the accuracy of the 
final evaluation. Also, since the hazards analysed have different influence, in these cases a 
mutual weighting of the risks becomes indispensable, and this entails the application of 
dedicated tools which could increase the level of difficulty for not-expert users, and protract 
the time required for the analysis.  
A filter is frequently introduced to limit the number of hazards analysed: i.e. (Di Mauro et 
al., 2006) considered only the main sources of dangerousness for Piedmont region, that 
means industrial risk, forest fires, earthquake and hydrogeological risk (flood and 
landslides).  
For the methodology here proposed, it was decided to follow the criteria of the “Spatial 
relevance” adopted for ESPON project: only hazards that regularly or irregularly interest the 
same area should be taken into account, disregarding those that could take place everywhere, 
like i.e. asteroids (Schmidt-Thomé, 2006). Therefore, the analysis carried out by each 
Municipality shall be settled on the specific hazards that characterize the territory, depending 
if it is located in coastal, volcanic or seismic areas. At the moment, the methodology was 
developed and for three main “spatial” hazards that are quite uniformly diffused on the entire 
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Italian territory: seismic, flood and industrial. The latter is particularly subjected to external 
influences.  
A fourth hazard was then introduced in the analysis, even if not properly spatial relevant: 
extreme local climatic events. In fact, climate change has increased the number of violent 
rains, windstorms and other events that could heavily affect a territory and influence the other 
risks; therefore, this possible hazard and its interactions were considered through a simplified 
approach, explained in Table 7 (See Paragraph 3.3.3).  
3.3.2 Hazard macro-categories  
The impact of each hazard has to be analysed and described through the identification of 
three different macro-categories, which represent different aspects of the same hazard that 
can influence its final effect, and that in some cases could also have been neglected by the 
overarching sectorial plans. The characterization through the macro-categories on one side 
enhance and better exploit the local knowledge of the territory of the Municipality 
technicians; on the other side, it helps in focusing the attention on the possible elements that 
could provoke unexpected consequences in case of interaction.  
The identified macro-categories to describe the hazard are:   
1) Strengthening effects (S.E.): the scope of this parameter is the identification of the 
“intrinsic inherent characteristics” of the analysed hazard that could produce an increase 
in the final impact. I.e., for the industrial hazard: two Seveso plants, both classified as 
Upper tier installations, could have a very different dangerousness depending on the 
quantity and type of substances detained, and the type of assets they own. For 
earthquakes, the strengthening effects are strictly related to the characteristics of the 
soil, which could produce amplification effects, liquefactions etc. enhancing the effects 
of the shakes.  
2) Historical and recent events (H.E.): this parameter aims at representing the recurrence 
of the events on the territory, therefore is the one more related to the surveys and 
analysis of the existing sectorial plans. However, not only return times and probabilities 
of the plans should be taken into account, but also the most recent events have to be 
checked, to verify if their occurring times are compliant or not with those estimated.   
3) Protection measures (P.M.): some of the hazards which affect the territory could be 
contained with dedicated protection measures, especially as far as it concerns industrial 
risks, flood, landslides etc. Some measures adopted can be effective also towards 
combined risk effects. These measures reduce the impact of the hazard.    
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3.3.3 Hazard rating assignation  
Once that each hazard is accurately described through its three Macro-categories, a rating 
shall be attributed to each of them to evaluate their influence on the final impact of the hazard.  
Table 7, reported in the following pages, constitutes a Guide for the attribution of the rating: 
the indications on which the scores are based derive both from existing literature and 
sectorial plans, and experts’ judgement. The table works as a basic guiding manual for the 
Municipal technicians but, clearly, it cannot widely represent all the possible situations and 
problems related to the hazards.  For floods, this is particularly evident: this kind of event is 
generated by a network of linear elements (main rivers and secondary creeks, canals etc.), 
which are connoted by several hydraulic devices, different dynamics, and complex 
interactions, whose extension can difficultly be limited to the parameters reported in the table 
below. An in-depth analysis of the characteristics of the rivers and their criticalities is 
therefore advocated. 
As far as it concerns local extreme climate events, they are evaluated with a simplified 
approach, due to the difficulties of analysis for data collection and interpretation of the trends 
on a local sale. Therefore, indicative ratings based on the global tendencies were expressed, 
as specified in Table 7. Final users are obviously free to adopt more precise ratings if the 
data available can support them. 
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Table 7: Guideline for ratings assignation 
Macro-
category 
 Hazard 
1 < I ≤ 1,99 
Low to Moderate 
2 < I ≤ 2,99 
Moderate to High 
I ≥ 3 
High to very high 
[SE] Elements 
which could 
have 
strengthening 
effects  
Seismic 
Rigid soils, without 
local amplification 
effects 
Soils with local 
amplification 
effects classes Z3 - 
Z56 
Soils with local 
amplification 
effects classes Z1 - 
Z2 
Flood 
Interaction between 
elements of the 
water network with 
low or reduced 
criticalities; 
hydraulic devices in 
good state; no or 
very few critical 
points like: crossing 
and bridges with 
insufficient flow 
section; eroding or 
sliding 
banks/levees; 
sudden section 
variations with 
possibility to 
provoke 
obstructions, 
portions flowing in 
culverts etc.     
Interaction between 
elements of the 
water network, and 
hydraulic control 
devices show 
moderate 
criticalities; critical 
points (see 
precedent column) 
have been 
identified;   
the part of the river 
/creek / etc. 
analysed contains 
key element for the 
safeguarding of the 
general safety of the 
system   
Problematic 
interaction points 
with the elements of 
the networks, 
presence of 
recognized high 
critical points, also 
reported in Flood 
plans by A.D.B.Po, 
Urban Plans etc (i.e. 
throttling points, 
areas interested by 
erosion etc). 
Hydraulic devices 
in bad conditions, 
with recognized 
criticalities 
Industry 
Only few and little 
items are exposed 
to Na-tech risks for 
their position / 
intrinsic 
characteristics / 
detained 
substances; limited 
extension of the 
damage areas. The 
substances detained 
are slightly above 
the thresholds 
There are items 
which could 
provoke NA-TECH 
risk; the quantity of 
substances detained 
is significantly 
higher than the 
thresholds; the 
potential scenarios 
overcome the plant 
boundaries and are 
related to 
flammable and 
environmental 
substances 
There are huge 
quantities of 
hazardous 
substances and 
many items with 
NA-TECH risk. 
Domino effects are 
possible. The 
scenarios are 
related to toxic 
substances and / or 
have a great 
extension.   
Climate* 
When no data on specific local trends are available, adoption of a 
unique value for the Strengthening effects, aimed at evidencing 
the increasing tropicalization, which could produce a major 
intensity and therefore major consequences for climate related 
events like i.e. raining, lightning, extreme temperatures etc  
                                                 
6 See Table 25 for the definitions of the soil classes. 
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Macro-
category 
 Hazard 
1 < I ≤ 1,99 
Low to Moderate 
2 < I ≤ 2,99 
Moderate to High 
I ≥ 3 
High to very high 
[HE] 
Historical 
events 
Seismic 
Class 3 zone, or:  
no unforeseen 
events with P.G.A. 
> Class 3 zone 
occurred 
Class 2 zone, or:  
seismic events with 
P.G.A. ≥  to that of 
the higher class 
occurred 
Class 1 zone, or 
seismic events with 
P.G.A. 2 times 
higher than that 
assigns, with 
unexpected 
amplification 
effects, reduced 
return times 
Flood 
Main flood events 
have been rare, 
return time given by 
P.A.I. / P.G.R.A. is 
confirmed. 
P.A.I. zone C, or 
Em, Cn (if recent 
events do not 
evidence different 
distributions / 
timing of the 
floods) 
Flood history 
shows the presence 
of areas interested 
by floods of 
moderate impact 
and/or in areas not 
included in P.A.I. / 
P.G.R.A., with a 
short return time (≥ 
50 years)   
P.A.I. Zone B, or 
Eb, Cp (if recent 
events do not 
evidence different 
distributions / 
timing of the 
floods) 
Flood history 
shows the presence 
of areas interested 
by events with 
return time > than 
that of P.A.I. 
/P.G.R.A zone A, 
which provoked 
damages to people 
and things.   
P.A.I. Zone A, or 
Ee, Ca (if recent 
events do not 
evidence different 
distributions / 
timing of the 
floods) 
Industry 
No relevant or 
NaTech accidents 
occurred.  
Accident history 
shows low impact 
events related to 
NaTech scenarios 
and / or with 
repercussion on the 
territorial and 
environmental 
receptors 
High impact 
NaTech events 
occurred, and / or 
with severe 
repercussion on   
the territorial and 
environmental 
receptors 
Climate* 
Continental climate 
(Plane zones) 
Climate 
characterized by 
elevate temperature 
and/or with relevant 
temperature gaps: 
arid continental 
climate / cold 
continental climate 
/ Mediterranean 
climate / mountain 
climate  
Climate 
characterized by 
extreme 
temperature 
conditions / raining 
/ intense storms: 
Tropical climate / 
equatorial climate / 
Desert climate / 
Subpolar climate  
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Macro-
category 
 Hazard 
1 < I ≤ 1,99 
Low to Moderate 
2 < I ≤ 2,99 
Moderate to High 
I ≥ 3 
High to very high 
[PM] 
Protection 
Measures 
Seismic - - - 
Flood 7 
Water regulation 
artefacts / systems 
are not present, or 
are present in an 
insufficient 
number/way, or 
showed criticalities 
and an inadequate 
safety level   
Water network / 
river / creek is 
properly controlled, 
the artefacts do not 
show relevant 
criticalities    
The management of 
the water network / 
river / creek is well 
coordinated, 
evidencing no falls 
both for the 
management and 
the artefacts  
Industry 
No dedicated 
measures for 
NaTech have been 
adopted; the 
protective measures 
towards the 
environment show 
shortcomings 
which can cause 
pollution  
The protection 
measures guarantee 
a good safety level 
also for the 
environment, and 
could be partially 
effective also 
towards NaTech 
accidents  
Adoption of all the 
preventive 
measures indicated 
in the checklist of 
Turin province and 
NaTech table by 
Cruz et al., in any 
case adequate for 
avoiding NaTech 
risk and domino 
effects  
Climate* - - - 
 
As far as it concerns the Protection measures adopted to face the Industrial hazard, not only 
all the safety measures implemented by the plants should be checked, but also an in-depth 
analysis on two different checklists has to be carried out.  
The first checklist is contained in the Turin Province guideline for E.RI.R. drafting, and 
consists of a series of measures mainly focused on the environmental protection, reported in 
Table 8. These measures could at least constitute a “passive protection” against Na-Tech 
events, because they try to improve the operational procedures and the arrangements of the 
plant for emergency and safety, to increase the general level of protection against 
environmental pollution.   
 
 
  
                                                 
7 As far as it concerns the protection measures adopted against floods, the more recent tendencies 
demonstrated that an excessive artificialization of the natural flows of rivers and creeks could enhance 
instead of protect the vulnerable areas from the consequences of a flood events. The best choice would 
be the creation or reactivation of the river’s natural areas for the flood expansion; however, this is not 
always compatible with the current uses of the territory. Therefore, the efficacy of the existing 
protection measures has to be carefully evaluated to verify if they actually work as a protection, or if 
on the contrary they could act as elements producing strengthening effects.  
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Table 8: Protection measures for the environment (Provincia di Torino, 2010) 
POINT 1a 
1. Identification of the supply and lines with a label containing the name of the substances and safety 
information  
2. Formalisation of a schedule to check and maintain the entirety of tanks and basins 
3. Formalisation of a schedule to check and maintain the entirety of pipes and lines, included the drainage 
lines and interception valve 
4. Constant updating of the documents, capable to demonstrate the physical and chemical compatibility of 
the substances chosen  
5. Provision of a system for the collection of the small releases (adsorbing materials and pads nearby wells, 
sewer covers etc.)  
POINT 1b 
6. Separation of the areas potentially involved by releases from the other areas, using containment basins 
and dedicated collection lines 
7. Arrangement of two different drainage lines for the rainfall water and the water employed in the process 
or interested by potential releases.  
8. Reduction of the areas interested by potential releases and provision of protection devices, such as 
waterproof paving, dedicated collection lines, etc. 
9. Elimination or reduction of the junctions with flanges, and adoption of completely soldered lines 
10. Provision of devices for the registration and alarm related to unexpected loss of level of the tanks and 
basins  
11. Substitution or renovation of the underground tanks, according to the decree 20/10/1998 n. 260 
POINT 2 
1. Definitive lock of the unused wells located inside the plant, and external protection of those still in 
operation 
2. Arrangement of the devices and measures foreseen by of the Regional regulation 20/2006 n 1/R on 
rainfall water collection. 
3. Provision of emergency devices (Adsorbing material, pads..) nearby wells and sewer covers in order to 
obstacle the access of the pollution agents to the municipal sewer  
4. Arrangement of devices for an automatic lock of the drainage lines whether is detected the presence of 
pollution agents. 
5. Arrangement of emergency management procedures 
POINT 3 
1. Assessment of the hydrogeological conditions nearby the plant and the points of possible release 
2. Assessment of the times employed by the pollution agents to arrive to the sensitive elements  
3. Arrangement of emergency safety measures (Hydraulic barrier) 
4. Employment of off-ground tanks instead of those underground 
5. Paving of the area for the new plant with layers of waterproof materials 
6. Employment of off-ground lines instead of those underground 
 
The second checklist is extracted from (Cruz et al., 2004), and indicates a series of safety 
and mitigation actions, both organizational and structural, aimed at address natural disaster-
triggered accidents. The list, reported in Table 9, is clearly quite generic, but it can provide 
a first feedback on the plant preparedness against NaTech events. 
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Table 9: NaTech protection measures (Cruz et al., 2004) 
Safety and mitigation measures 
Earthquake
s 
Flooding / 
landslide 
Wind / 
storm 
/hurricane 
Structural 
measure 
Use of structural design codes or retrofitting √ √ √ Y 
Containment dikes or walls √  √ Y 
Use of structural design codes or retrofitting of walls and 
dikes 
√  √ Y 
Anchoring mechanisms of tanks and equipment (e.g. 
anchor bolts, bracing) 
√ √ √ Y 
Bracing of pipes and connections √ √ √ Y 
Flexible connections for pipes X   N 
Restraining straps or chains for barrels or pressure vessels √ √ √ N 
Strapping and anchoring of emergency equipment √ √ √ N 
Emergency shut off/safety valves √ √ √ N 
Emergency water systems, and foam spraying systems √ √ √ N 
Adequate siting of emergency water and foam spraying 
systems to avoid damage from falling debris 
√  √ N 
Redundancy in pipeline systems, particularly emergency 
water 
√  √ N 
Warning systems √ √ √ N 
Emergency power generators designed to maintain 
critical equipment housing hazardous chemicals in safe 
condition for extended periods of time 
√ √ √ N 
Routine inspection and maintenance for corrosion and 
deterioration 
√ √ √ N 
Inventory control (e.g. minimizing the amount of 
hazardous materials used) 
√ √ √ N 
Strategic placement of substances inside plant in order to 
avoid chemical incompatibility 
√ √ √ N 
Placement of storage tanks with hazmats above the 
maximum height reachable by water 
 √  Y 
Construction of drainage system  √  Y 
Interruption of production process  √ √ N 
De-inventory of main processing units  √ √ N 
Giving transport priority to most dangerous chemicals 
(those that react violently with water) 
 √ √ N 
Verification of storage tank seals  √  N 
Hermetic sealing of silos and underground storage tanks  √ √ N 
Wrapping of substances in watertight packing and 
labelling 
 √ √ N 
Raising of electrical equipment such as motors, pumps 
and control panels to avoid water damage and system 
failure 
 √ √ Y 
Maintaining NaTech emergency response plan √ √ √ N 
Construction of retaining walls and levees or dykes  √  Y 
Drills and Training √ √ √ N 
Plan to allow workers to check on family √ √ √ N 
Training plan for external responders on management of 
hazardous chemicals onsite 
√ √ √ N 
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3.3.4 GIS mapping 
The characterization and assignation of the ratings, similarly to the other steps of the 
methodology, is reported in a geo-referenced GIS map, that shows the spatial implications 
of the hazards analysed. It would also allow the integration of the proposed tool with existing 
regulation instruments. The GIS map is an instrument that is almost universally employed 
by multi-risk projects, because it helps in clarifying the problems and illustrating thematic 
maps for an easy understanding; it can be used as base for further planning interventions.  
GIS give the possibility to represent geographic datasets as layers. A layer is composed by 
polygons, polylines or points, which are the basic elements of the subject drawn; each one is 
identified by homogenous and univocal characteristics. These descriptive identifying 
features, both numerical or textual, are reported in the Attribute table associated to each 
layer; each line of the table corresponds to a basic element, while the columns report the 
features. The features can be used to produce thematic maps: i.e. the attribute table of a layer 
representing Buildings can be composed by the columns Function, Address etc: it is possible 
to draw a thematic map by functions of the buildings.   
For the proposed methodology, each hazard dataset corresponds to a layer; therefore 4 layers 
were drafted: SEISMIC, FLOOD, INDUSTRIAL and CLIMATE. The macro-categories 
S.E., H.E. and M.P. were represented introducing three columns in the Attribute tables of 
each hazard layer: for each basic element identified, the correspondent ratings assigned were 
inserted in the columns. Since each hazard varies on the territory, depending on specific local 
characteristics, each Hazard-layer is composed by several basic elements (polygons). 
Figure 6 in the following page shows an example of polygon for the Seismic hazard layer, 
accompanied by its descriptive features (ground type, S.E., P.M., H.E.). When the identifier 
features S.E., P.M. and H.E. vary, a new polygon has to be represented. 
The layer Climate-related events is the only one represented by a unique polygon, because 
of the simplified approach adopted: since H.E., S.E., P.M. maintain the same values on the 
entire territory, a unique polygon having the exact extension of the Municipal territory was 
drafted.  
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Figure 6: Polygon for the Seismic hazard layer, soil Z2. 
Although the variations of the ratings for H.E., S.E. and P.M. were quite clear during the 
assignation phase, their spatial representation was not just as simple. In fact, the 
identification of the perimeters of the homogenous basic elements (polygons) was 
complicated by the difference between the hazard sources analysed (punctual for industry, 
linear for flood, areal for earthquake) and the presence of proved impact areas. Some 
assumptions and simplifications were introduced for the representation of polygons, in order 
to facilitate both the drawing and the further steps of the analysis:  
1) SEISMIC HAZARD: the category H.E. maintains the same value on the entire territory, 
following the current regulation related to the seismic classes, and the same is for M.P. 
that is always = 0. The difference between basic elements is exclusively determined by 
the typology of soil, which can cause potential Strengthening effects (S.E.). Therefore, 
the polygons shall be identified and drawn on the basis of the soil classification reported 
in the micro-seismic preliminary or detailed studies (see Figure 6). 
2) INDUSTRIAL HAZARD: A simplified approach was adopted in this case; the plant 
itself is assumed as source of the hazard, therefore each polygon coincides with one 
plant, even if usually internal or external damage areas are associated to the plants.  
The choice to exclude the damage areas generated by the scenarios assessed in the 
Safety reports is related to different reasons. The first is their extreme variability from 
one plant to another, and inside the same plant: they are strictly related to the substances 
employed, therefore can be subjected to quick modifications. In many cases, they do 
not, or slightly, overcome the plant boundaries, a condition that could bring to consider 
the plant as “safe” during i.e. the development of land use actions. However, as already 
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remarked, the damage areas for events with a probability lower than 10-6 are not 
produced; but these low probability-high impact events are exactly the type of scenario 
that could be activated by NaTech events. Therefore, the current damage areas cannot 
be considered completely representatives of the danger represented by the plant.  
Also, damage areas are not available for non-Seveso plants (the so-called Sub-threshold 
plants and hazardous plants8); these activities are under no obligation to denounce the 
substances they use, but they could detain items and substances that could provoke 
serious consequences. 
However, the damage areas are important for the Land Use Planning phase, in order to 
assess the compatibility with the vulnerable elements; for this reason, a buffer zone 
representing a potential damage area was drafted around the plants. The extension 
chosen for the buffer zone is 500 m.: this is the area usually considered by the Prefecture 
for the draft of the external Emergency Plan of the companies, and assumed in the 
E.R.I.R. as area subjected to specific planning actions. As explained in the following 
paragraphs, the values of H.E., S.E., P.M. and of the interaction are projected in this 
buffer zone to assess the impact on the vulnerabilities; however, an optional step based 
on the use of two modelling software allows to define with major precisions the possible 
damage areas consequent to a natural event impacting on the industry (Paragraph 3.5). 
3) FLOOD HAZARD: the definition of the polygons for flood hazards entailed more 
complexities that the others. Rivers and creeks not always represent a source of hazard; 
if yes, the spatial representation should consider that the hazard for the territory does 
not properly reside in the linear course of the river itself, but in the possibility of its 
expansion on areas not normally interested by the water flow. Surveys, historical events 
and simulations contained in the Sectorial flood plans9 usually identify these areas, 
                                                 
8 See footnote no. 1 in this same chapter. 
9 The maps of the P.G.R.A. - Piani per la Gestione del Rischio di Alluvioni (Plans for the Management 
of the Flood risk) report the maximum extension of the flooding related to events with high, medium 
and low return times. Different criteria and documents were adopted for the definition of the 
perimeters for the main water network, the secondary network, the lakes banks and coastal areas.  
Main water network: data based on previous analysis made for P.A.I. – Piani per l’Assetto 
Idrogeologico, feasibility studies and detailed studies drafted by regional, provincial and dedicated 
authorities. Maps for the flood level corresponding to medium probability events obtained through 
with hydraulic modelling, using: 1) interpolation of the extreme flooding points of the transversal 
sections, on technical maps and ortho-photos; 2) depth map elaborated with GIS obtained by the 
coupling of DEM-Digital Elevation Model and DTM-Digital Terrain Model; 3) maps of the flooded 
areas and levels of the most recent flooding events. The definition of the areas subjected to low return 
time events derives from the envelope of scenarios both due to extreme events, and to residual 
dangerousness due i.e. to dykes’ ruptures. 
Secondary water network (mountain and hills): the scenarios for high, medium and low return time 
were considered, taking into account the P.A.I. studies on the instability areas and regional, provincial 
and municipal studies. The definition of the areas potential subjected to flooding was made on the 
basis of simplified methodologies, based on geomorphological analysis and inventory and historical 
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which have different probabilities to be invaded by water; the assigned H.E. category 
mainly depend on these return times estimated. Therefore, the spatial representation of 
the flood hazard layer cannot disregard these flood expansion areas: even if they cannot 
be considered completely reliable, because i.e. the climate change effects on the 
extension of these areas were not taken into account, they actually are the only way to 
verify possible interactions with other potential hazards like i.e. the industrial one.  
However, the perimeters of uniform polygons are difficult to be identified as far as it 
concerns the spatial distributions of the macro-categories S.E. and M.P.: as showed in 
Table 7, they depend on the artefacts present on the analyzed watercourse, and on the 
interaction with other elements of the water network. But how to determine and draw the 
“influence” of these elements on the different areas potentially interested by flood? It was 
decided to attribute the same values of S.E. and M.P. to portions of watercourses with 
homogeneous characteristics; where discontinuity points like i.e. modifications in the 
sections, quotes, criticalities etc. could determine a variation, another polygon has to be 
draft.  
Figure 7 in the following page synthetizes the criteria above exposed for the determination 
of the polygons: it reports an exemplificative river, with damage areas A and C identified by 
former P.A.I. plan. A critical narrowing point determines a discontinuity in the attribution of 
the values to the flood hazard, because it could cause a strengthening effect with unforeseen 
consequences (i.e. obstructions etc.). Therefore, a different value of S.E. is assigned after 
this point. The values of H.E. change in function of the return time calculated by the former 
P.A.I. for the different damage areas. 
                                                 
data. The processes of sediment transport, riverbed mobility, and debris flow were also taken into 
account.   
Secondary water network (plain): definition of the areas made only for the scenarios with high and 
medium return time, on the basis of inventory and historical data, particularly related to the last 20-30 
years.  Some limited zones were drafted on the basis of hydrogeological models, or on indications by 
the Management authorities in relation to flooding episodes, consequent to rainy events with return 
times over 50 years (on average). The maps do not consider possible dykes’ ruptures, malfunctions of 
the water lifting plants or other hydraulic artefacts, for which it would be necessary a detailed local 
analysis.  
Lakes: the three flooding scenarios were considered; the maps were based on the statistical 
regularization of the lake levels historically registered in the main measurement points, and on the 
DTM.    
In this first phase of adoption in Italy of the European flood directive, the possible effects provoked 
by climate change on the potential flooded areas were not analyzed, because no reliable scenarios on 
the variation of the flood levels are available.  
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Figure 7: Identification of the polygons for Flood hazard 
It should be remarked that when recent events, or surveys, modified the damage areas and 
return times reported by the sectorial plans, both the attribution of the values and the 
identification of the polygons shall keep into account these variations.  
In case no damage areas are assessed and no spatial surveys are available, as could happen 
i.e. for secondary networks, on the basis of the recent events and local knowledge, the 
Municipality could eventually decide to assign a buffer zone as damage area.  
3.4 Assessment of the interactions 
This paragraph is dedicated to the assessment of the interactions between the hazards, which 
is the core of the proposed methodology; indeed, where overlaying of different hazards 
occurs, it is necessary to understand the detrimental effects that the occurring of one hazard 
could provoke on the others. 
The quantitative risk assessment methods, like that proposed by (Marzocchi et al., 2009), 
defines the multiple risk scenarios through event-trees. Since the probability was not taken 
into account for the proposed methodology, a dedicated approach for the interaction had to 
be constructed. Two inspiring sources were found in the projects ESPON and MATRIX (see 
Par. 2.3.2 and 2.3.5); as for ESPON project, each hazard received a rating in the first phase, 
(based on the macro-categories). These three parameters were considered as key elements 
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for the assessment of the interaction: in fact, as intrinsic characteristics of the hazard, they 
can provide good information on the possible role played by each hazard in the interaction.  
Therefore, in order to assess the possible impact of one hazard on another (binary 
interaction), a sum of the 3 macro-categories of the two hazards was proposed; two possible 
formulas were tested: a simple sum (Equation 1) and an average sum of the parameters 
(Equation 2). 
Equation 1 
            = [( .  .    +  .  .     ) + ( .  .    +  .  .     ) + ( .  .    +  .  .     )] 
 
Equation 2 
            = [( .  .    +  .  .     ) + ( .  .    +  .  .     ) + ( .  .    +  .  .     )] /   
The results obtained for the interaction should have fallen inside the index scale explained 
in Paragraph 3.2, returning a direct value for the possible interaction impact:  
 0 ≤ I ≤ 0,99: negligible 
 1 ≤ I ≤ 1,99: from Low to Moderate 
 2 ≤ I ≤ 2,99: from Moderate to High 
 I > 3 onwards: from High to very high.  
However, the equations tested on a case study did not return reliable results: for Mantua case 
study (detailed in chapter 4), where the initial values of the macro-categories were quite low, 
the first equation returned extremely high values of interaction, trespassing by far the highest 
value of the index scale. The second equation returned only negligible interaction values, 
lower than the initial hazard values. 
3.4.1 Weighting of the macro-categories 
In order to solve the problem mentioned in the previous Paragraph, that means, obtaining 
credible Interaction results, in line with the index scale range, it was decided to intervene on 
the 3 parameters of the equations, the macro-categories H.E., S.E. and P.M. In fact, the 
implausible results obtained could be ascribable to an effective different influence of the 
Macro-categories on the final interaction value. In addition, the 3 parameters are founded on 
available data and proofs very different, and this was another aspect to be kept into account 
to evaluate the results. 
Therefore, the candidate assigned simple experimental weights to each macro-category to 
measure both the ability to describe and influence the possible effects on the interaction, and 
the solidity in terms of data available. Scores from 0 to 2 were attributed; this range was 
chosen because it answered the necessity of maintaining the final interaction value in line 
with the general scale adopted for the proposed methodology: 
  2 points were assigned to H.E. - Historical events, because the past and recent events 
could give an immediate clear idea to describe the impact of potential future events. 
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Even if high impact, low extreme events could be not perfectly described in this 
category, thus it remains the most “reliable” category, proved by many surveys and 
observations; 
 1 point was assigned to the category Strengthening effects; this category is the most 
innovative one, whose aim is to explicit possible elements intrinsic to the analyzed 
hazard, that could enhance the final impact. Because of the possible uncertainties that 
could arise i.e. for the definition and consequent rating of the criticality associated to 
each element, the scores assigned in the previous phase were maintained as they were, 
in order not to excessively influence the final score of the interaction. 
 0,5 point was assigned to the category Protection measures; this low weight takes into 
account the possibility that protection measures could unexpectedly fail, or have 
unforeseen malfunctions, in particular when combined events are considered. As 
reminded by (Menoni et al, 2006, even when protection measures are put in place, the 
resulting overconfidence can be an important drawback for their potential to actually 
protect exposed communities towards whatever hazard. Indeed, the overconfidence 
leads to risky behaviors, increasing the overall community’s exposure and vulnerability 
to events that, though rare, are not impossible and which are beyond the “acceptable 
level of risk” explicitly or implicitly set by any built defense system. 
The weighting of the macro-categories was tested and validated through an experts’ 
judgement, which involved a little panel of risk analysts and LUP experts from various EU 
countries. The experts’ judgement confirmed the importance of the macro-categories HE and 
SE; more details are provided in Annex 1.  
The weights assigned were employed into the average sum of the macro-categories proposed 
in Equation 2: the final formula proposed to assess the interaction of two hazards is reported 
in Equation 3 below: 
Equation 3 
            = [( .  .    +  .  .     ) ∗ 2 + ( .  .    +  .  .     ) ∗ 1 + ( .  .    +  .  .     ) ∗ 0,5] / 6   
 
Through the application of Equation 3, the Municipality technicians can verify the possible 
impact of one hazard on another one (binary interaction), starting from observable 
characteristics and data of the hazards themselves. As later explained, this is a first step to 
orientate further in-depth studies and actions; even if indicative, it can in any case provide a 
great help to identify possible problematic areas starting from shared and common 
knowledge on the risks.  
3.4.2 Interaction table 
Equation 3 can be applied to calculate the binary interaction values in every area of the 
territory where hazards are superimposed, with a particular attention for the areas where 
many territorial or environmental vulnerabilities are present. A dedicated Interaction table, 
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elaborated with Excel, allows the Municipalities to verify and calculate the binary interaction 
values in a determined point of the territory.   
The points of hazard overlaying can be easily identified with the GIS map: i.e., Figure 8 
shows the distribution of the hazards for Mantua territory. Where the color is darker, four 
hazards are overlaid, where it is clearer, only two hazards are superimposed (in this case, 
seismic hazard and climate, that do not have mutual influence). 
 
Figure 8: Hazard layers overlaying in Mantua 
Mantua case study, further explained in Chapter 4, is also employed to illustrate the 
Interaction table.  
Table 10 in the following page shows an example for the areas where four hazards overlay: 
the table reports the hazards and their ratings. The influence is evaluated following the lines; 
when a possible correlation is detected, Equation 3 is applied.   
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Table 10: Example of Interaction table 
HAZARDS & 
Macrocategories 
Seismic Flood Industrial Climate 
SE HE PM SE HE PM SE HE PM SE HE PM 
2 1 0 1,5 1 -3 3 2 -1 2 1 0 
Seismic 
SE 2 
No interaction 1,00 1,75 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
Flood 
SE 1,5 
No interaction No interaction 1,42 No interaction HE 1 
PM -3 
Industr
ial 
SE 3 
No interaction No interaction - No interaction HE 2 
PM -1 
Climate 
SE 2 
No interaction 1,00 1,75 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
The results of the binary interaction tables constitute the basis for the final step of the 
methodology, the compatibility assessment. A further focus on the consequences of the 
interactions was introduced for the Na-tech events, which combine industrial and natural 
hazards. 
3.4.3 GIS & interaction tables 
The Interaction values obtained through the draft of the Interaction tables can be directly 
calculated in ArcGIS®. In the following lines, the steps to reach this objective are explained: 
1) Addition of a Field calculator column to each attribute table: as mentioned in Chapter 3, 
each hazard layer has an attribute table, where the values of the three macro-categories 
S.E., M.P. and H.E. are reported, aside to other columns of description. In order to proceed 
with the calculation of the binary interactions, a column is added to the attribute table (see 
Figure 9), with the feature “Field calculator”, that allows introducing formulas into GIS. 
The columns were named ISUM for industrial hazard layer, FSUM for Flood hazard layer, 
SSUM for Seismic hazard layer and CSUM for Climate related events layer. 
Figure 9: Attribute table with “Calculator field” column 
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Equation 4 shows the formula inserted in the column ISUM: it is the weighted average sum 
of Equation 3, without the parameters of the second hazard. In this way, the values of the 
Macro-categories are automatically weighted and summed up by the GIS. 
Equation 4 
( .  .    ∗ 2 +  .  .    ∗ 1 +  .  .    ∗ 0,5) / 6  
Figure 10 shows how the “Field calculator” works: all the parameters of the Attribute table 
columns are reported in the box on the left. They can be extrapolated and employed into 
Equation 4, inserted in the lower box.  
 
Figure 10: Equation 4 reported in the field calculator (column ISUM) 
2) Intersection of the layers: the GIS tool called “Intersect” is applied to obtain the exact 
boundaries of the areas where the interaction can take place; the tool creates a new layer 
containing only the exact portions of overlaying. All the values contained in the 4 original 
attribute tables of the hazards are put together in the unique attribute table of the new 
Intersect layer, reported in Figure 11 This table is the basis for the calculation through GIS 
of the binary interaction. 
 
Figure 11: Attribute table of the Intersect layer 
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The “Intersect table” reported in Figure 11 was re-elaborated in order to make it clearer for 
the following steps: all the columns not representing a Macro-category or a Sum were 
removed, and a column with the Name of the polygons was added (Figure 12).  
Figure 12: Reworking of the Attribute table of the Intersect layer 
3) Addiction of the Field calculator columns for Interaction: the last step to obtain through 
GIS the same values calculated with the Excel Interaction table consists in adding three 
columns to the Intersect table, where it is applied the “Field calculator” to sum by twos the 
values of the Sums of each hazard.  
In the example below, the interactions between Industry and the other hazards were 
assessed:  
F → I (FSUM + ISUM),  
S → I (SSUM + ISUM),  
C → I (CSUM + ISUM) 
but it is also possible to add two other columns for S → F (SSUM + FSUM) and C → F 
(CSUM + FSUM). 
The columns of the interactions are highlighted in red in Figure 13 below; the central row 
corresponds to the Interaction Table reported in Table 10. 
Figure 13: Attribute table of the Intersect layer, showing the Interaction values 
Finally, Figure 14 reports an example of the Field calculator applied to the Interaction 
column, where the Interaction F → I is calculated. As anticipated, the Interaction result is 
obtained simply summing the two columns FSUM and ISUM. 
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Figure 14: Calculator field with the formula for interaction 
3.4.4 Damage areas deriving from the interactions 
The GIS Intersect tool allows to precisely identify the areas of hazards overlaying and to 
assign them the values of the interaction; however, the effects of the interaction could 
overcome these boundaries.  
For interactions related to earthquake / climate hazards impacting on flood, it was decided to 
maintain the areas as assessed by the sectorial plans and/or through direct surveys.  
On the contrary, for interactions involving industries, it is not possible to assume the plant 
boundaries as limit of the interaction effects. As previously anticipated, the effects of the 
interaction calculated through GIS or Interaction table should be projected into the buffer 
zone around the plant of 500 m. In some specific cases, i.e. when all the hazards involved 
have values from “High to very high”, or for precautionary reasons related i.e. to the presence 
of high vulnerable elements in the surroundings of the industrial plant, the Municipality can 
decide to expand the limit of the buffer zone. In these cases, a suggestion for its distance 
from the plant is provided by (Regione Lombardia, 2007) that uses buffer areas of 1000 m. 
In case of adjacent or very close industries, it is possible to observe a superimposition of the 
buffer areas, signalling a possible domino effect.  Dedicated Interaction tables can be drafted 
for the areas where the industrial buffer zones overlay; Mantua case study provides a clear 
example of the above-mentioned situation. As highlighted by the following Figure 15, the 
buffer zone of Versalis plant is crossed by the buffer zones of Ies, Sol and Versalis. The 
interaction caused by other industries (I → I) in the crossing areas assumes the following 
values: 
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A. (Ies → Versalis) = [(2+2)*2+(3+2,5)*1+(-1-1)*0,5] / 6=2,08  
B. (Sol → Versalis) = [(2+1,5)*2+(3+1,5)*1+(-1-1,5)*0,5] / 6=1,70  
C. (Sapio → Versalis) = [(2+1)*2+(3+1,5)*1+(-1-1)*0,5] / 6=1,54 
 
Figure 15: Intersecting areas of Versalis, IES, Sol and Sapio buffer zones 
However, the uncertainties for the I → I interaction increase. In fact, the Interaction in this 
case is calculated considering the buffer zones, which however are precautionary 
conventional areas that do not represent the actual damage areas. They do not take into 
account the position of the items, the type of substances detained, the meteorological 
conditions and other aspects, but slightly variations in these factors could also completely 
exclude the possibility of a domino effects. Therefore, the interaction values obtained for the 
industrial intersecting areas, as the sample areas A, B, C, always need to be verified, 
acquiring a deepen knowledge of the hazardous items and substances present inside the areas 
of superimposition. In case the dangerousness is confirmed, the interaction value can be 
considered reliable and further considerations can be done on the safety of the interested 
areas.  
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3.4.5 Multiple interactions 
As already explained, the proposed Table of interaction allows evaluating only the effects of 
interaction between hazards correlated, that means one hazard impacting on another one, 
provoking unexpected consequences. However, there could be rare cases of multiple 
interactions or simultaneous occurring; even if these events are usually connoted by a very 
low probability, it could be helpful to at least obtain a first measure of the possible impact.  
In this case, the best solution to actually return the potential impact of a multiple interaction 
was identified in a simple sum of the values obtained from the interaction table; indeed, it 
was observed that it can well represent the increase of dangerousness due to the interactions 
of multiple hazards, or their simultaneous appearance.  
In order to understand all the possible multiple influences, the values assumed by the binary 
interactions are reported in a dedicated scheme, which allows relating the hazards, also 
highlighting their possible combinations.  
The following Figure 16 is an example of the proposed diagram, once again based on the 
example of Versalis and its Interaction table.  The 4 analyzed hazards are represented by the 
spots (I = Industry, F = flood, S = seismic hazard, C = climate events); the arrows show the 
direction of the influence, and aside them the value of the binary interaction between two 
hazards, as calculated in the Interaction table, is reported. In order to analyze the possible 
multiple events, it is sufficient to consider all the possible interactions between the chosen 
hazards. 
 
Figure 16: Diagram for multiple interactions 
. 
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Example: FCI – Flood Climate Industry 
 
1) Interactions climate/flood and flood/industry: C → F → I 
Value = 1 + 1,42 = 2,42 “From moderate to high” influence 
 
 
 
 
2) Simultaneous occurring of C → I and F → I interactions: 
Value = 1,42 + 1,75 = 3, 17 “High” influence 
 
  
 
 
 
3) Interactions C → F → I and C → I 
Value = 1 + 1,42 +1,75 = 4,17 “Very high” influence 
 
 
With reference to Mantua specific conditions, the most likely situation is the first one, 
because strong localized rainy events could provoke growth of the water level and stress the 
functioning of the entire system, leading to a flood event. The second case could be 
represented i.e. by the simultaneous occurring of a lightning hitting the industry, and a flood, 
i.e. provoked by Po river. Finally, the last case represents the contemporary occurring of all 
the interactions; even if it has a very high possible impact, it is for sure the rarest condition. 
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Example: FSI – Flood Earthquake Industry 
 
 
1) Interactions earthquake/flood and flood/industry: S → F → I 
Value = 1 + 1,42 = 2,42 “From moderate to high” influence 
 
 
 
 
2) Simultaneous occurring of S → I and F → I interactions: 
Value = 1,42 + 1,75 = 3, 17 “High” influence 
 
 
 
 
 
3) Interactions S → F → I and S → I 
Value = 1 + 1,42 +1,75 = 4,17 “Very high” influence 
 
 
Concerning the first case, the interaction here is multiple: an earthquake could damage the 
flood protection devices and system, which cease their protecting functions towards 
industries and other urban functions. In addition, Flood and Earthquake could simultaneously 
occur, affecting the Industry, or all the interactions can take place, causing a Very high 
impact. 
The multiple interaction of the 4 hazards analyzed would reach a value equal to 1+1+1,42 + 
1,75 + 1,75 = 6,92. It is possible to observe that the values of multiple interaction have a 
great increase even if the starting values are quite low; however, these extreme values reflect 
events barely impossible.  
3.5 Spatial consequences of the industrial interactions 
Before the compatibility phase, a further optional step was developed for the assessment of 
the spatial extension of the interactions produced by natural events on industry. As 
anticipated, the whole methodology deserves a particular attention to the industrial 
interactions, as it explicitly descends from E.R.I.R. framework; therefore, it was considered 
particularly important to provide the Municipalities with clearer spatial data on the industrial 
consequences, to better addressing the compatibility phase and the future L.U.P. provisions. 
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This spatial analysis entails the use of modelling tools for the hazardous zones, therefore its 
level of difficulty for not-expert users increases; however, in order to maintain a usability as 
simplest as possible, modelling tools freely available and with a user-friendly interface were 
chosen. For the evaluation of toxic releases, flashfires, pool fires etc ALOHA® software was 
adopted, developed by EPA - United States Environmental Protection Agency.  
The choice of the software for the environmental consequences was more difficult. The 
analysis of the environmental pollution was particularly important, because is an aspect 
frequently neglected: environmental scenarios are frequently excluded by Safety reports on 
the basis of probability analysis, but they could be easily triggered by NaTech events. 
However, no simple modelling tools are available yet, because of the difficulties in assessing 
the transfer of pollutant agents into soil and underground water. The property of the 
substance, and the local properties of the soil (like the porosity or hydraulic conductivity) 
determine very different behaviours and, in particular, in the vadose zone of the soil, 
characterized by the juxtaposition of liquid, solid and gaseous phases, the movement of the 
pollutant is influenced by the specific characteristics of the transport media and by the 
pedology. Transfer equations for the three different states are required to assess the behaviour 
of the pollutant.  
The software RBCA – Environmental modelling and risk-assessment software, or the Italian 
Giuditta, designed for the recovery procedures of industrial zones, estimate the capability of 
areas characterized by high environmental pollution to reach sensitive objectives; however, 
these tools assume that the users already know the quantity of pollutant present in the aquifers 
or soils. On the contrary, for the purposes of the present study, it would have been necessary 
to estimate the quantity of pollutant that effectively can contaminate the water table.  
Therefore, another EPA software, HSSM®, was adopted, even if it suffers the limitation that 
can assess the penetration into soil and diffusion on the aquifer only for LNAPL - Light Non-
Aqueous Phase Liquids. If a pollutant denser than water is suspected to provoke possible 
environmental scenarios, the Municipality should carry on (or commission to the Employer 
of the plant) an in-depth investigation on the plant. Both the items presenting risk of 
pollution, and the specific quality of the soil and aquifer should be investigated, in order to 
dispose preventive and protective environmental measures; the questionnaire reported in 
Table 23 can be used for the first step of the analysis. 
3.5.1 ALOHA® 
ALOHA® (Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres) is a software aimed at modelling 
chemical releases (toxic gas dispersions, fires, and/or explosions), especially for emergency 
planning and training purposes; it has been explicitly designed to produce good results 
quickly enough to be of use to first responders, therefore “its computations represent a 
compromise between accuracy and speed”. The following lines describe the main steps of 
the program: 
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1) Choice of the chemical: ALOHA assessment starts with the choice of the hazardous 
substance which can possibly provoke an accident; the software chemical library contains 
information about the physical properties of approximately 1,000 common hazardous 
chemicals, however only 5 solutions are included. It is also possible to expand the library 
adding other substances, but several parameters have to be specified in order to allow the 
program to simulate the chemical releases. The online database cameochemicals.noaa.gov 
can provide useful information for the parameters of the added hazardous substances. 
2) Information on the weather conditions: the software has two dedicated boxes for the 
weather conditions, where the following information should be inserted: the wind speed in 
m/s; the wind direction; measurement height and ground roughness; the conditions of cloud 
cover and humidity. ALOHA automatically assigns a stability class, depending on the settled 
conditions. The weather information can be found at a local level by weather stations on the 
Municipal territory, whose data are frequently freely available.  
3) Choice of the source of release: ALOHA® presents 4 different sources of release: direct 
/ tank / puddle and gas pipeline, for which the gas release is estimated. The first source, to 
be used when little information is available, requires to directly insert the amount of gas 
released (also an esteem could be ok), while the other source options better define the 
originating conditions of the release. Both the puddle and the tank can produce different 
types of scenarios, depending if the chemical immediately burns or not. The user can choose 
between these options, and can then specify the type of soil on which the release take place, 
the dimension of the hole for the tank and other information.  
4) Display threat zone: on the basis of the data inserted by the user in the previous phases, 
ALOHA® software calculates the extension of the toxic release, poolfire, flashfire or VCE 
that can be produced by the release of the substance analysed. The areas obtained can be 
exported in a file extension compatible with ArcGIS or in .kml extension. The latter can be 
opened through GoogleEarth®, returning an immediate idea of the areas in the surroundings 
that can be interested by the accident. 
3.5.2 HSSM® 
Fluids less dense than water migrate downward through the vadose zone; once they have 
reached the water table, they tend to form lenses (floating) on the top of the aquifer. HSSM® 
(Hydrocarbon Spill Screening Model) simulates the flow of the light non aqueous-phase 
liquid (LNAPL) and transport of a chemical constituent of the LNAPL from the surface to 
the water table. It also calculates the radial spreading of the LNAPL at the water table, and 
the dissolution and aquifer transport of the chemical constituent. The LNAPL is assumed to 
be released at or below the ground surface in sufficient quantity to form a fluid phase, that 
remains distinct from the water.  
HSSM is not suitable for liquids denser-than-water (DNAPLs). According to HSSM manual 
(Weaver et al., 1994), only the first module of HSSM, named KOPT (Kinematic Oily 
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Pollutant Transport), could be used for a DNAPL, as the qualitative behaviour of that module 
is not affected by fluid density; however, the substance analysed shall not be easily soluble.  
HSSM is composed by three modules, that can be run at the user’s choice: 1) KOPT simulates 
the flow of the LNAPL from the surface to the water table; 2) If the volume of hydrocarbon 
released is sufficient to reach the water table, OILENS simulates the radial spreading of the 
LNAPL on the aquifer surface; TSGPLUME simulates the transport of the chemical 
constituent through the aquifer.  
In order to run the models, the user is required to fill three input boxes: Hydrologic 
parameters, Hydrocarbon phase parameters and Simulation parameters. The data for soil and 
water connoting the analysed area, the data about the LNAPL, and the parameters for the 
simulation (i.e. beginning time, release time etc.) have to be inserted; if the user decides not 
to run some of the modules (i.e. OILENS or TSGPLUME), less fields have to be compiled.  
3.5.3 Limitations 
As previously mentioned, the easy usability of ALOHA and HSSM software implicates some 
limitations, that should be taken into account when the results are shown.  
As far as it concerns the first software, the most important limit is related to the duration of 
the simulation: ALOHA calculates the evaporation rate or burn rate for no more than an hour, 
because the variations of the atmospheric conditions after this period would affect the 
predictions. Also, the software cannot draw release areas of reduced dimensions, in particular 
nearby the source of release, because of the so-called “Concentration patchiness”: in fact, in 
these areas the wind eddies produce a cloud unpredictably about, characterized by highly 
variable gas concentrations from one point to another. Finally, other limitations are related 
to: 1) poolfire accidents, whose extension cannot be simulated for the water; 2) depth of the 
puddle source, that is automatically settled by the program as 0,5 cm and 3) release from the 
tank, which do not consider the pressure produced by the mass of liquid present above the 
rupture point. A further description of all the limitations can be found in (EPA, 2007). 
With reference to HSSM, it requires to search and collect a major quantity of data with 
respect to ALOHA, which in some cases could be highly specialized. This can partially affect 
its usability; also, its outcomes are not exportable to any drawing software. However, the 
main HSSM limit is related to the field of application: the simulation could be conducted 
only for LNAPL, that means petroleum derived substances; but many pollutants have not 
these characteristics and their effects on the underground aquifers cannot be simulated with 
HSSM. 
3.5.4 Damage states for the simulation 
HSSM and ALOHA can return the effects of industrial accidental events, but their use for 
the present methodology was subordinated to the settlement of credible initial conditions, 
Risk management and land use planning for environmental and asset 
protection purposes 
71 
 
able to represent the possible effects of the interactions. Therefore, the interaction indexes 
obtained through the Interaction tables or GIS had to be associated to a possible damage, 
depending on the different initial strength of the natural event impacting on the plant.  
In order to satisfy this request, a helpful and easy classification was found in (Salzano et al., 
2009), (Cozzani et al., 2010), (Renni et al, 2010): as reminded in paragraph 2.4.1., these 
authors established simplified damage states (DS to calculate the intensity of loss of 
containment from tanks. The possible release scenarios, called R1, R2, and R3 (reported in 
Table 6) were coupled to the interaction levels, as shown in Table 11 below: 
Table 11: Coupling of interaction levels and damage states   
INTERACTION VALUE DAMAGE STATE 
1 ≤ I ≤ 1,99 Low to Moderate R3 
continuous release from a hole having an equivalent 
diameter of 10 mm 
2 ≤ I ≤ 2,99 Moderate to High R2 
continuous release of the complete inventory (in more 
than 10 min) 
I > 3 onwards High to very high R1 
instantaneous release of the complete inventory (in less 
than 2 min) following severe structural damage 
However, some adjustments of these initial conditions were required in order to answer the 
basic information required to use ALOHA and HSSM software. In particular, for ALOHA, 
a determined area for the hole of release was requested, which was not available for R2 and 
R1 damage states. In addition, HSSM required inserting both depth and extension of the 
puddle of release.  
 (HSE, 2012) was employed for the definition of possible areas for the hole of release of R2 
and R3, with particular reference to the dimensions of release reported for the tanks (Table 
12): 
Table 12: Diameters for tank ruptures (HSE, 2012) 
Hole diameters for tank volumes (m3) 
Category >12000 12000-4000 4000-450 
Major 1000 mm 750 mm 500 mm 
Minor 300 mm 225 mm 150 mm 
 
As far as it concerns the puddle dimensions and depth requested by HSSM, the Bernoulli 
principle was initially applied to calculate the spills from the tanks. However, a validation 
carried out with EFFECTS® software demonstrated that the puddle extensions calculated 
were excessive. Therefore, the extension of the puddle was extracted from ALOHA 
simulations; in fact, when tank is settled as release source, ALOHA automatically provides 
he measure of the puddle diameter. Unfortunately, ALOHA does not calculate the pond depth 
but assumes that, after 1 hour of release, the depth is equal to 0,5 cm. For HSSM, this depth 
can be considered credible only to simulate R3 damage states.  
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The following Table 13  resumes all the initial parameters settled on ALOHA and HSSM to 
simulate the effects of the NaTech interactions.  
Table 13: Parameters for the estimation of the interaction consequences 
Interaction 
level 
Damage 
state 
ALOHA HSSM 
1 ≤ I ≤ 1,99 R3 
Source: tank 
Release hole: 1 cm, or minimum hole 
area able to produce effects (2-3 cm) 
Source: puddle 
Diameter calculated with ALOHA 
for 1 cm release. 
Depth: 0,5 cm (conventional 
ALOHA depth) 
2 ≤ I ≤ 2,99 R2 
Source: tank 
Release hole: (HSE, 2012) minor 
damages = 150 mm or 225 mm or 300 
mm. 
Source: puddle 
Diameter calculated with ALOHA 
for 150/225/300 mm. 
Depth: to be assessed 
I > 3 
onwards 
R1 
Source: puddle (more suitable to 
represent the catastrophic scenario 
correspondent to R1).  
Diameter: containment basin diameter 
Volume: total volume of substance 
contained in the tank 
Source: puddle 
Diameter equal:  containment basin 
diameter 
Depth: calculated through: volume 
of the substance / area of the 
containment basin 
 
The parameters adopted allowed employing ALOHA and HSSM to obtain a first and 
immediate idea of the possible consequences of NaTech interactions: However these two 
programs were not created for NaTech assessment scopes, and this has to be taken into 
account: 
 The damage states R1, R2, R3 represent simplified release scenarios, however, the 
consequences of NaTech events entail also complicated chains of events or unforeseen 
damages (i.e. failure of the electric supply etc.) that would require a more detailed 
approach to be precisely evaluated and modelled.  
 The damage states R1, R2, R3 are specific for tanks. If simulations for other items are 
required, they shall be adapted to the different situations, also verifying if (HSE, 2012) 
or other literature data provide specific hole release measures for the chosen items. 
Barrels, tanker trucks, rail tanks, can be simulated in ALOHA as tanks, while the 
pipelines have a dedicated ALOHA source. For HSSM, the only important thing is to 
settle in ALOHA conditions of soil and containment as much as possible close to the 
reality, in order to obtain a reasonable simulation of the possible extension of the puddle.  
 Neither ALOHA or HSSM were designed to represent a NaTech event. The specific 
conditions produced by a flood or seismic event were simulated in ALOHA through the 
settlement of atmospheric features and type of soil. For earthquake, a sunny day, with 
low wind speed (2 m/s, stability class = B) and humidity = 50% was assumed; the 
ground was chosen on the basis of the type of containment basin analyzed. For flood, a 
cloudy and rainy day was assumed, with wind speed = 5 m/s (stability class = D); the 
ground on which the release takes place was settled as “Water”.  
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With reference to HSSM, the dataset of parameters made available by the software only 
allows to insert the characteristic of soil and of substances in normal conditions; the 
program is not able to represent the peculiar condition of a release on the water, that can 
spread the pollutant towards superficial waters and to major distances. Therefore, the 
simulations made with HSSM shall necessary be referred to damages provoked by 
earthquake, or releases occurring with the soil in normal conditions.  
 Since ALOHA assumes as starting point the release from a tank or puddle, NaTech 
interactions related to Extreme climate events like i.e. lightning, or rain accumulation, 
could not be simulated. In fact, they usually provoke types of accidents that are not 
ascribable to a release, like i.e. the immediate ignition of the vapors present on the tank 
roof, the roof overturning etc. For this reason, even if (Renni et al, 2010) elaborated 
three simplified damage states also for Lightning, this type of event could not be 
modelled. 
 The standard depth of ALOHA pond (0,5 cm) can be assumed for HSSM, to simplify 
the simulations. However, this depth is credible only for R3 damage state, and cannot 
be valid for R2 damage state, which necessities more calculations. 
 ALOHA and HSSM cannot include the possible passive or active monitoring and 
protection measures disposed by the industries (i.e. level control, tanks firefighting 
systems, emergency team intervention etc.). Since the action of an external event could 
provoke problems also for the protection systems, it is assumed for the simulations that 
the leaking conditions and creation of a pond could not be detected in time to stop the 
consequent scenario. However, the results obtained have to be interpreted in the light of 
the existing measures, and on the basis of the level of impact calculated (i.e., 
malfunctions and failures of the protection measures and emergency systems are more 
probable for medium-high levels of NaTech interactions).    
3.6 Vulnerability analysis 
The current approach to vulnerability defines it as a multi-dimensional concept, which should 
not only represent the predisposition of the exposed elements (people, buildings, 
infrastructures, activities, etc.) to be subjected to the risk, but also the capacity of a system 
to face and overcome a hazardous event (Coping capacity). Many multi-risk projects tried to 
define a framework for the vulnerability assessment, defining analytical o qualitative 
methodologies, and facing problems related to: the different vulnerability presented by the 
exposed elements towards the risk analyzed; the lack of detailed information and reliable 
parameters to take into account the copying capacity.  
As it concerns the quantitative methods, there is a general agreement on the use of 
vulnerability functions (fragility curves) to express the physical vulnerability: the input is the 
single hazard analyzed (e.g. intensity, magnitude, category) and the output is the average loss 
of a given element at risk, possibly defined as probability of occurrence (fragility curve). 
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However, reliable vulnerability or fragility curves are not available for all the types of risks: 
the only exception is seismic risk, for which long years of studies and researches allowed to 
clearly reconstruct the relation between damage, hazard intensity (in this case Peak Ground 
Acceleration) and vulnerability. For flood and other hazards, only experimental proposals 
like that of ARMONIA project are available yet (Menoni et al., 2006). Also, the fragility 
curves do not express the vulnerability assessment for social and environmental factors, so 
that it can be difficult to integrate them within a multi-risk framework. In other cases, 
vulnerability is defined through semi-quantitative or qualitative methods, therefore the 
elements are described through indicators, which can be also weighted and summed up in 
order to establish an integrate vulnerability index. The choice of the indicators and of the 
scale of the analysis are strictly related to the scale of the project: i.e. a transnational project 
as ESPON (Schmidt-Thomè, 2006) defined 3 main indicators for the vulnerability, able to 
express the damage potential (regional GDP/capita, population density, fragmented natural 
areas) and the coping capacity (regional GDP/capita), while more exposed elements and 
vulnerability indicators are defined by projects whose focus is at a regional/local scale. I.e. 
the project ARMONIA identifies the many different types of exposed elements; for some of 
these elements, a vulnerability index was introduced (i.e. for the population, the presence of 
people younger than 5 years, and older than 65 years).  
While the elements exposed to the danger are simpler to be identified (type, number or 
surface, etc.), the vulnerability and coping capacity entail more complexity. The Guidelines 
prepared by (Regione Piemonte, 2004) and the vulnerability maps by (Di Mauro et al., 2006) 
represent a first attempt at regional level to cope with these aspects. According to (Regione 
Piemonte, 2004), the damage depends on the target elements, but also on factors which can 
increase or reduce the effects of the event; the anthropic and territorial vulnerability of each 
target should be analysed, compiling detailed sheets which contain the indicators for the 
vulnerability. The values will be summed up through a weighted sum to obtain an aggregated 
vulnerability index.   
In their research for the Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen, (Di Mauro et 
al., 2006) calculated the damage as a mathematic function, composed by 4 different factors 
(exposure level and impact area (potential damage), susceptibility and facing capacity 
(vulnerability). The damage was calculated for each type of risk on the basis of this equation.  
Another proposal at regional level came from (Regione Lombardia, 2007): in this case, the 
importance and vulnerability of each element were assessed through the methodology of the 
budgetary allocation. 
In spite of the increasing attention dedicated to the theme of vulnerability, it is possible to 
observe that currently the regulations both in the field of risk planning and emergency 
management are mainly focused on the aspects related to the exposure. Probably, the 
difficulties in identifying the parameters to determine a specific vulnerability and to measure 
the coping capacity, and the scarce data available did not favour an official adoption and 
implementation of more precise techniques. The approaches above exposed entailed an in-
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depth analysis and a high involvement of resources (technical and financial) that on site could 
complicate their adoption, particularly if the authorities involved are the Municipalities. A 
clear example of this problem is represented by the compilation of the vulnerability data 
sheets requested in Italy for the seismic risk, already mentioned in Chapter 1. In 2003, the 
Ordinanza OPCM 3274 (Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri, 2003) required the 
assessment of the safety state for two types of buildings: a) strategic buildings and 
infrastructures whose functions during seismic evens are fundamental for civil protection 
operations; 2) Public buildings and infrastructures whose collapse could provoke severe 
consequences. Three types of safety data sheets were foreseen: a level 0, mainly containing 
statistical information related to the building, and then levels 1 and 2, containing more in-
depth information on the structural characteristics of the building. Each Region should have 
issued a dedicated Regional law for this scope, and then the Municipalities should have 
proceeded with the compilation of the data sheets; for the Municipalities located in very risky 
area (Class 1 and 2 of the national seismic classification), a governmental contribution was 
foreseen for the operations. In spite of these special measures, the deadline for the 
compilation of the data sheets was postponed three times, because of the delays caused by 
the lack of financial and technical resources. The last term for the submission of the safety 
data sheets (level 0) was 2013, but it is still not clear if all the involved Municipalities have 
submitted their ones. 
For the proposed methodology, the step related to the assessment of vulnerability followed 
the ERIR approach: even if it is exposure-oriented and does not include indicators related 
i.e. to the specific vulnerability of buildings and other aspects, it has the advantage of a quick 
and quite easy utilization, that can be more compliant with the general purposes of the 
research. This step should proceed in parallel with the hazard characterization, with the aim 
of identifying all the territorial and environmental vulnerable elements present on the 
territory of the Municipality.  
Both the vulnerabilities related to the population and those related to the environment are 
identified, establishing a first classification of vulnerability on the basis of 6 classes for the 
population (territorial) vulnerability, and of 2 classes for the environmental vulnerability. 
This approach, even if established to assess the vulnerability towards industrial risk, can be 
easily extended to other types of risks and to risk interactions: as far as it concerns the 
territorial vulnerability, the assessment of the people density and frequentation provides a 
valid representation of the exposure towards any type of risk, because a high concentration 
of people increases the risk with respect to any hazard analyzed (industrial, seismic etc.). 
Even if the type of building and the proper characteristics of the construction can influence 
the vulnerability level, this analysis could be demanded to successive steps, i.e. it could be 
developed if the frequentation and number of people point out a risky situation. 
As far as it concerns the environmental risk, the E.R.I.R. approach suggested by (Regione 
Piemonte, 2010) and (Provincia di Torino, 2010) identified a series of elements whose 
vulnerability can be defined as Very High or Relevant; however, the concept of 
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environmental vulnerability results always “variable” in function of the danger analyzed. In 
fact, an environmental element can be vulnerable or not to the specific risk presented by a 
plant (i.e. in case of presence of flammable substances, the vulnerable element “Wooden 
area” is clearly at risk), and the same “variability” is found towards the other risks analyzed 
in the proposed methodology.  
Finally, a further step was added with respect to the ERIR vulnerability: shelters and areas 
for the emergency management indicated in the Municipal emergency plan, strategic 
infrastructures ad buildings were also analysed and considered to verify their compatibility. 
3.6.1 Territorial vulnerability 
The framework of D.M. 09/05/2001 was adopted; it defined the basic principles for a safe 
planning around Seveso plants, implementing in Italy the provisions of Legislative Decree 
334/1999 and EC Directive 96/82/CE. Further extensions of this approach, defined by 
(Regione Piemonte, 2010), and by (Provincia di Torino, 2010), were also taken into account. 
According to D.M. 09/05/2001, art. 6.1, two different categories of vulnerable elements 
should be identified on the municipal territory: 
 The territorial vulnerabilities, related to the human use of the territory (functions and 
infrastructures) 
 The environmental vulnerabilities.  
As showed by Table 14, the decree is very accurate as far as it concerns the territorial 
elements: 6 different categories of vulnerability are defined on the basis of the urban 
function, the building ratio index, and the presence of people.  
Table 14: D.M. 09/05/2001, territorial vulnerable classification 
Category DM 
09/05/2001 
Vulnerable elements 
A 
1. Residential areas, with building ratio index > 4,5 m3/m2 
2. Buildings hosting people with limited mobility (more than 100 people or 25 
hospital beds) – hospitals, hospices, nursery schools 
3. Outdoor places interested by high presence of people, like markets or other 
commercial functions (more than 500 people)  
B 
1. Residential areas, with building ratio index from 1,5 m3/m2 to 4,5 m3/m2 
2. Buildings hosting people with limited mobility (up to 100 people or 25 hospital 
beds) – hospitals, hospices, nursery schools 
3. Outdoor places interested by high presence of people, like markets or other 
commercial functions (up to 500 people)  
4. Indoor places interested by high presence of people, like shopping centres, business 
districts, hotels, universities, high schools, etc. (more than 500 people) 
5. Places interested in limited periods by high presence of people, i.e. places for public 
entertainment and for cultural, sporty, religious activities (more than 100 people 
for outdoor places, more than 1000 people for indoor places) 
6. Railway stations (more than 1000 passengers by day). 
C 
1. Residential areas, with building ratio index from 1 m3/m2 to 1,5 m3/m2 
2. Indoor places interested by high presence of people, like shopping centres, business 
districts, hotels, universities, high schools, etc. (up to 500 people) 
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Category DM 
09/05/2001 
Vulnerable elements 
3. Places interested in limited periods by high presence of people, i.e. places for public 
entertainment and for cultural, sporty, religious activities (up to 100 people for 
outdoor places, up to 1000 people for indoor places) 
4. Railway stations (up to 1000 passengers by day). 
D 
1. Residential areas, with building ratio index from 0,5 m3/m2 to 1.5 m3/m2 
2. Places interested by high presence of people once a month, i.e. local fairs, flea 
markets, events, cemeteries etc. 
E 
1. Residential areas, with building ratio index < 0,5 m3/m2  
2. Industrial, artisan, agricultural and livestock activities 
F 1. Area inside the plant boundaries 
 
(Regione Piemonte, 2010) grouped territorial vulnerable elements into three categories: 
 Areas (to be classified on the basis of the activities established by the City Plan) 
 Punctual elements (Buildings or places characterized by high presence of people or 
people with limited mobility) 
 Linear elements (Energy infrastructures, railways, highways etc.) 
According to (Regione Piemonte, 2010), the presence of these territorial elements should be 
verified in a 1 km area around the Seveso plants; nevertheless, both for E.R.I.R. drafting, and 
most of all for the proposed approach, it is preferable to examine the whole Municipal 
territory. This extended analysis allows to evaluate in each point of the territory the 
relationship between vulnerable elements and the identified risks, and could help the 
Municipality in a correct and safe planning of future actions. 
3.6.2 Environmental vulnerability 
As far as it concerns the environmental vulnerabilities, the DM 09/05/2001 provides less 
precise indications (see Chapter 1): it identifies 5 main environmental matrixes, whose 
vulnerability should be evaluated depending on the typology of accidental events considered. 
The matrixes are: Landscapes and environmental assets ex D.Lgs. 29/10/1999, no. 490; 
Protected natural areas (i.e. parks and other areas delimited by law); Superficial water 
resources (i.e. phreatic aquifer; primary and secondary hydrography); Deep water resources 
(i.e. dwells for potable use or irrigation, unprotected or protected deep aquifer; recharge areas 
for the underground water); Soil use (i.e. quality cultivated areas, woody areas) 
Since (Regione Piemonte, 2010) and (Provincia di Torino, 2010) implemented these 
matrixes with a more detailed list of the vulnerable elements to be analysed, this approach 
was chosen for the research. In particular, 2 levels of vulnerability are identified: Extreme 
vulnerability elements, and Relevant vulnerability elements. Table 15 in the following page 
reports the list of environmental vulnerable elements whose presence has to be checked. 
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Table 15: Environmental vulnerable elements (Regione Piemonte, 2010) 
EXTREME 
VULNERABILITY 
1. Protected natural areas (national, regional, provincial)   
2. Natura 2000 ex Direttiva 92/43/CEE “Habitat” areas 
3. Landscapes protected by D.Lgs.42/2004 s.m.i. art. 142, letters: b, (300 m. areas 
around the lakes), d (mountains higher than 1600 m), m (archaeological areas) 
4. A and B zones from PAI plan, areas with very high or high hydrogeological 
instability  
5. Landslides  
6. Residential areas to be transferred or consolidated according to legge 9 luglio 1908 
n. 445 e s.m.i. 
RELEVANT 
VULNERABILITY 
1. Historical monuments, protected landscape / environmental archaeological areas  
2. Geological-geomorphological elements of interest 
3. Landscapes protected by D.Lgs.42/2004 s.m.i. art. 142, letter g: (wood areas) 
4. Area subjected to hydrogeological restrictions ex l.r. 45/1989. 
5. Landscapes protected by D.Lgs.42/2004 s.m.i. art. 142, letter c, (150 m. areas 
around rivers and public creeks) 
6. Environmental passageways 
7. Land use capacity categories 1 and 2 
8. Typical / specialized agriculture 
9. C zones from PAI plan, areas with moderate hydrogeological instability 
10. River buffer zones with medium flooding probability identified by Province 
studies 
11. Underground water with very high or high vulnerability 
12. Aquifer recharge areas 
13. Underground water depth > 3 m. 
14. Underground water depth from 3 m. to 10 m., sandy or loamy soils 
3.7 Compatibility assessment 
The compatibility assessment represents the final step of the proposed methodology: the 
hazards identified and described through the 3 macro-categories, together with their 
interactions, are superimposed to the vulnerable elements, in order to verify the overall 
compatibility. This assessment could be directly developed on the basis of the Interaction 
tables described in Paragraph 3.3, or when possible, taking into account the mapping of 
consequences obtained through the procedures explained in Paragraph 3.5.  
The areas to be analysed are those with highest concentration of population, or where 
particular high environmental vulnerabilities are encountered or, on the contrary, where 
natural hazards can activate NaTech scenarios. 
The compatibility assessment does not consider the Multiple hazards interactions, but takes 
into account only binary Interactions. The reason is that multiple interactions have a high 
disruptive potential, according to the calculations made, but their results could be misleading 
for a correct compatibility analysis. Indeed, their very high scores are affected by great 
uncertainties related to the several possible event chains, and also, they have extremely low 
probabilities. Even if the probability was not considered in the current methodology, it could 
be unusually alarmist to base the evaluation of compatibility on these results. 
For the proposed methodology, the compatibility assessment is based on a threshold of 2.5 
(medium riskiness tending to high), validated through experts’ judgment. A potential 
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incompatibility is identified if in areas of superimposition with highly vulnerable elements, 
the macro-categories Strengthening Effects and Historical Events, or some values of 
interaction overcome the threshold. Following this check, the Municipality will have to carry 
out more in-depth studies in the area, aimed at confirming the incompatibility, and verifying 
possible preventive solutions, or protective measures. 
As far as it concerns the threshold, some specifications have to be provided: 
 For the single risk, the judge is based on the values assumed by the categories 
Strengthening effects and/or Historical Events, because of their importance: both S.E. 
and H.E. express aspects of the risks that could be neglected in the existing plans, thus 
representing an unforeseen threat for the exposed vulnerable elements. Therefore, for a 
precautionary purpose, it is fundamental to consider them in the compatibility 
assessment.  
 As already reminded in Chapter 4, the value of interaction considered for the 
compatibility analysis derives from the binary interactions; even if multiple levels of 
interaction can be considered for further analysis, at a first stage it could be more 
convenient to analyse the situations that could provoke problems even with two only 
hazards interacting.  
3.7.1 Territorial compatibility 
The D.M. 09/05/2001 defines the territorial compatibility criteria for Seveso plants on the 
basis of their damage areas; they have to be overlaid on the vulnerable territorial areas, then 
the compatibility is assessed depending on the probability of occurrence of the event and of 
its type of effects (High Lethality, Early Lethality, Irreversible Damage and Reversible 
Damage). Table 16 shows the compatibility criteria established by the DM 09/05/2001: i.e. 
for an unlikely event, BCDEF categories are considered compatible in the Reversible 
Damage zone; for a probable event, only DEF can be present in the Reversible Damage zone. 
Table 16: DM 09/05/2011 Compatibility criteria 
Probability of 
occurrence 
Effects 
High lethality Early lethality 
Irreversible 
Damage 
Reversible 
Damage 
< 10-6 EF DEF CDEF BCDEF 
10-4 - 10-6 F EF DEF CDEF 
10-3 - 10-4 F F EF DEF 
> 10-3 F F F EF 
 
Table 16 helps evidencing that territorial elements belonging to the categories A and B are 
the most vulnerable ones, never considered compatible with an industrial scenario, because 
of their high presence of people, or presence of people with reduced mobility. These 
characteristics also make them vulnerable to other natural risks.  
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Therefore, in order to evaluate the territorial compatibility for the proposed methodology, if 
A and B elements are included in an area characterized by values of the risk macro-categories 
or hazard interactions > 2.5, there could be a potential incompatibility that shall be further 
analysed.  
The strategic and emergency buildings, areas, infrastructures or linear elements are not 
classified on the basis of the 6 classes, however if one of this element is located in areas with 
values > 2.5, further analyses shall be carried out. 
The assessment of the territorial compatibility can be easily developed through the use of the 
GIS thematic map, superimposing the vulnerability maps with the hazard maps and 
Interaction polygons; however, in relation to the industrial hazard and interactions, some 
specifications are needed in relation to the spatial distribution.  
As specified in Paragraphs 3.3 and 3.4, for the industries, the possible impact is simulated 
through the creation of a buffer zone of 500 m. around the plants, where the values of the 
Industrial three macro-categories and of the interactions are projected. However, it has to be 
considered that the values of other risks inside the 500 m. buffer zone could be subjected to 
modifications, because of the variation of their characteristics.  
Figure 17 provides a simple explanation of this situation, and of the method chosen to deal 
with it: 
 An industry (I) is located in an area interested by Seismic (S) and Flood (F) hazards; in 
the overlaying zone A, the macro-category S.E. has the following values: I = 3; S = 1, 
F = 1.5. S and F maintain the same values in the area A1.  
The binary interaction value S → I (calculated only for S.E. macro-category) in the 
overlaying zone A is 2. 
 Inside the 500 m. buffer zone, in the area identified as B, the value of S.E. for the seismic 
hazard changes (S.E. = 2,5), because of a different quality of the soil.  
In this case, in the area indicated as A1, the compatibility assessment will be based on the 
following values: projection of the interaction value S→ I =2 and of S.E. Industry = 3; S.E. 
seismic risk 1, S.E. hydrogeological risk 1,5.  
For the assessment in the B zone, the projected values remain the same (Interaction value = 
2, and S.E. Industry = 3), but the seismic S.E. to be taken into account will be = 2,5. S.E. for 
Flood hazard in zone B is no more considered, because is not present. 
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Figure 17: Assessment of the territorial compatibility in the buffer zone 
Therefore, in the buffer zone, the compatibility assessment is based on multiple elements: on 
one hand, the projection of the interaction effects provoked by the industry, on the other 
hand, the local characteristics of the risk. All the following values have to be evaluated, in 
order to check if they remain or not below the threshold of 2.5:  
 The values of the interactions projected from the industry 
 The values of the macro-categories S.E. and H.E. of the industry 
 The local values assumed by the macro-categories S.E. and H.E. of the not-industrial 
risk in the buffer zone. 
3.7.2 Environmental compatibility 
As far as it concerns the environmental compatibility, the D.M. 09/05/2001 only marginally 
defines a method to assess it: as reported by (Menoni et al., 2006), the Decree merely states 
that Public Authorities have to verify the compatibility between dangerous plants and 
environmental resources, checking if the environmental damage can be qualified as 
Significant or Severe on the basis of the foreseen time for the recovery. According to the DM 
09/05/2001 “In case of potential impact on the environmental elements (Significant damage), 
the Master Plan should introduce provisions for the building and planning activities, or 
preventive and protective measures including specific arrangements and territorial, 
infrastructural and organizational intervention, in order to protect the surrounding 
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environment. These actions shall be defined on the basis of their feasibility and of the 
characteristics of the plants, with the aim of reducing the category of damage”. No further 
indications on the possible measures to be adopted were given. 
Nevertheless, as reminded in Chapter 1, some Italian Regions and Provinces made an 
improvement with respect to the national regulations as far as it concerns the environmental 
compatibility: in particular, Turin Province defined a list of incompatibility depending on 
the substances detained by the plant and the environmental vulnerabilities encountered in the 
area of analysis. Also, it required to the existing plants to develop a further compatibility 
research, based on the analysis of the peculiar characteristics of soil and water in the area 
interested by the plant. The presence of the following elements should be investigated:    
1) the depth and the direction of the phreatic aquifer nearby the plant, in a sector with 30° 
degrees of amplitude and 3 kilometres of extension, measured from the possible point of 
release in the direction of the aquifer flow;  
2) the presence of wells inside the same sector, within an extension of 500 metres;  
3) the presence of drains in superficial creeks or canals.  
If the three conditions reported are all verified, the owner has to adopt a specific list of 
preventive and protection measures (reported in Paragraph 3.3, Table 8). 
However, for the proposed methodology, the environmental compatibility should be assessed 
not only in relation to industry, but also with reference to other risks; therefore, its assessment 
presents more difficulties, because the same exposed element can present a different level of 
vulnerability to different risks.  
Table 17 constitutes an indicative Guide to identify the influence that each hazard can have 
on the different environmental receptors; the level of influence was assigned on the basis of 
literature data and surveys on natural and combined events, and in comparison with the 
hazard which exercises the highest influence (industry). The “influence” is intended as the 
capacity of a determined hazard to provoke permanent negative changes to the analysed 
receptor, which could also bring to its complete loss. 
As far as it concerns the interactions, if the industrial risk is involved, the estimation of the 
possible influence will have to take into account the presence of the plant; otherwise it will 
be necessary to evaluate the influence on the vulnerable element for each risk involved, and 
adopt for the compatibility assessment the most impacting. 
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Table 17: Risk influence on environmental vulnerable elements 
VULNERABLE 
ELEMENTS 
RISKS 
SEISMIC FLOOD INDUSTRIAL 
CLIMATE 
EVENTS 
Extreme vulnerability 
Protected natural areas 
(national, regional, 
provincial)   
Reduced 
influence 
From reduced to 
moderate 
influence 
High influence 
(environmental 
/toxic/ 
flammable 
substances) 
From reduced to 
moderate 
influence (for 
lightning, 
drought) 
Natura 2000 ex Direttiva 
92/43/CEE “Habitat” 
areas 
Reduced 
influence 
From reduced to 
moderate 
influence 
High 
influence 
(environmental 
/toxic/ 
flammable 
substances) 
Reduced 
influence 
Landscapes protected by 
D.Lgs.42/2004 s.m.i. art. 
142, letters: b, (300 m. 
areas around the lakes), d 
(mountains higher than 
1600 m), m 
(archaeological areas) 
From moderate 
to high 
influence 
From moderate 
to high 
influence (on 
areas around the 
lakes and 
archaeological 
zones) 
High 
influence 
(environmental  
/ flammable 
substances) 
Moderate 
influence (on 
mountains) 
Relevant vulnerability 
Historical monuments, 
protected landscape / 
environmental 
archaeological areas  
High influence High influence 
From moderate 
to high 
influence 
(depending on 
the substances 
detained) 
Moderate 
influence 
Geological-
geomorphological 
elements of interest 
High influence High influence 
Moderate 
influence 
(flammable 
substances) 
Reduced 
influence 
Landscapes protected by 
D.Lgs.42/2004 s.m.i. art. 
142, letter g: (wood areas) 
Reduced 
influence 
Moderate 
influence 
High influence 
(flammable, 
environmental) 
Moderate 
influence 
(lightning, 
drought) 
Area subjected to 
hydrogeological 
restrictions ex l.r. 45/1989. 
- - - - 
 Landscapes protected by 
D.Lgs.42/2004 s.m.i. art. 
142, letter c, (150 m. areas 
around rivers and public 
creeks) 
Reduced 
influence 
From moderate 
to high 
influence 
From moderate 
to high 
influence 
(environmental 
substances) 
Moderate 
influence 
Environmental 
passageways 
Reduced 
influence 
Reduced 
influence 
From moderate 
to high 
influence 
(environmental 
substances) 
Reduced 
influence 
Land use capacity 
categories 1 and 2 
Moderate 
influence 
From moderate 
to high 
influence 
High influence 
From moderate 
to high 
influence 
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VULNERABLE 
ELEMENTS 
RISKS 
SEISMIC FLOOD INDUSTRIAL 
CLIMATE 
EVENTS 
Typical / specialized 
agriculture 
Moderate 
influence 
From moderate 
to high 
influence 
High influence 
From moderate 
to high 
influence 
Underground water with 
very high or high 
vulnerability 
See Note10 below 
High influence 
(environmental, 
toxic) 
 
Aquifer recharge areas 
Underground water depth 
> 3 m. 
Underground water depth 
from 3 m. to 10 m., sandy 
or loamy soils 
As a consequence of the previous mentioned “variability” of the environmental vulnerability, 
the compatibility assessment for environmental elements should be assessed in two steps: for 
an area connoted by Extreme or Relevant vulnerable elements, after verifying if the risks and 
interaction values overcome the threshold of 2.5., the specific relations between the risk 
analysed and the vulnerable element shall be investigated. 
Table 17 above represents an attempt to drive this process, but clearly the situations have to 
be evaluated case by case. 
3.8. Planning phase 
The last step of the methodology is dedicated to the studies and actions to be carried out 
when possible incompatibilities are encountered.  The overcoming of the threshold of 2.5. in 
areas with potential territorial or environmental incompatibilities, is an alert signal for the 
Municipalities, indicating that it is necessary to concentrate here economical and technical 
resources.   
The first step to be planned is an analysis in detail of the potential incompatible situation, 
both as far as it concerns the hazards and the vulnerabilities: i.e. for the territorial 
                                                 
10 Seismic and flood hazards and climate events clearly have repercussion on the aquifers, mainly 
consisting in fluctuations in the levels, however the actual occurring of a possible negative permanent 
influence could be extremely variable and strictly related or to local conditions or to factors which 
scale is wider than local. For this reason, it was not expressed a judgement on the relationship between 
these hazards and the exposed elements. However, usually a flood provokes a sudden increase in the 
level of the water in the rivers, that brings also the phreatic water to increase. For the earthquakes, the 
relationship with underground water fluctuation is still matter of investigation; the anomalies of levels 
observed during seismic events can be related both to a level-raising (as observed in Emilia Romagna 
in 2012), and to level-decreasing. It depends on the characteristics of the soil which hosts the aquifer, 
that can be subjected to dilatation or compression. The size of the anomaly encountered depends also 
on other variables, like the distance from the earthquake epicenter. 
The fluctuations do not present an expression of a negative influence per se, but they could have 
further repercussions on other elements, like i.e. territorial vulnerable elements.  
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vulnerability, the exposure of the elements menaced by seismic, flood and climate risk, could 
be integrated analysing the characteristics of the buildings.  
After this first level of investigation, aimed at confirming and verifying the characteristics of 
the incompatibility encountered, the Municipality will have to identify preventive or 
protective measures that could be adopted.  
Table 18, Table 19, Table 20, Table 21 collect the possible actions for the in-depth analysis 
and the adoption of measures of prevention and protection, and constitute a path to help the 
Municipalities in the planning phase. The indications are mainly referred to existing Manuals 
and Guidelines, diffused by the government or other public authorities, or settled by research 
groups, which in many cases do not have binding value, and therefore are little known and 
applied.  
The first two tables report the measures related to natural risks and their interactions, the 
second two are referred to industrial risk. This is the risk with the highest influence on 
environmental elements, and at the same time, it is the most subjected to external influences; 
the application of HSSM and ALOHA software give a first idea of the consequences of the 
interactions, but an in-depth analysis is necessary. 
As far as it concerns the preventive and protective measures, usually they are ascribable to 4 
different categories: hazard, exposure, vulnerability or risk oriented (Menoni et al., 2006):  
 Hazard: structural interventions aimed at reducing the hazard severity or probability (i.e. 
levees and dams, consolidation and drainage systems, barriers, etc.);  
 Exposure: relocation of the exposed elements, or in some cases of the threat (i.e. 
industrial plants); they are rarely applied because of the high costs;  
 Vulnerability: based on the concept of resilience. Improvement of the qualities and 
characteristics of the exposed elements to increase the passive resistance to the hazards.  
 Risk: the damage is not reduced, but the impact on the community is mitigated through 
financial strategies, to permit quick recovery at reasonable costs (i.e. insurance). 
The measures proposed for this last step of the methodology are mainly hazard-oriented, and 
in some cases vulnerability-oriented. In fact, as far as it concerns the measures exposure-
oriented, the relocation, even if suggested by E.R.I.R. and applied to peculiar cases of cities 
menaced by landslides, never had a wide application in Italy. Also, the risk-oriented 
measures, like insurance, are normally not integrated in land-use plans.  
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Table 18: In-depth analysis for natural risks and interactions 
RISK 
Measures 
In presence of: Punctual / areal 
elements and infrastructure cat. A, 
B 
In presence of: Environmental 
elements subjected to a high influence 
Earthquake 
Draft of 0 and 1 level data sheets in 
compliance with the OPCM 3274 
(Presidente del Consiglio dei 
Ministri, 2003), starting from the 
public buildings and infrastructures 
classified as A. 
For the archaeological and historical 
monuments, and protected landscapes: 
development of an in-depth analysis in 
compliance with (Ministero dei Beni e 
delle Attività culturali e del Turismo, 
2010) 
Flood 
For the buildings classified A and B, 
the characteristics of the pavement, 
walls etc. should be analysed and on 
the basis of the indication of 
(A.D.B.Po e Università degli Studi 
di Pavia, 2009): i.e. ground level 
should be higher than that of the 
reference flood or levee height 
For the bridges (linear element), it is 
recommended the compilation of 
the vulnerability sheet proposed by 
(Provincia di Torino, 2004), an 
Operative manual on the hydraulic 
vulnerability of bridges. 
Case by case assessment of the 
specific vulnerabilities for the 
elements subjected to high influence 
Climate 
No guidelines are available for 
climate-related events. In this case, 
the in-depth analysis could be more 
focused on the study of the local 
climate trends, therefore, depending 
on the specific climatic risk 
identified, different investigations 
on the vulnerability can be carried 
out: i.e. on the roofs resistance etc. 
- 
Interactions 
Flood-
Earthquake, 
Flood-Climate 
The interactions between risks could cause an increase of the effects; in case 
the threshold of interaction is higher than 2.5, it could be useful to proceed 
with an in-depth analysis related to the probability of occurrence and the 
assessment of the spatial distributions of the possible effects. In this case 
maybe it would be necessary to involve experts with precise skills in matter 
of Seismic / flood and other hazards.   
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Table 19: Measures for Natural risks and interactions 
RISK 
Measures 
In presence of: Punctual / 
areal elements and infrastructure 
cat. A, B 
In presence of: Environmental 
elements subjected to a high 
influence from the analysed risks 
Earthquake 
The interventions suggested in this 
case are vulnerability-oriented: the 
NTC - Norme tecniche per le 
costruzioni provide indications for 
the seismic adaptation and 
improvements when the buildings 
are in area where the acceleration 
overcome certain threshold. The 
application of these measures could 
be evaluated for buildings A and B 
for which the in-depth analysis 
evidenced particular fragilities.  
The protection of the archaeological, 
historical monuments, protected 
landscapes can be improved through 
the adoption of the measures 
contained into (Ministero dei Beni e 
delle Attività culturali e del 
Turismo, 2010) and NTC - Norme 
tecniche per le costruzioni. 
Flood 
If the characteristics of the buildings located in areas menaced by flood 
demonstrate to be not compliant with those suggested by (A.D.B.Po e 
Università degli Studi di Pavia, 2009) or, for bridges, by (Provincia di 
Torino, 2004), several actions could be carried out. On one side, it is 
possible to directly intervene on the vulnerable elements themselves 
through the improvement of their resistance to the hazard; otherwise hazard-
oriented measures can be adopted. In fact, structural interventions adapt to 
improve the hydrogeological protection can be implemented: three manuals 
released by APAT - Agenzia per la Protezione dell’Ambiente – Agency for 
the Environment protection, related to river and coastal arrangement, and 
landslides, can be used as guidelines for the actions (APAT, 2002) (APAT, 
2003) (APAT, 2007). The choice of hazard-oriented measures could also 
protect the vulnerable environmental elements, even if in this case the 
impact of the protective interventions should be carefully evaluated. 
Climate 
Depending on the specific climatic 
risk identified, different actions can 
be carried out. 
- 
Interactions 
Flood-
Earthquake, 
Flood-Climate 
The efficacy of the implemented measures towards a possible interaction 
should be object of a specific evaluation. 
   
  
88 Risk management and land use planning for environmental and asset protection 
purposes 
 
Table 20: In-depth analysis for industrial risks and interactions 
RISK 
Measures 
In presence of Punctual / areal 
elements and infrastructure cat. A, 
B 
In presence of Environmental 
elements 
Industrial 
When the threshold values are 
overcome, it is necessary to verify 
the characteristics both of the 
vulnerable elements present in the 
area and of the plant. The position of 
the most dangerous items and 
substances has to be checked, and 
the topics of the area, linear or 
punctual elements in the vicinity 
have to be investigated: are they 
outside or inside? Which is the 
specific scenario that could interest 
them and which are the protective 
measures already in place? etc. 
When the thresholds are overcome, 
the plants should carry out further 
investigations on their 
environmental impact in compliance 
with the prescriptions of the Turin 
province Guidelines (Provincia di 
Torino, 2010). The analysis, mainly 
related to water and soil conditions, 
aims at verifying: 1) depth and 
direction of the phreatic aquifer 
nearby the plant, in a sector with 30° 
of amplitude and 3 kilometers of 
extension, measured from the 
possible point of release in the 
direction of the aquifer flow; 2) 
presence of wells inside the same 
sector; 3) presence of drains in 
superficial creeks or canals.  
For other types of exposed elements, 
it is necessary to verify their 
compatibility with the substances 
detained by the plant, therefore 
analyzing in depth to which 
influence the element could be 
exposed.  
Interaction with 
other industries 
When the buffer zones of two 
industries are overlaid, it is 
necessary to verify if effectively 
there are items which could generate 
an interaction in the areas involved; 
it is suggested for particularly severe 
situations to contact experts for the 
application of the assessment of 
domino effects as developed by 
Antonioni et al. (2009)  
Interactions with 
other risks  
When the interaction involving 
industrial risk overcomes the 
threshold value of 2,5, the 
application of quantitative 
methodologies for the assessment of 
the NA-TECH risk, aimed at 
verifying the possible damages and 
probabilities of occurrence is 
suggested. The integrated Q.R.A. 
developed by Cozzani et al. (2014) 
or the methodology by Chiaia et al. 
(2016) for the seismic verification of 
industrial structures are examples of 
the possible methods to be adopted. 
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Table 21: Measures for Industrial risks and interactions 
RISK 
Measures 
In presence of Punctual / areal 
elements and infrastructure cat. A, 
B 
In presence of Environmental 
elements subjected to a high 
influence from the analysed risks 
Industrial 
No A and B elements should be 
allowed in the damage areas, or in 
a “Exclusion binding zone”, whose 
extension is calculated in 200 m 
from the limits of the plant for 
energetic events, or 300 m for toxic 
events.  In case of incompatibility, 
the plant or the vulnerable element 
should be relocated, or the safety 
level of the structure or of the plant 
shall be increased: i.e. for 
flammable accidents, it is possible 
to require the plant to construct 
walls. The Municipality can also 
require to the industrial activity: 
the modification of the internal 
traffic; assets modification aimed 
at reducing the probability of 
accident, etc. In order to increase 
the protection against Na-tech 
events, it could be also possible to 
require the adoption of some of the 
measures indicated by Cruz et al. 
(2004), to increase the protection 
of the assets which could be more 
at risk in case of interaction. 
It is necessary to strictly monitor all 
the interventions on the 
transformation areas included in 
the damage areas, and in the 
Exclusion areas, in order to avoid 
to have A and B categories in these 
areas. 
In the areas connoted by a Very high 
vulnerability, no plants should be 
admitted; 
In the areas with a Relevant 
vulnerability, the following plants 
should not be admitted: 
 Energy plants in wooden areas  
 Toxic plants in areas with 
specialized agriculture 
Environmental plants in areas with 
vulnerable aquifers, underground 
water recharge, aquifer depth from 0 
to 10 m.   
Further prevention and protection 
measures have to be adopted 
following the in-depth analysis 
reported in the Table above: if the 
three conditions are all verified, or 
the plant is on an area with 
vulnerable aquifer, the owner will 
have to adopt the measures 
recommended by Turin province, 
points 1, 2, 3 (see Table 8). When 
the plant has wells inside its 
boundaries, or drains in superficial 
waters, the measures of Points 1 and 
2 shall be adopted. In all the other 
cases, it is recommended at least the 
adoption of the measure of Point 1.   
As far as it concerns the effects of 
the interaction, if the simulations 
prove possible environmental 
damages, the adoption of all the 
measures of the table should be 
imposed, in addiction to specific 
measures evaluated case by case. 
 
Interactions with 
other risks  
The studies and measures reported should be mandatory in case the threshold is overcome, 
however, even for risk levels and interaction levels below the threshold, a careful evaluation 
should be carried on. As illustrated in Chapter 4 and 5, the Municipalities could decide to go 
in depth in any case with further studies, in order to clarify some uncertainties.    
90 Risk management and land use planning for environmental and asset protection 
purposes 
 
3.8.1 Questionnaire for industrial in-depth analysis 
Table 20 and Table 21 suggested, in case of industrial incompatibilities, the execution of 
further risk assessment, and the application of the environmental analysis and measures of 
Turin province guideline.  
However, risk assessment is not executable in case of non-Seveso plants or abandoned plants, 
that could represent a threat for the population and the environment (see Chapter 5). The type 
of storage, the prevention and protection measures adopted, the case history can deeply 
influence the possible consequences of the interaction of non-Seveso plants with natural 
events, but the information collected about these plants’ assets are often inexistent or 
insufficient. In fact, they have no legal obligation to provide information about the substances 
detained or the possible external risks deriving from their activities. This lack of obligation 
and monitoring could in some cases enhance the level of risk in comparison to a Seveso 
plant. 
As reminded in Paragraph 1.2.1, till now only Piedmont region has extended the E.R.I.R. 
analysis to non-Seveso plants, including: 
1) Seveso “sub-threshold plants”, detaining an amount of hazardous substances equal to 
20% of the inferior threshold fixed by the Decree no. 334/1999 for the application of 
Seveso regulation; 
2) Plants detaining carcinogenic substances; with high pressure / high temperature 
processes; ionizing radiations; hazardous biological agents.   
In order to identify Sub-thresholds plants and other dangerous plants, the Municipalities have 
to undertake the following steps:  
1) Require the list of potential dangerous plants to the Chamber of Commerce on the basis 
of their ATECO code (code identifying the activity).  
2) Analysis of the list, and rejection of the plants considered not dangerous for the type of 
activity / number of employees  
A detailed questionnaire (Table 22) is sent to the potential dangerous plants, to verify the 
quantity of hazardous substances stored, the presence of high pressure/high temperature 
processes or ionizing radiation, the protection and prevention measures adopted.  
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 Table 22: Piedmont region questionnaire for Sub-threshold Seveso plants 
SECTION 1: PRODUCTION 
1) Short description of the main activities conducted in the plant  
2) Is the production process continuous? 
3) Does the production process involve?  
- High temperature (≥ 100°C)  
- High pressure (≥ 10 bar)  
- Ionizing radiation 
SECTION 2: GENERAL PREVENTION AND PROTECTION 
Is the plant equipped with the following structural and installation devices? 
- Division walls between the departments, or production chains 
- Fire prevention systems (specify) 
- Full perimeter walls (no iron-grids) 
SECTION 3:  ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION MEASURES 
1) Is the plant equipped with the following measures for the protection of the environment? 
- Devices for the monitoring and abatement of gas effluents 
- Retaining basins in the working and pouring areas  
- Waterproof service areas 
- Rain fall drainage system with accumulation basin/emergency basin 
2) Is the plant is equipped with two different drainage systems, one for the rainfall and the other 
for the water employed in the productions? 
3) Are the drainage systems equipped with interception valves? 
SECTION 4: VIABILITY 
1) Typology of vehicles which arrive to the plant: 18-wheelers, tank trucks, vans 
2) Arrivals/departures per month 
3) Main goods transported 
SECTION 5: HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES INVENTORY 
With reference to the Legislative Decree no. 105/2015, Annex I, Parts 1, 2, compile a list of the 
hazardous substances detained/ employed in the plant. 
Substance Category 
Hazard 
statements 
Maximum 
quantity 
Storage methods 
The questionnaire proposed by Piedmont region represents an essential step for the analysis 
of the non-Seveso plants, however it still leaves some information gaps, particularly evident 
when NaTech aspects and risk interaction are concerned (see Chapter 5). Therefore, some 
other tools should be integrated for the last phase of the proposed methodology, related to 
the In-depth studies and planning measures, to collect the necessary knowledge for better 
contextualizing the consistency of the industrial risk and its impact.  
The proposed solution to recover this in-depth information is a second questionnaire (see 
Table 23), that should be sent to the plants identified as potentially incompatible; it is 
composed by 3 sections that investigate about storage methods and items exposed to NaTech 
risk; case history; environmental impact (extracted from (Provincia di Torino, 2010)). The 
in-depth questionnaire can provide effective answers on the dangerousness of the plant and 
its exposure to NaTech risk, guiding the Municipalities in better identifying the possible 
actions and priorities of intervention; it represents a valid tool also to investigate Seveso 
plants for which the simulations with ALOHA and HSSM are not executable.  
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Table 23: In-depth questionnaire for plants 
A) STORAGE CONDITIONS & NA-TECH ITEMS 
1) With reference to the hazardous substances detained, please indicate in detail the storage 
conditions of each hazardous substance, describing type, capacity, quantity and containment 
measures adopted. 
Hazardous 
substance 
Stored in 
(container 
type) 
Number of 
containers or 
total capacity 
Single 
Container 
Capacity 
Position: 
Inside, 
outside, 
outside under 
coverage, 
underground, 
etc.. 
Containment 
measure 
adopted for 
the container 
(basin, 
waterproof 
ground etc.) 
2) Please report if the following items are present: 
Underground pipelines, pipelines passing on 
not-waterproofed soil.  
Description (length, width, substance 
transported, protection measure) 
Long and slim structures (torches, chimneys, 
cooling and distillation towers etc) 
Description of the structure and its function 
Open-air water treatment basin / liquid waste 
storage 
Description of the installation and related 
preventive measures 
Hazardous waste storage 
Description of the quality and quantity of stored 
waste, and related containment measures 
B) CASE HISTORY  
3) Please report a list of the accidents occurred in the last 20 years that have provoked release of 
hazardous materials 
Date Item interested Accident description 
4) Please signal eventual damages provoked by: flood events, extreme climate events, earthquake.  
Date Item interested Accident description 
C) ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS11  
5) For the environmental protection, the owner shall demonstrate to have adopted the protective 
and preventive measures recommended by Turin Province Guidelines (Table 8);  
OR 
6) Proceed with a vulnerability analysis of the conditions of water and soil around their plants: 
 Indicate the depth and the direction of the phreatic aquifer nearby the plant, in a sector with 30° 
degrees of amplitude and 3 kilometres of extension, measured from the possible point of release in 
the direction of the aquifer flow; 
 Indicate the presence of wells inside the same sector, within an extension of 500 metres 
 Indicate the presence of drains in superficial creeks or canals.  
                                                 
11 Turin Province guidelines; If the three conditions reported are all verified, the owner shall adopt all 
the measures of points 1, 2, 3 (although the Municipality could in some cases relieve the owner of the 
application of point 3). 
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Chapter 4 
Case study 1 
4.1 Introduction 
The Test case study for the methodology should have been a Municipality interested by at 
least three risks, that simultaneously affect the same areas. The city of Mantua, located in the 
Po valley, in Lombardy region, demonstrated to be a good example: a huge Seveso area 
raised in a zone both interested by flood and seismic hazards.     
Mantua is a famous historical city: its entire centre was recognized as UNESCO site in 2008. 
Three lakes, formed by the slow flowing of the Mincio river, surround the city; they were 
created in the medieval age to avoid the creation of marshes. Mincio river flows into Po river 
few kilometres after Mantua, therefore it is classified as one of the city on Po left bank. Po 
floods repeatedly interested the city during the years, particularly provoking the return surge 
of Mincio river flow from the confluence point. 
In 2012, Mantua was marginally interested by the earthquakes that affected Emilia and 
portions of Lombardy and Veneto regions; the epicentre of the second shakes, Mirandola, 
was located at only 50 kilometres from Mantua. However, while Mirandola and the adjacent 
municipalities were hit by an earthquake with a peak ground acceleration by far higher of 
that assigned according to the national classification - also amplified by the particular 
typology of sedimentary soils which provoked multiple phenomena of liquefaction -, Mantua 
did not register such problem, and the consequent damages consisted only in fissures to the 
buildings, particularly those of the historical centres. However, after 2012 Emilia Romagna 
and Lombardy regions reviewed their seismic classifications, in order to better describe the 
effective seismic impact in the areas (Regione Lombardia, 2014). The Municipalities nearby 
the epicentre were shifted to Class 1, and detailed micro-zoning studies were undertaken. 
Mantua classification was increased from the 4th class to the 3rd one. 
Mantua has an important chemical hub located on the lakes banks opposite to the city: the 
former refinery was built in 1947, while the petrochemical plant raised in 1956; around these 
two Seveso plants, many other industries were aggregated. As lately explained, the long 
years of industrial exploitation determined a serious pollution for soil and water: currently 
the entire zone is classified as Recovery site of National interest (SIN). The SIN has an 
extension of 9.519.678 m2, equal to 15% of Mantua territory, and includes, in addition to the 
productive zones, also the Median and Inferior lakes, and the Vallazza regional reserve.  
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Figure 18 shows Mantua city; the city centre and the industrial areas are evidenced, together 
with the Mincio lakes. 
 
Figure 18: Mantua main elements (GoogleMaps®) 
4.2 Hazard characterization 
The characterization phase aims at improving the information on the impact of each hazard 
verifying the possible elements of influence. The following paragraphs show, through the 
illustration of the test Case-study, the application of the first steps of the methodology 
previously explained, and namely: the hazard identification and characterization; the rating 
attribution; the drafting of thematic GIS maps.  
The collection phase was autonomously realized by the Candidate on the basis of documents 
broadly available; Mantua Municipality and Lombardy region provided basic maps of the 
territory for the GIS drafting.  For each hazard, the sectorial plans constituted the starting 
point for the analysis:  
 For Earthquake → the geological study annexed to Mantua City plan (Comune di 
Mantova, 2012) 
 For Flood → Plan for the evaluation and management of flood hazard, monographic 
data sheet related to Mantua (A.D.B.Po, 2016) 
 For Industry → Mantua E.R.I.R. (Comune di Mantova, 2012) 
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4.2.1 Seismic hazard characterization 
1) Data collection 
The seismic hazard characterization was carried out on the basis of the local Geological study 
related to the City Plan (Comune di Mantova, 2012), of the Provincial Seismic Emergency 
Plan (Prefettura di Mantova, 2012), and of other documentation available on the website of 
Lombardy Region.  
HISTORICAL EVENTS: Mantua is located in an area of Po valley with a reduced 
seismicity; however, intense earthquakes, provoked by two different tectonic movements, 
can interest its surroundings. Verona, the Garda Lake and the foothill areas under the Alps 
can be hit by the seismic shakes generated by the subduction of the European plate under the 
African plate, which also generated the Alps. Emilia Romagna hosts another subduction 
zone, where the Adria plate flows under the European plate; furthermore, in this zone, a 
complex system of faults, able to generate earthquakes like that in 2012, was identified. 
Mantua raises nearby the north-west border of the faults called “Pieghe ferraresi”, as shown 
in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19: Seismic faults named “Pieghe ferraresi” 
Until now, despite of the earthquakes that repeatedly interested the areas above mentioned, 
the seismic hazard in Mantua maintained low levels, both as far as it concerns the frequency 
of the events, the distance from the epicentres, and the quantity of energy released. Table 24 
reports the consequences on Mantua of some of the most important earthquakes that affected 
Po valley in the last centuries. 
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Table 24: Main seismic events in Mantua  
Date 
Intensit
y scale 
Epicentre 
General 
consequences 
Consequences in Mantua 
238-984 
≥ VIII 
Mercalli  
Cremona, Brescia, 
Garda Lake, 
Verona Baldo 
mountain 
n.a. n.a. 
1693 n.a. 
Province of 
Mantua 
The earthquake was 
perceived in Ferrara, 
Padua and Venice. 
The area most hit was the 
province of Mantua, where the 
earthquake cause the fall of many 
chimneys, and the collapse of 
some buildings.  
25/12/ 
1786 
n.a. 
Province of 
Rimini 
The province of 
Rimini was interested 
by deaths and building 
collapse. The earth 
shake was perceived 
also in Geneva.  
The shake in Mantua was brief, 
and only lasted some seconds. 
1834-36 n.a. 
Apennines in the 
area of Piacenza 
n.a. 
The earthquake was barely 
perceived in Mantua 
1841 n.a. 
Sanguinetto (26 
km from Mantua) 
n.a. n.a. 
1983 
VI-VII 
Mercalli 
Province of Parma 
(50 km from 
Mantua) 
n.a. 
The earthquake was perceived in 
Mantua, without any consequence 
on people or building 
1996 
VI-VII 
Mercalli  
Reggio Emilia (50 
km from Mantua) 
n.a. 
The earthquake was perceived in 
Mantua, without any consequence 
on people or building 
2004 
5.2 
Richter  
Salò (52 km from 
Mantua) 
n.a. No relevant consequences 
2008 
5.1 
Richterd
epth: 26 
km 
Canossa and 
Neviano degli 
Arduini (73 km 
from Mantua) 
Spotted damages 
nearby the epicentre, 
damages in the 
Municipality of 
Quingentole (Mantua 
province) 
n.a. 
25-
27/12/ 
2012 
4.9 and 
5 
Richterd
epth: 
km 33,2 
km and 
60, 8 
km 
Brescello, 
Poviglio and 
Castelnuovo di 
sotto (Reggio 
Emilia province – 
50 km from 
Mantua); 
Corniglio, 
Berceto, Monchio 
delle Corti and 
Palanzano (Parma 
province – 80 km 
from Mantua) 
Reduced damages 
The earthquake was perceived in 
Mantua, without any consequence 
on people or building 
20/05/ 
2012 
5.9 
Richterd
epth: 6,3 
km 
Finale Emilia 
(MO) and 
Sant’Agostino 
(FE) (50 km from 
Mantua) 
Victims, injuries and 
people evacuated in 
the zones close to the 
epicenters; in the 
province of Mantua, 
churches and 
Minor damages to Palazzo Ducale 
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Date 
Intensit
y scale 
Epicentre 
General 
consequences 
Consequences in Mantua 
architectonic heritage 
were damaged 
29/05/ 
2012 
5,8 
Richterd
epth: 
10,2 km 
Mirandola (MO) 
(35 km from 
Mantua) 
Victims and injuries. 
In Province of Mantua 
damages to historical 
and modern buildings 
(Moglia, Quistello, 
Schivenoglia e 
Quingentole)  
Damages to the artistic and 
architectonic heritage: cracks in 
Palazzo Ducale, collapse of the 
bell tower of Santa Barbara 
church; damages to Palazzo Te 
and Palazzo della Ragione.  
10/2012 
 
4.5 
Richterd
epth: 30 
km 
Apennines of 
Piacenza 
No effects for the 
people 
The earthquake was perceived in 
Mantua, without any consequence 
on people or building 
 
As far as it concerns the earthquake swarm of 2012, in Mantua no variation of the seismic 
classification assigned was registered: the P.G.A. maintained a low level, between 0.003 and 
0.004, as shown in Figure 20. This is extract of the “shaking map of 2012 earthquake” 
(Mappa dello scuotimento), available online on Lombardy region website, represents Mantua 
in blue colour, corresponding to low P.G.A. value. However, as previously mentioned, 
Mantua was included in the seismic re-classification of Lombardy Municipalities (Regione 
Lombardia, 2014). 
 
Figure 20: Mappa dello scuotimento for Mantua  
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STRENGTHENING EFFECTS: (Regione Lombardia, 2011) imposed a mandatory First 
level micro-zoning study to the Lombard municipalities, called P.S.L. Pericolosità sismica 
locale - Local Seismic Dangerousness. As reported in Table 25, P.S.L. should identify:  
 Site or local amplification effects: topographical or lithological amplification caused by: 
1) complex superficial morphologies or irregular topography, which favours the 
concentration of the seismic waves nearby the crests of the elevations; 2) deep 
morphologies or stratigraphic unites with specific mechanical properties. 
 Instability effects: instable behaviour of the soil under seismic solicitation. 1) slopes 
with unstable equilibrium, which can generate landslides; 2) areas interested by the 
presence of specific geological structures (active faults), where differential movements 
can take place; 3) soils with poor physical and mechanical properties, which can 
produce permanent soil deformation, or saturated granular soils, which provoke 
liquefaction; 4) territories interested by karst phenomena, that can originate subsidence. 
Table 25: Scenarios of local seismic dangerousness (Regione Lombardia, 2011) 
Code Local seismic dangerousness Effects 
Z1a Zones connoted by active landslide movements 
Instability Z1b Zones connoted by quiescent landslide movements 
Z1c Zones potentially subjected to landslides or exposed to landslides 
Z2a Zones with particularly poor saturated foundation soils Collapse 
Z2b Zones with saturated grainy and little sediment Liquefaction 
Z3a Border zones with h>10 m. (scarp, quarry edge, stream terrace, ecc.) Topographic 
amplifications Z3b Crest or peak zones 
Z4a 
Plain zones with presence of alluvial and/or fluvio-glacial sediment, 
grainy or cohesive  Lithological and 
geometrical 
amplifications 
Z4b Foothill zones, characterized by alluvial or lake fans 
Z4c Moraine zones, with grainy or cohesive sediment  
Z4d Zones with eluvio-colluvial clays 
Z5 
Zones where lithotypes with different physical and mechanical features 
are in stratigraphic or tectonic contact  
Differential 
behaviour 
As far as it concerns Mantua P.S.L. (Comune di Mantova, 2012), its soils are mainly 
sediments formed by floods occurred in Pleistocene and Holocene, caused by the rivers born 
from the Garda glacier. Therefore, the municipal territory is composed by sand, clay and 
loam sediment, distributed in 4 different zones: 1) right bank of the superior lake, formed by 
sandy and loamy sediment alternated; 2) city centre, where sandy and pebbly material 
prevails; 3) right bank of the Inferior lake, connoted by clays and peatlands; 4) the ancient 
Paiolo lake, characterized by thick peatlands. The main type of potential effects derives from 
site or local amplification, while only few areas of the Municipality seem subjected to 
instability. Therefore, almost the entire municipal territory is defined as Z4a soils “Plain 
zones with alluvial or fluvio-glacial sediment, grainy or cohesive”. Some limited areas (left 
bank of Superior lake, ancient riverbed of the Paiolo Basso creek, Vallazza) are classified as 
Z2 soils because of the presence of peat and marshy terrains, which can provoke instability 
effects due to the poor mechanical and physical characteristics. A Second level micro-zoning 
analysis was carried out on 4 sample areas of the municipal territory; however, according to 
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the seismic re-classification (Regione Lombardia, 2014), this 2nd level analysis shall be 
extended to all the urbanized zone. The sample areas were: Valdaro harbour (B1); Te 
Brunetti neighbourhood (B2); S. Giorgio castle (B3); industrial zone (B4). Their location is 
reported in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21: Sample areas in Mantua territory  
In the chosen areas, the underground propagation of the shear seismic waves was verified 
with a refraction test, in order to quantify the Amplification Factor Fa given by the Z4 and 
Z2 soils. The calculation demonstrated that the amplification could overcome the threshold 
values estimated for Mantua area. Therefore, the technicians recommended to execute a 3rd 
level micro-zoning analysis in these areas, before any new strategic construction. 
PROTECTION MEASURES: no intrinsic hazard-oriented measures can be taken against 
earthquake.  
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2) Macro-categories and Ratings assignation 
Table 26 shows the ratings assignation: only two types of soils determine the strengthening 
effects, while the historical recurrence of the events has a uniform distribution overall 
territory. No direct protection measures can be adopted towards seismic hazard; it is only 
possible to enhance the resilience of the vulnerable elements exposed. 
Table 26: Rating attribution for seismic hazard in Mantua 
Element 
considered 
[S.E.] Strengthening effects 
[P.M.] 
Protection 
measures 
[H.E.] Historical events 
Municipal 
territory 
Z4a soils 
Lithological 
and/or 
geometric 
amplifications 
Fa, local 
amplification 
factor, 
overcame the 
values the 
reference 
regulations in 
4 sample 
zones. 
- 
Seismic class = 3 
In 2012, the seismic 
system called the Ferrara 
fault lines reactivated, but 
the registered P.G.A. 
remained low. Reduced 
damages (i.e. falling 
cornices).  
Seismic risk in Mantua 
territory is low, both for 
local seismic capacity; 
distance from the 
epicentre of the most 
powerful earthquakes; 
frequency of the events; 
energy releases. 
SCORE 2 0 
Right banks of 
Superior lake, 
ancient 
riverbed of 
Paiolo Basso 
drain, area 
Vallazza  
Z2a soils: 
instability. 
  - 
SCORE 3 0 1 
The macro-category H.E. was evaluated as LOW = 1 because, even if seismic episodes can 
be quite frequent in Mantua area, these events always demonstrated to have a low impact, in 
line with the low seismic classification (Class 3). 
For Strengthening Effects, the micro-zoning studies of 1st and 2nd level demonstrated that the 
soils do have the possibility to enhance and worsen the effects of an earthquake. Therefore, 
for the Z4 soil, a value of MEDIUM = 2 was assigned, while the Z2 soils, capable of more 
negative effects, were evaluated as a potential HIGH = 3 impact element.  
As far as it concerns the GIS map, the polygons of the layer seismic hazard trace the 
perimeters of the different types of soil, in order to return the different values assumed by 
the portions of territory analysed; all these polygons have the same values for HE (1) and 
MP (0), and different values for SE (2, 3). Figure 22 is an extract of the GIS mapping, 
representing the layer Seismic Hazard – Strengthening effects theme. 
 
 
Risk management and land use planning for environmental and asset 
protection purposes 
101 
 
 
Figure 22: Thematic map of the seismic hazard layer, S.E. 
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4.2.2 Flood hazard characterization 
1) Data collection 
The flood hazard characterization was based on documents produced by several authorities, 
like the ADBPO (Authority for Po river), the Mincio consortium, and the Municipality itself. 
This paragraph introduces the main features related to history, hydraulic regulation and 
criticalities of Mincio river. 
HISTORICAL EVENTS: Mantua was repeatedly afflicted by floods provoked both by 
Mincio and Po river, which is located at only 20 km from the city. in addition, nearby the 
city, Mincio river tends to slow down, forming marshy and unhealthy areas. The attempts to 
arrange these situations started in the Medieval Age: in 1189, the engineer Alberto Pitentino 
realized a system of dikes to transform the marshes in 4 lakes, also aimed at defending the 
city from external assaults (Superior, Median and Inferior lakes, and the Paiolo lake). In 
order to protect the city from the return flow caused by Po river floods, Pitentino also 
designed the Governolo sluice, located in the village of Governolo where the Mincio river 
flows into Po. Despite of these hydraulic interventions, the floods continued to hit Mantua 
city; i.e. two huge events caused by Po river hit the city in 1801 and 1807, while in 1879 
Mincio river provoked an inundation. Thus, after II World War, a permanent hydraulic 
transformation was executed, to finally protect Mantua from floods. The system, later 
explained, functioned without criticalities even during the major Po floods in 1994 and 2001. 
(A.D.B.Po, 2016) mapped the scenarios for high and medium probability (A and B) on the 
basis of the existing levees or natural terrace, while the scenario with low probability 
(extreme event) was mapped on the basis of all the areas historically flooded. Mincio 
determines scenarios with high (10-20 years) and medium probability (100-200 years) that 
are almost completely overlaid, and which have a brief distance from the river; while the 
scenario with low probability (500 years) involves wider areas. Also 4 creeks of the 
secondary water network produce some limited potential flooded areas, with a return time 
calculated in 20/50 years (Fosso della Posta, Fosso Magistrale, Fossamana, Agnella). 
PROTECTION MEASURES: The hydraulic settlement of Mincio river, carried out from 
1965, led to a river flow completely artificialized, from the origin to the mouth. AIPO, 
Interregional Agency for Po river, is currently in charge for the management of Mincio river; 
telemetering and remote control are located in 4 points of the river (Casale, Vasarone, 
Formigosa and Governolo); and act on the electric hydraulic floodgates. The implementation 
of remote control is still on course. The re 
Mincio river origins in Peschiera del Garda, in the northern limit of Garda lake, at around 40 
km from Mantua; the flow rate from the lake is regulated by the Salionze barrage, composed 
by three floodgates. The maximum flow rate released in this point is equal to 200 m3/s, which 
is also the flood rate on which the reference-flood scenario was settled (200 years). During 
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the major flood events in the last 30 years, the maximum flow rates registered after the 
Salionze barrage were between 150 m3/s and 185 m3/s. 
Near to Pozzolo village, another important hydraulic arrangement is present: a divider 
addresses the major part of the rate flow (130 m3/s) to a drain, named Canale scaricatore 
Pozzolo Maglio. In Mincio river, a maximum flow of 70 m3/s is left; however, in this portion, 
the river receives the contribution of the plain northern-west water network, and in particular 
of the channel Caldone (max 40 m3/s).  
In the vicinity of Casale di Goito, one of the most important hydraulic artefact is located, 
composed by the divider of Casale and the drain called the Diversivo Mincio. The latter 
bypasses Mantua city and, in case of floods, can collect the entire flow rate remained in 
Mincio riverbed (70 m3/s); the Casale floodgate is closed and Diversivo Mincio releases the 
water to Mincio after Mantua and Formigosa barrage. 
Mantua city defence system is able to bear a maximum flow rate of 50 m3/s, that can be 
entirely reach by the sum of the tributaries that flow into Mincio riverbed before Mantua 
(Solfero-Goldone and Osone), and inside the Municipal territory (Naviglio, Cavo San 
Giorgio, Paiolo). In addition, Mantua drainage network can contribute, but the exact share 
has not been calculated yet. As a consequence of these contributions, the maximum amount 
of flow rate left into Mincio river at the Casale divider is usually around 10-20 m3/s. 
Figure 23 shows the hydraulic system of Mantua city: in the northern part, it is highlighted 
the path of Diversivo Mincio, while Mincio river surrounds the city creating three lakes. The 
Superior lake is contained by the dyke-bridge named Ponte dei Mulini, which is equipped 
with two floodgates (named Vasarone and Vasarina); this artefact maintains the water level 
in the lake at 17,40 m. The maximum foreseen water level is 18.40 m. The following lakes 
and the Vallazza are maintained at 14.20-14.40 m. by the barrage of Governolo; indeed, the 
Masetti dyke could act as a regulatory artefact for the levels of Median and Inferior lake, but 
it is not employed. Inside the Municipal territory, some channels flow into the lakes, and in 
some cases, they are equipped with lifting plants to help the water in trespassing the different 
heights of the lakes (i.e. Rio di Mantova, Fossa Magistrale, Fosso Paiolo Basso, Angeli 
Cerese). 
The crucial hub of Formigosa is located after the zone of Vallazza, which hosts also a 
protected natural area. It is constituted of a barrage with two floodgates, a lifting plant 
(Valdaro), and the drainage channel “Scaricatore Vallazza-Fissero”, which is connected with 
the starting point of the navigable channel named Canal Bianco. During the Po floods, the 
barrage of Formigosa is closed, in order not to allow the water returning from Governolo to 
increase the water levels in the lakes and inundate Mantua city. However, the water collected 
by Mincio before Formigosa needs to be discharged in some way: both Valdaro lifting plant 
and Vallazza-Fissero drain are designed for this scope. Valdaro can discharge in the 
Diversivo Mincio a flow rate of 50 m3/s; alternatively, the water can be addressed to the so-
called Canal Bianco through the Vallazza-Fissero drain, which has a capacity of 30 m3/s. 
Figure 24 shows in detail the Formigosa hub and its components. 
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Figure 23: Hydraulic artefacts in Mantua city 
 
Figure 24: Formigosa hydraulic hub 
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The last portion of Mincio river, from Formigosa to the barrage and navigation lock of 
Governolo, is completely contained by levees on both the banks. Mincio river flows into Po 
in Governolo, where a barrage maintains the level of the river higher than that of Po. 
Figure 25 (A.D.B.Po, 2016) provides the complete scheme of all the Mincio hydraulic 
arrangement previously described. 
 
Figure 25: Scheme of the hydraulic settlement of Mincio river  
STRENGTHENING EFFECTS: (A.D.B.PO, 2016) demonstrated that some minor 
criticalities of the complex Mincio hydraulic system need to be addressed: 
• The contributions of the secondary water network, in particular in the portion between 
Pozzolo divider and Mantua, together with the urban water drainage system, can 
influence the balance and correct functioning of the system. Two drainage channels 
were designed to divert the water of Osone, Marchionale, Birbesi and Goldone from 
Mincio, the so called North-west and North-East drains, but still they were not 
constructed. 
• The obsolescence of the hydraulic artefacts, in particular: Valdaro lifting plant, Casale 
di Goito divider, Vasarone dyke, and Formigosa hub 
• Phenomena of erosion and riverbed lowering in the dammed portion between Formigosa 
and Governolo.    
In the light of the complex situation above exposed, Mantua was identified by (A.D.B.Po, 
2016) in its Plan for the evaluation and management of flood hazard as “Area with relevant 
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flood risk”, that means a critical hub of strategic importance where conditions of high or very 
high risk involve relevant urbanized areas or productive plants.  
 
2) Macro-categories and ratings assignation 
Table 27 shows the ratings assignation for Flood risk. In order to attribute the ratings, it was 
first of all necessary to recognize homogenous zones of the river:  the upstream portion of 
the river was distinguished from the portion in the Municipal territory. For the first one, an 
overall evaluation was carried out, in order to verify if there were major criticalities that 
could increase the dangerousness of flood also inside the Municipality. For the municipal 
river portion, a deeper analysis was developed, evaluating all the hydraulic artefacts, the 
differences in heights, and the elements whose presence could have repercussion on the 
hydraulic behaviour. 
Table 27: Ratings assignation for Flood 
Element 
considered 
 
[S.E.] Strengthening effects 
[P.M.] Protection 
measures 
[H.E.] Historical 
events 
Interactions 
with other 
elements of 
the water 
network 
Criticalities 
of the 
hydraulic 
artefacts 
Hydraulic artefacts / 
levees etc. 
Mincio  
upstream 
portion 
outside 
Mantua 
Secundary 
water 
network can 
increase the 
Lakes level. 
Diversivo 
Mincio 
receives the 
Acque alte 
channel, that 
could 
generate 
unforeseen 
flow rates. 
Casale 
divider needs 
maintenance 
and 
consolidation 
interventions. 
Salionze barrage: 
length 72 m, multiple 
openings with planar 
metallic floodgates; 
max. flow rate = 200 
m3/s 
Pozzolo divider and 
drain; max capacity 
130 m3/s.  
Casale di Goito 
divider and Diversivo 
Mincio: deviates the 
water of Mincio, 
bypassing Mantua and 
protecting it from 
floods. Floodgates 
regulated with remote 
control. 
No floods after 
1965. Flow rates 
almost reached the 
maximum 
thresholds in 1985 
2000, 2001, 2002, 
2010, 2013 (150-
185 m3/s released in 
Salionze). 
 
SCORE 1 -3 1,2,3 
Mincio in 
Mantua, 
Superior 
lake 
Secondary 
water 
network and 
drainage 
could raise 
the Lakes 
level. 
Vasarone 
dyke needs 
maintenance 
and 
consolidation 
interventions. 
Porta dei mulini or 
Vasarone dyke and 
flood gates, maintains 
the level of Superior 
lake at 17,40 m., 
Floodgates can be open 
in case of high water 
See first cell 
SCORE 1 -3 1,2,3 
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Element 
considered 
 
[S.E.] Strengthening effects 
[P.M.] Protection 
measures 
[H.E.] Historical 
events 
Interactions 
with other 
elements of 
the water 
network 
Criticalities 
of the 
hydraulic 
artefacts 
Hydraulic artefacts / 
levees etc. 
Mincio in 
Mantua, 
Median and 
Inferior 
lake, 
Vallazza 
Contribution 
of the city 
drainage 
system not 
calculated. 
Vallazza 
Fissero could 
discharge to 
Canal Bianco 
channel its 
maximum 
capacity in 
conjunction 
with other 
floods 
contribution, 
generating 
problems for 
the channel.  
 
Formigosa 
barrage 
needs 
maintenance 
and 
consolidation 
interventions; 
the Valdaro 
lifting plant 
and its 
regulation 
system are 
obsolete  
 
San Giorgio bridge 
Masetti bridge-dyke: 
employed only as 
bridge 
Formigosa hub: 
Closed for lakes height 
≥ 16.5 m.  
Valdaro lifting plant 
activated for water ≥ 
16.8 m. (flow rate = 
50 m3/s) 
Vallazza-Fissero drain 
discharges water into 
Canale Bianco, max 
flow rate 30 m3/s, it 
works alternatively to 
Valdaro lifting plant.  
Syphon of the 
Diversivo Mincio, 
passes under Vallazza-
Fissero . 
See first cell 
SCORE 1,5 -3 1,2,3 
Mincio 
downstream 
– from 
Formigosa 
to 
Governolo 
Potential 
break of the 
left Po levee; 
in 1951, Po 
reached here 
22,5 m.  
Return flow 
in Mincio 
riverbed 
provoked by 
high level of 
Po. 
Banks 
erosion and 
lowering of 
riverbed 
could threat 
the stability 
of the levees 
and of 
Governolo 
and Pozzolo 
bridges. 
1) Continuous levees 
from Formigosa to 
Governolo  
2) Governolo barrage 
and navigation lock, 
maintain the level of 
Mincio median and 
inferior lakes, and 
Vallazza 
See first cell 
SCORE 2 -3 1,2,3 
Secondary 
creeks to 
drain 
stagnant 
water. 
n.a. n.a. 
Lifting plants of Paiolo, 
Fossa Magistrale, Rio di 
Mantova and Angeli  
Little floods: Fosso 
Posta, Magistrale, 
Fossamana, Agnella 
return time: 20-50 
years. 
Some considerations on the rating attributed: first, as far as it concerns the measures of 
protection, it is possible to observe that in all the cases they received the maximum ratings. 
Indeed, the artificialized system of flow regulation and all the hydraulic artefacts 
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demonstrated to be adequate in facing flood events, despite of the minor criticalities 
encountered, and their high efficacy was expressed with the value attributed.  
For the Historical events, it is clear that from the hydraulic arrangement, no major floods hit 
Mantua, and no documents are available on return times and areas different from those 
reported in (A.D.B.Po, 2016). Therefore, the values attributed for the historical recurrence 
fully reflect the plan scenarios for high probability (=3), medium probability (=2), low 
probability (=1).  
For Strengthening effects, the superior lake assumes values slightly different from the other 
lakes and Vallazza, which are regulated by Governolo barrage and can be more influenced 
by the functioning of Formigosa hub. Therefore, lower values were assigned to the upstream 
portions, where the contribution of the secondary networks can be managed through the 
deviation of the water into Diversivo Mincio. Then, S.E. values slightly increase in the 
portion regulated by the complex hub of Formigosa, whose efficacy is essential for the 
protection of the city. In the portion from Formigosa to Governolo, the value of S.E. rises 
again, because this area is more subjected to the influence of Po river. However, the values 
attributed remain in a low range, because no explicit proofs of the criticalities above 
mentioned are reported. 
In relation to the secondary water networks, this system can produce a great influence on the 
potential flood hazards, provoking unexpected floods in turn; however, the municipal 
secondary network is not connoted by particular criticalities. Outside the Municipality, some 
creeks could increase Mincio flow rate, however until now this contribution has been 
managed by deviating Mincio river into Diversivo Mincio, giving the possibility to its 
riverbed to receive the waters of its tributaries. Unfortunately, for the secondary network, it 
was not possible to carry out a local in-depth analysis because of the lack of more in-depth 
data, therefore no values were attributed. 
Figure 26 and Figure 27 report two thematic maps representing the values assigned to the 
categories S.E. and H.E.    
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Figure 26: Thematic map of the flood hazard layer, S.E. 
110 Risk management and land use planning for environmental and asset protection 
purposes 
 
 
Figure 27: Thematic map of the flood hazard layer, H.E. 
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4.2.3 Industrial hazard characterization 
1) Data collection 
The information related to the industrial hazards were collected on the basis of several 
documents, like i.e. the E.R.I.R. planning for the city of Mantua 2012, the municipal 
Emergency Plan (2014), the external Emergency plans of the Seveso companies, etc. Due to 
confidentiality issues, it was not possible to obtain the Safety reports of the Seveso 
companies of Mantua; however, they were in phase of revision to be compliant with the 
Legislative Decree no. 105/2015, recently issued. The information on the Companies were 
recovered from Emergency plans, IPPC authorisations, the Services Conferences related to 
the environmental recovery, Environmental relations drafted by the Companies etc.  
As far as it concerns the so-called Seveso sub-thresholds plants and other hazardous non-
Seveso companies, this kind of industries should be always considered in the proposed 
methodology because, even if they do not detain a huge quantity of Seveso substances, they 
are subjected to a minor control with respect to the Seveso companies, and therefore could 
produce unforeseen events, also as a consequence of an external activation. Mantua hosts 
several industrial activities that would merit a further investigation (i.e. ex Burgo paper 
factory, paint factory Industria Colori Freddi San Giorgio, etc.), but unfortunately, they were 
not investigated because the process would have need a strict and long cooperation with the 
Municipality, not possible outside E.RI.R. drafting.  
INTRODUCTION 
Mantua industrial hub is located on the left bank of Mincio river, near to the Vallazza area, 
and includes 4 Seveso plants:  
• the petrochemical plant Versalis;  
• the gasoline and diesel deposit IES;  
• the plant for the production and storage of oxygen and hydrogen SAPIO  
• the plant for the production and storage of oxygen and hydrogen SOL.  
The area is crossed by two main roads, connoted by an intense traffic of hazardous goods: 
Provincial road SP28 (via Brennero), which links Mantua centre and the industrial zone with 
the A22 highway (direction East-West); and Provincial road SP482, which represents 
Mantua north bypass. The industrial area is also crossed by the railway and served by a 
dedicated station, from which railroad switches address the rail tankers to IES and Versalis 
plants. Both IES and Versalis plants supply their raw materials not only through roads and 
railways, but also via river and pipeline. Each plant has a dedicated dock; furthermore, 
Versalis is reached by three pipelines transporting benzene, ethylbenzene and cumene, while 
IES was formerly served by a pipeline for crude oil coming from Porto Marghera. 
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Outside the industrial hub, another important industry can be found: the ex Burgo paper 
factory, in the San Giorgio neighbourhood. Despite Burgo was not taken into account by the 
E.R.I.R., the information contained in the IPPC document documents suggest that it could 
be at least a Sub-threshold Seveso plant (Regione Lombardia, 2008). It produced recycled 
paper, bleached through a de-inking process based on the use of chlorine.  
Mantua E.R.I.R. (Comune di Mantova, 2012) reported the information and accidental 
scenarios extracted from the Safety reports of the 4 Seveso plants:  
 the petrochemical plant Versalis detains about 87.000 t of hazardous substances, mainly 
flammable, toxic and carcinogenic substances. The predominant scenarios are toxic 
releases, with probabilities from 10-4 to 10-6, whose IDLH can reach a maximum 
distance of 290 m. The extension of the reversible injuries areas reaches 1200 m. 
However, these scenarios barely outcome the boundaries of the plant, and interest areas 
with no human activities, except for some industrial areas on the south-east limit. 
 The plant IES worked as a refinery until 2014, and the information of E.R.I.R. were still 
related to that phase. It had an amount of hazardous substances of 500.000 t., mainly 
flammable. The scenarios consisted of pool fires related to the gasoline tanks, and of 
flashfire caused by the GPL tanks located in the north portion of the plant. In this case, 
the area for beginning of lethality reached 121 m., hitting a residential area adjacent to 
the plant; this incompatibility was pointed out by the E.R.I.R., therefore IES proceeded 
with the construction of a dedicated wall to protect the neighbourhood. In March 2014, 
the decommissioning of the refinery plant began, and only a portion of the storage was 
maintained. The crude oil was no more received and stored, so that the remained 
substances were mainly gasoline and diesel (IES, 2014).  
 SAPIO plant, located in front of Versalis, detains about 16 t. of hydrogen and oxygen, 
that means flammable and combustive agents. They can provoke jet fire scenarios with 
a medium probability, between 10-3 and 10-4, which do not overcome the plant 
boundaries, except for one, very reduced. 
 SOL is located inside Versalis area, and produces oxygen and other technical gases for 
the petrochemical plant; it detains about 3700 t. of oxygen. The scenarios are related to 
vapours releases, and are contained inside the plant boundaries. 
Figure 28, extracted from Mantua E.R.I.R., shows the spatial extension of the Seveso 
scenarios; it has to be noticed that those of IES still reflects the refinery asset. 
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Figure 28: Mantua E.R.I.R. tavola 3, accident scenarios  
In the end, with the exception of the GPL flash fire for IES, no incompatibilities were 
encountered and pointed out by the E.R.I.R.. In particular, no environmental scenarios are 
reported or analysed in this document, therefore they were probably excluded for their low 
probability in the Safety reports of the plants. 
However, concerning environment, the last two decades of analyses, conferences organized 
by the Ministry for the Environment, and surveys vouch for a completely different situation 
(Ministero dell’ambiente e della tutela del territorio e del mare, 2015) and (Ministero 
dell’ambiente e della tutela del territorio e del mare, 2016). The industrial hub, together with 
the Median, Inferior and Vallazza lakes, and portions of Mincio river, was declared with the 
law 172/2002 as Site of recovery of national interest (SIN), because of the severe situation 
of pollution encountered both in soil and waters. The SIN includes all the Seveso industries 
previously described, and other minor industrial activities, that also contributed to the 
pollution (i.e. the paint factory Industria Colori Freddi San Giorgio). The contamination 
observed for soil and subsoil is related to heavy metals, BTXEs (benzene, toluene, 
ethylbenzene and xylene), light and heavy hydrocarbons, dioxin. The underground waters 
present traces of aliphatic compounds, carcinogenic chlorinated compounds, heavy metals, 
IPA (polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons), MTBE (Methyl tert-butyl ether), ETBE (ethyl tert-
butyl ether). The light hydrocarbons created a supernatant spot extended for about 105.000 
m2 (according to 2015 survey campaign), which interests the underground waters under Ies, 
Versalis and the Industry Belleli Energy. Mincio river and the adjacent wetlands, included 
in the SIC-ZPS “Vallazza”, are the final receptors of the pollution in progress; indeed, there 
is an interchange with the underground waters, and furthermore, the Diversivo Mincio canal 
acts as a draining system for the phreatic waters, conducting the pollutants to the river. In 
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fact, even if the canal is entirely made of concrete, the investigations have reveled several 
fractures and areas of permeability. 
Starting from 2002, the implementation of a network of piezometers was financed and 
carried out by Government agencies, and entrusted to the interested companies and to ARPA 
(Regional Agency for the Enviroment Protection), for a coordinated monitoring of the 
underground water. Annual survey campaigns should be carried out, but not all the 
companies or private societies demonstrated the same level of commitment. The industries 
Ies, Versalis, Belleli Energy and Syndial (a society of ENI group which manage the Versalis 
areas to be recovered) also have the specific charge of measuring the thick of the supernatant 
spot. The following pollutants were observed:  
• mercury in the underground water under the ex chlorine-soda plant of Versalis and, 
downstream to this area, in the wet zone owned by Syndial, called the “Poison hill”, 
delimited by the petrochemical water intake from Mincio and the sewer canal of the 
plant, named “Sisma”. Mercury was also found in the riverbed of Sisma;  
• pollutants in the Versalis piezometers and wells located along the Diversivo Mincio;  
• chlorinated solvents in the area between the Versalis units ST20 and CER;   
• chlorinated solvents in the underground water under the painty factory Clorificio san 
Giorgio; 
• supernatant spot under the properties Ies, Belleli Energy, versalis and Syndial.  
Both Versalis and Ies were required by the authorities in charge to design dedicated systems 
to improve the environmental quality of their area; the Companies activated hydraulic 
barriers constituted by drainage wells to drain the supernatant, and Syndial carried out 
recovery activities in the areas of the Sisma canal, Diversivo Mincio and the “poison hill” of 
Versalis. The wider hydraulic barrier network belongs to IES: 64 wells, partly destined to 
the water drainage, partly equipped with the dual pump system, are dedicated to the suction 
of the supernatant spot. The water is treated in a dedicated plant (TAF), which has a capacity 
of 50 m3/h. Other 10 new wells, and the doubling of the treatment capacity from 50 m3/h to 
108 m3/h, are on progress.   
Despite of the above-mentioned measures, (Ministero dell’ambiente e della tutela del 
territorio e del mare, 2016) pointed out that the hydraulic barriers are not sufficient: the 
elevated pollutant concentration remained stable, and the contamination was detected also 
downstream the barriers. I.e., one of the piezometer Versalis showed a benzene concentration 
of 177.000 µg/l, while the accepted threshold values should be ≤ 1 µg/l.  The severe situation 
of pollution currently present in the SIN is mainly a heritage of the past productions and 
management of the industrial area, however it cannot be excluded that some sources of 
contamination are still present today.  
The consequences of the contamination are not only problematic for the environment, but 
also for the people’s health; some studies have already been carried out in Mantua, to verify 
the possible impact. (ASL Privincia di Mantova, 2007) studied the dioxin concentration in 
plasma for Mantua population, in particular for that of the neighborhoods near to the 
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industrial hub, and the incidence of a peculiar type of sarcoma associated to it. In the 
Nineties, during the years of activity of Versalis chlorine-soda plant, and of the ex Burgo 
paper Factory, both the incinerators of the two factories burnt chlorinated residuals, 
producing dioxin. The study concluded that for the people living near to the industrial hub, 
the association between the exposition to the industrial emissions and the sarcoma arising 
appeared credible. 
IES  
STRENGTHENING EFFECTS: the quantity of detained hazardous substances, the presence 
of assets particularly exposed to NaTech risks (i.e. tanks, pipelines etc.) and the identified 
scenarios were taken into account. 
Ies is dedicated to the storage of oily products, mainly gasoline and diesel; certain data on 
the quantity of substances detained are not available, however the plant has a large number 
of atmospheric tanks, which are considered the item more exposed to NaTech risk. The 
storage park is composed of 87 atmospheric tanks, whose capacity varies from 60.000 m3 to 
1000 m3; the majority of the tanks has a floating roof. 8 horizontal underground tanks host 
LPG – liquefied petroleum gas. The whole storage capacity is around 680.000 m3.  
The products arrive through rail tankers, tanker trucks, and river barges, that constitute other 
items sensitive to possible NaTech events.  
Finally, IES has a plant for the treatment of the drained water (TAS), with open collection 
basins, exposed to potential overflow.  
Figure 29 represents the layout of IES plant, with the relevant hazardous substances 
detained: Green = gasoline; Purple = diesel fuel; Red = LPG; Acid green = biodiesel, 
kerosene, MTBE/ETBE; Brown = heating oil; Black = slop (residuals of oil products)  
The areas defined with the orange line belong to the former refinery, decommissioned in 
2014; the grey areas are tanks no more in use; the light blue area is the water treatment plant.  
The tanks whose colour is not full are those destined by the plant management to “Stand-
by”: they are not normally operative, but can be used to manage the variations in the quantity 
of products stored.  
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Figure 29: IES storage layout 
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The available scenarios are still related to the refinery phase, but according to (IES, 2014), 
those for gasoline and LPG remained valid after the decommissioning (see Table 28). Only 
fire consequences were identified.  
Table 28: IES scenarios for gasoline and LPG  
 
Substanc
e 
Event 
Scena
rio 
Frequ
ency/y
ear 
Proba
bility 
class 
High 
lethali
ty 
Begin
ning 
of 
lethali
ty 
Irreve
rsible 
woun
ds 
IDLH 
Rever
sible 
woun
ds 
Gasoline 
Release in basin SR5-6 
due to overfilling of the 
floating roof tanks 
Pool 
fire 
<10-6 <10-6 35 61 77 98 
Release in basin SR202-
203-204 due to 
overfilling of the 
floating roof tanks  
Pool 
fire 
4*10-6 
10-4 - 10-
6 
25 45 50 60 
LPG 
Release from the 
coupling pipeline/pump  
Flash 
fire 
1,2*10-4 10-3  10-4 67 96 - - 
Release for break of the 
loading arm  
Flash 
fire 
5,9*10-6 10-4 10-6 98 121 - - 
HISTORICAL EVENTS: Besides the presence of the supernatant spot, whose extension was 
not reduced by the hydraulic barrier, the case history produced by (IES, 2013) showed 
releases from tanks, pipelines, TAS with minor consequences for the environment.   
- 25/12/1994, gasoline release from S13 tank, accumulation in the containment basin not 
waterproofed, penetration into the ground;  
- 25/06/1999, kerosene release from a flanged coupling on a pipeline inside the waterproof 
containment basin of tank 150; 
- 13/09/2008, the intense rainy event caused the overflowing of the API separator system 
of the TAS, which interested some adjacent containment basins;   
- 07/04/2010, release from an underground pipeline between the tanks 5 and 7; 
- 08/08/2012, release of water contaminated by hydrocarbons from S39 tank, during 
maintenance operations.  
A program to equip the tanks with dedicated systems to detect overfilling started in 2015; 
periodic checks are carried out to verify the integrity and seal through acoustic emission (EA 
test). However, it was not possible to verify, from the available documents, if the tanks are 
provided or not with double bottom. The main criticality encountered is the lack of a 
waterproof containment basin that is missing for all the biggest tanks. 
PROTECTION MEASURES: The protection measures are described in the following lines; 
all the information collected were inserted into the checklists reported in Table 8 and Table 
9 to check their efficacy against pollution and NaTech events (See Annex II – Versalis and 
Ies protection measures).  
 atmospheric tanks: 1) fire detection system, constituted by thermosensitive cables 
located near the seal of the roofs; 2) foam discharge devices on the roof, to address the 
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foam exactly in the area where usually the gas releases, and the consequent fire takes 
place.  The foam discharge device can be fed with a fixed system or through tanker 
trucks. 3) Shell plating externally cooled. 4) Installation on progress of logic solvers 
able to detect and activate dedicated emergency procedures for: fire / roof inclination / 
overfilling or over emptying / isolation. For the fixed roof tanks, it was foreseen the 
detection of overfilling. 5) Containment: trip system related to high and low levels. 
Presence of basins of containment, or dykes, also to avoid accidental collisions; tanks 
equipped with an external concrete logline, connected to a cockpit with a dedicated 
pump, aimed at collecting minor releases or operational discharge to draining system.    
 Pipelines: The pipeline paths are developed in protected areas, to avoid collisions with 
vehicles. The major part is located on open racks, to be more easily inspected.   
 LPG tanks and LPG loading areas: thermosensitive cables for fire detection, and gas 
release detection system placed in loading areas, tanks and pumps. For gases, sensors 
are present at the entry and exit points of the pipelines from the mounds, and inferior 
portions of the mounds. Since the tanks are entombed, as required by the Ministerial 
Decree D.M.13.10.94, they would not need cooling system or fixed foam discharge 
devices; however, they are equipped with a water fixed plant. The LPG loading area, 
the control room, the pumps and their surroundings are protected with pulverized water, 
and foamy systems. The whole area is also equipped with portable fire extinguishers 
and hoses.    
 Dock: the area is protected by 4 fire-fighting monitors, that can be fed with water or 
foam, which are distributed on the 2 loading/unloading piers. The measures to avoid 
releases are: reduction of flanged couplings; motorized valves on the transport lines; 
jacketed pipelines in the underground portions.  
 Tank trucks and rail tankers loading areas: the loading areas for trucks are equipped 
with a fixed cooling system and with a fire-fighting system with automatic activation. 
The latter is constituted by 2 water-foam cannons; 5 fire hydrants. The loading areas for 
rail tankers are equipped with cooling system and fire-fighting foamy system with 
manual activation.  
Ratings assignation 
Table 29 shows the ratings assignation for IES. The first column reports the macro-category 
Strengthening effects, evaluated on the basis of the items, type and quantity of substances 
(toxic (T), flammable (F), dangerous for the environment (N)), and scenarios. The second 
column is related to the Protection measures, both adopted for the single item, or general for 
pollution and NaTech events. The third column is related to all the accidental events 
registered for the plant. The impossibility to consult the Safety Reports introduced some 
uncertainties in the evaluation; in case of lack of information, a precautionary judge was 
attributed.  
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Table 29: Ratings assignation for IES plant 
S.E. STRENGTHENING EFFECTS  P.M. PROTECTION MEASURES 
H.E. HISTORICAL 
EVENTS 
Assets / items with potential 
NaTech risk Substan
ce 
Scenari
os  
Protection 
measure 
related to the 
item 
Protection 
measures for Na-
tech / pollution 
events 
N
o 
Item description 
31 Fixed roof tank, 2000 m3 
Biodiesel 
(F, N) 
n.a. 
Unique 
waterproof 
containment 
basin, for the 
tanks 31- 46 
(excepted 40, 
41). Trip for 
high and low 
levels. Cooling 
system for the 
external coating 
and roof. 
POLLUTION the 
plant adopted many 
measures foreseen by 
(Provincia di Torino, 
2010). However, it 
was not possible to 
verify if there are 
system of automatic 
block of the water 
discharge into 
Mincio, and many 
tanks have no 
waterproof 
pavement. 
 
NATECH: No 
specific measures 
result adopted against 
NaTech events; 
unfortunately, many 
information are not 
available, however 
the documents for 
IPPC did not mention 
a plan for area 
events, and 
consequent dedicated 
actions. 
POLLUTION: IES is 
included in Mantua national 
area of recovery  (SIN), 
which is affected by a at least 
30-years of pollution. The 
supernatant spot of 
hydrocarbons detected on the 
underground water of the 
industrial area originated 
under Ies plant, and then 
expanded towards Versalis 
and Belleli energy. Despite of 
the containment barriers 
activated by the plant, in 
2015 the surveys made 
through the piezometers for 
monitoring the water table 
show no decrease in the 
values of the pollutants.  
Some accidents related to 
release took place in the 
plant, but no releases are 
considered in the safety 
report. 
 
EVENTS: the area is 
included in the ADBPO area 
for catastrophic flood (C), 
some parts of the tanks 9 and 
8 are included in the A areas, 
were the flood could be more 
likely.  No events in the last 
years hit the area. 
The area is connoted by 
seismic soil Z4, where it was 
encountered a level of 
amplification higher than the 
thresholds. 
Past intense rainy events 
cause problem to the drainage 
and water treatment system. 
32 Fixed roof tank, 5750 m3 
Diesel 
fuel (F,N) 
n.a. 
33 Fixed roof tank, 2000 m3 
34 Fixed roof tank, 5750 m3 
35 
Fixed roof tank (standby), 
2000 m3 
36 Fixed roof tank, 5750 m3 
37 Fixed roof tank, 2000 m3 
38 Fixed roof tank, 5750 m3 
39 Fixed roof tank, 2000 m3 
44 
Fixed roof tank (standby), 
1000 m3 
45 Fixed roof tank, 1000 m3 Kerosene 
(F, N) 
n.a. 
46 Fixed roof tank, 1000 m3 
40 
Fixed roof tank (stand-
by), 10000 m3 
Burning 
oil (F, N) 
n.a. 
Unique 
waterproof 
containment 
basin. Trip high 
and low levels. 
Cooling system 
for external 
coating, roof. 
41 
Fixed roof tank (stand-
by), 10000 m3 
109 
Floating roof tank, 40000 
m3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gasolin
e (F, N) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Release 
for 
overfilli
ng 
(Tanks 
5-6) 
Each tank has 
its not-
waterproof 
containment 
basin, with 
circumference 
concrete curbs 
with raceways 
to collect minor 
releases. Trip 
for high and low 
levels. Cooling 
system for the 
external coating 
and roof. Foam 
discharge 
devices along 
the roof sealing. 
 
2 
Floating roof tank (stand-
by), 7000 m3 
3 
Floating roof tank, 7000 
m3 
4 
Floating roof tank, 7000 
m3,  
5 
Floating roof tank (stand-
by), 10000 m3 
6 
Floating roof tank, 10000 
m3 
9 
Floating roof tank, 28000 
m3 
13 
Floating roof tank (stand-
by), 1000 m3 
20 
Floating roof tank (stand-
by), 5000 m3 
22 
Floating roof tank (stand-
by), 5000 m3 
23 
Floating roof tank (stand-
by), 2250 m3 
25 
Floating roof tank (stand-
by), 2250 m3 
27 
Floating roof tank (stand-
by), 1000 m3 
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S.E. STRENGTHENING EFFECTS  P.M. PROTECTION MEASURES 
H.E. HISTORICAL 
EVENTS 
Assets / items with potential 
NaTech risk Substan
ce 
Scenari
os  
Protection 
measure 
related to the 
item 
Protection 
measures for Na-
tech / pollution 
events 
N
o 
Item description 
28 
Floating roof tank (stand-
by), 5000 m3 
Gasolin
e (F, N) 
30 
Floating roof tank (stand-
by), 5000 m3 
110 
Floating roof tank, 40000 
m3 
Diesel 
fuel (F, 
N) 
n.a. 
Equal to 
gasoline tanks 
111 
Floating roof tank, 60000 
m3 
1 
Floating roof tank, 7000 
m3 
14 
Floating roof tank, 2000 
m3 
MTBE/
ETBE 
(F) 
n.a. 
122 
Horizontal tank (stand-
by), 252 m3 
LPG (F) 
Release 
for 
rupture 
loading 
arms, or 
coupling 
pipeline
-pump 
Underground 
tanks  
123 
Horizontal tank (stand-
by), 252 m3 
124 
Horizontal tank (stand-
by), 252 m3 
125 
Horizontal tank (stand-
by), 252 m3 
126 
Horizontal tank (stand-
by), 252 m3 
137 
Horizontal tank (stand-
by), 252 m3 
138 
Horizontal tank (stand-
by), 252 m3 
139 
Horizontal tank (stand-
by), 252 m3 
_ 
Pipelines for product 
transfer 
Hydrocar
bon and 
other 
products 
(F, N) 
n.a. 
Pipelines above-
ground, or with 
coating for 
inspection 
- 
Quay for the uploading 
and downloading 
Various 
(F) 
n.a. 
  
- 
Water treatment system 
for oily drainage 
Polluted 
liquids 
Overflo
w of the 
basins  
  
SCORE 
2,5 -1 2 
The score assigned to IES for the Strengthening Effects is between moderate and high (2,5), 
because of the detained quantity of flammable and pollutant substances (136.500 m3 of 
gasoline, 139.000 m3 of diesel fuel), and the considerable quantity of items vulnerable to 
external events (atmospheric tanks). Similarly, a medium value was assigned to the 
Historical Events (2): the severe pre-existing conditions of pollution, confirmed by the 
periodical surveys carried out every year, may suggest that some sources of pollution are still 
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active; also, the case accident collection from the plant showed multiple cases of releases in 
the soil. In addition, even if no flood events or seismic damages hit the plant after its 
construction, the plant is located in an area that could be affected by unforeseen 
consequences, i.e. because the amplification factor of the soil is high. Intense rainy events 
have already caused some problems. 
For the Protection measures, it was assigned a reduced value (-1). Even if the plant adopted 
many measures requested by (Provincia di Torino, 2010), no particular measures seemed to 
be addressed to possible NaTech events (see Annex II). Since it was not possible to go in-
depth with the specific provisions adopted by the plant, a precautionary low value was 
assigned in this case. The absence of waterproof pavement for the containment basins, a 
factor that facilitate the pollutant penetration in the soils, was also taken into account. 
Versalis 
Versalis is a petrochemical plant active from the end of the Fifties; its production is organized 
in three different cycles: 1) styrene monomer; 2) styrene polymers; 3) intermediate products 
(phenol, acetone, hydrogenated). The productive cycle of “styrene monomer” employs as 
raw materials ethylene and benzene, transforming them into ethylbenzene and finally into 
styrene monomer. This substance is the raw material for the cycle “Polystyrene”: it is 
polymerized, also with acrylonitrile and rubber, to obtain several types of Styrofoam, 
addressed to automotive, house and packaging sectors. The productive cycle “Intermediate 
products” is based on cumene and hydrogen (obtained from the de-hydrogenation of 
ethylbenzene), whose transformation returns phenol, acetone, alpha-methylstyrene, 
acetophenone, cumene hydroperoxide, cyclohexanol, cyclohexanone. 
The plant has a storage park with capacity equal to 170.000 m3; it also hosts a research center 
with pilot equipment, a plant for the water treatment connected to an incinerator, plants for 
the production and distribution of water (demi, industrial). Table 30 shows the main 
departments of Versalis plant (Ministero dell’ambiente e della tutela del territorio e del mare, 
2011); their location is reported in Figure 30. 
Table 30: Versalis main departments  
ID Description Department Description 
1 Styrene production 
ST20 Styrene production 
ST40 Styrene production 
2 
Raw chemical 
production 
PR7 Phenol and other raw chemicals production  
PR11 Hydrogenated phenol production 
3 
Polymers production 
and 
storage/transportation of 
solid products 
ST12 
Crystal and expandable polystyrene (GPPS  and EPS) 
production 
ST14 Expandable polystyrene (EPS) production 
N8 ST8 Rubber dissolution in styrene 
ST15 Anti-collision polystyrene (HIPS) production 
ST16 
Co-polymer ABS/HIPS and crystal polystyrene 
(GPPS) production 
ST17 
Co-polymer SAN and crystal polystyrene (GPPS) 
production 
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ID Description Department Description 
ST18 
Co-polymer ABS and Anti-collision polystyrene 
(HIPS) production 
SG12 Storage and transportation of solid products 
MS2 Warehouse 
4 
Storage/transportation 
of liquid products 
LCE/MSL Storage/transportation of liquid products 
5 Waste incineration SG30 Waste incineration 
Other activities 
  SG40 Water treatment 
  GSA Auxiliary services 
 
STRENGTHENING EFFECTS: Versalis detains huge quantities of hazardous substances, 
reported in Table 31 and Table 32 (Comune di Mantova, 2012), (Prefettura di Mantova, 
2012). The substances are toxic, flammable and dangerous for the environment. 
Table 31: Main hazardous substances detained by Versalis plant 
Substanc
e 
Max. 
quantity 
(t) 
Classifica
tion ex 
CEE 
67/548  
Classification 
ex CLP 
1272/2008 
Description 
Styrene 16688 R10 
H226, H332 
H315 
H319 
flammable liquid and vapors 
Alpha-
methylsty
rene 
959 
R10 
R51/53 
R36/37 
H226 H319 
H335 H411 
toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects, is 
a flammable liquid and vapors, 
Acrylonitr
ile 
1645 
R23/24/2
5 
R11 
R51/53 
H225 H350 
H331 H311 
H301 
H335 H315 
H318 
H317 H411 
Toxic if swallowed, toxic in contact with skin, 
toxic if inhaled, may cause cancer,  toxic to 
aquatic life with long lasting effects, highly 
flammable liquid and vapors, 
Phenol 6561 
R68 
R48 
R24, R25 
H314 H341 
H373 
H311 
H331 
toxic if swallowed, Toxic in contact with skin, 
toxic if inhaled,  
toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects. 
Acetone 9433 R11 
H225 H304 
H316 H320 
highly flammable liquid and vapors 
Cumene 21305 R10 
H226 H304 
H335 H411 
toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects, 
flammable liquid and vapors 
Benzene 22476 
R11 
R23/24/2
5 
H225 H315 
H319 H304 
H340 H350 
H372 
may cause genetic defects, may cause cancer, 
highly flammable liquid and vapors, harmful to 
aquatic life with long lasting effects. 
Cyclohex
anol, 
cyclohexa
none 
7781 R10 H226 H332 highly flammable liquid and vapors 
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Table 32: Overall quantities of hazardous substances detained by Versalis 
Categories of substances or 
compounds 
Maximum quantity (t) 
Superior Threshold D.Lgs. 
334/1999 (t) 
Toxic 59626,719 200 
Oxidising 551 200 
Explosive 5,78 200 
Flammable 60915,269 50000 
Highly flammable 517,456 200 
Liquids highly flammable 64773,065 200 
Extremely flammable 352,507 50 
Dangerous for the environment 220,594 200 
Dangerous for the environment 30143,005 200 
Items exposed to NaTech: Versalis storage park is located in its southern portion; 80 tanks 
store: acrylonitrile 1.500 m3, benzene 27.500 m3, ethylbenzene 15.000 m3, gasoline 10.000 
m3, dehydrogenated mixture 5.000 m3, nonene 2.000 m3, acetone 12.000 m3, cyclohexanone 
8.000 m3, olone 2.000 m3, cumene 26.500 m3, styrene 16.000 m3, pentane 351 m3, phenolic 
water 5.000 m3, oily water 10.000 m3. 25 tanks are pressurized, while the others are 
atmospheric with floating roof (benzene and derivates) or fixed roof; since December 2014, 
they are all equipped with double bottom. Every department also has process tanks, with 
smaller dimensions. Other sensitive items are: 
 the three pipelines from Porto Marghera, containing: 1) cumene, benzene, ethylbenzene, 
separated by water; and the internal pipelines of the plant used for the products transfer.    
 The loading/unloading areas are both for rail tankers, tank trucks and barges; they are 
located in the following zones, reported in Figure 30: zone XXXI – loading of styrene 
acetone cyclohexanone olone; zone XXVIII – loading of oily and chemical products; 
zone XXV: loading of pentane; dock - loading of acetone / styrene /ethylbenzene. 
 Basins of the oily and acid water treatment systems, located nearby the storage plant 
and in the east part of the plant, close to the incinerator. Different drainage networks are 
present in the plant, one for acid process water, the second for oily process water (which 
include those extracted from the underground water for the recovery of the supernatant), 
and the last two for the cooling water and rainy water. After the treatment, all the 
networks are addressed to the drain canal called “Sisma”, that flows into Mincio river 
before Formigosa.  
 The incinerator tower, the three plant torches, and the distillation towers are high and 
thin structures sensitive to earthquake effects. The first is authorized for the thermic 
destruction of 6.132 t/y of liquid and solid wastes; it also burns the residuals of the water 
treatments. The torches are connected to the emergency and safety vents of the 
departments PR11, PR7, ST14, ST20, ST40, and of the storage park. The distillation 
towers treat phenol and styrene. 
Figure 30 reports the layout of Versalis plant, with the main productive departments; the 
relevant hazardous substances are identified with: red for flammable substances; green for 
substances dangerous for the environment; purple for toxic substances; grey for the tanks not 
in use, and acid green for the tanks and basins containing drainage oily and acid waters. 
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Figure 30: Versalis layout 
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Versalis scenarios are related to toxic releases (see Table 33); the distances of the damage 
areas (IDLH) are moderate and slightly overcome the plant boundaries. According to the 
Safety report, cited in Mantua E.R.I.R. (Comune di Mantova, 2012), in the process areas 
there is no risk of relevant environmental accidents, because all the equipment and tanks are 
placed on a waterproof concrete slab, and the possible releases are collected by the drainage 
system. The loading/unloading areas have waterproof pavement too, while no substances 
dangerous for the environment are treated at the dock. Possible releases could take place in 
the areas where no waterproof pavement is present, i.e. along the pipeline paths of cumene, 
benzene, ethylbenzene, pentane; but the occurring of serious consequences was excluded in 
the Safety report.  
Table 33: Versalis scenarios 
Substance Dep. Accidental event 
Scenari
o 
Yearly 
frequenc
y 
Probabil
ity class 
High 
lethality 
LC50 
Beginnin
g of 
lethality 
Irreversi
ble 
wounds 
IDLH 
Reversib
le 
wounds 
Acrylonitril
e 
CER 
Release from 
pipeline arriving 
to CER 
Toxic 
release 
2,54*10-5 10-4 10-6 22 - 145 1200 
Benzene CER 
Release from 
pipeline arriving 
to CER 
Toxic 
release 
4,6*10-5 10-4 10-6 11 - 73 440 
Acrylonitril
e 
Storag
e park 
Release from 
flexible pipe for 
rail tankers 
unloading 
Toxic 
release 
1,31*10-5 10-4  10-6 22 - 187 715 
Benzene 
Storag
e park 
Release from 
transport pipeline 
Toxic 
release 
2*10-5 10-4 10-6 72 - 270 1550 
Separated 
product12 
PR7 
Release from 
sending pipe from 
pump GA-1110 
Toxic 
release 
3,34*10-5 10-4 10-6 8 - 115 740 
Separated 
product 
PR7 
Release from the 
sealing of pump 
GA-1110 
Toxic 
release 
5*10-4 10-3 10-4 13 - 62 512 
Flammable 
liquid 
hydrocarbo
n 
SAU 
Overfilling 
accumulator D20 
Toxic 
release 
2,49*10-5 10-4 10-6 10 - 70 430 
Acrylonitril
e 
ST16 
Release from 
feeding lines 
Toxic 
release 
3,34*10-5 10-4  10-6 20 - 290 1205 
Flammable 
liquid 
ST40 
Explosion in torch 
B-1700 
Confine
d 
explosio
n 
3,09*10-6 10-4  10-6 8 15 28 50 
 
More in-depth information on the environmental events were provided for the IPPC 
procedure: (Versalis, 2015) identified the possible “Dangerous points” for release of cumene, 
benzene, ethylbenzene, pentane, in accordance to the Ministerial Decree 272/2014 (internal 
                                                 
12 Phenol, acetone, alpha-methylstyrene, cumene 
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transport pipelines). In addition, a survey campaign was carried out on the piezometers:  the 
presence of cumene and benzene in the underground water resulted by far higher than the 
thresholds established by the legislative Decree 152/2006. (Versalis, 2015) ascribed these 
parameters to the previous Company management, but did not excluded a possible on-going 
contamination, given the particular hydrogeological characteristics of the site. 
It has to be highlighted that, as for long portions of the pipelines, the tanks of the storage 
park are not equipped with a waterproof pavement; they only have a circumference concrete 
logline aimed at addressing minor releases to the oily drainage system.     
In relation to IPPC procedures, (ENI Versalis, 2012) also evaluated possible Area events, 
earthquake, flood and energy shutdown. As far as it concerns the flood, it was simulated the 
maximum level reachable by the lakes, with the drain canal Vallazza correctly functioning; 
it resulted in 19,45 m. Since the ground levels of Versalis plant beyond Sisma canal are 
between 21 and 23 meters, the possibility of flood was excluded, and no dedicated measures 
against flood were adopted. For seismic events, Versalis prepared and transmitted to the 
competent authorities the 0 level seismic data sheets, aimed at give a basic idea of the seismic 
vulnerability of some equipment and buildings of the plant. Finally, for the electric supply, 
the plant in case of necessity can pass from a 380kV feeding to a 220 kV one; the areas of 
production of the polymers are also equipped with 3 generators, similarly to the firefighting 
system, which has 1 generator. 
PROTECTION MEASURES: The main protection measures and procedures adopted in the 
plant are described in the following lines; all the information collected were inserted into the 
checklists reported in Table 8 and Table 9 to check their efficacy against pollution and 
NaTech events (See Annex II).  
 Firefighting system: underground water network composed by 256 hydrants, pressure 
10 bar, fed by two electric pumps (capacity 250 m3/h and 500 m3/h) and two motor 
pumps with capacity 1000 m3/h. In normal condition, the 250 m3/h electric pump 
maintains pressure. A generator starts the motor pumps in case of electric shutdown.   
 Containment: the tanks of the storage park are equipped with double bottom; the 
Company is progressively equipping also 50 department tanks with double bottom. The 
storage tanks containing acrylonitrile, styrene, acetone, cyclohexanone, olone are 
insulated to reduce the heat exchange and the emissions. All the tanks are equipped with 
level monitoring, transmitted to DCS and alarmed; within 2019, a second high-level 
detector, with block for too high level, shall be installed. For the acrylonitrile tanks, a 
gas chromatograph is installed in the double bottom to immediately detect a potential 
release. Monitoring program: for the double bottom tanks → absence of product 
between the two bottoms verified every 3 months; external inspection every 5 years; 
complete inspection every 20 years. For the single bottom tanks → the integrity tested 
with EA test every 5 years; bottom sealing tested with tracer test every 2 years; external 
inspection every 5 years; complete inspection every 10 years.   
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Process areas and the loading / unloading areas are placed on waterproof concrete 
pavement, equipped with curbs which address potential releases to the drainage system.   
There are not underground tanks or underground pipelines containing process fluids.  
The pipelines, placed on racks, and the equipment are also subjected to periodical 
monitoring campaigns: an external inspection is carried out every 5 years, but also 
ultrasonic surveys of thickness, magnetic examination and other surveys are carried out. 
The portions of racks crossing the plant rail or roads are monitored through a dedicated 
coating, which allows detecting eventual releases.  From 1990, the lines are inserted in 
an Inspection Manager tool, which keeps under control the monitoring activities and the 
needs of maintenance.  
HISTORICAL EVENTS: No information on Versalis case history is available, but the plant 
is partially responsible of the severe pollution encountered in the area. 
Ratings assignation 
Table 34 shows the ratings assignation for Versalis. The first column reports the macro-
category Strengthening effects, evaluated on the basis of the items, type and quantity of 
substances (toxic (T), flammable (F), dangerous for the environment (N)), and scenarios. 
The second column is related to the Protection measures, both adopted for the single item, 
or general for pollution and NaTech events. The third column is related to all the accidental 
events registered for the plant. The impossibility to consult the Safety Reports introduced 
some uncertainties in the evaluation; in case of lack of information, a precautionary judge 
was attributed.  
Table 34: Ratings assignation for Versalis plant 
S.E. STRENGTHENING EFFECTS  P.M. PROTECTION MEASURES 
H.E. HISTORICAL EVENTS Assets / items with potential 
NaTech risk 
Substanc
e 
Scenario
s  
Protection 
measure related 
to the item 
Protection measures 
for Na-tech / 
pollution events No Item description 
421 Fixed roof tank, 750 m3 
Acrylonitril
e (T,F,N) 
Toxic 
release: 
flexible 
duct for 
unloadin
g  
Waterproof 
containment 
basins, concrete 
curbs connected to 
DA405. Double 
bottom, 
insulation. 
NATECH: No specific 
measures were 
adopted for flood 
events.  
Concerning the table 
reported in (Cruz et 
al., 2004), only 10/31 
measures can be 
considered adopted; 
no structural 
interventions were 
made on the tanks, 
like anchoring or 
construction of 
containment walls. 
No intervention is 
mentioned against 
lightening 
VERSALIS is included in 
Mantua national area of 
decontamination (SIN), 
which is affected by a at least 
30-years of pollution. 
Despite of the containment 
barriers and protective 
measures imposed by the 
Government, the piezometers 
still register parameters for 
benzene and other hazardous 
substances higher than the 
thresholds. 
As far as it concerns floods, 
according to (ENI Versalis, 
2013), the maximum height 
reachable by Mantua lakes 
during an exceptional raining 
422 Fixed roof tank, 750 m3 
401 Floating roof tank, 5000 m3 
Benzene 
(F) 
n.a. 
Non-waterproof 
containment 
basins, concrete 
curbs connected to 
DA405. Double 
bottoms. 
 
403 Floating roof tank, 5000 m3 
404 Floating roof tank, 5000 m3 
409 Floating roof tank, 10000 m3 
415 Floating roof tank, 2000 m3 
406 Floating roof tank, 5000 m3 
Ethylbenze
ne (F) 
n.a. 
407 Floating roof tank, 10000 m3 
431 Floating roof tank, 1000 m3 
432 Floating roof tank, 1000 m3 
416 Floating roof tank, 2000 m3 
Semi 
finished 
toluene (F) 
n.a. 
417 Floating roof tank, 2000 m3 
450 Floating roof tank, 2000 m3 
451 Floating roof tank, 2000 m3 
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S.E. STRENGTHENING EFFECTS  P.M. PROTECTION MEASURES 
H.E. HISTORICAL EVENTS Assets / items with potential 
NaTech risk 
Substanc
e 
Scenario
s  
Protection 
measure related 
to the item 
Protection measures 
for Na-tech / 
pollution events No Item description 
428 Floating roof tank, 1000 m3  
POLLUTION: 15/22 
measures 
recommended by 
(Provincia di Torino, 
2010) were adopted 
event, with return time = 100 
years and last d = 96 ore, 
could go from m 18,50 to m 
19,00. 
Since Versalis plant is 
located on a river terrace 
whose heights vary from  m 
22,00 to m 23,00, the 
hydraulic risk for the plant 
was excluded.  However, the 
calculation did not take into 
account the possible 
obstruction of Scaricatore 
Vallazza-fissero 
429 Floating roof tank, 1000 m3 
402 Floating roof tank, 5000 m3 
Styrene 
dehydrogen
ated 
mixture (F) 
n.a. 
1001 Fixed roof tank, 2000 m3 
Cyclohexa
none (F) 
n.a. Non-waterproof 
containment 
basins, concrete 
curbs connected to 
DA405 (Double 
bottoms, 
insulation). 
1002 Fixed roof tank, 1000 m3 
460 Fixed roof tank, 5000 m3 
1003 Fixed roof tank, 1000 m3 
Olone - KA 
oil 
cyclohexan
ol and 
cyclohexan
one (F) 
n.a. 
1004 Fixed roof tank, 1000 m3 
408 Floating roof tank, 10000 m3 
Cumene (F, 
N) 
n.a. 
Non-waterproof 
containment 
basins, concrete 
curbs connected to 
DA405. Double 
bottoms 
430 Floating roof tank, 1000 m3 
452 Floating roof tank, 5000 m3 
453 Floating roof tank, 5000 m3 
455 Floating roof tank, 5000 m3 
1005 Fixed roof tank, 2000 m3 
Styrene (F) 
n.a. 
 
Ground 
containment 
basins, concrete 
curbs connected to 
DA405. Double 
bottom; insulation 
1006 Fixed roof tank, 2000 m3 
1007 Fixed roof tank, 1000 m3 
1008 Fixed roof tank, 5000 m3 
1010 Fixed roof tank, 2000 m3 
1013 Fixed roof tank, 2000 m3 
1014 Fixed roof tank, 2000 m3 
1017 Floating roof tank, 500 m3 
Benzene 
(F) 
n.a. 
Ground 
containment 
basins, concrete 
curbs connected to 
DA405. Double 
bottom;  
1018 Floating roof tank, 500 m3 
Cumene (F, 
N) 
n.a. 
482 Horizontal tank, 117 m3 
Pentane (F, 
N) 
n.a. 
Ground 
containment 
basins, concrete 
curbs connected to 
DA405. No 
double bottom 
483 Horizontal tank, 117 m3 
484 Horizontal tank, 117 m3 
ST20 
 
10 tanks with fixed roofs, 
capacity from 75 to 770 m3 
Styrene, 
benzene (F) 
n.a. 
Waterproof 
basins, concrete 
curbs addressed to 
DA405. No 
double bottom for 
some tanks 
ST40 
8 with fixed roofs, capacity 
from 45 to 1000 m3 
Styrene, 
benzene (F) 
n.a. 
Waterproof 
basins, connected 
with the drainage 
system  
PR7 
 
30 tanks with fixed roofs, 
capacity from 100 to 1000 
m3 (phenol) 
alpha 
methyl 
styrene, 
phenol, 
cumene, 
Hydrocarb
ons (T,F,N) 
Releases 
from the 
ducts of 
the pump 
GA1110 
Waterproof basin 
with containment 
walls, connected 
with the oily 
drainage system  
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S.E. STRENGTHENING EFFECTS  P.M. PROTECTION MEASURES 
H.E. HISTORICAL EVENTS Assets / items with potential 
NaTech risk 
Substanc
e 
Scenario
s  
Protection 
measure related 
to the item 
Protection measures 
for Na-tech / 
pollution events No Item description 
PR11  
 
14 tanks with fixed roofs, 
capacity from 100 to 1000 
m3  
alpha 
methyl 
styrene, 
phenol (T, 
F, N) 
n.a. 
Waterproof basin 
with containment 
walls, connected 
with the oily 
drainage system  
ST12
-15-
16-
17-
28  
20 pressurized tanks, 
capacity from 4 to 120 m3 
(styrene) 
alpha 
methyl 
styrene, 
styrene, 
ethylbenze
ne (F,N) 
n.a. 
Waterproof 
pavements, 
connected to the 
oily drainage 
system  
ST14 
 
9 pressurized and fixed roof 
tanks, capacity from 0,15 to 
10 m3  (pentane) 
Styrene 
Pentane 
(F,N) 
n.a. 
Waterproof 
pavements, 
connected to the 
oily drainage 
system  
S.G.
A. 
 
9 fiberglass tanks, capacity 
from 28 to 150 m3 (pentane) 
Hydrochlor
ic acid, 
sodium 
hypochlorit
e (T, N) 
n.a. 
Containment 
basin in concrete 
- 
Pipelines from Porto 
Marghera, diameter 150 mm 
2 - Pressurized pipeline 
ethylene, towards areas 
ST20 e ST40 
Cumene 
benzene 
ethylbenze
ne (F, N) 
n.a. n.a. 
 
 
- 
Pipelines on racks - 5 m.; 
inside the Tank Park they are 
at ground level 
Various (F, 
N) 
Potential 
leaks and 
toxic 
releases:  
cumene, 
benzene, 
ethylbenz
ene, 
pentane.  
n.a. 
 
- 7 Distillation towers 
Phenol, 
styrene (T, 
F) 
n.a. n.a. 
- 
1 Quay for the uploading 
and downloading 
Acetone, 
styrene, 
ethylbenze
ne (F) 
n.a. n.a. 
- Incinerator and torches 
Hazardous 
wastes 
n.a. n.a. 
- 
Drainage oily and acid 
basins and tanks 
Polluted 
liquids 
n.a. n.a. 
SCORE 
3 -1 2 
Versalis received a high score for the Category Strengthening effects (3): in fact, it detains a 
huge amount of hazardous substances (toxic, carcinogenic, hazardous for the environment 
and flammable), representing a multiple source of hazard; in addition, many items are 
particularly vulnerable in case of an external impact  (tanks and pipelines of the storage park, 
in large part located on a non-waterproof basement, the multiple distillation towers that could 
be hit in case of earthquake, the open sky basins for the water treatment etc.)  
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A medium-high value (2) was assigned for the Historical Events; indeed, even if the most 
dangerous productions are ceased, and the plant adopted more precautionary measures with 
respect to the past, the yearly surveys demonstrated no sensible diminution of the pollutants, 
in particular for benzene. The plant still represents a source of pollution, located in a zone 
which could be affected by external events. 
For the Protection measures, as illustrated in the following tables, Versalis adopted a large 
part of the measures suggested by (Provincia di Torino, 2010). The information available on 
the interventions to safeguard the plant from NaTech events do not allow to go in-depth with 
the analysis, however only 10 on 31 measures by (Cruz et al., 2004) were implemented (See 
Annex II). For a precautionary reason, it was decided to assign a low value to PM macro-
category, in particular considering the problem related to the non-waterproof areas of the 
plant (i.e. the storage park). Also, the lack of preventive measures against flood interest some 
crucial departments of the plant that are very close to Mincio river (i.e. the incinerator, the 
water treatment plant etc.).  
Sol and Sapio 
Both the Companies produce technical gases, mainly for the adjacent companies Versalis 
and Ies.  
Sapio is located in front of the loading / unloading area of Versalis, beyond “Diversivo 
Mincio”; it is composed by two parallel lines which produce hydrogen from methane steam 
reforming, and a line for the purification and liquefaction of CO2. The hydrogen was sent to 
IES refinery through a gas pipeline DN200; however, it is not clear if this conduct is still 
active, or maybe is used by Versalis. The plant stores gas cylinders containing hydrogen, 
oxygen, acetylene and GPL, and has an area for the parking and supply of cylinders trucks. 
STRENGTHENING EFFECTS: The hazardous substances present in the plant are reported 
in Table 35, taken from Mantua E.R.I.R.: the plant overcomes the inferior threshold of the 
Legislative decree no. 105/2015 for only one substance, hydrogen (threshold = 5 t). 
Table 35: Sapio hazardous substances  
Substance 
Maximum 
quantity (t) 
Classification ex 
CEE 67/548  
Classification ex 
CLP 1272/2008 
Description 
Methane 0,3 R12 H220 Extremely flammable gas 
Hydrogen 9,56 R12 H220 Extremely flammable gas 
Oxygen 7,144 R8 H270 Oxidiser 
Acetylene 1,5 R5-6-12 H220 Extremely flammable gas 
Ethylene 0,55 R11 H220 H336 Extremely flammable gas 
LPG 0,55 R12 H220 H340 H350 
Extremely flammable gas, 
may cause cancer  
Dimethyl disulphide 0,531 R11 R51/53 
H302 H312 H315 
H319 H330 H335 
H411 
toxic if inhaled, toxic to 
aquatic life, with long lasting 
effects, highly flammable 
liquid and vapour 
The hydrogen is present in the process areas and in the loading areas for cylinders trucks and 
cylinders warehouse. The first is composed by 18 concrete boxes, equipped with flexible 
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pipes with non-return valves and anti-tear device; the latter is a concrete-building that can 
contain cylinders for an equivalent hydrogen quantity of 23400 Nm3. The warehouses for the 
acetylene and LPG cylinders, and for the oxygen cylinders are placed at an appropriate 
distance from the process areas and the hydrogen warehouse. 
Sapio scenarios are reported in Table 36, extracted from Mantua E.R.I.R.; only one damage 
area (highlighted) overcomes a little the boundaries of the plant. All the scenarios are related 
to jet-fires; environmental scenarios can be excluded because of the type of substances. 
Table 36: SAPIO accidental scenarios 
Substance 
Department 
/equipment 
Event Scenario 
Yearly 
frequency of 
occurrence 
Length of the jet 
fire 
Hydrogen 
Flanged coupling 
prereformer 
Release 
Jet fire 
 
3,53*10-6 1 m 
Flanged coupling 
degasser 
Release 6,16*10-6 7,4 m 
Transfer pipelines 
Release for rupture 1,06*10-3 9,5 m 
Release from 
flanged coupling 
4,64*10-4 1,2 m 
Flexible pipes to 
cylinders trucks / 
cylinders 
Release for rupture 1,17*10-3 6,2 m 
Release from 
flanged coupling 
1,05*10-2 1,2 m 
Flanged coupling reactor Release 2,5*10-4 1 m 
Flanged coupling 
converter 
Release 1,09*10-3 1,1 m 
Flanged coupling 
degasser 
Release 2,82*10-5 0,9 m 
Emergency vent Release from torch 4,69*10-4 21  m 
Transfer pipelines 
Release for rupture 2,18*10-3 9,5  m 
Release from 
flanged coupling 
3,35*10-4 1,2  m 
Flexible pipes to 
cylinders trucks / 
cylinders 
Release from rupture 1,03*10-2 6,2  m 
Methane 
Pipelines Release 
Jet fire 
2,84*10-3 6,4 m 
Pipelines Release 3,61*10-4 6,4 m 
PROTECTION MEASURES: As far as it concerns the measures of protection, the plant is 
equipped with 1 underground water basin (150 m3) and 1 external basin (150 m3), both with 
electric pump and diesel pump; a network of distribution of the water to hydrants and 
sprinklers. The areas for truck loading and acetylene storage are cooled off with vaporized 
water systems.   
Sol plant produces nitrogen, oxygen and argon through an air splitting up process by 
distillation; the liquid products are stored in 2 tanks with capacity 3000 m3. Nitrogen and 
oxygen are sent to Versalis through a gas pipeline, or loaded on tanker trucks. The plant 
detains 3736 t. of oxygen, an oxidizer, which overcomes the superior thresholds established 
by the Legislative Decree no. 105/2015 (2000 t). The plant has also 280 kg of fuel oil. 
Sol scenarios are reported in Table 37. They do not overcome the plant boundaries, and 
there are no environmental scenarios, because of the type of substances. 
Concerning the Measures of protection adopted, the firefighting system is manual; the plant 
is equipped with control alarm and trip systems. 
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Table 37: SOL accidental scenarios 
Substanc
e 
Equipment 
Accidental 
event 
Scenario 
High 
lethality 
LC50 
Beginnin
g of 
lethality 
Irreversi
ble 
wounds 
IDLH 
Reversibl
e wounds 
High 
lethality 
LC50 
Oxygen 
Transfer pump 
from tank to 
evaporators 
Partial rupture 
of the exit pipe 
Gas release 
(gravity 
dispersion) 
 
1,6*10-3 - - 4,7 - 
Complete 
rupture of the 
exit pipe 
1,8*10-5 - - 7,4 - 
Pipe for tankers 
uploading 
Partial rupture  9,4*10-5 - - 3 - 
Complete 
rupture  
1,1*10-7 - - 13 - 
Transfer pump 
from column to 
tank 
Partial rupture  1,15*10-3 - - - - 
Complete 
rupture  
2,5*10-5 - - 4,7 - 
Ratings assignation 
Table 38 and Table 39 report the ratings for the Seveso plants Sol and Sapio; they not owe 
substances that are hazardous for the environment, therefore the hazard is exclusively due to 
flammable and oxidant substances. The two plants have only pressurized tanks, which 
according to (Krausmann et al., 2011) should have a major resistance against external 
triggered events. 
Table 38: Rating assignation for Sapio plant 
[S.E.] STRENGTHENING EFFECTS 
[M.P.] PROTECTION 
MEASURES 
[H.E.] 
HISTORICAL 
EVENTS 
 
Assets / items with 
potential NaTech risk 
Hazardo
us 
substanc
es 
T F N 
Credible events 
/ scenarios RDS 
Protection 
measure 
related to 
the item 
Protection 
measures for 
Na-tech / 
pollution 
events 
No.  
Item 
description 
  Pressurised 
tank, 351000 lt, 
0,35 barg 
Hydrogen  F  
n.a. 
 
Firefighting 
water 
network, 
fed by two 
basins (150 
m3, and 175 
m3, both 
served by 
an electrical 
and a 
motorized 
pump. The 
network 
serves both 
automatic 
sprinkler 
devices, 
and 
monitors 
and 
hydrants.  
POLLUTION
: the plant 
does not 
detain 
hazardous 
substances for 
the 
environment, 
however 
containment 
basins and 
curbs are 
adopted for 
the possible 
areas of 
release. 
NATECH: 
Information 
not available.  
No information 
on the plant 
accidents are 
available.  
 
EVENTS: the 
plant borders the 
area for 
catastrophic 
flood (C). It is 
located in an 
area with Z4 
seismic soil.  
Pressurised 
tank, 301000 lt, 
0,4 barg 
Hydrogen 
cylinders’ 
warehouse 
Oxygen 
warehouse 
Oxygen  F  n.a. 
Acetylene and 
LPG warehouse 
Acetylene 
and LPG 
 F  n.a. 
Internal lines 
and Gas 
pipeline DN 
200, 19 barg, 
40°C 
Hydrogen  F  
Partial or total 
rupture transfer 
pipelines 
(probability range 
10-3 - 10-4) 
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[S.E.] STRENGTHENING EFFECTS 
[M.P.] PROTECTION 
MEASURES 
[H.E.] 
HISTORICAL 
EVENTS 
 
Assets / items with 
potential NaTech risk 
Hazardo
us 
substanc
es 
T F N 
Credible events 
/ scenarios RDS 
Protection 
measure 
related to 
the item 
Protection 
measures for 
Na-tech / 
pollution 
events 
No.  
Item 
description 
9 Hydrogen 
absorber beds 
Hydrogen  F  n.a. 
Stripping 
columns 
-    n.a. 
Box for the 
stop/recharge of 
cylinders trucks 
Hydrogen  F  
Partial or total 
rupture flexible 
pipes for the 
loading 
(probability range 
10-3 - 10-2) 
SCORE 
1,5 -1 1 
Table 39: Rating assignation for Sol plant 
[S.E.] STRENGTHENING EFFECTS 
[MP] PROTECTION 
MEASURES 
[HE] 
HISTORICAL 
EVENTS 
 
Assets / items with 
potential NaTech risk 
Hazardo
us 
substanc
es 
T F N 
Credible events 
/ scenarios RDS 
Protection 
measure 
related to 
the item 
Protection 
measures for 
Na-tech / 
pollution 
events 
No.  
Item 
description 
7201 
Pressurized 
tank 60 mbar, 
3000 m3 
Liquid 
OXYGE
N (F) 
 F  
Credible 
scenarios 
related to the 
partial or 
complete 
rupture of the 
pumps serving 
the oxygen 
transfer line 
(probability 
range = 10-3 - 
10-5 
Alarm and 
trip 
systems; 
manual 
firefighting 
system 
POLLUTION
: the plant do 
not detain 
hazardous 
substances for 
the 
environment. 
NATECH: 
The 
information 
on the 
measures 
implemented 
is not 
available; 
however the 
biggest tank 
bottom is 
placed at +3 
m. with 
respect to the 
ground level.  
No information 
on the plant 
accidents are 
available.  
 
EVENTS: the 
area is included 
in the ADBPO 
area for 
catastrophic 
flood (C), 
adjacent to its 
boundaries. 
Therefore, the 
quote of the 
ground level is 
here at 23,50 m.; 
according to the 
Emergency 
External Plan, 
this quote is too 
high to be 
reached both by 
a flood from the 
lake or Po river.  
7401 
Pressurized 
tank 1bar, 3000 
m3 
7701 
Back up tank, 
10 m3 
- 
8 other 
pressurized 
tanks, capacity 
from 3000 m3 to 
200 and 10 m3 
Nitrogen 
and 
argon 
(not 
hazardou
s) 
   
35 
Tower for the 
air fractioning 
Oxygen, 
nitrogen, 
argon 
 F  n.a. 
SCORE 
1,5 -1,5 1,5 
The scores assigned to Sol and Sapio were affected by lack of information about the items 
and the adopted measures. However, both the plants received low ratings for S.E. and H.E., 
because of the reduced presence of hazardous substances (lack of toxic substances and 
pollutants), and of items with a higher resistance to external events (pressurized tanks). 
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However, the presence of high and tiny structures, like distillation and stripping towers, or 
the purge gas tanks for Sapio, could represent a problem in case of earthquake. For P.M., 
very little information was available, so that the evaluation was based on the contents of the 
external emergency plans. Both the plants have a firefighting system adequate to their 
necessities, but that of SOL is manual; this could be a partial criticality. However, SOL is 
also the only plant which adopted a specific measure against an external event, that means 
the super-elevation of the bottoms of the biggest tanks with respect to the ground levels. Due 
to the lack of more in-depth information, the rating attributed to the capacity of protection 
remained low.      
Figure 31 represents the Industrial Hazard layer. Thematic GIS map for S.E.; the buffer-
zones of 500 m generated by each Mantua plant is also reported (see Paragraph 3.4.4.).  
 
Figure 31: Industrial hazard layer, ratings attributed to S.E. 
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4.2.4 Local extreme climate events 
The inclusion of climate in risk assessment practices or in land use planning is a relatively 
new discipline, and still has a reduced spread; for the present methodology, it was important 
to introduce indexes related to climate extreme events, because they can be a hazard source 
themselves or produce a great influence on other risks. However, as reported in (Schmidt 
Thomé and Klein, 2011) the local trends of climate are the most difficult to be assessed, 
because of the great variations of local phenomena which can influence them.  
The data for rain, temperature, extreme rainy events available for Mantua were collected to 
constitute a general basis of information, but, without major expertise and in-depth research 
in the field, it was not possible to verify the presence of local trends. Therefore, it was decided 
to adopt the simplified approach reported in Table 7, aimed at reflecting the common 
tendencies for the entire Po valley. The following ratings were therefore assigned to each 
macro-category for the Climate related events (Table 40): 
Table 40: Rating assignation for Local climate events 
[S.E.] Strengthening effects [H.E.] Historical events [P.M.] Protection measures 
Mantua area is located in the area 
defined as southern Europe, where 
a diminution of rainy events was 
observed, against the increase of 
extreme stormy/rainy events. 
However, given to its position in 
the northern Italy, the phenomena 
are slightly attenuated with respect 
to other Italian areas. 
The area is a plane zone 
characterized by continental 
climate.   
- 
Score 
2 1 0 
4.3 Assessment of the interactions 
The possible risk interactions for Mantua were assessed in the areas where 4 hazards 
overlaid, corresponding to the 4 Seveso industries. A further Interaction table was applied in 
the area of the city center, which is connoted by the highest density of people and vulnerable 
elements.  
VERSALIS: the possible risk interaction on the area of Versalis is described by two different 
interaction tables, because the plant raises on areas connoted by different levels of flood risk. 
The first interaction table (Table 41) includes the majority of the plant, where the values of 
Flood risk are = H.E. 1; S.E. 1,5; P.M. -3. The second table (Table 42) is related to the 
Incinerator and some empty areas in the southern portion of the plant, whose ground level is 
lower, and that are included in a flood risk zone where = H.E. 3; S.E. 1,5; P.M. -3. 
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Table 41: Versalis interaction table (1) 
HAZARDS & 
Macrocategories 
Seismic Flood Industrial Climate 
SE HE PM SE HE PM SE HE PM SE HE PM 
2 1 0 1,5 1 -3 3 2 -1 2 1 0 
Seismic 
SE 2 
No interaction 1,00 1,75 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
Flood 
SE 1,5 
No interaction No interaction 1,42 No interaction HE 1 
PM -3 
Industr
ial 
SE 3 
No interaction No interaction - No interaction HE 2 
PM -1 
Climate 
SE 2 
No interaction 1,00 1,75 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
Table 42: Versalis interaction table (2) 
HAZARDS & 
Macrocategories 
Seismic Flood Industrial Climate 
SE HE PM SE HE PM SE HE PM SE HE PM 
2 1 0 1,5 3 -3 3 2 -1 2 1 0 
Seismic 
SE 2 
No interaction 1,67 1,75 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
Flood 
SE 1,5 
No interaction No interaction 2,08 No interaction HE 3 
PM -3 
Industr
ial 
SE 3 
No interaction No interaction - No interaction HE 2 
PM -1 
Climate 
SE 2 
No interaction 1,00 1,75 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
As far as it concerns the possible multiple interactions and simultaneous occurring of risks 
in the area of Versalis, the following values were obtained for the zone of Table 41:  
(C) → (F)→ (I) = 1 + 1,42 = 2,42 “From moderate to high” influence 
(S) → (I) + (F) → (I) = 1,75 + 1,42 = 3, 17 “High” influence 
(C) → (F) → (I) + (C) → (I) = 2,42 + 1,75 = 4,17 “Very high” influence 
(S) → (F) → (I) = 1 + 1,42 = 2,42 “From moderate to high” influence 
(S) → (I) + (F) → (I) = 1,75 + 1,42 = 3, 17 “High” influence 
(S) → (F) → (I) + (S) → (I) = 2,42 + 1,75 = 4,17 “Very high” influence 
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IES: as for Versalis, the area of IES is interested by different values of Interaction (Table 43 
and Table 44), because a marginal portion of the plant is included in an area more frequently 
interested by flood. In this area, a risky item is located (tank 9, containing gasoline). 
Table 43: IES interaction table (1) 
HAZARDS & 
Macrocategories 
Seismic Flood Industrial Climate 
SE HE PM SE HE PM SE HE PM SE HE PM 
2 1 0 1,5 1 -3 2,5 2 -1 2 1 0 
Seismic 
SE 2 
No interaction 1,00 1,67 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
Flood 
SE 1,5 
No interaction No interaction 1,33 No interaction HE 1 
PM -3 
Industr
ial 
SE 2,5 
No interaction No interaction - No interaction HE 2 
PM -1 
Climate 
SE 2 
No interaction 1,00 1,67 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
Table 44: IES interaction table (2) 
HAZARDS & 
Macrocategories 
Seismic Flood Industrial Climate 
SE HE PM SE HE PM SE HE PM SE HE PM 
2 1 0 1,5 3 -3 2,5 2 -1 2 1 0 
Seismic 
SE 2 
No interaction 1,67 1,67 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
Flood 
SE 1,5 
No interaction No interaction 2,00 No interaction HE 3 
PM -3 
Industr
ial 
SE 2,5 
No interaction No interaction - No interaction HE 2 
PM -1 
Climate 
SE 2 
No interaction 1,67 1,67 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
The following values were obtained for possible multiple interactions and simultaneous 
occurring of risks in the area of Table 43:  
(C) → (F) → (I) = 1 + 1,33 = 2,33 “From moderate to high” influence 
(S) → (I) + (F) → (I) = 1,67 + 1,33 = 3 “High” influence 
(C) → (F) → (I) + (C) → (I) = 2,33 + 1,67 = 4 “Very high” influence 
(S) → (F) → (I) = 1 + 1,33 = 2,33 “From moderate to high” influence 
(S) → (I) + (F) → (I) = 1,67 + 1,33 = 3, 17 “High” influence 
(S) → (F) → (I) + (S) → (I) = 2,33 + 1,67 = 4 “Very high” influence 
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SOL: Table 45 describes the values of the interactions of the natural hazards with SOL plant. 
Table 45: SOL interaction table 
HAZARDS & 
Macrocategories 
Seismic Flood Industrial Climate 
SE HE PM SE HE PM SE HE PM SE HE PM 
2 1 0 1,5 1 -3 1,5 1,5 -1,5 2 1 0 
Seismic 
SE 2 
No interaction 1,00 1,29 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
Flood 
SE 1,5 
No interaction No interaction 0,96 No interaction HE 1 
PM -3 
Industr
ial 
SE 1,5 
No interaction No interaction - No interaction HE 1,5 
PM -1,5 
Climate 
SE 2 
No interaction 1,00 1,29 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
SOL multiple interactions and simultaneous occurring:  
(C) → (F) → (I) = 1 + 0,96 = 1,96 “From low to moderate” influence 
(S) → (I) + (F) → (I) = 1,29 + 0,96 = 2,25 “From moderate to high” influence 
(C) → (F) → (I) + (C) → (I) = 1,96 + 1,29 = 3,25 “Very high” influence 
(S) → (F) → (I) = 1 + 0,96 = 1,96 “From low to moderate” influence 
(S) → (I) + (F) → (I) = 1,29 + 0,96 = 2,25 “From moderate to high” influence 
(S) → (F) → (I) + (S) → (I) = 1,96 + 1,29 = 3,25 “Very high” influence 
SAPIO: in the area of Sapio, only three hazards are overlaid: earthquake, industry and 
climate, therefore the Interaction table has a row and a column less than the other tables. 
Climate and earthquake have no direct correlation.   
Table 46: SAPIO interaction table 
HAZARDS & 
Macrocategories 
Seismic Industrial Climate 
SE HE PM SE HE PM SE HE PM 
2 1 0 1,5 1 -1 2 1 0 
Seismic 
SE 2 
No interaction 1,16 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
Industr
ial 
SE 1,5 
No interaction - No interaction HE 1 
PM -1 
Climate 
SE 2 
No interaction 1,16 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
 
SAPIO simultaneous occurring:  
(C) → (I) + (F) → (I) = 1,17 + 1,17 = 2,34 “From moderate to high” influence. 
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The values obtained for the effects of the binary interactions that involve Mantua plants are 
between Low and moderate; they can be considered as credible, because they reflect the low 
incidence of the natural hazards in the zone analyzed. In fact, the historical and recent seismic 
events proved that the peak ground acceleration for Mantua remained low, while the 
artificialization of Mincio drastically reduced the possibilities of intense flooding. 
Furthermore, considering the ground level of the industries analyzed with respect to Mincio 
river, a possible flood would reach a moderate height, with a reduced impact. These 
conditions are well represented by the value of interaction obtained.  
The multiple interactions or simultaneous occurring reach higher values in comparison with 
those of the binary interactions, expressing the increase of hazard that could be caused by 
several natural hazards acting simultaneously.  
4.4 HSSM and ALOHA simulations 
HSSM and ALOHA simulations were carried out to verify the possible spatial consequences 
of natural events impacting on the industrial areas of IES and Versalis. This optional step 
was executed to acquire more in-depth information for the compatibility assessment in 
relation to the two industries with the highest values for the category Strengthening Effects.  
Both the plants reported low values of interaction for earthquake and flood; in fact, the 
natural dangers have low impacts, and low recurring rates (with the exception of the little 
portions where the flood can have a stronger impact – see Table 42 and Table 44).  
The damage state associated to the interactions corresponds to R3 both for seismic and flood 
risk: continuous spill from a hole with diameter 10 mm. ALOHA simulations were executed 
for possible R2 and R3 damage states provoked by Earthquake (S) and Flood (F). HSSM 
was executed only for a R3 damage state provoked by Earthquake (S), due to the software 
limitations (paragraph 3.5.4). 
Table 47 resumes the parameters settled to carry out HSSM and ALOHA simulations in 
Mantua. The following paragraphs show in detail: 1) the items on which the simulation was 
executed; 2) the specific parameters adopted for Mantua case study. 
Table 47: Parameters for HSSM and ALOHA simulations in Mantua 
Damage 
state 
ALOHA 
Natural 
risk 
HSSM 
Natural 
risk 
Parameters S F Parameters S F 
R3 (binary 
interactions) 
Source: tank 
Release hole: 1 cm-3 
cm 
  
Source: puddle for 1 cm release. 
Depth: 0,5 cm (conventional 
ALOHA depth) 
  
R2 
(multiple 
interactions) 
Source: tank 
Release hole: 15 cm-
22,5 cm-30 cm 
  Not executed   
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4.4.1 Items exposed 
In order to speed up the simulation process, the characteristics of the items more exposed to 
possible NaTech risk were listed (Table 48 and Table 49). The items were mainly tanks:  
both IES and Versalis have a wide storage park, which evidence criticalities due to the lack 
of waterproof pavement. Versalis also owes several productive departments, but little data 
were available for the items in these areas. Only two simulations were carried out outside the 
storage park: one for the rail tankers that enter the plant in the zone nearby Frassine station, 
and the other for the tank containing phenol located in the Phenol treatment department 
(PR7-PR9). The pipelines were signalled in (Versalis, 2015) as capable to produce 
environmental consequences but, due to the scarcity of information about their dimensions 
and characteristics of the soil, it was not possible to carry out a valid simulation.  
Table 48: Versalis items for ALOHA and HSSM simulations 
Substan
ce 
Density 
(g/cm3) 
Viscosit
y (Cp) 
Item 
Roof: 
Fixed (FI) 
or Floating 
(FL) 
Volume 
(m3) 
Diamete
r (m) 
Area 
(m2) 
Height 
(m) 
Contain. 
basin 
area 
(m2) 
Eq. 
basin 
radius 
(m) 
Waterpr
oof 
basin 
 (t) 
Acrylonitr
ile 
0,81 
0,34 
DA422 FI  750 10 79 10 736 15,31 Y 
DA421 FI  750 10 79 10 736 15,31 Y 
Benzene 
0,87 
0,696 
DA401 FL 34 5000 22 380 13 2100 25,85 N 
DA403 FL 34 5000 22 380 13 2100 25,85 N 
DA404 FL 34 5000 22 380 13 2100 25,85 N 
DA409 FL 68 10000 30 707 14 3474 33,25 N 
DA415 FL 14 2000 14,5 165 12 1040 18,19 N 
DA1017 FL 3 500 8 50 8 386 11,08 N 
Ethylbenz
ene 
0,86 
0,68 
DA406 FL 34 5000 22 380 13 2100 25,85 N 
DA407 FL 68 10000 30 707 14 2774 29,71 N 
DA431 FL 7 1000 11 95 11 1005 17,89 N 
DA432 FL 7 1000 11 95 11 1005 17,89 N 
Semifinish
ed toluene 
0,86 
0,6 
DA416 FL 14 2000 14,5 165 12 1040 18,19 N 
DA417 FL 14 2000 14,5 165 12 1040 18,19 N 
DA450 FL 14 2000 16 201 10 729 15,23 N 
DA451 FL 14 2000 16 201 10 797 15,92 N 
DA428 FL 7 1000 11 95 11 845 16,40 N 
DA429 FL 7 1000 11 95 11 845 16,40 N 
Cyclohexa
none 
0,94 
2,2 
DA1001 FI  1000 14 154 12 246 8,85 N 
DA1002 FI  1000 11 95 11 285 9,52 N 
DA460 FI  5000 24 452 11 1418 21,24 N 
OLONE - 
KA OIL 
0,94 
2,2 
DA1003 FI  1000 11 95 11 246 8,85 N 
DA1004 FI  1000 11 95 11 305 9,85 N 
Cumene 
0,86 
0,79 
DA408 FL 68 10000 30 707 14 3474 33,25 N 
DA430 FL 7 1000 11 95 11 845 16,40 N 
DA452 FL 34 5000 27 572 12 1928 24,77 N 
DA453 FL 34 5000 27 572 12 1992 25,18 N 
DA455 FL 34 5000 27 572 12 1784 23,83 N 
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Substan
ce 
Density 
(g/cm3) 
Viscosit
y (Cp) 
Item 
Roof: 
Fixed (FI) 
or Floating 
(FL) 
Volume 
(m3) 
Diamete
r (m) 
Area 
(m2) 
Height 
(m) 
Contain. 
basin 
area 
(m2) 
Eq. 
basin 
radius 
(m) 
Waterpr
oof 
basin 
 (t) 
DA1018 FL 3 500 8 50 8 392 11,17  
Styrene 
dehydroge
nated 
mixture 
0,9 
0,696 
DA402 FL 34 5000 22 380 13 2100 25,85 N 
Stryene 
0,9 
0,696 
DA1005 FI  1000 14 154 12 246 8,85 N 
DA1006 FI  1000 14 154 12 246 8,85 N 
DA1007 FI  1000 11 95 11 235 8,65 N 
DA1008 FI  5000 24 452 11 1276 20,15 N 
DA1010 FI  2000 15 177 11 696 14,89 N 
DA1013 FI  2000 15 177 11 1054 18,32 N 
DA1014 FI  2000 15 177 11 1196 19,51 N 
Pentane 0,63 
DA482 
Horizontal 
tanks 
117 
n.a. 
53 
n.a. 431 11,71 
N 
DA483 117 53 N 
DA484 117 53 N 
Phenol 1,06 
Generic 
tank 
n.a. 1000 10 78 12,7 22 - Y 
Benzene 
and 
acrylonit
rile 
See cells 
above 
Rail 
tankers 
Assimilated 
to 
horizontal, 
length 10,8 
m. 
73 - - 2,93 - - N 
Table 49: IES items for ALOHA and HSSM simulations 
Substan
ce 
Density 
(g/cm3) 
Viscosit
y (Cp) 
Item 
Roof: 
Fixed (FI) 
or Floating 
(FL) 
Volume 
(m3) 
Diamete
r (m) 
Area 
(m2) 
Height 
(m) 
Contain. 
basin 
area 
(m2) 
Eq. 
basin 
radius 
(m) 
Waterpr
oof 
basin 
 (t) 
Diesel fuel 
0,84 
2,5 
110 FL 270 40000 60,96 2917 15,00 4464 37,69 N 
111 FL 405 60000 73,15 4200 15,00 7811 49,86 N 
1 FL 47 7000 27,50 594 11,79 818 16,14 N 
32 FI  5750 24,00 452 12,78 
9200 54.12 Y 
33 FI  2000 15,24 182 10,68 
34 FI  5750 24,00 452 12,78 
35 FI  2000 15,24 182 10,68 
36 FI  5750 24,00 452 12,78 
37 FI  2000 15,24 182 10,68 
38 FI  5750 24,00 452 12,78 
39 FI  2000 15,24 182 10,68 
44 FI  1000 12,28 118 9,14 
Kerosene 0,81 
46 FI  1000 12,28 118 9,14 
47 FI  1000 12,28 118 9,14 
Biodiesel 0,85 31 FI  2000 15,24 182 10,68 
Burning 
oil 
0,98 
40 FI  10000 30,50 730 14,40 
2352 27,36 Y 
41 FI  10000 30,50 730 14,40 
Gasoline 
0,72 
0,8 
109 FL 270 40000 60,96 2917 15,00 4752 38,89 N 
2 FL 54 8050 27,50 594 13,85 1379 20,95 N 
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Substan
ce 
Density 
(g/cm3) 
Viscosit
y (Cp) 
Item 
Roof: 
Fixed (FI) 
or Floating 
(FL) 
Volume 
(m3) 
Diamete
r (m) 
Area 
(m2) 
Height 
(m) 
Contain. 
basin 
area 
(m2) 
Eq. 
basin 
radius 
(m) 
Waterpr
oof 
basin 
 (t) 
3 FL 47 7000 27,50 594 11,79 1301 20,35 N 
4 FL 68 7000 27,50 594 12,19 1497 21,83 N 
5 FL 68 10000 38,40 1158 9,14 751 15,47 N 
6 FL 68 10000 38,40 1158 9,14 1997 25,22 N 
9 FL 189 28000 50,00 1963 15,00 2316 27,15 N 
13 FL 7 1000 12,50 123 8,15 698 14,91 N 
15 FL 7 1000 12,50 123 8,15 698 14,91 N 
20 FL 34 5000 21,34 357 15,00 1565 22,32 N 
22 FL 34 5000 21,34 357 15,00 1871 24,40 N 
23 FL 15 2250 13,71 148 15,24 591 13,72 N 
25 FL 15 2250 13,71 148 15,24 591 13,72 N 
27 FL 7 1000 12,50 123 8,15 361 10,72 N 
28 FL 34 5000 21,34 357 15,00 1790 23,87 N 
30 FL 34 5000 21,34 357 15,00 1453 21,50 N 
Mtbe 
/Etbe 
0,75 
0,35 
14 
20
00 
FL 2000 15,34 185 10,83 610 13,94 N 
LPG 0,5 
122 
Undergroun
d tanks 
250  89   0,00 - 
123 250  89   0,00 - 
124 250  89   0,00 - 
125 250  89   0,00 - 
126 250  89   0,00 - 
137 600  178   0,00 - 
138 600  178   0,00 - 
139 600  178   0,00 - 
4.4.2 Parameters for the simulation 
The simulations were carried out on the items reported in Table 48 and Table 49, which 
were grouped and analyzed depending on different criteria. The two paragraphs below 
expose the parameters employed for the execution of ALOHA and HSSM on Versalis and 
IES plants. 
ALOHA:  
Climatic conditions:  
The data on humidity, wind speed and wind direction were recovered from the weather 
station located in the area of Frassine-Lunetta.    
Two different climatic conditions were hypothesized, aimed at reproducing the actual 
conditions of a sunny day and of a rainy day in Mantua. The first was associated to possible 
seismic events (S), that can take place independently from the weather conditions, the second 
to flood events (F), which could probably follow adverse weather conditions.  
 S = wind speed (2 m/s), wind direction (286 degrees), Cloud cover (clear), Temperature 
(20° C), Humidity (medium) 
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 F = wind speed (5 m/s), wind direction (286 degrees), Cloud cover (complete cover), 
Temperature (20° C), Humidity (wet)  
The wind direction was established on the basis of the prevalent directions registered in a 
year, shown in Table 50: E-NE (78 degrees), E-SE (91 degrees), W-NW (286 degrees). The 
latter was adopted for ALOHA simulation, because it can push eventual release of pollutants 
towards urban areas external to the plants. 
Wind speed: the analysis of 1 year of daily surveys revealed low values of wind speed: spring 
= 2.01 m/s, summer = 1,93 m/s, fall = 1,5 m/s, winter = 1,75 m/s. The maximum value 
reached in Mantua is equal to 10,5. The values of the two stability classes B and D (2 and 5 
m/s) were adopted, because they result in line with the general values encountered in Mantua. 
Table 50: Assessment of the wind main directions in Mantua 
Wind rose 
sectors 
(degrees) 
Recurren
ce / year 
(hours) 
Percentag
e (%) 
Sector 
Median 
value 
(degrees) 
 
0-22,5 225 2,6  
22,5-45 311 3,6  
45-67,5 771 8,9  
67,5-90 1443 16,6 78 
90-112,5 1016 11,7 91 
112,5-135 347 4,0  
135-157,5 189 2,2  
157,5-180 202 2,3  
180-202,5 216 2,5  
202,5-225 374 4,3  
225-247,5 558 6,4  
247,5-270 771 8,9  
270-292,5 1217 14,0 286 
292,5-315 583 6,7  
315-337,5 245 2,8  
337,5-360 226 2,6  
Sources of release: 
The settled source of release was “Tank”: ALOHA simulates the creation of a Puddle, whose 
extension can be unlimited or limited by containment basins or other obstacles.  
 For Seismic event conditions: limits of the puddle = containment basin of the tank 
analysed. Ground type = dry sandy soil 
 For Flood event conditions: no boundaries specified (flood wave can overcome the 
basin limits). Ground type = water.  
The items analysed in ALOHA were picked from Table 48 and Table 49 depending on: 
 the proximity to the borders of the plant (they represent a major threat towards external 
targets) 
 the exposure to natural external events. For seismic events all the items can be 
considered exposed at the same level, because the quality of the soil remains the same 
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under the entire plants. For Flood events, the vulnerability is strictly correlated to the 
ground elevation. 
For Versalis, the ground elevation varies from 18 m. (incinerator) to 23,5 m. (areas 
located in the north-eastern corner of the plant). Since the maximum flood height 
reachable could be around 22,3-22,5 m. (in case of floods provoked by Po river), the 
simulation was carried out only for items with reduced ground elevation (tanks located 
on the south-western border of the plant, in front of the Sisma drain). For seismic events, 
the simulation was carried out for all the tanks located on the borders of the plant, for 
the rail tankers and for the Phenol tank located in PR7 department.  
IES has a lower ground elevation, and the plant is located nearby the passage from 
Inferior lake to Vallazza; the simulations, both for seismic and flood events, were 
carried out for the tanks nearest to the riverside (biggest plants in front of via Brennero).    
Events:  
For each source of release selected, ALOHA provides multiple scenarios, shown in Table 
51, but they were not all suitable for the low damage state R3 associated to the Interactions 
in Mantua (i.e. BLEVE simulations was not carried out). 
Table 51: Scenarios developed by ALOHA 
Initiating event Scenarios 
Leaking tank, chemical is not burning and forms an 
evaporating puddle 
Toxic area of vapour cloud 
Flammable area of vapour cloud 
(Flashfire) 
Blast area of Vapour Cloud Explosion 
(VCE) 
Leaking tank, chemical is burning and forms a pool 
fire   
Poolfire 
BLEVE tank explodes and chemical burns in a 
fireball 
BLEVE 
Toxic area of vapour cloud, Flashfire, Poolfire and VCE were modelled; for each scenario, 
threshold values related to the impact (Level of Concern) had to be inserted in ALOHA. In 
fact, ALOHA provides default values for LOCs, but the user can modify them: for the current 
case study, the threshold values indicated by the Ministerial decree 09/05/2001 were inserted 
(Table 52).  
Table 52: LOC thresholds inserted in ALOHA 
Scenario 
High 
lethality 
Beginning 
of lethality 
Non-
reversible 
wounds 
Reversible 
wounds 
Damage to 
structures / 
Domino 
effects 
Pool-fire (stationary 
thermal radiation) 
12,5 kW/m2 7 kW/m2 5 kW/m2 3 kW/m2 12,5 kW/m2 
BLEVE/Fireball 
(Variable thermal 
radiation) 
Radius of the 
fireball 
350 kJ/m2 200 kJ/m2 125 kJ/m2 
200-800 m 
(depending 
on the type 
of tank) 
Risk management and land use planning for environmental and asset 
protection purposes 
145 
 
Scenario 
High 
lethality 
Beginning 
of lethality 
Non-
reversible 
wounds 
Reversible 
wounds 
Damage to 
structures / 
Domino 
effects 
Flash-fire 
(instantaneous thermal 
radiation) 
LFL13 ½ LFL - - - 
VCE 
(peak overpressure) 
0,3 bar (0,6 
for open 
spaces) 
0,14 bar 0,07 bar 0,03 bar 0,3 bar 
Toxic release (adsorbed 
dose) 
LC5014 - IDLH15   
Leakage: The damage state associated to the level of interaction for Ies and Versalis plant 
corresponds to R3; 2 possible hole sizes were tested for all the tanks analysed (1 cm and 3 
cm). In addition, a bigger hole dimension was simulated to verify a R2 damage state, related 
to possible multiple interactions: the dimension was defined on the basis of (HSE, 2012): 15, 
22,5 or 30 cm (see Table 12). The R1 damage state, equivalent to a catastrophic rupture with 
immediate release of the entire content, was tested only for the two Versalis tanks containing 
acrylonitrile.   
HSSM: 
For Mantua case study, KOPT and OILENS models were run, in order to check: 1) the time 
of arrival of the pollutant to the aquifer; 2) the extension reachable by the LNAPL lens. 
TGSPLUME running, related to the dispersion of the dissolved constituents in the water, 
needed data not available.  
Leakage: R3 damage state = 1 cm was simulated, with the pond depth given by ALOHA. 
Data: The input data required to run HSSM tables are more complicated than for ALOHA, 
and could imply local surveys. However, HSSM manual (Weaver et al., 1994) contains 
useful indications. The data collected for Mantua were organized through excel tables 
reproducing the contents of HSSM Input boxes (Table 53), conceived to constitute a useful 
help for future users of the methodology, because:  
 the column Notes explain how and where to find each value required;  
 the lines in grey evidence the parameters that have to be filled for OILENS model only. 
                                                 
13 LFL = Lower Flammable Limit 
14 LC50 = lethal concentration 50, Standard measure of the toxicity of the surrounding medium that 
killS half of the sample population of a specific test-animal in a specified period through exposure via 
inhalation (respiration) 
15 IDLH = Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health condition, defined by the National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) as a situation "that poses a threat of exposure to airborne 
contaminants when that exposure is likely to cause death or immediate or delayed permanent adverse 
health effects or prevent escape from such an environment." The IDLH limit represents the 
concentration of a chemical in the air to which healthy adult workers could be exposed (if their 
respirators fail) without suffering permanent or escape-impairing health effects. 
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Table 53: Criteria for HSSM running  
HSSM Parameter 
Generic 
value 
Value 
in 
Mantua 
Notes 
1st INPUT BOX: HYDROLOGIC PARAMETERS 
Water dynamic viscosity 
(cp) 
1 1 
The values inserted are default values provided by 
HSSM manual (Weaver et al., 1994) 
Water density (g/cm3) 1 1 
Water surface tension 
(dyne/cm) 
65 65 
Maximum krw during 
infiltration 
0,5 0,5 
Recharg
e rate 
Average annual 
recharge (m/d) 
- -  Local source data 
Or Saturation 0,35 0,35 
Local source data: to be calculated starting from 
volumetric moisture content and porosity.  For Mantua: 
35% of the pore space filled with water, taken from the 
examples provided by the HSSM manual (Weaver et al., 
1994) .  
Capillar
y 
pressure 
curve 
model 
(Brooks 
and 
Corey) 
 
Pore size 
distribution 
index (λ) 
See 
HSSM 
Manual, 
Table 
92 
0,398 
Table 92 of HSSM manual (Weaver et al., 1994) 
provides the values for λ and air entry head, depending 
on the type of soil. Residual water saturation calculated 
on the basis of table 92, starting from the values of 
residual water content Ѳwr and porosity η = Ѳwr/ η. In 
order to identify the type of soil, the Italian classification 
should be adapted to the USDA textural soil 
classification, using the textural triangle. According to 
(Comune di Mantova, 2012), the soils in the area of 
Versalis and IES are mainly sandy: sand 46 - 89%, loam 
10-39%, clay 1-18%. USDA textural triangle identifies 
these soils as “Sandy loam”, therefore the values for λ, 
air entry head and residual water saturation of sandy 
loam soils were adopted. 
Air entry head 
(m) 
0,29 
Residual water 
saturation 
0,24 
Saturated vertical hydraulic 
conductivity K (m/d) 
See 
HSSM 
Manual, 
Table 
96 
8,64 
Table 96 of HSSM manual (Weaver et al., 1994) 
presents Literature datasets for the different types of 
soils, but it is highly recommended to use directly 
measured values, because ksat has an extremely high 
variability. For Versalis area, (Ministero dell’ambiente e 
della tutela del territorio e del mare, 2014) provided the 
following values for Ksat: between 5*10-4 m/s (43,2 m/d) 
and 1*10-4 (8,64 m/d). In HSSM simulation was adopted 
the lowest value. 
Ratio of horizontal /vert hyd 
cond. 
See 
HSSM 
Manual,  
2,5 
The parameter is related to anisotropy. For soils slightly 
anisotropic, like the sandy one, it is adopted the value of 
2,5, indicated in HSSM manual (Weaver et al., 1994) 
examples. 
Porosity 
See 
HSSM 
Manual, 
Table 
92 
0,2 
Table 92 of HSSM manual provides the values for 
porosity η. For Mantua, the value provided by (Ministero 
dell’ambiente e della tutela del territorio e del mare, 
2014) was used. 
Bulk density (g/cm3) 
To be 
determi
ned 
(Tbd) 
1,5 
Parameter related to the soil porosity and density; it is 
possible to find online some data: i.e.   
Sandy soils have a bulk density = 1.500-1.600 kg/m3 = 
1,5 g/cm3 
Clay and loamy soils have a bulk density = 1.200 kg/m3.  
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HSSM Parameter 
Generic 
value 
Value 
in 
Mantua 
Notes 
Peaty soils have a bulk density =   900-1.000 kg/m3.  
Aquifer saturated thickness 
(m) 
Tbd 20 
These data could be find in the geological report that is 
usually associated to the Urban plan. For Mantua, values 
taken from (Ministero dell’ambiente e della tutela del 
territorio e del mare, 2011) 
Depth to water table (m) Tbd 8 
Capillary thickness 
parameter (m) 
0,01 0,01 
Default value provided by HSSM manual (Weaver et al., 
1994) 
Ground water gradient 
(m/m) 
0,01 0,01 
Typical maximum natural gradients range from 0.005 to 
0.02. In HSSM examples it is always used 0,01 
Aquifer 
dispersi
vities 
Longitudinal 
(m) 
10 10 
According to HSSM manual (Weaver et al., 1994), the 
dispersion coefficients are not fundamental parameters, 
but they are characterized by scale dependence: 
horizontal transverse dispersivities are typically from 
1/3 to almost 3 orders-of magnitude lower than 
longitudinal dispersivities. Vertical transverse 
dispersivities are typically 1-2 orders-of-magnitude 
lower than horizontal transverse dispersivities. The 
values reported for the case study are those used in 
HSSM examples. 
Transverse (m) 1 1 
Vertical (m) 0,1 0,1 
2ND INPUT BOX: HYDROCARBON PARAMETERS 
NAPL density (g/cm3) Tbd 
Table 48 
Table 49 
For OILENS simulation, the density values should be 
minor than water density. Some density and viscosity 
data are reported in Table 10 of HSSM manual (Weaver 
et al., 1994), however they could be easily found online 
or in the Safety data Sheets of the substances. 
NAPL dynamic viscosity 
(cp) 
Tbd 
Hydrocarbon (NAPL) 
solubility (mg/l) 
10 10 
According to HSSM manual (Weaver et al., 1994), this 
is not a critical parameter, however it should be greater 
than zero. Here the value 10 is employed, as in the 
examples provided by HSSM manual. 
Aquifer residual NAPL 
saturation Sors 
0,15 0,15 
Sorv is assumed as a known constant; for hydrocarbons, 
it can vary from 0,10 to 0,20. Sors for hydrocarbons 
varies from 0,15 to 0,50. HSSM examples for OILENS 
running report for Sors 0,15, for Sorv 0,05 
Vadose zone residual NAPL 
saturation Sorv 
0,1 0,1 
Soil water partition 
coefficient (l/kg) 
0,083 0,083 
According to HSSM manual (Weaver et al., 1994), like 
the solubility of the NAPL phase, listed above, this 
parameter could be considered not critical. The value 
adopted is that reported in HSSM examples.  
NAPL surface tension 
(dyne/cm) 
See 
HSSM 
Manual, 
Table 
11 
35 
Some values are provided in Table 11 (Weaver et al., 
1994): typically, for hydrocarbon products, the values 
range from 26 to 32. In our simulations, we adopted the 
value 35 employed in the examples. 
Hydroca
rbon 
release 
NAPL flux:  
q0 (m/d) 
- - HSSM provides 4 possible alternatives to simulate the 
leakage; as far as it concerns the case of a slowly leaking 
tank or a leaking tank within an embankment, HSSM 
manual (Weaver et al., 1994) suggests to choose the 
option “ponded LNAPL “, options 3 or 4. Option 3: the 
ponding abruptly goes to zero at the end of the ponding 
period. Option 4: the ponded depth decreases gradually 
at the end of the ponding period.  
In our simulation, we adopted the third option, inserting 
the default ponding depth used by ALOHA = 0, 5 cm 
NAPL 
volume/area (m) 
lower depth of 
NAPL zone (m) 
- - 
Constant head 
ponding: depth 
(m) 
0,005 0,005 
Variable 
ponding after a 
- - 
148 Risk management and land use planning for environmental and asset protection 
purposes 
 
HSSM Parameter 
Generic 
value 
Value 
in 
Mantua 
Notes 
constant period: 
depth (m) 
Beginning time 
(d) 
0 0  Usually, 0 days beginning time is adopted.  
Ending time (d) TBD 
2-3 
hours 
The ending time represents the period in which the pond 
remains on the soil and therefore its pollutant agents are 
free to penetrate it. Repeated simulations with different 
ending times were carried out for Mantua items, in order 
to test the minimum time of release necessary for the 
different pollutants to reach the water table; for the 
majority of the substances analysed, an ending time 
between 2 and 3 hours was sufficient. 
3RD INPUT BOX: SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
Radius of oil lens source Rs   
For KOPT simulation it could be inserted a standard 
value: 0,5642. For OILENS, the value inserted was the 
radius calculated by ALOHA  
Radius multiplication factor 1,001 1,001 
Standard value provided by HSSM manual (Weaver et 
al., 1994) 
Maximum NAPL saturation 
in the NAPL lenz, S0 (max) 
TBD See note 
Parameter related to the thickness of the lens, it should 
be calculated using the NTHICK utility provided 
together with HSSM software - see detailed instructions 
at page 188 of the Manual (Weaver et al., 1994). 
Unfortunately, because of a bug of the utility NTHICK, 
we could not calculate the exact value; after many 
simulations to verify the influence of the parameter, it 
was decided to adopt that indicated in HSSM examples.   
Simulation ending time (d) 
From 25 
to 2500 
From 25 
to 2500 
The parameter depends on the characteristics of the 
substance and on the model that the user is running: for 
KOPT, it should be an interval of time related to the 
foreseen time of arrival to the water-table (i.e. 25-30 
days). For OILENS model, HSSM example suggests to 
insert a time much greater than that expected for the 
NAPL lens to form (i.e. 2500 days) 
Maximum solution time step 
(d) 
From 
few 
hours to 
25 or 
less 
From 
few 
hours to 
25 or 
less 
It is proportionally related to the simulation ending time; 
for OILENS it should be high as possible: values of up 
to 25 days are acceptable.  
Minimum time between 
printed time steps (d) 
0,1-0,25 0,1-0,25 
Standard value provided by HSSM manual (Weaver et 
al., 1994) 
Simulation 
ending 
criterion 
User 
specified 
time 
  
4 alternatives are provided by HSSM. Since the 
contaminant dispersion was not analysed for Mantua, the 
first option was adopted for KOPT running, the second 
for OILENS. 
NAPL lens 
spreading 
stops 
  
Max 
contaminant 
max flux 
into aquifer 
  
Contaminan
t leached 
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HSSM Parameter 
Generic 
value 
Value 
in 
Mantua 
Notes 
from the 
lens 
NAPL lens 
profiles 
Number of 
profiles 
Max 10 Max 10 Up to ten profiles are allowed. 
Time of 
profiles (d) 
  Enter up to ten profile times in days. They are obviously 
correlated to the chosen simulation ending time. 
Receptor 
location 
Number of 
wells 
1 1 
If no HSSM-T is run, it is enough to specify that there is 
one receptor located in 0,0-0,0. 
 
 First input box (hydrologic parameters): the values remained the same for all the 
simulations executed, in particular for: Saturated vertical hydraulic cond. (m/d) = 8,64, 
depth to the water table = 6 m and Aquifer saturated thickness = 20 m.  
The saturated vertical hydraulic condition is a parameter that can hugely influence the 
results of the model: it expresses the permeability of the ground and can assume a wide 
range of values, strictly correlated to the local characteristics of the soil. In Mantua, the 
values of the saturated vertical hydraulic condition provided by (Ministero dell’ambiente e 
della tutela del territorio e del mare, 2014) are very high, that means that the soil in the 
industrial area is particularly vulnerable to pollutant penetration. 
 Second Input box (Hydrocarbon properties): Only substances located in tanks or rail 
tankers without waterproof pavement were analyzed. The values changed in relation to the 
substance analyzed, however, substances with the same density and viscosity produce the 
same results in terms of time to reach the water-table and expansion of the oil lens. 
Therefore, the simulations were conducted for groups of substances with similar viscosity 
and density: i.e. benzene simulations are valid also for ethylbenzene, toluene, cumene and 
styrene. Cyclohexanone, gasoline and diesel required individual simulations.  
As far as it the source of release, the diameter and depth of the pond calculated by ALOHA 
for 1 cm release hole was adopted, as explained in Par. 3.5.4. 1 cm, the minimum measure 
associated to damage state R3, was not sufficient to produce consequences in terms of 
fire/toxic events. Thus, it was particularly important to explore the consequences on the 
environmental side: if such a minimum release was able to produce pollution, clearly the 
environmental vulnerability of the place could not be neglected. 
Finally, different durations of release from the pond were tested in order to verify the time 
necessary to the different substances to reach the water-table: since the substances analyzed 
were characterized by low density and low viscosity, usually a pond remaining on the soil 
for three hours was sufficient to push the pollutants into the aquifer. 
 Third Input box (Simulation parameters): the ending time and the adopted profiles 
remained constant for all the simulations executed: 
 For KOPT, 25 days simulation ending time, 5 profiles (0,25; 0,5; 1; 2; 5 days) 
 For OILENS, 2500 days simulation ending time, 7 profiles (25; 50; 75; 100; 125; 150; 
200 days) 
150 Risk management and land use planning for environmental and asset protection 
purposes 
 
4.4.3 ALOHA and HSSM results 
Annex III - ALOHA and HSSM results reports the simulations executed for each tank of 
Versalis and IES, and their outcomings. The most significant results of the simulations are 
shown in this Paragraph, through graphics related to ground penetration and oil lens 
expansion for HSSM, Google Earth® maps with the spatial extension of the scenarios 
(ALOHA).  
For Mantua plants, the simulations identified the most dangerous substances, and the 
threatened areas that could be associated to a NaTech event with low impact, corresponding 
to a R3 damage state.  
As far as it concerns the energetic/toxic consequences, ALOHA pointed out that Versalis 
tanks and rail-tankers containing acrylonitrile and benzene could generate toxic external 
consequences. While for acrylonitrile tanks, the protection measures implemented (survey 
of leakages through gas chromatograph, double bottom etc) could grant a rapid intervention 
to avoid the scenario, the railway indeed could be the most vulnerable area in case of 
interaction effects, because no containment basins or direct control are available. 
For IES plant, the R3 damage state can produce a diesel pool-fire, which remains inside the 
plant boundaries; the tank 9, containing gasoline, for which the binary interaction value F→I 
reaches a R2 damage state, produces a pool-fire too, that does not reach critical targets. 
However, rail-tankers containing gasoline could be exposed to the same consequences of 
those of Versalis.   
However, the most alarming scenario associated to Na-Tech interactions both for Versalis 
and Ies is related to environmental pollution. HSSM demonstrated that a very small release 
hole (1 cm), and 3 hours of release from the puddle on the ground are sufficient to cause 
pollution for the aquifer. Further interactions with external factors like flood, extreme climate 
events (storms, raining) can spread pollutants to unforeseeable distances. The surveys in the 
industrial area confirm the data obtained with HSSM; considering that such a small release 
could also not being detected in time by the monitoring and protection devices, it is very 
important to duly take into account this scenario for the compatibility phase. 
Damage state: R3 – release hole: 1 cm  
The simulations carried out for a 1cm hole did not produce meaningful results in terms of 
toxic or fire events; even in case the Levels of Concern were reached, the extension of the 
incidental areas did not overcome the basins of containment. However, given the high 
hydraulic conductivity of the Mantua soils, this little leakage - for substances characterized 
by a low density and low viscosity - was sufficient to provoke pollution.  
VERSALIS: For tanks containing benzene and substances with similar density and viscosity, 
the pond produced by a 1 cm hole, after three hours of stay on the ground, can reach 6 m. 
deep in 5 days. The extension of the Hydrocarbon lens formed on the aquifer surface in 200 
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days can reach 25 meters from the point of release; for major releases of pollutant, it can 
vary from 90 to 120 meters.  
The tanks containing Cyclohexanone and olone are less dangerous for the environmental 
effects: the viscosity of these substances is equal to 2.2, therefore the penetration of the 
pollutant flux in the soil is slower. Both for the 5000 m3 and 1000 m3 tanks, a release time 
of 12 hours would be necessary for the pollutant to reach the aquifer. 
Figure 32, Figure 33Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. and Figure 34 show 
HSSM results for the biggest tank of Benzene, 10.000 m3 (valid for tanks DA407, DA408, 
DA409). Figure 32 shows KOPT simulation: flux penetration into the ground after 3 hours 
of release from the puddle. The 5 time- profiles evidence the depth reached by the pollutant 
after 6 hours – first curve on the right – and after 5 days – first curve on the left. Since the 
depth of the aquifer in the area of Versalis is between 4 and 8 m., it appears clear that the 
pollutant can reach the water table in a brief period. 
 
Figure 32: KOPT results for benzene and similar substances 
Figure 33 and Figure 34 show OILENS model: formation of a lens of hydrocarbon 
substance on the surface of the aquifer, after the arrival of the pollutant to the water table. In 
this case, the time profiles analyzed are longer than in KOPT model and go from 25 days to 
200 days.  
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Figure 33: OILENS results for benzene and similar substances (25 days) 
 
 
Figure 34: OILENS results for benzene and similar substances (200 days) 
IES: the tanks without waterproof basins contain gasoline and diesel. The first showed a 
behavior similar to that of benzene, reaching the water table in 5 days after three hours of 
release from the puddle; however, given the major dimension of the tank, and the consequent 
major dimension of the puddle and of released pollutant, the oil lens can reach distance from 
the starting point of about 40 m. On the contrary, the viscosity of diesel fuel, equal to 2.5, 
slows down its penetration into the ground: after 4 hours, it reaches only 2,50 meters deep, 
and in order to reach the water table, 14 hours of uninterrupted leakage from the puddle are 
required.  
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In addition, the tank of MTBE / ETBE was analyzed: the viscosity in this case is very low, 
therefore only 2 hours of release from the puddle are sufficient for the pollutant to reach the 
aquifer; the lens can arrive to 40 meters in 200 days. 
Damage state: R3 – release hole: 3 cm (Seismic events) 
VERSALIS: Figure 35 shows that a possible minor rupture (3 cm) caused by an earthquake 
could lead to a critical event in the storage park provoked by the tanks containing 
acrylonitrile. The toxic release would reach some areas outside the plant, mainly industrial, 
and a civil house. The same damage on the benzene tanks can generate a vapor release limited 
to internal areas of the plant; benzene is not classified as toxic substance, but it is recognized 
as a carcinogenic one.   
 
Figure 35: Seismic R3 damage state on acrylonitrile and benzene tanks 
As far as it concerns the productive departments and the Frassine railway, another potential 
risky situation was identified for the rail tankers. Possible leakages of acrylonitrile and 
benzene could generate toxic releases (Figure 36) involving the residential zones located 
along the railway. 
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Figure 36: Seismic R3 damage state on acrylonitrile and benzene rail-tankers 
IES: the possible scenario caused by a minor leakage provoked by an Earthquake consists of 
a pool-fire from the biggest tank of diesel fuel, which in any case remains confined inside 
the tank basin (Figure 37).     
 
Figure 37: Seismic R3 damage state on acrylonitrile and benzene rail-tankers 
Damage state: R3 – release hole: 3 cm (Flood events) 
The simulations developed for a R3 damage state provoked by a possible flood impact 
evidenced little or negligible scenarios both for Versalis and IES.  
VERSALIS: the tanks located in the lowest portion of the plant, in front of the Sisma drain, 
were analysed: they contain cumene, cyclohexanone, toluene and styrene. Figure 38 shows 
that the leakage provokes minor poolfires, contained inside the containment basins.  
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Figure 38: Flood R3 damage state on cumene, cyclohexanone, toluene, styrene tanks 
Damage state: R2 – release hole: 15-30 cm (Seismic events) 
Some simulations for R2 damage state were conducted in order to verify the possible 
scenarios related to multiple interactions. Different dimensions of the leakage holes, 
compliant to those provided by (HSE, 2012) were tested.  
VERSALIS: all the tanks analysed could produce pool-fires; they do not overcome the plant 
boundaries, but could provoke domino effects on the adjacent tanks. As far as it concerns the 
possible toxic release (orange areas), once again the tank containing acrylonitrile could 
provoke the largest toxic area outside the plant; it includes one residential building. The 
release from benzene tank could overcome the plant boundaries and reach the industrial 
buildings in front of Versalis (Figure 39). 
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Figure 39: Seismic R2 damage state on Versalis tanks 
IES: the R2 damage state applied to the biggest tanks of diesel fuel and gasoline could bring 
to major pool-fires, which include via Brennero (Figure 40). However, it has to be 
considered that the perimeter wall of the plant partially protects the street. 
 
Figure 40: Seismic R2 damage state on IES tanks 
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Damage state: R2 – release hole: 15-30 cm (FLOOD) 
The scenarios related to a R2 damage related to Flood events are once again Pool-fires; 
however, considering that ALOHA cannot simulate Pool-fires on water, the extension of the 
area could be very different from the map. 
VERSALIS: the scenarios are produced by the tanks with a low ground elevation; they 
overcome the plant boundaries, but do not reach areas of interest (Figure 41). 
 
Figure 41: Flood R2 damage state on Versalis tanks 
IES: the R2 damage state for the gasoline tank 9 could be the result of a simple binary 
interaction Flood→Industry (Table 44), as a consequence of the major hazard value that the 
flood risk has in that area. On the contrary, for gasoline tank 109, R2 damage state is a remote 
event, that could be provoked by multiple interactions. 
In any case, the areas generated by 9 do not reach sensible targets, while the poolfire from 
109 could involve the Brennero street (Figure 42). 
 
Figure 42: Flood R2 damage state on IES tanks 
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4.5. Territorial and environmental vulnerabilities 
The territorial vulnerability for Mantua was assessed through the identification of areal, 
linear and punctual vulnerabilities (Regione Piemonte, 2010), classified according to 
Ministerial decree DM 09/05/2001. The territorial vulnerable elements and the assigned 
classes are reported in Annex III; 3 thematic layers were also drafted in Arcgis, as shown by 
Figure 43. 
1) Areal vulnerabilities: the vulnerability classification was based on the building ratio 
indexes defined by Mantua City plan (Comune di Mantova, 2012). Usually, the city plan 
defines the building ratio index for each urban function, specifying the allowed density 
of construction; but this index is not indicated for the most ancient areas. For Mantua city 
centre, the class was assigned on the basis of the urban density; normally the city centers 
could assume categories between A and B.  
In relation to areal analysis, the E.R.I.R. approach recommends to investigate only the 
residential areas; however, in order to obtain a good knowledge of the territory, the 
analysis was extended also to other urban functions, i.e. commercial and tertiary areas, 
green public areas, parks, and areas destined to the transformation. These spaces were 
attributed to a C category, because of their average people frequentation; an in-depth 
research was then carried out to verify the correct attribution and verify the presence of 
vulnerable punctual elements.  
2) Punctual vulnerabilities: all the buildings with public functions or connoted by high 
frequentation were analyzed; in particular schools, hospitals, churches, museums, nursing 
homes, stations, commercial malls etc. For Mantua, the lists provided by the local 
E.R.I.R. (Comune di Mantova, 2012) and Emergency plan (2014) were assumed, and then 
expanded through to a closer investigation of the territory. Since many dates related to 
the frequentation of the buildings were not available, precautionary categories were 
assigned on the basis of the specific functions and dimensions of the building analyzed.  
3) Linear vulnerabilities and strategic elements: railways, main roads, gas ducts were 
identified (etc.). In addition, the strategic elements for emergency, and key infrastructures 
for the functioning of the city were pointed out: areas signalled in Mantua Emergency 
Plan as shelter areas, and storage places for the civil protection; buildings related to public 
services, police and strategic civil protection; power plants and infrastructures for water 
regulation.  
Annex III also reports the environmental vulnerabilities encountered in Mantua: several 
elements are connoted by Extreme and Relevant environmental vulnerability. The entire city 
centre and the surrounding lakes are classified as Unesco area, because of their unique 
historical, artistic and landscape characteristics. At the same time, the Mincio river, in spite 
of its artificial flow, still constitutes a fundamental natural element for the biodiversity 
safeguard: two “Natura 2000” areas are defined inside Mantua municipality, for the host and 
reproduction of wild birds and other species.  
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Figure 43: Territorial vulnerable elements in Mantua 
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4.6. Compatibility and planning actions 
The risks encountered in Mantua and the effects of their possible interactions were 
superimposed to the vulnerabilities listed in Annex III in order to verify the presence of 
possible incompatibility situations. Studies and interventions to grant the protection of 
people and environment have to be activated for these areas. 
Two different zones of Mantua were chosen for the compatibility assessment: 
 the city centre, the area with the highest concentration of vulnerabilities, both of territorial 
and environmental type. Flood, seismic and extreme climate events can overlay in this 
zone, but they present homogenous low values.  
 Industrial area of Frassino-Lunetta, where Versalis and IES are located, together with the 
other Seveso plants Sol and SAPIO and other industrial activities. 4 different risks 
(Industrial, hydrogeological, seismic and climatic) are concentrated here. In this case, the 
assessment of the compatibility was based on further considerations deriving from the 
estimation and mapping of the potential consequences of the interaction, produced with 
ALOHA and HSSM software.  
The two compatibility assessments are resumed in the following paragraphs, that follow each 
step of the process: 1) the assessment of the interaction levels and effects, through the 
interaction tables, and the simulations with ALOHA and HSSM; 2) the list of the 
vulnerabilities encountered in the analysed zone; 3) the identification of the possible 
incompatibilities or alert situations, and the recommended in-depth studies and interventions. 
4.6.1. Central area 
The area analysed consists of the entire city centre of Mantua, included the more recent urban 
areas of via Donati and via Nenni, that delimitate the southern border of the centre.  Two 
hazards are overlaid (seismic and flood), together with the overall influence of the Climate; 
the ratings assigned for the Earthquake and the Flood maintain the same values for the whole 
central area, with the exception of a little zone in via Nenni, where the seismic risk results 
higher. Even if the low values encountered do not require further studies and interventions, 
some recommendations were given to increase the general safety of the area. 
1. Risks and interactions 
Flood Risk: SE 1,5, HE 1, MP -3  
Seismic Risk: SE 2, HE 1, MP 0 (via Nenni = SE 3, HE 1, MP 0) 
Climate: SE 1,5, HE 1, MP 0 
Risks in central area 
Flood Seismic Climate 
SE HE PM SE HE PM SE HE PM 
1,5 1 -3 2 1 0 2 1 0 
Flood 
SE 2 
- - - HE 1 
PM 0 
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Seismic 
SE 1,5 
1 - - HE 1 
PM -1 
Climate 
SE 2 
1 - - HE 1 
PM 0 
 
 
2. Territorial vulnerability 
Areal vulnerabilities (A and B urban functions):  
D14 - A1 Città della prima cerchia (A), D15 - A2 Suburbio della prima e seconda cerchia (A), 
D16D16 - A3 Aree di continuità con area Unesco (A), D18  - Area resid. Valletta Paiolo Valsecchi 
(B), D19 – aree residenziali (B) 
Punctual elements classified as A or B: 
Schools: Mons. Martini (+ Institute Casa Pace), Leon Battista Alberti, Pomponazzo, Ferrari e 
Bertazzoli, Montessori, Chaplin, D’Este e Nievo, D’Arco e Pitentino, Redentore, Mantegna, 
Romano, Istituti Santa Paola, Ardigò e Sacchi, Virgilio, Campogalliani e Martiri di B., 
Politecnico di Milano, UniMantova, Conservatorio 
Hospital, hospices, etc: Istituti Geriatrici Mazzali, Poliambulatorio, Casa di riposo Sereno 
Soggiorno, Casa di riposo Isabella d’Este.  
Other elements: Palazzo ducale, Duomo di Mantova 
Linear elements and strategic areas / building / infrastructures: Railway; Impianto idrovoro 
Valsecchi; Area di ricovero R3; Polizia di stato e polizia stradale; Questura; Corpo forestale dello 
stato; Comune di Mantova; Prefettura; Tribunale di Mantova; Casa circondariale Mantova; 
Palazzo Soardi - uffici comunali; Guardia di Finanza; Polizia locale; Regione Lombardia – STER; 
Carabinieri; VVF Mantova 
 
3. TERRITORIAL COMPATIBILITY 
Many A and B vulnerable elements were identified in the City centre, but neither the values 
assigned to the risks, nor the interactions overcome the critical threshold of 2,5, therefore no 
further actions should be taken. However, some recommendations are given in relation to:  
Flood and the possible effects provoked by its interactions → the protection of the central area 
majorly depends on the efficacy of the hydraulic defence system, composed by the integrated 
functioning of several elements. In order to continue to ensure this safety, a periodic maintenance 
and test of the entire system should be applied.  
Earthquake → the S.E. value = 2, due to sandy soils, does not reach the threshold for further 
analysis; in any case, since this soil would increase the effects of an earthquake, it is 
recommended to verify the state of progress in the compiling of the vulnerability seismic sheets 
(level 0), and to evaluate if it is convenient to deepen the analysis for the most important public 
buildings. A clear incompatibility is identified only in the area of via Nenni: the macro-category 
S.E. for earthquake is equal to 3, and many buildings with public functions raise on this soil with 
very poor structural characteristics. In particular, two vulnerable elements classified as B were 
identified: a residential area, and the centre for the treatment of drug dependences (SERT).  
Further investigations should be carried out for the B elements, and possibly for the entire area: 
first of all, it is necessary to precisely identify the frequentation and number of people in the zone, 
at least for each public building. Therefore, further micro-zoning analysis are advocated and at 
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least the level 0 vulnerability seismic sheet should be arranged for the public buildings. On the 
basis of the results of these further studies, appropriate measures for the construction and 
restoration activities in the area could be introduced in the City plan. 
 
2bis. Environmental vulnerability  
As mentioned in Paragraph 3.7.2, the compatibility of the environmental elements has to be 
analysed case by case, in relation to the peculiar characteristics of the element analysed and of the 
risk and risk interactions. Below the environmental vulnerable elements identified for Mantua city 
centre are reported, together with the analysis of the possible influence from the risks identified.     
Extreme vulnerable 
elements: 
Flood risk Seismic risk Climate 
Archaeological area 
in the city centre (not 
an excavation area; 
zone where the 
presence of 
archaeological 
vestiges is known and 
recognized, as centre 
of the ancient roman 
city). 
Given the fact that the 
vulnerable element is 
underground, the 
influence of a flood 
could be considered 
REDUCED.  
Possible conditions of 
digging out could be 
produced by major 
flood, but this scenario 
would require more 
in-depth verifications.  
The nature of the 
archaeological 
vestiges analysed, 
which do not 
constitute an organic 
compound, can led to 
consider the effects of 
the seismic risk as 
REDUCED 
The same 
considerations as for 
the flood risks are 
given. 
Protected park of 
Mincio river (the 
coastal green banks of 
the lakes are inserted 
in the area of the park) 
The possible impact of 
a flood on these areas 
could be considered 
MODERATE; indeed, 
a flood could hit the 
organization of these 
areas, bringing mud 
and waste; however, 
they are naturally 
predisposed to flood. 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
300 m. areas around 
the Inferior, Superior 
and Median lakes) 
FROM MODERATE 
TO HIGH 
INFLUENCE 
FROM MODERATE 
TO HIGH 
INFLUENCE: an 
earthquake could 
impact on the built 
part of the landscape 
that constitutes the 
lake coast 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
Relevant vulnerability 
elements: 
Flood risk Seismic risk Climate 
Historical monuments and 
Landscape: Mantova e 
Cittadella, Lago Mezzo e 
Inferiore, Fiume Mincio 
HIGH 
INFLUENCE 
HIGH 
INFLUENCE 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
Little wood area near to via 
Nenni and the railway 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
MODERATE 
INFLUENCE 
(lightning) 
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The coastal areas and the 
southern areas nearby  via 
Nenni are subjected to 
hydrogeological 
restrictions ex l.r. 45/1989:  
FROM 
MODERATE TO 
HIGH 
INFLUENCE, 
because of the 
reduced altimetry of 
the analysed areas 
HIGH 
INFLUENCE in 
the area of Via 
Nenni, 
characterized by 
Z4 type of soil 
MODERATE 
INFLUENCE 
Mincio river and lakes 
constitutes a passageway 
for several wild species, in 
particular birds 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
Only two plots of land with 
land use capacity 1 or 2 are 
included in the area 
analysed  
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
FROM MODERATE 
TO HIGH 
INFLUENCE 
The vulnerability of the 
aquifers under the city 
centre goes from Very high 
to High 
Mincio river and 
lakes are very close, 
and have high 
possibility to 
influence the 
underground water 
level 
The fluctuation of 
the underground 
water could 
favour the 
liquefaction for 
Z2 soils  
 The entire city centre has a 
level of the aquifer between 
2 m. and 4 m.; in the area 
of via Nenni the depth level 
decrease to 1 m.  
 
3bis. ENVIRONMENTAL COMPATIBILITY 
On the basis of the previous analysis of vulnerability, flood and earthquake and possible interactions 
have the highest influence on the monumental heritage. However, both the interactions and the 
strengthening effects values are low; therefore, no further measures can be imposed. Anyway, an 
accurate maintenance of the hydraulic control system is suggested.  
The threshold is overcome only for the area of via Nenni, where the macro category Strengthening 
effects for earthquake is equal to 3. The following vulnerable environmental elements were 
identified nearby via Nenni: a wooden area, a hydrogeological restriction, and a vulnerable aquifer 
whose depth is between 1 and 2 m. The wooden area is subjected to a low influence from seismic 
events, but earthquake can provoke some repercussions on water behaviour: there is no a direct 
environmental compatibility, but this particular situation should be considered as a further reason 
to conduct seismic verifications on the buildings present in the area.   
4.6.2. Lunetta-Frassino neighbourhood 
The neighbourhood of Lunetta-Frassino is connoted by a wide industrial presence, hosting 
all the Seveso plants of Mantua. Portions of the neighbourhood are included in the buffer 
zones identified by (A.D.B.Po, 2016) as exposed to flood risk, and the soils belong to the 
class Z2 (possible amplification effects). ALOHA and HSSM simulations were executed for 
the two most dangerous Seveso plants, Versalis and IES, to verify the possible spatial 
consequences of interactions with natural risks. The vulnerable elements were investigated 
inside a radius of 1 km from the industries, that are the zone were 4 risks overlay. 
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1. Risks and interactions 
Flood Risk: SE 1,5, HE 1, MP -3  
Seismic Risk: SE 2, HE 1, MP 0  
Industrial Risk: Versalis SE 3, HE 2, MP -1, Ies SE 2,5, HE 2, MP -1 
Climate: SE 1,5, HE 1, MP 0 
Risks in Versalis area 
Industrial Flood Seismic Climate 
SE HE MP SE SE HE MP SE SE HE MP SE 
3 2 -1 1,5 3 2 -1 1,5 3 2 -1 1,5 
Industrial 
risk 
SE 3 
- - - - HE 2 
MP -1 
Flood risk 
SE 1,5 
1,42 - - - HE 1 
MP -3 
Seismic 
risk 
SE 2 
1,75 1,00 - - HE 1 
MP 0 
Climate 
SE 2 
1,75 1.00 - - HE 1 
MP 0 
Risks in Ies area 
Industrial risk Flood risk Seismic risk Climate 
SE HE MP SE SE HE MP SE SE HE MP SE 
2,5 2 -1 1,5 2,5 2 -1 1,5 2,5 2 -1 1,5 
Industrial 
risk 
SE 2,5 
- - - - HE 2 
MP -1 
Flood risk 
SE 1,5 
1,33 - - - HE 1 
MP -3 
Seismic 
risk 
SE 2 
1,67 1,00 - - HE 1 
MP 0 
Climate 
SE 2 
1,67 1.00 - - HE 1 
MP 0 
2. Territorial vulnerability (1 km from the plants) 
Areal vulnerabilities: the following B urban functions are included: D19 – residential areas (B); 
some of them are inside the buffer zone of 500 m from the Seveso industries. The City Plan 
identified a huge area adjacent to the east border of Versalis for the placement of commercial and 
industrial activities. 
Punctual elements classified as A or B: only few C punctual elements were identified. 
Linear elements and strategic areas / building / infrastructures: railway, Mantua orbital road, 
methane pipe line, services line to the plants 
 
3. TERRITORIAL COMPATIBILITY 
The buffer zones of 500 m. for the 4 Seveso industries (Versalis, Ies, Sapio and Sol) are almost 
completely overlaid, and include some residential zones classified as B. The values attributed to 
the macro-categories of Sapio and Sol are low, as their possible interactions with natural events; 
on the contrary, Ies and Versalis obtained high values both for S.E. and H.E. The interaction 
values are low, because of the low levels of the natural risks; however, they tend to medium level. 
Given these initial conditions, ALOHA software was employed to obtain more defined scenarios 
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deriving from the interaction. A R3 damage state, corresponding to the low levels of interaction 
calculated for both plants, was adopted for the simulation → continuous leakage from a hole of 
3 cm. 
The scenarios obtained through ALOHA were superimposed to the territorial vulnerable elements 
identified: two incompatibilities along Versalis North and East borders were encountered, in 
relation to potential accidents provoked by the release of acrylonitrile and benzene from tanks 
and rail tankers. In particular, along the railway, the impact of natural external events could cause 
minor damage to the rail-tankers, producing release that could interest the residential areas 
classified as B. As far as it concerns the east border, releases from the tanks of acrylonitrile and 
benzene could interest some adjacent industrial activities and a residential house results involved.  
For IES, the only consequence for R3 damage state is related to diesel fuel, but remains inside 
the plant boundaries. Therefore, no incompatibilities were detected.  
The potential incompatibility identified for the railway zone requires further analyses: first, on 
the quantity and characteristics of the people living in the B residential areas nearby the railway, 
on the type of use of Frassine station, frequency of the arrivals of the dangerous goods etc. More 
detailed simulations on the possible scenarios should be carried out too. Finally, possible 
integrative protection measures could be taken, like i.e. improvement of the emergency 
procedures of Versalis and Ies plants, check of the openings of the residential houses pointed 
towards the railway, automatic lock of the ventilation systems etc.     
 
2bis. Environmental vulnerability (1 km from the plants) 
Below are reported the environmental vulnerabilities encountered in the area of analysis of 1 km., 
and the potential influence of the various risks. The influence of the plants Versalis and IES 
always result very high, because they both detain different kind of substances (toxic, flammable, 
dangerous for the environment) that can consequently affect different types of vulnerabilities.  
Extreme 
vulnerability 
elements: 
Industrial risk Flood risk Seismic risk Climate 
Protected area 
SIC/ZPS 
Vallazza and 
Mincio coastal 
banks belonging 
to Mincio 
protected park 
(both included in 
the 500 m. buffer 
zone of Versalis 
and Ies) 
HIGH 
INFLUENCE 
The possible 
impact of a flood 
on these areas 
could be 
considered 
MODERATE; 
they are 
naturally 
predisposed to 
flood. 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
MODERATE 
INFLUENCE 
300 m.  protected 
area generated 
by the Inferior 
lake (included in 
IES buffer zone) 
FROM 
MODERATE 
TO HIGH 
INFLUENCE 
MODERATE 
INFLUENCE 
(on the built 
landscape) 
MODERATE 
INFLUENCE 
(on the built 
landscape) 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
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Relevant 
vulnerability 
elements: 
Industrial risk Flood risk Seismic risk Climate 
Wooded areas 
pertaining to  
Mincio park 
included both in 
Ies and Versalis 
buffer zones 
HIGH 
INFLUENCE 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
MODERATE 
INFLUENCE 
Area subjected 
to 
hydrogeological 
restrictions ex 
l.r. 45/1989: 
coastal banks of 
Mincio River 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
 
 
HIGH 
INFLUENCE 
HIGH 
INFLUENCE 
(Z4 soils in 
certain areas) 
MODERATE 
INFLUENCE 
Mincio river and 
the lakes 
constitutes a 
passageway for 
several wild 
species, in 
particular birds 
HIGH 
INFLUENCE 
 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
Many soils with 
Lnd Use 
Capacity 1 or 2 
are included in 
the buffer zones  
HIGH 
INFLUENCE 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
REDUCED 
INFLUENCE 
FROM 
MODERATE 
TO HIGH 
INFLUENCE 
The vulnerability 
of the aquifers in 
the area is High 
HIGH 
INFLUENCE 
Mincio river and 
lakes are very 
close, and have 
high possibility 
to influence the 
underground 
water level 
The fluctuation 
of the 
underground 
water could 
enhance the 
possibility of 
liquefaction 
phaenomena in 
case of 
earthquake 
 The level of the 
aquifer is 
between 4 m. and 
8m.  
 
3bis. ENVIRONMENTAL COMPATIBILITY 
Sapio and Sol are plants connoted by the presence of flammable substances, that do not overcome 
the alert threshold; no environmental elements (like woods or architectural heritage) vulnerable 
to energetic events were found in their proximity, therefore they can be considered compatible. 
The highest influence on the vulnerable environmental elements of the area Lunetta-Frassino is 
associated to the presence of the industries Ies and Versalis, whose interaction with the Natural 
risks can widen the risk of pollution. In fact, even if the estimated level of interaction is quite low, 
the simulations with HSSM demonstrated that minor incidents to the tanks provoked by an 
external event (damage state R3 →  1 cm hole of release) could easily bring to dispersion of 
pollutant in the aquifer, a situation that is confirmed by the current state of severe pollution of the 
area. An evident environmental incompatibility is therefore associated to these plants; the current 
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protective measures adopted (i.e. hydraulic barrier) seem to be not sufficient to face this situation. 
The adoption of the measures recommended by Turin province Guidelines should be verified by 
the Municipality; some integration could be required to the plant. Monitoring and plans for the 
recovery are currently on course for the procedures related to the national Site of Recovery, leaded 
by the Ministry for the Environment. They can be considered as sufficient, even if the most 
adequate procedure to avoid the continuation of the pollution should be the complete 
impermeabilization of the storage parks and pipelines paths; since this is a costly operation, it 
could be at least proposed for the tanks and pipelines that transport the substances whose presence 
still result further over the thresholds in the surveys campaign (like i.e. benzene).  
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Chapter 5 
Case study 2 
5.1 Introduction 
The second case study analysed is a small town in the Piedmont region; it allowed taking 
into account risks produced by sources considered as "minor" or “secondary”; these risks, in 
some cases neglected or not accurately described in the existing sectorial plans, demonstrated 
to have a relevant impact on the municipal territory, therefore a wider analysis of their 
possible interactions was needed. 
A Seveso plant was identified on the Municipal territory by the Regional authorities: it was 
an abandoned factory, closed for not being compliant with the requests for the Environmental 
Authorization – Autorizzazione Integrata Ambientale (AIA). No proved recovery operations 
were undertaken; neither the Municipality was able to verify if the building were secured or 
not. Other two potential Seveso plants not identified by Piedmont Region were found: both 
detained a quantity of hazardous substances higher than the thresholds established by Annex 
I of the Legislative Decree 105/2015. Other factories, even if below the Seveso thresholds, 
were analysed because they employed or stored of toxic substances and substances 
dangerous for the environment in vulnerable areas. No one of these plants was subjected to 
any specific regulations related to risk assessment.  
The particular hydrologic and morphologic condition of the case study made the presence of 
these industries potentially incompatible; indeed, the town rises on a flat land area connoted 
by high vulnerability due to flood events. The flood problem is not provoked here by a major 
river, but by a network of secondary artificial canals and creeks, for which no maintenance 
was carried out across the years. More specifically, the Municipality, together with the 
adjacent ones, rises on a mega alluvial fan (Figure 44) crossed by a large number of irrigation 
canals. The increasing urbanization and the industrialization brought to the abandon of the 
canals - which in many cases were covered - and to the complete waterproofing of areas 
formerly destined to agriculture and farming activities. Consequently, the hydric system is 
currently no more able to drain the water surplus, and during intense rain events, it produces 
floods that affect the entire fan.  
During Piedmont major flood events in 1994, 2004, 2008, the areas affected by flood in the 
Case study area were definitely wider than those identified by (A.D.B.Po et al, 2016): this 
plan mapped the flooding areas generated by one hydric element, but the minor hydrographic 
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network provoked unforeseen overflows in areas that were unmapped. Even if the water 
reached moderate heights (between 30 cm and 80 cm.), this was sufficient to cause several 
damages.   
 
Figure 44: Mega-alluvial fan (Provincia di Torino, 2009) 
The relation between industries and nature obviously is not unidirectional: flood can 
represent a problem for the factories, but the plants constitute a high risk for the environment 
too. The alluvial fan is characterized by soils constituted by sand and sinters with an 
extremely high permeability; in the area of the case study, the phreatic waters can be found 
within 0 and 3 meters from the ground level. This means that the aquifer is extremely 
vulnerable to industrial pollution.   
In the end, the risk for Case study 2 is produced on one side by industries that are not 
subjected neither to Seveso regulation nor to the Ministerial decree 09/05/2001, and on the 
other side by canals, which are not taken into account in the Flood sectorial plan. Therefore, 
the application of the methodology could constitute a helpful step to better describe the actual 
risk and define possible preventive measures.  
 
 
170 Risk management and land use planning for environmental and asset protection 
purposes 
 
 
Figure 45: Flooding buffer-zone of Creek β, defined by (A.D.B.Po et, al 2016). 
5.2. Hazard characterization 
The following paragraphs describe the characteristics of the Flood and Industrial hazards; in 
comparison to Mantua (Case Study 1), less information was available, because of the 
“minor” features of the hazards themselves. The seismic hazard was not taken into account 
because the entire Municipal territory was connoted by Class 4, corresponding to a 
“Negligible” value. The collection phase was autonomously realized by the Candidate on the 
basis of:  
• For Flood → Piano Gestione del Rischio alluvioni - Plan for the evaluation and 
management of flood hazard (A.D.B.P.O., 2016) and (A.D.B.Po et al., 2016), surveys of 
the flood events from 1994 to 1996 (Regione Piemonte, 1998), feasibility studies issued 
by (Politecnico di Torino, 2009 and (Provincia di Torino, 2009), studies on the secondary 
water network by the Municipalities.    
• For Industry → E.R.I.R. draft documents (2015) 
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5.2.1. Flood hazard 
Case study 2 rises on a mega-alluvial fan, that starts from the left side of River α and is 
delimited on its east portion by Creek β; Figure 46 shows the area examined. The alluvial 
fan occupies 174 km2, and is mostly constituted by flat land; during the years, many irrigation 
canals were derived from river to support the development of agriculture. These canals flow 
towards East and South and constitute a dense network which provide water to the fields. 
The return of the water to River α was not foreseen, because the main function of the canals 
was to water the crops; therefore, some of them flow into River γ, but the majority simply 
end in the meadows.    
In ancient times, when the urbanised areas where limited, the hydraulic framework could 
bear also intense rainy events; the canals were constantly monitored, therefore the water 
intakes on α river were immediately closed; also, in case of overflowing, the water was free 
to run into meadows and crops without provoking serious damages.  However, starting from 
1950, a relevant part of the land was urbanised and therefore made waterproof; furthermore, 
the construction of transporting routes and other infrastructures created artificial barriers to 
the water overflowing. All these infrastructures were equipped with systems of drainage for 
the rainy water, which ended conferring other water to the irrigation canals.      
Figure 46: Minor hydraulic network between River α and Creek β  
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Nowadays, the hydraulic system is unable to grant the security in case of intense rainy events; 
the overflowing of canals and creeks can provoke damages to the towns, as demonstrated by 
the floods occurred in 1994, 2000 and 2008. In particular, during the flooding event that took 
place between the 4th and the 7th November 1994, β creek overflowed in several points. 
Even if buffer zones connoted by low-medium dangerousness Em (return-times 300-500 
years) were identified, the flood covered wider areas, with features typical of the 200 return 
times events, for rainfall lasting 24 hours. The conformation of β creek was found not 
adequate for channelling peak discharges, even for reduced water quantities (Politecnico di 
Torino, 2009). 
After 1994 event, the Municipalities belonging to Creek β basin decided to constitute a 
Consortium for the prevention and control of the flood risk. In 1998, a General Plan for 
fitting-out works to Creek β was released by the Consortium. Three main activities were 
planned: 1) the execution of a floodway canal upstream, to address the exceeding flow of 
Creek β to River α; 2) the execution of one overflow basin downstream; 3) the execution of 
two overflow basins in the last portion of the creek. In 2000, the floodway canal started 
operating; during the same years, some activities of river bank defense and riverbed 
restoration were executed.   
In 2009, two significant coordinated studies were executed on Creek β and the secondary 
network, to identify the most urgent and convenient interventions to be executed: the first, 
realized by (Politecnico di Torino, 2009) tested the efficacy of the overflow basin designed; 
the second, executed by (Provincia di Torino, 2009) identified the artefacts and activities to 
be carried out to reduce the flood risk caused by the canals.  
The following hazard characterization is extracted from the two studies previously 
mentioned.  
STRENGTHENING EFFECTS: 
Creek β → β riverbed is connoted by a reduced width, while the riverbank has a limited 
height; these characteristics are uniformly distributed along all the creek path. In particular, 
these hydraulic inefficiencies are more frequent in correspondence to the crossing artefacts 
of the urbanized areas, where the riverbanks can result also lower than 2 m. The presence of 
bridges, combined with the scarce width of the riverbed, make Creek β unable to bear peak 
discharges, even in case of reduced flows like 30 m3/s.   
The floodway canal built in 2000 partially contributes in reducing the volume of peak 
discharges, but the residuals transported by Creek β progressively obstruct its intake, and it 
has very low riverbanks. Therefore, for rate flows equal to 40-45 m3/s, the hydric section of 
the floodway results inadequate, producing a severe hydraulic risk.    
The portion of Creek β in the territory of the second case study is connoted by fluvial terraces 
with height between 1 and 3 m; the riverbed has scarce slope (<1%). 5 critical sections 
(crossing bridges) were identified, with maximum tolerable rate-flows of 20 m3/s; 40 m3/s; 
40 m3/s; 10 m3/s and 50 m3/s.  
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In case of intense rate-flow, Creek β can feed its tributaries (the secondary channels 
network).   
Channels network → in addition to the massive urbanization and the increasing land 
waterproofing, other factors favour the overflowing of the network of irrigation canals:  
 the network is not equipped with flood-ways able to return the exceeding water into 
River α. In addition, the majority of water intakes from River α is not controllable, 
because they are not equipped with any shutter.  
 the entire network has a reduced slope, aggravated by the state of scarce or non-existent 
maintenance. These problems, summed up with the presence of extended portions 
covered or diverted to comply with the building needs, obviously reduce the flowing 
sections, facilitating the overflowing.     
 the raised roads, often perpendicular to the flowing direction of the network, act as a 
barrier towards the expansion of the waters, enhancing their level.  
 
The Municipalities as Case Study 2, located in the downstream portion of the alluvial fan, 
constitute the most fragile part of the territory, because they collect the water arriving from 
the entire fan.   
HISTORICAL EVENTS  
Creek β → Creek β was responsible of several inundations, coinciding with intense rainy 
events; the floods were characterized by low energy, with height between 60-100 m. The 
western portion of Case study 2 territory was interested by Creek β flooding. 
Channels network → Both in 1994 and 2008, the secondary network provoked flood wider 
than those reported in P.A.I plan: a covered canal was responsible of the inundation of the 
city centre. Other extensive flooding interested the southern areas of the Municipality, 
interesting a wide industrial area. Figure 47 (Provincia di Torino, 2009) reports the areas 
interested by flood in 1994, 2000 and 2008 (blue and light blue areas); the buffer zones of 
Creek β identified by P.A.I. are represented with yellow color. 
In spite of the detailed surveys realize both by Piedmont region and by the studies promoted 
by the Consortium, the new Piano Gestione del Rischio alluvioni (AD.B.P.O, 2016) that 
substituted P.A.I. in compliance with the European directive, reported only the buffer zones 
of Creek β (see Figure 45). The dangerousness of the secondary water network and its 
combined effects with Creek β in case of intense rainy events were not analyzed, and the 
areas interested by the floods in 1994, 2000 and 2008 were not mapped. 
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Figure 47: Case-study 2 - regional survey of the areas interested by flood  
PROTECTION MEASURES:  
Creek β → with reference to the interventions programmed by the Consortium in 1998, only 
the upstream floodway canal was executed.  
The preliminary plan for the realization of the first overflow basin is currently on progress. 
However, (Politecnico di Torino, 2009) demonstrated that the advantages coming from the 
construction of this basin have moderate effects on the farer downstream portions of the 
creek. The intervention was considered effective, but not sufficient to grant the security along 
the entire path of the creek. According to Politecnico experts, only the execution of a detailed 
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hydraulic-hydrologic model of the entire basin could allow to program coordinated 
interventions to grant protection from floods.   
Channels network → The feasibility study by Provincia di Torino, 2009 proposed the 
realization of 5 floodway canals to return the exceeding waters of the secondary network into 
River α (one in the territory of Case-study 2), but no one of the above-mentioned 
interventions was executed till now.  
The need of further protection measures and studies is advocated by the new Piano Gestione 
del Rischio alluvioni (A.D.B.Po, 2016): the following measures were identified: 
Table 54: Measures suggested by (A.D.B.Po, 2016):  
Objectives Measure name 
Authority 
in charge 
Progress Priority 
IMPROVING THE RISK 
KNOWLEDGE – Updating 
and improving the 
knowledge related to flood 
hazard and risk 
Completion of the hydraulic 
study for the entire creek, to 
define the criticalities and 
the priority interventions. 
Consortium 
for creek β 
Ongoing 
constructio
n 
High 
IMPROVING THE 
PERFORMANCE OF THE 
EXISTING DEFENCE 
ELEMENTS – Execution of 
interventions for the control 
of flooding through overflow 
basins 
Planning and execution of 
the overflow basin  
Ongoing 
constructio
n 
High 
GRANT MAJOR 
EXPANSION AREAS TO 
RIVERS – Preserving side 
areas of the rivers for 
expansion 
Proposal of new buffer zones 
for the creek, for the risk 
reduction in the 
Municipalities  
Piedmont 
region 
Not started Critical 
Ratings assignation 
As reminded in the previous chapters, the rating assignation to rivers and creeks requires to 
identify portions connoted by homogenous characteristics and behaviour.  
As far as it concerns Creek β, the first partition adopted, like in Mantua, was: “Upstream not-
municipal portion” and “Municipal portion”.  The latter was treated as a unique element 
because (Politecnico di Torino, 2009) identified the plain portion of the creek as a unique 
sub-basin, uniformly connoted by very small slopes of both riversides and river course.      
For H.E. ratings, the flood buffer zones identified by the Piano di Gestione del Rischio 
Alluvioni (A.D.B.Po, 2016) were taken into account: the areas with higher probability of 
flood obtained a higher rating. However, the several floods events of the last 20 years showed 
return times not exactly compliant with those defined by the sectorial flood plans, in 
particular for medium-low flood hazard. The study by (Politecnico di Torino, 2009) reported 
that the 1994 flood had an intensity equal to the events with 200 years return time, also in 
areas where the flood was considered rare (300-500 years). This discrepancy was also 
recognized by (A.D.B.Po, 2016) - see Table 54.  
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The inadequacy of the actual flood buffer zones was kept into account in the rating 
assignation: the areas with Very high flood hazard (Ee) and High flood hazard (Eb) 
respectively obtained 3 and 2, as indicated in Table 7 but the rating of the areas with medium-
low flood hazard (Em) was raised to 2, instead of 1. 
In relation to the secondary network, given the complexity of the interactions and 
interdependencies between the canals, it was decided to consider them as a unique element, 
also because all the main canals identified were equally responsible of several overflowing. 
(A.D.B.Po, 2016)  did not assign buffer zones, therefore only the case history could help in 
attributing the rating: the hydraulic secondary network participated in all the major flood 
events of the last 20 years, and in particular in 2008 it was interested by a proper breakdown, 
according to (Politecnico di Torino, 2009). For this reason, a medium value = 2, 
corresponding to that of a flood buffer zone “High flood hazard Eb (100-200 yrs) = not 
frequent flood scenario” was assigned. 
Table 55: Ratings assignation for Case-study 2 water-network 
Element 
considered 
 
[SE] Strengthening effects 
[PM] Protection 
measures 
[HE] Historical events 
Interactions 
with other 
elements of 
the water 
network 
Criticalities of 
the hydraulic 
artefacts 
Hydraulic 
artefacts / levees 
etc. 
Creek β 
(upstream 
not-
municipal 
portion) 
Possibilities 
of inverted 
flow from the 
creek main 
course to the 
tributaries or 
upstream. 
Portions with 
riverbanks 
height < 2 m. 
Reduced width 
of the riverbed  
Critical sections 
due to crossing 
bridges 
uniformly 
distributed along 
the river course 
Unique protection 
artefact = 
floodway canal. 
The realization of 
the overflow basin 
could enhance the 
security of the 
upper course of 
Creek β, but its 
effect decreases 
for the farthest 
portions of the 
creek. 
3 flood buffer zones  
1) Very high flood 
hazard Ee (20-50 yrs) = 
frequent flood scenario 
2) High flood hazard Eb 
(100-200 yrs) = not 
frequent flood scenario 
3) Medium-low flood 
hazard Em (300-500 
yrs) = rare flood 
scenario. 
In the last 20 years, 
several important flood 
events occurred; the one 
in 1994 reached an 
intensity correspondent 
to return times of 200 
yrs, even in areas where 
return time =  300, 500 
yrs (Em). 
Floodway canal: 
obstruction due 
to scarce 
maintenance 
inadequate 
hydric section 
for peak 
discharge 
SCORE 3 
Depending on the 
portion analyzed 
Em  2 Eb  2 Ee  3 
Creek β 
creek 
Possible 
interactions 
5 critical 
sections 
(bridges) 
2 areas for flood 
expansion and a 
stone riverbank 
2 flood buffer zones:  
2) Very high flood 
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Element 
considered 
 
[SE] Strengthening effects 
[PM] Protection 
measures 
[HE] Historical events 
Interactions 
with other 
elements of 
the water 
network 
Criticalities of 
the hydraulic 
artefacts 
Hydraulic 
artefacts / levees 
etc. 
(municipal 
portion) 
with other 
canals 
producing 
hydric 
insufficiencies 
were identified.  
were planned; only 
the riverbank was 
realized, after the 
flood event in 
2000. 
hazard Ee (20-50 yrs) = 
frequent flood scenario 
3) Medium-low flood 
hazard Em (300-500 
yrs) = rare flood 
scenario. 
In the buffer zone 
classified as Em, in 
1994 Creek β 
overflowed, reaching 
municipal sectors 
outside the buffer 
zones. The water height 
reached 1 m. 
SCORE 3  0 Em  2  Ee  3 
Secondary 
municipal 
water 
network, 
right side of 
Creek β 
Water intakes 
from River α 
cannot be 
regulated; 
 
Creek β can 
act as a feeder 
of the 
channels 
network 
during flood 
events 
 
 
Geomorphologic 
features:  aquifer 
close to the 
ground level, 
reduced slope of 
the soil and 
canals 
Scarce 
maintenance: 
obstructions, 
riverbeds not 
defined, 
inadequate 
crossing 
artefacts 
Forcing of the 
network due to 
building needs: 
covered 
portions, 
diversions (even 
with 90° curves) 
Raised roads 
block the natural 
flow of the 
hydric network 
5 floodway 
channels were 
planned to return 
the exceeding 
flows to River α, 
but no 
interventions were 
executed. 
No flood buffer zones 
and return times are 
assigned to the 
secondary network, 
except for a little 
portion in an 
agricultural area, that is 
classified as Em. 
However, the network 
provoked overflowing 
in 1994, 2000 e 2008, 
reaching water heights 
between 30-80 cm in 
the city centre, and in 
southern and western 
municipal areas. 
SCORE 3 0 2 
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5.2.2. Industrial hazard 
This paragraph introduces the description of the hazardous plants identified for Case study 
2; as previously stated, only one Seveso plant was present; other 8 potential dangerous plants 
were investigated and identified thanks to the questionnaire reported in Table 22.  
E.R.I.R. was drafted during the initial stage of application of the new Seveso legislative 
decree (no. 05/2015), which introduced modifications in the parameters for Seveso 
classification; therefore, the investigation on the non-Seveso plants pointed out some 
Companies not yet in line with the new requirements. 
The analysis of the Sub-threshold Seveso plants introduced some uncertainties for the ratings 
assignation phase because, in spite of the compilation of the questionnaire, some essential 
information related to case history, storage conditions and preventive and protection 
measures were missing. In example, in relation to the macro-category Historical Events, the 
surveys realized after the floods in 1994, 2000 and 2008 demonstrated that the majority of 
the plants was affected; but no information was available on the effects provoked. Also, no 
data on the previous accidents of the plants were available.  
Therefore, a common indicative value of 1,5, corresponding to a low-medium impact, was 
assigned to the plants interested by the flood events. In fact, since the registered water heights 
were not so relevant, it could be possible that the damages suffered by the factories were 
limited. A negligible H.E. value, equal to 0,5, was given to the plants not hit by flood events 
located in proximity of canals, to take into account the possibility overflowing water.  
The ratings for S.E. and P.M. were assigned on the basis of the information provided by the 
owners in the questionnaires, and of the data contained in the procedures for the release of 
the Environmental authorization - AIA. Google maps and Google street view were employed 
to check if outdoor storage was present, if there were items like tanks more exposed to 
NaTech risk, which delimiting systems were adopted for the perimeter (full wall or railings), 
and the presence of waterproof apron.  
Unfortunately, the environmental analysis on soil and water required by Turin province 
guidelines is mandatory for Seveso sub-thresholds plants and the non-Seveso plant only in 
case of modifications with risk increase; therefore, it is not possible to require this 
information in a “level 0” condition for the existing plants.  
Consequently, the ratings assigned to the macro-category P.M. were maintained generally 
low because of cautionary reasons. 
‘A’ (Seveso plant) 
‘A’plant was closed in 2011, after several recalling from the authorities aimed at obtaining 
the integration of unavoidable safety, preventive and protective measures. After the closure, 
the Municipality required to the plant owner to secure the factory, but this was never verified 
on site. For this reason, the plant was still included by Piedmont region in its Seveso plants 
regional list. 
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The information on the substances detained and the scenarios were extracted from the 
Emergency plan (Prefettura di Torino, 2007), the Environmental Authorization - AIA 
(Provincia di Torino, 2007) and the Notification of the plant. No external damage areas were 
identified in 2007; however, the risk analysis could be too obsolete, considering the actual 
conditions of abandon and absence of monitoring. 
Rating assignation 
S.E. → Plant ‘A’ represents the most hazardous plant, mainly for its permanent condition of 
unmanned abandon. The plant still has 10 underground basins, whose conditions would 
require an on-site inspection; some of them were not equipped with any containment system. 
Rating assigned to S.E. = 3 
H.E. → Plant ‘A’ is included in an area of potential overflowing of Creek β, identified with 
medium-moderate dangerousness (Em) by the Piano di Gestione del Rischio alluvioni. The 
plant was reached by the water in 1994. The indicative value for H.E. = 1,5 was assigned. 
P.M. → the documents related to AIA authorization demonstrated that the measures adopted 
were completely inadequate, and this problem brought to the closure of the activity. The 
information is not sufficient to establish if there are some NaTech measures.  Rating assigned 
to P.M. = 0 
Table 56: Ratings assignation for plant ‘A’ 
[S.E.] STRENGTHENING EFFECTS 
[M.P.] PROTECTION 
MEASURES 
[H.E.] 
HISTORICAL 
EVENTS 
 
Assets / items with 
potential NaTech risk 
Hazard
ous 
substan
ces 
Credible 
events / 
scenarios 
RDS 
Protection 
measure 
related to 
the item 
Protection 
measures 
for Na-tech 
/ pollution 
events 
Item type  
Item 
descriptio
n 
5 
undergrou
nd basins 
Overall 
capacity: 
296, 1 t. 
 (T, N) 
No external 
scenarios 
identified. 
Factory 
closed, 
situation not 
monitored. 
Required 
level alarms 
for basins, 
measures for 
the safe 
disposal of 
rainy water.  
Implementat
ion not 
verifiable. 
Factory 
closed for its 
not 
compliance. 
POLLUTIO
N: measures 
for 
environment
al protection 
not adopted 
NATECH: 
information 
not 
available 
No information on 
accidents case 
history; plant closed 
under unsafe 
conditions. 
 
EVENTS: the area is 
included in the area 
classified with 
medium-moderate 
dangerousness (Em) 
by the Piano di 
Gestione del Rischio 
alluvioni. It was 
interested by the 
flood of 1994 .  
5 
undergrou
nd basins 
Overall 
capacity: 
180,4 t. 
(N) 
Storage 
barrels 
3,5 t. + 1   (T, N) 
SCORE 
3 0 1,5 
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‘B’ (potential Seveso plant) 
Plant ‘B’ hosts 30 reactors with capacities from 4 to 25 m3. Processes with temperature > 
100°C and pressure > 10 bar are carried out; mobile firefighting systems and systems for the 
monitoring and abatement of gaseous discharges are adopted.  
The plant has different collection lines for process and rainy water, respectively addressed 
to the Municipal drain and to the canal adjacent to the north border. Retaining basins for 
possible leakages are present in the working and pouring areas; an emergency basin before 
the discharge is also present.  
Plant ‘B’ is subjected to Environmental Authorization - AIA, therefore it adopted several 
protection and preventive measures, like i.e. for the tanks, the implementation of high level 
alarms, and the construction of dedicated containment basins.  
Plant ‘B’ can be considered a potential Seveso plant because the quantity of substances 
categorized as H2 - Acute toxic overcomes the Lower-tier requirements of Annex I of the 
Legislative decree 105/2015. In addition, the substances classified as hazardous for the 
environment overcome the 20% of the Lower-tier requirements of Annex I of the Legislative 
decree 105/2015, therefore Plant ‘B’ is also an environmental hazardous Sub-threshold plant. 
Rating assignation 
S.E. → As Seveso plant, Plant ‘B’ should be subjected to the commitments of the Legislative 
decree 105/2015. Plant ‘B’ storage is located in its external apron; several tanks of hazardous 
substances are placed here, without a cover, and can therefore be exposed to extreme climate 
events. Turin province required, for the release of the Environmental Authorization - AIA, 
high-level alarms and basins of containment for the tanks with hazardous substances, 
however the implementation of these measures cannot be verified. Considering the presence 
of items potentially subjected to NaTech and the absence of specific Seveso regulations, the 
rating assigned for S.E. = 2,8  
H.E. → Plant ‘B’ was interested by the flooding of the adjacent canal in 1994 and 2008; 
however, the heights of the water and the damages provoked are unknown. The indicative 
rating assigned was = 1,5 
P.M. → Adoption of the measures of Turin Province guideline and of NaTech measures not 
verifiable. The Plant is equipped with separated lines for rainy and process water; the Plan 
for Rainy water, requested by Piedmont region, was fully implemented. The plant has a drain 
in the adjacent canal, whose condition should be more investigated. For these reasons, the 
rating assigned = -1,8 
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Table 57: Ratings assignation for Plant ‘B’ 
[S.E.] STRENGTHENING EFFECTS 
[M.P.] PROTECTION 
MEASURES 
[H.E.] 
HISTORICAL 
EVENTS 
 
Assets / items with 
potential NaTech risk 
Hazard
ous 
substan
ces 
Credible 
events / 
scenarios 
RDS 
Protection 
measure 
related to 
the item 
Protection 
measures for 
Na-tech / 
pollution events 
Item type  
Item 
descriptio
n 
Tanks 
Overall 
quantity: 
27 t 
 (T) 
Quantity of 
toxic 
substances > 
lower tier 
Legislative 
Decree 
105/2015. 
No Safety 
report. 
Outdoor 
unprotected 
storage 
areas, some 
tanks seem 
to have the 
containment 
basin. 
AIA authority 
recommended 
adopting for 
the tanks: level 
alarms, 
containment 
basins. 
Plant subjected 
to AIA; Plan 
for the 
management 
of rainy water. 
Collection 
system for 
accidental 
spills; different 
drainage lines 
for rainy and 
process water; 
emergency 
basin.   
NaTech: 
Information 
n.a.  
No information 
on the plant 
accidents are 
available.  
The plant was 
repeatedly 
interest by the 
flooding of the 
adjacent canal. 
Overall 
quantity: 
50 t 
 (T) 
Overall 
quantity = 
25 t. 
 (F, N) 
Overall 
quantity = 
27 t. 
 (F) 
Bags 
Overall 
quantity = 
22 t. 
(F) 
SCORE 
2,8 -1,8 1,5 
‘C’ (potential Seveso plant) 
Plant ‘C’ employs processes with temperature > 100°C. The plant is subjected to 
Environmental Authorization - AIA; in compliance with this regulation, the plant has 
systems for the monitoring and abatement of gaseous discharges; retaining basins for 
possible leakages in the working and pouring areas; waterproof aprons, and separated drain 
lines for the rainy and process waters. The deposition basin is equipped with a shutter that 
allows interrupting the flow towards the Municipal drain in case of dispersion of pollutants.  
The quantity of substances categorized as H1 - Acute toxic overcome the Lower-tier 
requirements of Annex I of the Legislative decree 105/2015. 
Rating assignation 
S.E. → the plant overcame the lower tier-requirements of Annex I of the Legislative decree 
105/2015; it should be subjected to the commitments of the Legislative decree 105/2015, 
which were not respected. Even if the quantity of substances detained is not particularly 
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significant, the absence of specific Seveso regulations leads to assign a medium-high rate for 
S.E. = 2,5  
H.E. → Plant ‘C’ was not interested by any major floods, but it is near to two irrigation 
canals. Since the entire network of irrigation channels has problems of scarce maintenance, 
a possible flood cannot be completely excluded. A very low rating was assigned to keep into 
account this possibility = 0,5. 
P.M. → Adoption of the measures of Turin Province guideline and NaTech measures not 
verified for lack of information. The Plant is equipped with separated lines for rainy and 
process water, the discharge to the Municipal sewer can be controlled with a shutter, and the 
Plan for Rainy water requested by Piedmont region was fully implemented. Also, the apron 
is waterproof. For these reasons, the rating assigned = -2 
Table 58: Ratings assignation for plant ‘C’ 
[S.E.] STRENGTHENING EFFECTS 
[M.P.] PROTECTION 
MEASURES 
[H.E.] 
HISTORICAL 
EVENTS 
 
Assets / items with 
potential NaTech risk 
Hazard
ous 
substan
ces 
Credible 
events / 
scenarios 
RDS 
Protection 
measure 
related to 
the item 
Protection 
measures for 
Na-tech / 
pollution events Item type  
Item 
descriptio
n 
Storage 
barrels 
Overall 
quantity: 
4,6 t 
(T) 
Quantity of 
toxic 
substances > 
lower tier 
Legislative 
Decree 
105/2015. 
No Safety 
report. 
Waterproof 
pavements; 
the storage 
of raw 
materials 
and wastes 
is under 
cover, and 
the area for 
trunks 
loading and 
unloading 
too. 
Plant subjected 
to AIA; Plan for 
the management 
of rainy water. 
Collection 
system for 
accidental spills; 
different 
drainage lines 
for rainy and 
process water; 
sedimentation 
basin,  shutter.   
NaTech: 
information n.a. 
No information 
on the plant 
accidents are 
available.  
 
EVENTS: the 
area is very 
close to those 
interested by the 
flood in 1994 
and 2008. 
Overall 
quantity: 5 t 
 (T, N) 
Overall 
quantity = 
0,2 t. 
 (T) 
Overall 
quantity = 
0,8 t. 
(T, F) 
Overall 
quantity 
=0,7 t. 
(F) 
Overall 
quantity = 
17, 4 t. 
 (N) 
Overall 
quantity = 
0,3 t. 
 (N) 
Overall 
quantity = 1 
t. 
 (F) 
Bags 
Overall 
quantity = 5 
t. 
 (F) 
SCORE 
2,5 -2 0,5 
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‘D’ (Seveso sub-threshold) 
Plant ‘D’ is equipped with mobile and fixed firefighting systems, systems for the monitoring 
and abatement of gaseous discharges; retaining basins for possible leakages in the working 
and pouring areas; waterproof aprons. Process cooling water and rainy water are addressed 
to a unique authorized discharge. 
Plant ‘D’ is a toxic Sub-threshold plant because the quantity of substances classified as Acute 
toxic overcome the 20% of the Lower-tier requirements of Annex I of the Legislative decree 
105/2015.  
Rating assignation 
S.E. → The plant is a Seveso sub-threshold for category H1 (Acute toxicity). No outside 
storage is present. The rating assigned is medium, tending to low = 2 
H.E. → Plant ‘D’ was interested by the flooding in 1994 and 2008.  The indicative rating 
assigned was = 1,5 
P.M. → The adoption of the measures of Turin Province guideline, and of the NaTech 
measures cannot be verified. The plant is equipped with retaining basins for possible 
leakages in the working and pouring areas; waterproof aprons. Process cooling water and 
rainy water are addressed to a unique authorized discharge. Due to the uncertainty related to 
the measures for the environmental protection, the rating assigned = -1,5 
Table 59: Ratings assignation for Plant ‘D’ 
[S.E.] STRENGTHENING EFFECTS 
[M.P.] PROTECTION 
MEASURES 
[H.E.] 
HISTORICAL 
EVENTS 
 
Assets / items with 
potential NaTech risk 
Hazard
ous 
substan
ces 
Credible 
events / 
scenarios 
RDS 
Protection 
measure 
related to 
the item 
Protection 
measures 
for Na-tech 
/ pollution 
events 
Item type  
Item 
descriptio
n 
Tank on 
containme
nt basin 
Overall 
quantity: 
2,8 t  
 (T) 
The plant is 
not 
subjected to 
the 
Legislative 
decree 
105/2015; 
no external 
storage 
Waterproof 
storage 
areas 
Collection 
system for 
accidental 
spills. Rainy 
and process 
water 
addressed to 
the public 
sewer.  
NaTech: 
Information 
n.a. 
No information on 
the plant accidents 
are available. 
EVENTS: the area 
was interested by the 
flood in 1994 and 
2008.  
Overall 
quantity: 
3,7 t  
 (N) 
Tins in a 
fireproof 
box 
Overall 
quantity: 
0,1 t  
 (F,N) 
Overall 
quantity: 
0,19 t. 
 (F) 
SCORE 
2 -1,5 0,5 
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‘E’ (Seveso sub-threshold) 
Plant ‘E’ is equipped with mobile firefighting systems, retaining basins for possible leakages 
in the working and pouring areas; waterproof aprons. It owes a dedicated drain line for rainy 
water, that is discharged into a canal adjacent to the plant.  
Plant ‘E’ is classified as an environmental hazardous Sub-threshold plant, because the 
quantity of substances classified as hazardous for the environment overcome the 20% of the 
Lower-tier requirements of Annex 1 of the Legislative decree 105/2015.  
Rating assignation 
S.E. → The plant is a Seveso sub-threshold for category E1 (Environmental hazard). Outside, 
uncovered storage is present, that could be subjected to effects of extreme climate events or 
floods. The rating assigned is = 2,5 
H.E. → Plant ‘E’ was not interested by any major floods, but it is near to one irrigation canal. 
Since the entire network of irrigation channels has problems of scarce maintenance, it cannot 
be completely excluded a possible flood. A very low rating was assigned to keep into account 
this possibility = 0,5 
P.M. → The adoption of the measures of Turin Province guideline and of NaTech measures 
cannot be verified. The plant is equipped with retaining basins for possible leakages in the 
working and pouring areas; waterproof aprons. Rainy water is addressed to an adjacent canal. 
Due to the uncertainty related to the measures for the environmental protection, the rating 
assigned = -1 
Table 60: Ratings assignation for Plant ‘E’ 
[S.E.] STRENGTHENING EFFECTS 
[M.P.] PROTECTION 
MEASURES 
[H.E.] 
HISTORICAL 
EVENTS 
 
Assets / items with 
potential NaTech risk 
Hazard
ous 
substan
ces 
Credible 
events / 
scenarios 
RDS 
Protection 
measure 
related to 
the item 
Protection 
measures 
for Na-tech 
/ pollution 
events 
Item type  
Item 
descriptio
n 
Bags 
Overall 
quantity: 
90 t  
 (N) 
The plant is 
not 
subjected to 
the 
Legislative 
decree 
105/2015. 
External 
covered 
storage of 
materials 
waterproof 
storage 
areas 
Collection 
system for 
accidental 
spills. Rainy 
water 
addressed to 
a channel. 
NATECH: 
Information 
not 
sufficient 
No information on 
the plant accidents 
are available. 
EVENTS: the area is 
very close to those 
interested by the 
flood in 1994.  
Tank 
Overall 
quantity: 
0,38 t. 
 (F,N) 
Undergro
und tank 
Overall 
quantity: 
0,88 t. 
(F) 
SCORE 
2,5 -1 0,5 
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‘F’ 
Plant ‘F’ has a surface of 70.000 m2; 11.000 m2 are dedicated to storage. The plant is 
subjected to Environmental Authorization - AIA. 
The plant is equipped with mobile firefighting systems, systems for the monitoring and 
abatement of gaseous discharges; retaining basins for possible leakages in the working and 
pouring areas; waterproof aprons; drain line for the collection of rainy water with dedicated 
basin. Process water and rainy water are collected in a series of basins and discharged to the 
Municipal drain; a shutter allows stopping the flow in case of presence of pollutants. A 
portion of the rainy water is discharged in an adjacent canal.  
Rating assignation 
S.E. → Plant ‘F’ carries out an activity with high risk for the environmental matrixes. Also, 
there are items potentially exposed to NaTech risk, like opencast treatment basins. For these 
reasons, the rating assigned was = 2,8   
H.E. → Plant ‘F’ was not interested by the last major floods. However, it is very close to an 
area of potential overflow classified as medium-moderate dangerous (Em), by the Piano di 
Gestione del Rischio alluvioni. Therefore, the indicative value = 0,5 was assigned. 
P.M. → The adoption of the measures of Turin Province guideline and of the NaTech 
measures cannot be verified. However, the plant integrated all the AIA indications, and the 
discharge to the public sewer is controlled through a shutter. The value assigned was = - 1,5. 
Table 61: Ratings assignation for Plant ‘F’ 
[S.E.] STRENGTHENING EFFECTS 
[M.P.] PROTECTION 
MEASURES 
[H.E.] 
HISTORICAL 
EVENTS 
 
Assets / items with 
potential NaTech risk 
Hazard
ous 
substan
ces 
Credible 
events / 
scenarios 
RDS 
Protection 
measure 
related to 
the item 
Protection 
measures 
for Na-tech 
/ pollution 
events 
Item type  
Item 
descriptio
n 
Tank on 
containme
nt basin 
Overall 
quantity: 5 
t 
 (N) 
The plant 
did not 
declare the 
quantities of 
the 
hazardous 
substances 
treated. 
Outdoor 
basin for the 
treatment of 
liquid 
wastes, 
surrounded 
by a not 
Waterproof 
storage 
areas 
Subjected to 
AIA; Plan 
for the 
Managemen
t of rainy 
water. 
Rainy and 
process 
water to the 
public 
sewer, after 
3 collection 
and 
sedimentati
No information on 
the plant accidents 
are available. 
 
EVENTS: Plant 
close to an area 
classified with 
medium-moderate 
dangerousness 
(Em), or low 
dangerousness by 
P.G.R.A.  
186 Risk management and land use planning for environmental and asset protection 
purposes 
 
[S.E.] STRENGTHENING EFFECTS 
[M.P.] PROTECTION 
MEASURES 
[H.E.] 
HISTORICAL 
EVENTS 
 
Assets / items with 
potential NaTech risk 
Hazard
ous 
substan
ces 
Credible 
events / 
scenarios 
RDS 
Protection 
measure 
related to 
the item 
Protection 
measures 
for Na-tech 
/ pollution 
events 
Item type  
Item 
descriptio
n 
Overall 
quantity: 
0,4 t  
 (N) 
waterproof 
surface. 
Outdoor 
tanks 
on basins, 
controlled 
through a 
shutter. 
Collection 
system for 
accidental 
spills.   
NaTech: 
Information 
n.a. 
SCORE 
2,8 -1,5 0,5 
5.3. Assessment of the interactions 
The industrial and flood characterizations made clear that Case-Study 2 is not interested by 
extremely high hazards; the risk derives from little lower-tier Seveso plants or Sub-threshold 
plants, and flood events with low energy. However, the interaction of plants, mostly 
detaining toxic and environmental hazardous substances, with the recurrent overflowing 
events could produce unexpected and severe conditions for people and environment, because 
of the lack of adequate protection and prevention measures. In order to verify possible 
impacts, the interaction tables were realized for each area where flood areas and plants 
overlay. Figure 48 shows the location of the plants ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’. 
Possible local extreme climate events were also taken into account, for their possible impact 
on industries and influence on flooding; they were rated according to the simplified approach 
exposed in Chapter 3. 
The interaction assessment was carried out also for the plants that were never interested by 
flood (‘C’, ‘E’, ‘F’), because of a cautionary reason. In fact, these plants are close or adjacent 
to canals whose slope, maintenance and riverbed conditions are not different from those of 
the canals provoking the past overflowing. Future flood events could not be completely 
excluded.  In this case, the following ratings were attributed to the FLOOD RISK: S.E. = 1, 
H.E. = 0, P.M. = 0; while to H.E. of the industries the value of =0,5 was assigned. 
Risk management and land use planning for environmental and asset 
protection purposes 
187 
 
 
Figure 48: Areas for the assessment of the interaction (‘A’, ‘B’, ‘D’) 
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Table 62: Interaction tables for plants exposed to flood risk 
Plant ‘A’ (Seveso) 
FLOOD Industrial Climate 
SE HE PM SE HE PM SE HE PM 
3 2 0 3 1,5 0 2 1 0 
FLOO
D 
SE 3 
No interaction 2,17 No interaction HE 2 
PM 0 
Industr
ial 
SE 3 
No interaction - No interaction HE 1,5 
PM 0 
Climate 
SE 2 
1,83 1,67 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
Plant ‘B’ (Potential 
Seveso) 
FLOOD Industrial Climate 
SE HE PM SE HE PM SE HE PM 
3 2 0 2,8 1,5 -1,8 2 1 0 
FLOO
D 
SE 3 
No interaction 1,98 No interaction HE 2 
PM 0 
Industr
ial 
SE 2,8 
No interaction - No interaction HE 1,5 
PM -1,8 
Climate 
SE 2 
1,83 1,48 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
Plant ‘D’ (sub-threshold) 
FLOOD Industrial Climate 
SE HE PM SE SE HE PM HE SE 
3 2 0 2 1,5 -1,5 2 1 0 
FLOO
D 
SE 3 
No interaction 1,88 No interaction HE 2 
PM 0 
Industr
ial 
SE 2 
No interaction - No interaction HE 1,5 
PM -1,5 
Climate 
SE 2 
1,83 1,38 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
Table 63: Interaction tables for plants not exposed to flood risk 
Plant ‘C’ (potential 
Seveso) 
FLOOD Industrial Climate 
SE HE PM SE SE HE PM HE SE 
1 0 0 2,5 0,5 -2 2 1 0 
FLOO
D 
SE 1 
No interaction 0,58 No interaction HE 0 
PM 0 
Industr
ial 
SE 2,5 
No interaction - No interaction HE 0,5 
PM -2 
Climate 
SE 2 
0,83 1,08 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
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Plant ‘E’ (sub-threshold) 
FLOOD Industrial Climate 
SE HE PM SE SE HE PM HE SE 
1 0 0 2,5 0,5 -1 2 1 0 
FLOO
D 
SE 1 
No interaction 0,67 No interaction HE 0 
PM 0 
Industr
ial 
SE 2,5 
No interaction - No interaction HE 0,5 
PM -1 
Climate 
SE 2 
0,83 1,17 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
Plant ‘F’ 
FLOOD Industrial Climate 
SE HE PM SE SE HE PM HE SE 
1 0 0 2,8 0,5 -1,5 2 1 0 
FLOO
D 
SE 1 
No interaction 0,68 No interaction HE 0 
PM 0 
Industr
ial 
SE 2,8 
No interaction - No interaction HE 0,5 
PM -1,5 
Climate 
SE 2 
0,83 1,18 No interaction HE 1 
PM 0 
The interaction values obtained for the possible influence flood → industries correspond to 
a medium-low impact of interaction for plants ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘D’, in line with the registered 
low energy of the flood events. For the other industries analysed for cautionary reasons, the 
interaction values can be considered as negligible.  
The results obtained are strongly influenced by the indicative medium-low level assigned to 
the industrial macro-category H.E. (1,5); an in-depth analysis could produce different and 
more accurate results for the interaction. 
5.4. Territorial and environmental vulnerabilities 
The following paragraph reports the categorization of the territorial and environmental 
vulnerabilities of Case-study 2; the first are classified in compliance with the Ministerial 
decree 09/05/2001, the second are identified according to Piedmont Regional Guidelines. 
5.4.1 Territorial vulnerabilities 
3 types of territorial elements were identified and classified:  
 Areal vulnerable elements. They were categorized on the basis of the building ratio index 
reported in the Technical standards of the City plan. The urban density was quite low: the 
majority of the residential areas was categorized as C and D. The areas addressed to public 
services and the areas addressed to transformations with commercial o tertiary 
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destination were individually investigated to verify if punctual vulnerable elements were 
present; the parcels not occupied by punctual elements obtained the conservative C 
category. Monitoring the transformations of these areas, in particular in case of risk 
exposure, is particularly important.  
The list of urban functions and related categories is showed in Annex IV. 
 Punctual vulnerable elements. They were identified and categorized on the basis of the 
capacity, type of attendance (daily, weekly, monthly), type of exposure (inside, outside), 
etc. Several schools and 1 nursing home were classified as A; structures for leisure like  
i.e. a mall, a discotheque, a bowling center obtained a B. The list of the punctual 
vulnerable elements is reported in Annex V. 
 Linear vulnerable elements. The following elements were identified: Highway and 
Provincial route / Energy lines arriving from the energy production center / Methane 
pipeline.  
Figure 49 is an extract of the vulnerable territorial map of the city centre: the areal elements 
are colored in different ways depending on their classification (B = red, C = yellow, D = light 
green, E = light blue), while the punctual elements are identified in dark blue and 
accompanied with their ID number. The linear elements are also traced in dark blue. 
 
Figure 49: Case-study 2 Extract of the map of territorial vulnerabilities  
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5.4.2 Environmental vulnerability 
No Extreme environmental elements were encountered for Case study 2; however, many 
Relevant vulnerable elements typical of flat land areas are present. In particular, the depth of 
the aquifer from the ground level is between 0 and 3 meters, and the soils are connoted by 
Land use capacity class between 1 and 2. Therefore, the territory is very vulnerable towards 
possible pollution events. The complete list of vulnerable elements can be found in Annex 
V. Figure 50 reports an extract of the map for environmental vulnerabilities: the green 
uniform color represents the depth of the aquifer 0-3 m., uniformly distributed in the 
municipal territory. The cross layer represents the distribution of soils cap. 1 and 2. On the 
top of the figure, Creek β appears, with the two-landscape protected areas of 150 m. on each 
side. The red buildings are the protected historical heritage.  
 
Figure 50: Case study 2 - environmental vulnerabilities 
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5.5. Compatibility and planning actions 
The areas of risk interaction (flood → industry) were located in correspondence of plants; 
therefore, the assessment of the environmental and territorial compatibility was carried out 
drawing a buffer zone of 500 m. around each plant. The values of the Industrial macro-
categories and of F/I interaction were projected here, and the possible variations of the Flood 
macro-categories were verified.  
The condition of compatibility can be considered satisfied if no vulnerable areas of A and B 
categories are present inside buffer zones where H.E., S.E. or Interaction values are higher 
than 2,5. 
As far as it concerns the environmental vulnerability, the same threshold of 2.5. was adopted, 
but first the specific relation between the threats analysed and the environmental vulnerable 
element was considered. 
 The assessment of the territorial and environmental compatibility for each plant is reported 
in the next Paragraph 5.5.1. Figure 51 and the following lines shows an example of the 
Territorial compatibility analysis, carried out inside the buffer area of 500 m. for plant ‘A’: 
 
Figure 51: Plant ‘A’ buffer zone overlaid with the territorial vulnerabilities 
 FLOOD RISK. Creek β appears in the top portion of Figure 51; it is surrounded by two 
blue buffer zones. The nearest and darkest area is that of frequent risk flood scenario 
(Ee), the furthest and wider area is that of the rare scenario (Em), and includes plant 
‘A’. They received a rating for H.E. = 3 and 2, S.E. = 3 (see Paragraph 5.2.1). The areas 
in light blue in the bottom of the Figure are those repeatedly hit by the floods caused by 
the secondary water network in 1994, 2000 and 2008, as identified by Piedmont region 
and Province.  The ratings are =H.E. 2, S.E. 3  
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 INDUSTRIAL RISK: Plant ‘A’ is represented in black in the middle of Figure 51. The 
ratings for S.E. and H.E. were 3 and 1,5, even if the latter is an indicative value attributed 
in the absence of in-depth data.  
 INTERACTION: the interaction F → I in the area of overlaying returned a value = 2,17. 
 The values for INDUSTRIAL RISK and INTERACTION were projected inside the 
buffer zone of 500 m. (red circle) to verify their impact on the vulnerable elements. The 
variations of ratings for FLOOD RISK were considered too. 
COMPATIBILITY: inside the buffer zone some residential areas in C, D and E category are 
located. They have no explicit incompatibility neither with the Industrial risk and the Flood 
risk, because the density of people is limited; however, the fact that S.E. overcomes the 
threshold of 2,5 both for Industrial and Flood risk is an alert signal that should not be 
neglected. 
5.5.1 Punctual provisions 
Table 64: Plant ‘A’ (Seveso) Compatibility and planning actions 
Ratings 
Territorial vulnerabilities inside 
500 m. 
Environmental vulnerabilities 
inside 500 m. 
Interaction 1) C and D Residential areas. 3 
productive areas (E) destined for 
reconversion to commercial 
function, whose transformation has 
to be monitored, also because two 
are interested by levels of HE for 
flood = 3 
2) Only few C punctual elements 
are included;   
3) No linear elements and strategic 
areas / building / infrastructures 
RV – land use soil capacity 1st and 
2nd classes (agricultural areas around 
the plant) 
RV – water table depth < 3 m. 
RV – historical urban areas 
Presence of a canal for irrigation 
adjacent to the northern border of the 
plant, probably used in the past to 
drain the rainy water. Presence of a 
well inside the plant. 
2,17 
Industrial risk 
SE 3, HE 1,5  
Flood risk 
SE 3, HE 2 
Variations inside 
the buffer area 
SE 3, HE 3 (Flood 
risk on the 
northern border) 
Judgement of 
compatibility & 
possible further 
steps 
 Territorial compatibility Environmental compatibility 
The ratings for the macro-
categories of Flood and Industrial 
risks overcome the threshold of 
2,5, but there is no manifest 
incompatibility because of the low 
people density.  
However, the state of abandon of 
the plant, without implementation 
of safety measures, represents a 
potential threat for all the territorial 
elements. This condition can be 
potentiated by a flood event, as 
evidenced by the medium value of 
interaction, which would 
contribute in spreading the 
pollutants and toxic substances. 
Further analysis should be carried 
A potential incompatibility is 
detected for the plant, detaining toxic 
substances and substances dangerous 
for the environment: the threshold 
for industrial S.E. is overcome in an 
area where the environmental 
elements are particularly sensitive to 
pollution. The interaction value is 
medium: flood events, even with 
their low energy, could cause 
unexpected consequences of 
spreading and diffusion of pollutants 
towards the underground water and 
superficial water. No prevention and 
protective measures for the 
environment have never been 
adopted. 
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out, in particular to verify the state 
and filling of the containment 
basins, and protection measures 
should be adopted. 
As far as it concerns the areas 
addressed to future 
transformations, it has to be 
considered the compatibility with 
the High-risk level of flood, 
avoiding high density of people 
and adopting specific constructive 
parameters.  
An onsite visit is recommended to 
verify the actual conditions of the 
plant, and to organize a recovery 
procedure. 
 
Table 65: Plant ‘B’ (potential Seveso) Compatibility and planning actions 
Ratings 
Territorial vulnerabilities inside 
500 m. 
Environmental vulnerabilities inside 
500 m. 
Interaction 
1) C residential areas.  2 productive 
areas (E) destined for reconversion 
to commercial function, whose 
transformation has to be monitored. 
2) 2 punctual elements in B 
(commercial centre/ bowling; 
church)   
3) Energetic lines 
RV – water table depth < 3 m. 
 
Presence of a canal for irrigation 
adjacent to the northern of the plant 
1,98 
Industrial risk  
SE 2,8, HE 1,5 
Flood risk  
SE 3, HE 2 
Variations 
inside the buffer 
area  
Area not 
entirely 
interested by 
Flood risk 
judgement of 
compatibility & 
possible further 
steps 
Territorial compatibility Environmental compatibility 
Potential incompatibility in case of 
toxic release with the two punctual 
elements classified as B (threshold 
for S.E. > 2,5).  
An in-depth analysis is 
recommended for: 1) the specific 
activities of the 2 vulnerable 
elements classified as B; 2) the 
storage methods and protection and 
preventive measures of the 
substances classified as TOXIC 
(H2) 
The plant, detaining toxic substances 
and substances dangerous for the 
environment, is not compatible with 
the vulnerable element identified. S.E. 
= 2,8 overcomes the compatibility 
threshold; the interaction with flood 
events, even if connoted by a low-
medium value (1,98), could enhance 
the threat. Further analysis on the 
possible pollution scenarios and 
prevention and protective measures 
against flood should be carried out. 
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Table 66: Plant ‘C’ (potential Seveso) Compatibility and planning actions 
Ratings 
Territorial vulnerabilities inside 
500 m. 
Environmental vulnerabilities 
inside 500 m. 
Interaction 
1) E productive areas.  
2) No A and B punctual elements  
3) No linear elements and strategic 
areas / building / infrastructures 
RV – water table depth < 3 m. 
RV – land use soil capacity 1st and 
2nd classes (agricultural areas 
around the plant) 
Two canals for irrigation are close to 
the plant 
0,58 (negligible) 
Industrial risk  
SE 2,5, HE 0,5 
Flood risk  
SE 1, HE 0 
Variations inside 
the buffer area  
On the border of 
the buffer zone, the 
flood risk increases 
(S.E =3, HE. = 2) 
Judgement of 
compatibility & 
possible further 
steps 
Territorial compatibility Environmental compatibility 
No incompatibilities were 
encountered with respect to the 
territorial vulnerabilities. 
An incompatibility is detected, 
threshold for S.E. overcome in an 
area where the environmental 
elements are highly sensitive to 
pollution. Adequate Protection 
measures but, since the plant is not in 
line with the Seveso regulation, an 
in-depth analysis on the storage 
methods and protection and 
preventive measures should be 
carried out. 
 
Table 67: Plant ‘D’ (Sub-threshold) Compatibility and planning actions 
Ratings 
Territorial vulnerabilities inside 
500 m. 
Environmental vulnerabilities 
inside 500 m. 
Interaction 
1) E Productive areas; little C and 
D residential areas on the extreme 
border of the buffer zone.  
2) No punctual elements classified 
as A or B 
3) No linear elements and strategic 
areas / building / infrastructures 
RV – water table depth < 3 m. 
1,88 
Industrial risk  
SE 2, HE 1,5  
Flood risk  
SE 3, HE 2 
Variations inside 
the buffer area  
- 
Judgement of 
compatibility & 
possible further 
steps 
Territorial compatibility Environmental compatibility 
Neither the macro-categories of the 
industrial risks nor the interaction 
with flood overcome the threshold 
of 2.5; no incompatibilities were 
encountered. 
The plant detains both toxic and 
dangerous for the environment 
substances, to which the 
environmental elements identified 
are vulnerable. Even if the threshold 
of 2.5. is not overcome, a further 
investigation on the storage methods 
and protective measures could be 
developed. 
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Table 68: Plant ‘E’ (Sub-threshold) Compatibility and planning actions 
Ratings 
Territorial vulnerabilities inside 
500 m. 
Environmental vulnerabilities 
inside 500 m. 
Interaction 
1) E productive areas; on the 
border of the buffer zone, C and D 
residential areas  
2) No A and B punctual elements  
3) No linear elements and strategic 
areas / building / infrastructures 
RV – water table depth < 3 m. 
 
One canal for irrigation is close to 
the plant 
0,67 (negligible) 
Industrial risk 
SE 2,5, HE 0,5 
Flood risk 
SE 1, HE 0 
Variations inside 
the buffer area 
On the border of 
the buffer zone the 
flood risk increases 
(SE.E =3, HE. = 2) 
Judgement of 
compatibility & 
possible further 
steps 
Territorial compatibility Environmental compatibility 
No incompatibilities were 
identified on the basis of the 
substances detained.   
An incompatibility is detected, 
because the threshold for S.E. is 
overcome in an area where the 
environmental elements are highly 
sensitive to pollution. An in-depth 
analysis on the storage methods and 
protection and preventive measures 
should be carry out. 
 
Table 69: Plant ‘F’ Compatibility and planning actions 
Ratings 
Territorial vulnerabilities inside 
500 m. 
Environmental vulnerabilities inside 
500 m. 
Interaction 
1) E productive areas.  
2) No A and B punctual elements  
3) Torino-Val d’Aosta highway 
RV – water table depth < 3 m. 
RV – land use soil capacity 1st and 
2nd classes (agricultural areas around 
the plant) 
 
Canals for irrigation are close to the 
plant 
0,68 (negligible) 
Industrial risk 
SE 2,8, HE 0,5 
Flood risk 
SE 1, HE 0 
Variations inside 
the buffer area 
Nearby the plant 
the flood risk 
increases (S.E. 
=3, HE. = 2) 
Judgement of 
compatibility & 
possible further 
steps 
Territorial compatibility Environmental compatibility 
The data on the substances detained 
are too scarce to determine the 
compatibility.   
The activities of hazardous waste 
treatment represent a potential risk for 
the aquifer and the irrigation channels.  
S.E. overcomes the compatibility 
threshold; an in-depth analysis on the 
storage methods and protection and 
preventive measures should be carry 
out. 
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The incompatibilities identified were mainly related to the presence of the industries 
themselves; in fact, the level of interaction with flood events did not overcome the threshold 
of 2,5. However, for two cases (Plants ‘A’ and ‘B’, Seveso plants), medium levels of 
interaction were reached and this should be interpreted as an alert signal, as explained further 
on. 
As far as it concerns territorial compatibility, a general compatibility was found for all the 
plants, because they were located in areas connoted by low people density or industrial use. 
The only exception was represented by plant ‘B’, whose buffer zone includes two punctual 
vulnerable elements; their characteristics of attendance and use shall be investigated to 
confirm the incompatibility encountered. 
The environmental compatibility presents more issues: the entire Municipal territory hosts 
environmental receptors very sensitive to pollution, and the majority of the industries 
analysed overcome the compatibility threshold of 2,5 because of the presence of toxic and 
environmental hazardous substances. A potential environmental incompatibility was 
encountered for plants ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘E’ and ‘F’, while plant ‘D’’ remained under the 
compatibility threshold. For plants ‘A’ and ‘B’, the environmental incompatibility can be 
aggravated by the interaction with flood events, that could provoke spreading of substances 
and other unforeseen consequences.  
In conclusion, the compatibility analysis signalled that for Case study 2 is particularly 
important to focus the attention on two plants, ‘A’ and ‘B’; both present aspects not 
sufficiently analysed in E.R.I.R. and other industrial plans, and could cause unexpected 
scenarios deriving from the interaction with Flood events. In order to enhance the general 
safety and protection for the population and the territory, the two situations need to be 
investigated, to verify in detail NaTech vulnerabilities of the two plants. For this purpose, 
the application of the environmental analysis foreseen by Turin Province guidelines is 
proposed, together with the dedicated in-depth questionnaire for the plants developed by the 
candidate (see Paragraph 3.8.1). 
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Chapter 6 
Discussion of results 
6.1 Advantages of the methodology 
The methodology exposed in the previous chapters focuses on three types of risk, which are 
those majorly diffused in Italy and in Europe (Flood, earthquake, industry). In Italy, these 
risks are managed in a separate way, through dedicated sectorial plans which adopt different 
methodologies for the risk assessment. The only “meeting point” of these risk sectorial plans 
are the municipal City plan and Emergency plan, which however do not operate an integrate 
analysis of the possible risk mutual influences.  
The multiplication of plans and responsibilities related to risk, together with the scarcity of 
financial resources, often constitute an obstacle for a proper risk management and land use-
planning, most of all at a local scale. As already evidenced, Municipalities are in front line 
for risk management and are also those more exposed to the direct consequences of risks, 
but they have not adequate tools to face multiple risks impinging the same territory. 
The proposed methodology represents an attempt to fill the current gap, focusing on the 
augmented risk impact caused by possible interactions. It is an easy-to-use and simple tool 
that can be adopted at a local scale to enhance the knowledge and security of the territory, 
waiting for the implementation of an official multi-risk methodology, recognized both by the 
European and national laws.   
Therefore, the proposed methodology does not substitute existing plans or LUP structure, 
but acts as a collector of the overall available information on risks, integrating them in a 
unique framework directly usable by the Municipal technicians. In particular, through this 
methodology, they can identify the areas more exposed to risks and risk interactions, and 
concentrate here further studies and financial resources. Thanks to a clearer vision of the 
several threats on the territory, LUP and risk management actions can keep into account 
possible extreme events deriving from risk interactions, that at the moment the separate 
sectorial plans do not consider. 
The methodology is explicitly designed for local planners not expert in risk assessment, that 
are called to assume a more active role on their territory: on one side, they directly analyze 
the contents of the sectorial plans and acquire a major awareness, but at the same time, they 
can integrate missing information or imprecisions using their direct knowledge of the 
territory. The direct management by local technicians allows to spare resources, which at the 
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moment is one of the main obstacles for local government; these same resources can be better 
addressed after the risk pre-screening made by the methodology. 
The implementation of the methodology should be executed independently from contingent 
situations, because its purpose is to orient the strategic decisions that underpin the local plans 
(City plan and emergency plan), providing the Municipalities with a huge and systemic 
know-how on risks and risk interactions that affect their territory. The in-depth studies and 
the planning actions that compose the “planning phase”, last step of the methodology, can 
be executed each time that a revision of the city plan, or the development of determined 
project is programmed.  
The methodology was developed to be used by a task force of Municipality technicians, 
coming from different Municipal offices and functions (Environment, Urban planning, etc.); 
however, as later specified, local experts and other entities should join the panel for the 
assessment.  
The development requires between 6-12 months, like an E.R.I.R. draft; it can be almost 
completely developed on documents that are already owed by the Municipality, so that the 
major effort consists of the systematization and organization of the data, in order to be able 
to assign the ratings.   
6.2 Main innovations 
The main innovative elements of the methodology are here resumed, together with a short 
explanation. The inspiring criteria for all these elements was to maintain a simple approach, 
accessible for users not expert in risk analysis. 
1) Common index scale for risk and risk interactions. The scale should be directly used by 
the Municipal technicians to evaluate the risks; it measures also the possible impacts of 
the interactions. 
2) Risk characterization through macro-categories. The macro-categories help the user to 
focus on the different aspects that determine the final impact of a risk: not only the 
recurrence, but also other elements can have influence. Perhaps they are better known 
at a local scale than at the wider scale of the sectorial plans. 
3) Introduction of the macro-category Strengthening effects. This macro-category was 
entirely dedicated to aspects not analyzed or superficially treated in the sectorial plans: 
i.e. for seismic risk, the quality of soil, that is usually not investigated, because in Italy 
the micro-zoning studies are mandatory only for Municipalities included in seismic 
class I. For flood, the local scale allows to better detect critical sections and interactions 
of the hydraulic network; in many cases, they are already known, but not adequately 
evaluated and reported in the plans. For industries, this macro-category helps focusing 
the attention on an aspect left out from ERIR, like i.e. the presence of items, storage 
conditions and substances that make the industries more vulnerable towards NaTech 
events. 
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4) Assessment of the interactions. The methodology particularly focused on the 
interactions, that currently are completely neglected in the plans: a simple formula, 
deriving from the macro-categories, was settled to return a possible impact of the 
interaction. The interactions are calculated in the areas of risk overlaying through the 
Interaction table. The calculation can be also directly managed through GIS. 
5) Employment of ALOHA and HSSM for the spatial consequences of the interaction. 
Existing simple modelling programs were employed to obtain a first esteem of the 
spatial consequences of interaction involving industries. Even if a buffer zone of 500 
m. around the plants is adopted to project possible interaction consequences, the 
simulations can return a clearer and more precise vision of possible scenarios.  
Specific parameters were fixed to simulate the initial damage conditions produced by 
an interaction; the data to be inserted in HSSM and ALOHA were clearly detailed in 
dedicated data-sheets in order to guide the utilization also for not-expert users. 
6) Development of a questionnaire for an in-depth analysis of the NaTech vulnerability of 
the plants.  This questionnaire aimed at integrating the information on the plants 
collected during the ERIR drafting, through the collection of further data on items, 
storage conditions, past events etc. with a special attention to their NaTech vulnerability. 
The questionnaire is particularly important to investigate hazardous plants that do not 
reach Seveso thresholds.  
6.3 Case-studies 
The methodology was developed and tested on two different Italian case-studies, which were 
connoted by risks with different characteristics, and by different levels of data availability: 
1) CASE STUDY 1: MANTUA.  
Choice → Famous Italian city with several vulnerabilities, both territorial and 
environmental; it was chosen because three different risks were superimposed, besides 
local extreme climatic events: flood, earthquake, and 4 Seveso industries (2 with huge 
dimension).  
The probabilities of occurrence for the risks analyzed were quite low; i.e. because of the 
complete artificialization of Mincio river, and of industrial scenarios that did not or 
slightly overcome the plants’ boundaries. However, the presence of extremely important 
vulnerable elements (Unesco historical centre, protected SIC-ZPS natural areas, etc), 
together with the persistence of a severe situation of environmental pollution, raised 
doubts on the possible unexpected consequences of risk interactions, even if with low 
levels. The application of the methodology tried to answer these issues. 
Data → Mantua Municipality and Lombardy region provided the basic GIS maps; the 
other data were autonomously collected by the Candidate and they are all publicly 
available.  
2) CASE STUDY 2: 
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Choice → Little outlying city in Piedmont, 2 main risks with low impact: flood risk 
(P.G.R.A. identified the return times for a creek crossing the municipal territory) and 
industrial risk (1 Seveso plant, a former factory closed in unsafe conditions). The plant 
was included in the flood areas of the creek.  
The necessity to investigate the interactions raised from conditions not adequately 
investigate and represented, neither in the sectorial plans, nor in the City plan. Surveys 
by Piedmont Region demonstrated that the secondary hydraulic network, not analyzed 
by P.G.R.A., was responsible of the recent flood events as much as the creek represented 
as the solely source of risk in P.G.R.A. Two plants, not identified by the authorities in 
charge but classifiable as Seveso, were included in the areas flooded by the secondary 
network. 
The methodology was applied to compensate this lack of information, and to test 
possible unexpected consequences of risks not correctly reported or known by the 
Authorities. In addition, this second case study gave the opportunity to test the 
methodology on industrial risk not only caused by Seveso plants.  
Data → the Candidate participated in the ERIR drafted for the Municipality, made in 
compliance with (Regione Piemonte, 2010). Therefore, the investigation on the 
municipal territory entailed also Sub-threshold plants, whose main information were 
collected through the questionnaire reported in Table 22. The identification of the 
territorial and environmental vulnerabilities was very detailed, thanks to the support of 
the Municipality. With respect to the first case-study, more data were available, but the 
information on the industrial risk were less precise, due to the fact that the plants were 
not Seveso. 
The application of the methodology on both the case studies returned positive results, 
signaling risky situation that currently are not adequately described neither in the sectorial 
risk plans nor in the Municipal city plan. In spite of the initial low values for risk and risk 
interactions, potential incompatibilities were identified for both the case studies:  
1) CASE STUDY 1. A possible problematic situation was identified for the rail-tankers 
that serve Seveso plants and transport acrylonitrile and benzene. Since in this area the 
protection measures adopted are minor than for the tanks of the storage parks, in case 
of damage caused by external events, some unforeseen consequences could arise. 
HSSM simulation demonstrated that a very little damage caused by external events 
could produce environmental pollution, because the soil is highly permeable and many 
areas in the storage parks are not waterproofed. The result of the simulation confirmed 
the data of the surveys campaigns carried out by the authorities for the recovery of the 
industrial zone: the concentration of benzene and other hydrocarbon substances 
remained very high in the aquifer, in spite of the hydraulic barriers built by the plants.   
In the city centre, some further studies were recommended for an area where a poor 
quality of soil was identified. 
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2) CASE STUDY 2. The application of the methodology signaled several potential 
incompatibilities due to the presence of industries detaining pollutants; they are included 
in areas interested in the past by flood provoked by the minor hydraulic network, and 
the methodology signaled the need to investigate in detail the items of the plants to 
correctly evaluate possible NaTech events. 
The values of the interaction obtained for the two case studies demonstrated that the 
procedure adopted for the calculation and the weights attributed to the macro-categories were 
able to produce credible results, in line with the initial global values of the risks (that in those 
cases were low).  
6.4 Possible shortcomings 
The application of the methodology to case studies connoted by different situations and risk 
sources allowed to test its functioning towards different contexts, facing at the same time 
possible operational difficulties.  
The following lines evidenced some possible shortcomings or aspects to be addressed: 
1) IMPLEMENTATION.  
 The lack of data could decrease the efficacy and the precision of the results; for both the 
case studies, some data resulted missing, mainly because of the impossibility to recover 
them in absence of a stronger cooperation with the Municipalities. I.e. for Mantua, the 
Sub-thresholds plants were not analyzed because E.R.I.R. did not include them, 
therefore no data were available, even if some critical situations related to 
environmental pollution were known. Also, the analysis focused only on Mincio river 
because of the unavailability of data on the secondary water network in the municipal 
territory. Finally, Safety reports of the Seveso plants were not available, even if the huge 
collection of documents related to the A.I.A. releases and to the process of recovery of 
the lakes provided very detailed information.    
 Some problems could arise also during the phase of assignation of the ratings, because 
of uncertainties due to a correct interpretation of the data themselves and possible doubts 
arising from the users’ scientific background. 
 The implementation of the methodology will add an adjunctive commitment to the 
Municipalities, for which they should be adequately supported by the central authorities. 
 A possible problem related to the implementation can derive from external influences 
or unforeseen “contaminations” on the Municipality technicians; in order to compensate 
and monitor possible problems, the panel of technicians could be extended to include 
external experts, like those of the Environmental Protection Agency for the 
Environment. They could check the implementation of the procedure through collegial 
conferences, analogous to those already employed for other LUP procedures.    
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2) TECHNICAL ASPECTS.  
Although the weights assigned to the macro-categories produced for both the case 
studies results in line with the expectations and with the initial risk values, the weights 
assigned actually reflect a conservative position, in which the macro-category HE 
received the higher weight because of its major reliability. Variations in the weights 
assigned could vary the final value of the interaction; given the importance assigned by 
many experts consulted to the macro-category SE, the procedure of weights assignation 
could be strengthened through an enlargement of the panel of experts and the adoption 
of an AHP procedure.      
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
The data presented by Cred (Centre for the Epidemiology of Disaster) in 2017 showed an 
increase of natural disasters related to droughts, floods and earthquakes; Italy resulted the 
seventh nation in the world for number of victims and expenses for the recovery of damages. 
One of the identified causes, besides the climate change, is the lack of prevention actions; as 
already discussed in the previous chapters, Italy scarcely implements maintenance and 
prevention actions in land use planning, neither possible actions to increase the resilience of 
the exposed vulnerable elements are defined. Earthquake is the only sector in which a more 
structured regulation was adopted; however, the draft of the sheets for the estimation of 
seismic risks, and the execution of the microzoning studies are proceeding too slow to avoid 
dramatic consequences, as for Amatrice and the central Apennine in 2016.  
In addition to a scarce diffusion of a prevention culture, and to the bureaucratic difficulties, 
the reason most frequently indicated for the lack of prevention and maintenance action is 
identified in the absence of sufficient financial resources. This issue is particularly felt by 
the Municipalities, which have to answer to several necessities of maintenance and protection 
of the territory, with limited available funds. 
In absence of specific measures voted to the prevention, the actual situation is expected to 
increasingly worsen: in fact, the augmented violence and recurrence of the natural events 
could also influence the probability of multi-risk events, involving more hazardous sources, 
and causing more extensive damages. This possible scenario currently is not addressed by 
any regulations.   
The objective of this thesis was to help the Municipalities in facing risk management in a 
more adequate way, making them more aware of the possible consequences of the climate 
change and more prepared towards multi-risk events. In particular, the aim was to build a 
quick and easy to use methodology, able to support the Municipalities in: 
1) identifying the areas more exposed to high levels of risk and risk interactions;  
2) addressing the available funds to further studies and interventions on the areas identified. 
A dedicated semi-quantitative methodology, based on indexes meant to be directly assigned 
by the Municipality technicians, was developed and applied to two test case-studies, that 
produced plausible results in terms of representation of the intensity of the risk interactions. 
Both the towns had risks with some worrisome features (included and evaluated in the 
macro-category S.E.), but that   - for intensity or recurrence – did not have a strong impact 
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on the vulnerable elements (as expressed by H.E. macro-category). The application of the 
weighted sum and the interaction tables, proposed to verify the possible impact of multi-risk 
events, returned low-medium values of interaction, that were reasonably in line with the 
starting conditions and the case-histories of the areas. In spite of these low values, the 
simulations with ALOHA and HSSM demonstrated that unforeseen multi-risk events, even 
with low intensity, could be able to provoke hazardous consequences, in particular as far as 
it concerns the environmental aspects.  
The results obtained from the case studies highlighted some possible risky situations 
neglected in the risk sectorial plans, guiding the Municipalities in better addressing further 
studies or interventions. They completely met the initial objective of the methodology, aimed 
at pointing out eventual problems related to risk interactions and aspects neglected by the 
sectorial plans.  
Therefore, the methodology represents an advance with respect to the state of the art, because 
local authorities can deal with risk and risk interactions at a local scale, from a perspective 
aimed at enhancing their participation and involvement. It has to be reminded that, even if 
local planners usually do not have a strong background in risk analysis, in the end they are 
responsible for the governance and safety of the territory; the municipality-centered approach 
“force” local administrators to recover an active role towards the risks, overcoming the 
fragmentation of the sectorial plans and the delays in the implementation. This allows on one 
side to increase the local technicians’ awareness about the contents and information of the 
sectorial plans, and on the other side to exploit the major direct knowledge of the local 
administrators. 
The methodology treats the risks in an integrating and systemic way, acting as a pre-
screening instrument that orient future choices: it does not substitute existing plans or 
methodologies, but brings the users to take into account their contents in a wider context, 
focusing better on the areas where further studies and interventions are required.  
The simple framework proposed represent a starting point of a path towards the increase of 
the safety that can be applied worldwide, to make local authorities more conscious for risks 
and their interactions. Indeed, the current guidelines developed for the ratings of the macro-
categories H.E., S.E. and P.M. can be adapted to the laws and procedures in use among other 
countries; the calculation of the interaction remain the same, while the list of measures 
suggested for the planning phase once again can be explicitly drawn for the country 
interested.   
 
Some further steps could be hypothesized to widen and promote the use of the methodology: 
1) Development of the rating guidelines for other territorial risks, defining the levels 
for the three macro-categories in cooperation with experts of each specific discipline 
(landslide, volcanic risk, sea risk etc.) 
2) Strengthening of the approach in relation to the local extreme events caused by 
climate change, with a wider local data collection and definition of the phenomena.  
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3) Enhancement of the representation of the spatial consequences. At the moment the 
simulations related to the interactions were essentially focused on industrial assets; 
however, a major involvement of experts of other disciplines could allow to set tools 
and instruments to analyze and study the consequences of all the types of interaction, 
creating an all-inclusive and more powerful tool.  
4) Strengthening of the approach in relation to the vulnerability analysis, in order to 
evaluate the different aspects of susceptibility presented by the vulnerable elements, 
and trying to settle possible solutions to enhance the resilience.  
5) Developing a participative process to improve the application of the methodology 
among the Municipalities, to reinforce the cooperation between the users and 
external authorities. In this context, also the adoption of a Multi-criteria Decision 
Analysis (MCDA) could be useful, to better guide and support the choice of the 
possible planning actions, as proposed by (Nivolianitou & Papazoglou, 2014) for 
LUP around Seveso plants.  
6) Integrating the methodologies with procedures related not only to structural 
interventions, but also to emergency management, i.e. taking into account the 
guidance for flood disaster management with the use of AHP by (Nivolianitou & 
Synodinou, 2015). 
 
In conclusion, the methodology tried to address the wide-spread problem of dealing with risk 
interactions in contexts where risks are usually managed in a separate way, considering this 
issue from the point of view of the local authorities. The results obtained from the case 
studies confirmed the simple usability of the methodology to quickly identify the areas more 
exposed to risks and risk interactions; therefore, this approach can constitute a valid pre-
screening, able to orient the application of further more precise and quantitative 
methodologies, both for risk and for multi-risk. The framework can be extended to other 
risks and countries with an opportune enforcing of some aspects.  
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Annex I: Experts’ judgement 
The process of validation of the weights assigned to the macro-categories was conducted 
through experts’ judgement, collecting the experts’opinions through a dedicated 
questionnaire. 
The selection of the experts was made on the basis of the suggestions by (Crispen & 
Hoffman, 2016): experts should be identified depending on the career analysis, performance 
analysis and socio-metric analysis; they should have 5 years of full-time professional 
experience, and be recognized as “go-to persons” for the field analysed.  
The expert panels employed by other Multi-risk projects were evaluated: i.e. for ESPON 
project (Schmidt-Thomé, 2006), a sufficient scientific background in the work with hazards, 
and with multi-hazard approaches was required; 12 people were selected, with different 
geographical provenience. For PRIM Lombardia (Lari et al, 2009), 15 experts coming from 
different disciplines were identified: geologists dealing with flood, landslide, and avalanche 
risk, Civil Protection officers in charge of economic resources for mitigation projects, 
environmental researchers and public administrators.  
As far as it concerns the size of the panel, the problem of the definition of a “correct size” 
was deeply treated by (Crispen & Hoffman, 2016), who questioned the common scientific 
concept that a wider sample of experts can return more robust, dependable and believable 
results. The authors observed through repeated experiments that the amount of knowledge 
elicited from experts’ panel increases with a decreasing rate, that means that the marginal 
utility for each added expert is about 5%. In case of small group of interest and limited 
generalization, and when the goal is related to “practical significance more than statistical 
significance”, the authors recommend to employ panels composed by 3-4 experts, whose 
contribution should be evaluated measuring the marginal utility. 
For the proposed research, size and composition of the panel recovered the practices used in 
other Multi-risk projects: 11 experts were consulted, mainly pertaining to Engineering field 
and dealing with industrial risk and NaTech risk; however, 3 LUP experts and 1 
environmental engineer were also involved. The geographical provenience covers some of 
the main EU countries. The experts were asked to express their opinions on the role of the 
risk macro-categories, in terms of influence on a possible risk-interaction, and of reliability, 
intended as data available and supporting proofs. Furthermore, an opinion on the threshold 
adopted to evaluate the compatibility of risks and risk interaction with vulnerable elements 
was required. 
The following table reports the content of the questionnaire; the questions were introduced 
by a brief explanation related to the adopted methodology. 
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The methodology developed aims at providing the local authorities, which are responsible for land use 
planning, with a rapid guide to the risks impinging on the territory, able to point out the areas more exposed 
to risks and taking into account explicitly the possible interactions among the risks. The purpose is to have a 
complete picture of the risks and some numerical indications supporting the decision making in terms of 
intervention on the territory and/or request for further and more detailed studies. 
In order to reach this objective, the Municipality technicians will have to follow a semi-quantitative 
methodology, through the assignation of indexes, which express the impact of the risk and risk interaction: 
the scale proposed goes from 0 to 3 and onwards (in absolute values); values between 0 ≤ I < 1 are considered 
negligible. 
1 ≤ I < 2 From low to medium impact 
2 ≤ I < 3 From medium to high impact 
I ≥ 3 From High to extremely high impact 
The risks taken into account are: Flood risk, seismic risk, industrial risk. 
 
1st step of the methodology: RISK RATING.  
Each risk identified on the Municipal territory is described and rated in accordance to three specific macro-
categories, which aim to bring the users to think about all the possible elements that can potentially influence 
the risk intensity. 
 HISTORICAL EVENTS, HE: recurrence of the risk analysed, based on the information provided by 
the existing plans, studies and surveys 
 STRENGTHENING EFFECTS, SE: elements that could enhance the final impact of the risks, and 
that could have been neglected by the existing plans (i.e. quality of the soil for earthquake, type of 
items and substances for Seveso industries etc.) 
 PROTECTION MEASURES, PM: existing protection measures adopted for the specific risk (i.e. 
levees for flood, hydraulic barriers etc.) 
A guideline was developed to drive the Municipality technicians in the rating attribution. 
 
2nd step of the methodology: ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERACTION AMONG THE RISKS. 
In order to assess the interaction of two different events impacting on the same area at the same moment, an 
arithmetic average between the risk rates was proposed:  
 [(H. E.    + H. E.     ) ∗ w1 + (S. E.    + S. E.     ) ∗ w2 + (P. M.    + P. M.     ) ∗ w3] / 6  
However, it was necessary to attribute some weights (w1, w2, w3) to the three macro-categories to obtain 
credible values for the binary interaction.  
The weights were attributed on the basis of two parameters:  
 on one side, the overall reliability of the macro-category, related to the reliability of the information 
available and potential uncertainties (i.e., the attribution of the values to the macro-category H.E. is 
based on existing studies and surveys, while for S.E. the identification and rating of the potential 
strengthening elements could be more uncertain);  
 on the other side, the possible final influence of the macro-category on the interaction was taken into 
account (i.e. for P.M., literature data demonstrated that the in many cases the protection measures failed 
when extreme unforeseen events occurred; therefore P.M. capacity to reduce the impact of the 
interaction is low).    
 
3rd step of the methodology: COMPATIBILITY ASSESSMENT 
The values attributed to the macro-categories and the values obtained for the binary risk interactions are super-
imposed to the vulnerabilities encountered on the Municipal territory to assess the compatibility.  
An alertness threshold was identified for values of impact that overcome 2.5 (medium-high impact);  
if vulnerable elements connoted by high density of people, or environmental vulnerable elements are included 
in zones where the macro-categories of the risks, or the risk interactions overcome the threshold, the 
Municipality will have to carry out further studies and/or actions to analyse in-depth the compatibility and 
improve the situation. 
The purpose of this short questionnaire consists of: 
 the validation of the weights assigned to the macro-categories 
 the validation of the chosen alertness threshold for the compatibility. 
I kindly ask you to answer the following questions, on the basis of your knowledge and previous experiences: 
 
218 Risk management and land use planning for environmental and asset protection 
purposes 
 
1) In assessing the interaction within two risks, which macro-category do you think will be more relevant 
between: 
☐ HISTORICAL EVENTS ☐ STRENGHTENING EFFECTS 
why? 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------ 
2) In assessing the interaction within two risks, which macro-category do you think will be more relevant 
between: 
☐ HISTORICAL EVENTS ☐ PROTECTION MEASURES 
why? 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
3) In assessing the interaction within two risks, which macro-category do you think will be more relevant 
between: 
☐ STRENGHTENING EFFECTS ☐ PROTECTION MEASURES 
why? 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
4) In a scale from 0 to 4, which weight would you attribute to each macro-category, in relation to its 
reliability and capability to influence the final interaction impact? 
 No 
importance 
Low 
importance 
Medium 
importance 
Discrete 
importance 
High 
importance 
HISTORICAL EVENTS ☐0 ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 
STRENGHTENING 
EFFECTS 
☐0 ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 
PROTECTION 
MEASURES 
☐0 ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 
 
5) In a scale from 0 (N) to 4 (Y), do you consider appropriate to adopt as alertness threshold for the 
compatibility a value corresponding to a 2,5 (medium-high impact)? 
No  Quite disagree Indifferent Quite agree y 
☐0 ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 
6) If no, could you suggest which would be in your opinion an appropriate vale for the threshold, and 
why? 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------- 
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8 experts answered the questionnaire; the following lines report a summary of the answers 
received for each question. 
QUESTION 1: Macro-category more relevant for risk interaction between 
HE 4 SE 4 
QUESTION 2: Macro-category more relevant for risk interaction between 
HE 6,516 PM 1,5 
QUESTION 3: Macro-category more relevant for risk interaction between 
SE 5,5 PM 2,5 
QUESTION 4: Level of importance of the macro-category in terms of reliability 
No importance 
(0) 
Low importance 
(1) 
Medium 
importance (2) 
Discrete 
importance (3) 
High importance 
(4) 
  3 SE 2 SE 3 SE 
  2 HE 3 HE 3 HE 
 1 PM 4 PM 2 PM 1 PM 
QUESTION 5: agreement on the threshold level chosen for the compatibility:  
No  Quite disagree Indifferent Quite agree y 
  2 5 1 
 
The results obtained showed a substantial equivalence between the macro-categories 
Strengthening effects (SE) and Historical events (HE) in terms of importance attributed by 
the experts, with a slight advantage of the macro-category Historical events. HE was judged 
as the most important and reliable category by the majority of the risks analysts, because 
they considered it more capable to return a correct idea of the possible NaTech events on the 
territory. On the contrary, experts from other disciplines attributed a major importance to SE, 
underlining the possible variations of HE in terms of probability of occurrence of events 
related to climate, and the difficulties related to correctly identify and report all the events. 
Questions 2,3 and 4 make evident that the macro-category Protection measures was judged 
as the less relevant to describe the possible effects of an interaction: 4 experts attributed it a 
medium importance, and 1 a low importance. The explanations provided by the experts are 
mainly related to the fact that the Protection measures are designed on the basis of the 
Historical events for a specific single risk, and they could be inadequate in case of interaction; 
PM can be ineffective, work badly or be broken.   
The results of the experts’ judgment confirmed the importance of HE (2) and SE (1) in 
evaluating a possible interaction impact; however, for the weights assignation, the candidate 
decided to attribute a major weight to the Historical events (=2), more in line with the judges 
of the risk analysts. Since the proposed methodology did not adopt a probabilistic approach, 
the major weight assigned to the macro-category Historical events, deriving from the existing 
sectorial plans, allows to take in due account the solid data and probabilistic analyses 
                                                 
16 The rating 6,5 and 1,5 is obtained because one expert considered the two macro-categories analysed 
equally important, so his/her vote was equally divided between the two. The same happened for 
Question 3.   
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developed in the risk plans. The macro-category Strengthening effects, that can be helpful in 
determining the final effects of the interaction, could be interested by major uncertainties, as 
lack of data and a minor objectiveness in the evaluation by the Municipal technicians, 
because the elements that compose it are not formalized by specific laws (with the exception 
of the types of soil for the earthquakes). Therefore, for a conservative reason, SE received a 
minor weight (=1). In the end, the macro-category Protection Measures received the lowest 
value (=0,5) to remain in line with the evaluations of the experts: even if it is based on secure 
data, many problems related to design, maintenance and efficacy could affect this category, 
therefore the presence of Protection measures could not be sufficient to properly reduce the 
possible effects of an interaction, also because they are usually designed for single risk 
effects. 
As remarked in the chapters related to the Case studies and in the Conclusion, the adoption 
of the proposed weights returned positive results for the two case-studies analysed; possible 
problematic areas were identified, but the threshold alert was not overcome. Thanks to the 
weights attributed, the results obtained for the interactions were reasonably in line with the 
low initial risk levels of the two case studies.   
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Annex II: Versalis and Ies Protection 
measures 
The following tables report the checklists of Protection measures by (Provincia di Torino, 
2010) and (Cruz et al., 2004), completed with the information of Versalis. 
Table 70: Versalis environmental protection measures 
PREVENTIVE/PROTECTIVE MEASURES 
VERSALIS FULFILMENT 
Y/N Description 
POINT 1a 
Identification of the supply and lines with a 
label containing the name of the substances 
and safety information  
Y Probably yes (prescribed by the law) 
Formalisation of a schedule to check and 
maintain the entirety of tanks and basins 
Y 
Three-monthly verification of the double bottoms of the tanks; 
every 5 years external inspection; every 20 years complete 
inspection. Single bottom tanks: verification with tracer test every 
2 years. 
Formalisation of a schedule to check and 
maintain the entirety of pipes and lines, 
included the drainage lines and interception 
valve 
Y 
The pipelines are monitored through the informatic Manager tool, 
which programmes the maintenance interventions and the recovery 
of the metallic portions. The drainage system is yearly inspected.  
Constant updating of the documents, capable 
to demonstrate the physical and chemical 
compatibility of the substances chosen  
Y Probably yes (prescribed by the law) 
Provision of a system for the collection of the 
small releases (adsorbing materials and pads 
nearby wells, sewer covers etc.)  
? Information not available 
POINT 1b 
Separation of the areas potentially involved by 
releases from the other areas, using 
containment basins and dedicated collection 
lines 
Y 
The process areas are located on a concrete waterproof basement; 
all the tanks are provided with containment basins, and have 
circumferential curbs collected to the process drainage for the 
adsorption of the minor releases. For critical equipment, the 
pavement is equipped with slopes and curbs with allow to contain 
the release and facilitate its collection. For critical lines, 
interception devices are available at the beginning and at the arrival 
to the user.  
Arrangement of two different drainage lines 
for the rainfall water and the water employed 
in the process or interested by potential 
releases.  
Y 
3 drainage systems are present in the plant: 
- 1 drainage system for the meteoric water and the cooling water, 
which are directly returned to the river without treatment; 
- the acid process drainage system 
- the oily process drainage system  
Reduction of the areas interested by potential 
releases and provision of protection devices, 
such as waterproof paving, dedicated 
collection lines, etc. 
Y/N 
The adoption of the waterproof paving is not extended to the entire 
plant; therefore, some areas of the park storage and product 
transfers result not protected yet.  
Elimination or reduction of the junctions with 
flanges, and adoption of completely soldered 
lines 
? 
Information not available (even if it has to be observed that in case 
of earthquake, flexible junctions could be safer) 
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PREVENTIVE/PROTECTIVE MEASURES 
VERSALIS FULFILMENT 
Y/N Description 
Provision of devices for the registration and 
alarm related to unexpected loss of level of the 
tanks and basins  
Y 
A monitoring system for the level of resting tanks is implemented; 
the levels are transmitted to DCS and alarmed. A second tool of 
alarm and trip was in course of installation on all the plants 
containing Hazardous substances.  
Substitution or renovation of the underground 
tanks, according to the decree 20/10/1998 n. 
260 
Y No underground tanks are present. 
POINT 2 
Definitive lock of the unused wells located 
inside the plant, and external protection of 
those still in operation 
N 
The wells which compose Versalis hydraulic barrier and all its 
piezometers are still in operation; no information is available on 
external protections 
Arrangement of the devices and measures 
foreseen by of the Regional regulation 20/2006 
n 1/R on rainfall water collection. 
? Information not available 
Provision of emergency devices (Adsorbing 
material, pads..) nearby wells and sewer 
covers in order to obstacle the access of the 
pollution agents to the municipal sewer  
? Information not available 
Arrangement of devices for an automatic lock 
of the drainage lines whether is detected the 
presence of pollution agents. 
? 
There is no information on automatic devices for the lock of the 
drainage lines; however, the drainage systems are monitored both 
in their paths and in the points of delivery, through devices which 
allow a continuous analysis   
Arrangement of emergency management 
procedures 
Y  
POINT 3 
Assessment of the hydrogeological conditions 
nearby the plant and the points of possible 
release 
Y 
The hydrogeological and soil conditions are at least monitored once 
a year, in relation to the operations required by the recovery of the 
SIN area 
Assessment of the times employed by the 
pollution agents to arrive to the sensitive 
elements  
- 
Some hypotheses were made for the Safety Report, judging the 
type of soil as slightly permeable; however, the analysis carried out 
by ARPA showed higher levels of permeability, also demonstrated 
by the stability of the pollution levels in the water, despite of the 
hydraulic barriers.   
Arrangement of emergency safety measures 
(Hydraulic barrier) 
Y 
The hydraulic barrier for Versalis was implemented during the 
Nineties, however its efficacy seems to be partial 
Employment of off-ground tanks instead of 
those underground 
Y 
 
Paving of the area for the new plant with 
layers of waterproof materials 
Y/N 
aSomeprocess and storage areas of the plant still lack of waterproof 
pavements.  
Employment of off-ground lines instead of 
those underground 
Y 
 
 
Table 71: Versalis NaTech protection measures 
 NA-TECH SAFETY AND MITIGATION 
MEASURES 
VERSALIS FULFILMENT 
Y/N Description 
Use of structural design codes or retrofitting N  
Containment dikes or walls N  
Use of structural design codes or retrofitting of 
walls and dikes 
N  
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 NA-TECH SAFETY AND MITIGATION 
MEASURES 
VERSALIS FULFILMENT 
Y/N Description 
Anchoring mechanisms of tanks and equipment 
(e.g. anchor bolts, bracing) 
N  
Bracing of pipes and connections Y 
The pipelines are located on racks or trenches; in the areas of 
intersections they are reinforced with jackets, which are 
monitored for possible losses.  
Flexible connections for pipes ? Information not available 
Restraining straps or chains for barrels or 
pressure vessels 
? Information not available 
Strapping and anchoring of emergency 
equipment 
? Information not available 
Emergency shut off/safety valves Y  
Emergency water systems, and foam spraying 
systems 
Y 
The plant is equipped with an underground firefighting water 
network, served by Mincio river, and fed by 4 pumps, both 
electrical and motorized, which progressively activate on the 
basis of the request. In case of electric default, a generator can 
activate one of the motorize pumps. No information on the 
presence of foam sytems is available.  
Adequate siting of emergency water and foam 
spraying systems to avoid damage from falling 
debris 
? Information not available 
Redundancy in pipeline systems, particularly 
emergency water 
? Information not available 
Warning systems Y 
 
Emergency power generators designed to 
maintain critical equipment housing 
hazardous chemicals in safe condition for 
extended periods of time 
? 
The information available is not sufficient: Versalis has adopted 
specific structural measures to fix possible electrical defaults, 
reducing their probability and duration,  however it is not clear if 
there are measures specifically adopted for the critical equipment 
and installations.  
Routine inspection and maintenance for 
corrosion and deterioration 
Y The installations, pipelines and tanks are periodically inspected. 
Inventory control (e.g. minimizing the amount 
of hazardous materials used) 
?  
Strategic placement of substances inside plant 
in order to avoid chemical incompatibility 
Y  
Placement of storage tanks with hazmats 
above the maximum height reachable by water 
N 
No explicit measures were adopted against a possible flood, 
because according to some documents of the plant, it could not 
be reached by water. 
Construction of drainage system Y  
Interruption of production process Y  
De-inventory of main processing units ? Information not available 
Giving transport priority to most dangerous 
chemicals (those that react violently with 
water) 
? Information not available 
Verification of storage tank seals Y  
Hermetic sealing of silos and underground 
storage tanks 
? Information not available 
Wrapping of substances in watertight packing 
and labelling 
? Information not available 
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 NA-TECH SAFETY AND MITIGATION 
MEASURES 
VERSALIS FULFILMENT 
Y/N Description 
Raising of electrical equipment such as 
motors, pumps and control panels to avoid 
water damage and system failure 
? Information not available 
Maintaining na-tech emergency response plan N  
Construction of retaining walls and levees or 
dykes 
N  
Drills and Training Y  
Plan to allow workers to check on family ? Information not available 
Training plan for external responders on 
management of hazardous chemicals onsite 
? Information not available 
 
Table 72: Ies environmental protection measures 
PREVENTIVE/PROTECTIVE MEASURES 
IES FULFILMENT 
Y/N Description 
POINT 1a 
Identification of the supply and lines with a 
label containing the name of the substances 
and safety information  
Y Probably yes (prescribed by the law) 
Formalisation of a schedule to check and 
maintain the entirety of tanks and basins 
Y 
- Plan for the inspection of the tanks, and integrity check with EA 
test for tanks without double bottom  
- Periodic check of the tank and critical pipelines according to a 
yearly program, to verify integrity, functionality and corrosion  
- Underground tanks equipped with cathode protection  
Formalisation of a schedule to check and 
maintain the entirety of pipes and lines, 
included the drainage lines and interception 
valve 
Y 
Plan for inspection and prevention of the pipelines; the 
underground pipelines were progressively reconstructed as above 
ground pipelines on rack or, if not possible, located in trenches or 
provided with inspectable coating.   
The oil pipeline from Porto Marghera is equipped with cathode 
protection. 
For the drainage system: the oily network is entirely above-ground, 
and inspectable.   
Constant updating of the documents, capable 
to demonstrate the physical and chemical 
compatibility of the substances chosen  
Y Probably yes (prescribed by the law) 
Provision of a system for the collection of the 
small releases (adsorbing materials and pads 
nearby wells, sewer covers etc.)  
? Information not available 
POINT 1b 
Separation of the areas potentially involved by 
releases from the other areas, using 
containment basins and dedicated collection 
lines 
Y 
The tanks of the plant are provided with containment basins, the 
loading areas are pavemented and equipped with perimeter curbs 
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PREVENTIVE/PROTECTIVE MEASURES 
IES FULFILMENT 
Y/N Description 
Arrangement of two different drainage lines 
for the rainfall water and the water employed 
in the process or interested by potential 
releases.  
Y 
IES has a double drainage network: 
- White sewer, for process water, vapor condensation, rainy water 
- Oily sewer, for the water coming from the tanks and process areas, 
containing hydrocarbons. This water is stored in a dedicated tank, 
from which is addressed to the TAS (biologic and physical 
chemical treatment) system. 
Reduction of the areas interested by potential 
releases and provision of protection devices, 
such as waterproof paving, dedicated 
collection lines, etc. 
Y/N 
According to the documents release by the plant for AIA, the risk 
of soil and water contamination is limited because of specific 
containment measures:  
• installation of double bottoms on progress; periodical EA tests  
• the storage areas are connected to the oily drainage system, which 
addresses possible releases to TAS  
• the pipelines transporting hydrocarbons are above ground or 
easily inspectable  
• the oily sewer pipelines are entirely above ground 
• there are not underground tanks containing hazardous substances  
However, the containment basins have not a waterproof paving 
Elimination or reduction of the junctions with 
flanges, and adoption of completely soldered 
lines 
? 
In the area of the dock, it was applied the reduction of the flanged 
couplings. No indication for the other parts of the plant.  
Provision of devices for the registration and 
alarm related to unexpected loss of level of the 
tanks and basins  
Y  
The tanks are equipped with trip system for high and low levels. It 
is in progress the installation of logic solvers for the protection of 
the floating roof tanks from overfilling/overemptying. 
Substitution or renovation of the underground 
tanks, according to the decree 20/10/1998 n. 
260 
Y 
The only underground tanks are those for LPG, compliant with the 
provisions of Ministerial Decree 13.10.94 
POINT 2 
Definitive lock of the unused wells located 
inside the plant, and external protection of 
those still in operation 
N 
The wells and piezometers composing the hydraulic barrier are all 
active and cannot be locked 
Arrangement of the devices and measures 
foreseen by of the Regional regulation 20/2006 
n 1/R on rainfall water collection. 
? Information not available 
Provision of emergency devices (Adsorbing 
material, pads..) nearby wells and sewer 
covers in order to obstacle the access of the 
pollution agents to the municipal sewer  
? The water discharge is in Mincio; there is a continuous check of 
the water discharged by TAF (treatment of the water sucked by the 
hydraulic barrier). From the document, available, it is not clear if it 
is present an automatic lock of the drainage lines.  
Arrangement of devices for an automatic lock 
of the drainage lines whether is detected the 
presence of pollution agents. 
? 
Arrangement of emergency management 
procedures 
Y  
POINT 3 
Assessment of the hydrogeological conditions 
nearby the plant and the points of possible 
release 
Y 
The hydrogeological conditions are periodically monitored by the 
plant and public authorities in relation to the project of recovery of 
the SIN area 
Assessment of the times employed by the 
pollution agents to arrive to the sensitive 
elements  
? Information not available 
Arrangement of emergency safety measures 
(Hydraulic barrier) 
Y 
64 wells act as an hydraulic barrier for the containment and 
removal of the supernatant hydrocarbon spot present in the 
underground water; a dedicated water treatment system (TAF) is 
present.   
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PREVENTIVE/PROTECTIVE MEASURES 
IES FULFILMENT 
Y/N Description 
Employment of off-ground tanks instead of 
those underground 
Y 
The only underground tanks are those for LPG, compliant with the 
provisions of Ministerial Decree 13.10.94 
Paving of the area for the new plant with 
layers of waterproof materials 
Y/N 
Only some loading areas and some containment basins have 
waterproof paving 
Employment of off-ground lines instead of 
those underground 
Y 
 
Table 73: Ies NaTech protection measures 
NA-TECH SAFETY AND MITIGATION 
MEASURES 
IES FULFILMENT 
Y/N Description 
Use of structural design codes or retrofitting N  
Containment dikes or walls N  
Use of structural design codes or retrofitting of 
walls and dikes 
N  
Anchoring mechanisms of tanks and equipment 
(e.g. anchor bolts, bracing) 
N  
Bracing of pipes and connections N  
Flexible connections for pipes ? Information not available 
Restraining straps or chains for barrels or 
pressure vessels 
? Information not available 
Strapping and anchoring of emergency 
equipment 
? Information not available 
Emergency shut off/safety valves Y  
Emergency water systems, and foam spraying 
systems 
Y 
- The firefighting water network encloses all the plant, 
distributing water to the protection points near the tanks and 
process units. The water is taken from the Inferior lake through 
electrical or diesel pumps; it can also be partially reintegrated 
with the water produced by the TAF.    
- The floating roof tanks are equipped with foam discharge 
devices along the roof sealing; all the tanks are equipped with 
cooling system for coating and roof.  
- The LPG tanks are provided with water firefighting pipelines. 
The entire LPG areas is equipped with dedicated firefighting 
system, using both pulverized water and foam.   
- the loading area for tanker trucks is equipped with firefighting 
automatic system, based on foam and water 
- the loading area for rail tankers is equipped with manual 
firefighting system, based on foam and water 
- 4 monitors are present for the protection of the dock area. 
Adequate siting of emergency water and foam 
spraying systems to avoid damage from falling 
debris 
? Information not available 
Redundancy in pipeline systems, particularly 
emergency water 
? 
Information not available, the redundancy is certainly active for 
the pumps 
Warning systems Y  
Emergency power generators designed to 
maintain critical equipment housing 
hazardous chemicals in safe condition for 
extended periods of time 
? Information not available 
Routine inspection and maintenance for 
corrosion and deterioration 
Y 
Periodical inspection and maintenance, non-disruptive checks 
through ultrasounds, x-ray etc.  
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NA-TECH SAFETY AND MITIGATION 
MEASURES 
IES FULFILMENT 
Y/N Description 
Inventory control (e.g. minimizing the amount 
of hazardous materials used) 
? Information not available 
Strategic placement of substances inside plant 
in order to avoid chemical incompatibility 
Y  
Placement of storage tanks with hazmats 
above the maximum height reachable by water 
N  
Construction of drainage system Y 
Double drainage system, equipped with emergency tanks and 
basins to adsorb an excessive charge 
Interruption of production process Y The trip is foreseen for certain anomalies 
De-inventory of main processing units ? Information not available 
Giving transport priority to most dangerous 
chemicals (those that react violently with 
water) 
? Information not available 
Verification of storage tank seals Y Periodical checks of the integrity of tanks 
Hermetic sealing of silos and underground 
storage tanks 
? Information not available 
Wrapping of substances in watertight packing 
and labelling 
? Information not available 
Raising of electrical equipment such as 
motors, pumps and control panels to avoid 
water damage and system failure 
? Information not available 
Maintaining na-tech emergency response plan N  
Construction of retaining walls and levees or 
dykes 
N  
Drills and Training Y  
Plan to allow workers to check on family ? Information not available 
Training plan for external responders on 
management of hazardous chemicals onsite 
? Information not available 
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Annex II: ALOHA and HSSM results 
ALOHA and HSSM simulations and results for the items of Versalis and IES are showed. 
The scenarios for Toxic release, Flash-fire, pool-fire and environmental pollution are 
reported; VCE is not present because all the simulations returned results in which the Level 
of Concern was not exceeded.  
The simulations aimed at reproducing the possible effects of the interactions between the 
industries and the natural events (Flood, Earthquake), but the Flood conditions were not 
tested for the items whose ground elevation made them safe from the flood wave. 
The measures of the puddles obtained through ALOHA, and those reported as Input for 
HSSM are also shown. In case the basin of containment is settled as boundary (E), the 
maximum extension reached by the puddle coincides with the diameter of the basin, while 
in F conditions the puddle is allowed to expand on the water without boundaries, and 
therefore reaches bigger sizes. 
Table 74: ALOHA and HSSM results for Versalis 
VERSALIS 
Substance & 
item 
Damag
e state 
Damage areas 
Environmental 
pollution 
Toxic release 
(IDLH) 
Flash-fire 
1) LFL  
2) 60%LFL) 
Pool-fire 
1)  12,5 Kw/m2 
2) 7 Kw/m2 
3) 5 Kw/m2  
F S  F S  F S 
Benzene 
DA404, 5000 
m3 
Containment 
basin Ø = 52 
m. 
 
R3 
10 mm 
- 
10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 6,9 
m.) 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m. 
- 
1) = 10 
m.  
2) < 10 
m. 
R3 – 1 cm hole 
Puddle Ø:  7,6 m, 
r = 3,8 m (median 
between puddle Ø 
obtained for 
benzene, 
ethylbenzene, 
cumene, toluene, 
styrene).  
KOPT: After a 3 
hours release from 
the puddle, the 
pollutant can reach 
the underground 
water depth (6 m.) 
in 5 days. In half 
day, it overcomes 
3 m. 
OILENS = around 
10 m. in 25 days, 
25 m. in 200 days 
R3 
30 mm 
- 
57 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 21 
m.) 
- 
1) = 
LOC not 
exceede
d  
2) > 10 
m 
- 
1) < 10 
m.  
2) < 10 
m. 
R2 
225 mm 
- 
160 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 52 
m) 
- 
1) 15 m 
2) 29 m 
- 
1) 43 m  
2) 59 m 
3) 71 m 
Acrylonitrile 
 
DA422, 750 
m3 
Containment 
R3 
10 mm 
 
- 
29 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 7,3 
m) 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m. 
- 
1)<10 m  
2)<10 m Waterproof 
containment basin 
R3 
30 mm 
- 
195 m 
(Puddle 
- 
2) level 
of 
- 
1)<10 m  
2)<10 m 
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VERSALIS 
Substance & 
item 
Damag
e state 
Damage areas 
Environmental 
pollution 
Toxic release 
(IDLH) 
Flash-fire 
1) LFL  
2) 60%LFL) 
Pool-fire 
1)  12,5 Kw/m2 
2) 7 Kw/m2 
3) 5 Kw/m2  
F S  F S  F S 
basin Ø = 30 
m 
Ø = 22 
m) 
concern 
never 
exceede
d 
R2 
150 mm 
- 
347 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 30 
m) 
- 
2) level 
of 
concern 
never 
exceede
d 
- 
1) 19 m 
2) 27 m 
3) 32 m. 
R117 - 358 m. - 
1) and 
2) Level 
of 
Concern 
never 
exceede
d 
- 
1) 41 m.  
2) 55 m. 
3) 65 m. 
Cumene 
DA408, 
10000 m3 
Containment 
basin Ø = 66 
m 
R3 
10 mm 
 
- 
< 10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 8,1 
m) 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
- 
1)<10 m  
2)<10 m 
R3 – 1 cm hole 
Puddle Ø:  7,6 m, 
r = 3,8 m (median 
between puddle Ø 
obtained for 
benzene, 
ethylbenzene, 
cumene, toluene, 
styrene). 
KOPT: After a 3 
hours release from 
the puddle, the 
pollutant can reach 
the underground 
water depth (6 m.) 
in 5 days. In half 
day, it overcomes 
3 m. 
OILENS = around 
10 m. in 25 days, 
25 m. in 200 days 
R3 
30 mm 
- 
12 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 24 
m) 
- 
1) 12 m. 
2) 12 m 
- 
1)<10 m  
2)<10 m 
R2 
225 mm 
- 
33 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 66 
m) 
- 
1) 17 m. 
2) 17 m. 
- 
1) 44 m  
2) 60 m 
3) 71 m 
Cumene 
DA453, 5000 
m3 
 
Containment 
basin Ø = 50 
m. 
R3 
10 mm 
 
< 10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 12,6 
m) 
< 10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 8 m) 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
1)<10 m  
2)<10 m 
1)<10 m  
2)<10 m 
R3 
30 mm 
19 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 38 
m) 
12 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 24 
m) 
1) 19 m. 
2) 19 m 
1) 12 m. 
2) 12 m 
1)<10 m  
2)<10 m 
1)<10 m  
2)<10 m 
R2 
225 mm 
144 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 289 
m) 
25 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 50 
m) 
1)144 m 
2)145 m 
1) 17 m. 
2) 17 m 
1) 42 m  
2) 58 m 
3) 69 m 
1) 44 m.  
2) 60 m. 
3)71 m. 
Ethylbenzen
e 
DA431,1000 
m3 
Containment 
basin Ø = 18 
m 
R3 
10 mm 
- 
10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 7,9 
m) 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
- 
1) and 2) 
< 10 m 
R3 – 1 cm hole 
Puddle Ø:  7,6 m, r 
= 3,8 m (median 
between puddle Ø 
obtained for 
benzene, 
ethylbenzene, 
cumene, toluene, 
styrene). 
KOPT: After a 3 
R3 
30 mm 
- 
12 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 24 
m) 
- 
1) 12 m 
2) 12 m 
- 
1) and 2) 
< 10 m 
R2 
150 mm 
- 
18 m 
(Puddle 
- 
1) 18 m 
2) 18 m 
- 
1) 29 m 
2) 40 m 
3) 48 m 
                                                 
17 R1 damage state – catastrophic rupture, is simulated through a puddle source, having the same area of the 
containment basin (736 m2), and the same volume of the tank (750 m3). 
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VERSALIS 
Substance & 
item 
Damag
e state 
Damage areas 
Environmental 
pollution 
Toxic release 
(IDLH) 
Flash-fire 
1) LFL  
2) 60%LFL) 
Pool-fire 
1)  12,5 Kw/m2 
2) 7 Kw/m2 
3) 5 Kw/m2  
F S  F S  F S 
Ø = 36 
m) 
hours release from 
the puddle, the 
pollutant can reach 
the underground 
water depth (6 m.) 
in 5 days. In half 
day, it overcomes 
3 m. 
OILENS = around 
10 m. in 25 days, 
25 m. in 200 days 
Ethylbenzen
e 
DA406, 5000 
m3 
Containment 
basin Ø =26 
m 
R3 
10 mm 
 
- 
< 10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 7,9 
m) 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
- 
1) and 2) 
< 10 m 
R3 
30 mm 
- 
12 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 24 
m) 
- 
1) 12 m 
2) 12 m 
- 
1) and 2) 
< 10 m 
R2 
225 mm 
- 
22 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 52 
m) 
- 
Level of 
concern 
never 
exceede
d 
- 
1) 49 m  
2) 60 m 
3) 71 m 
Cyclohexano
ne  
DA460,5000 
m3 
Containment 
basin Ø = 42 
m 
R3 
10 mm 
- 
< 10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 7,9 
m) 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
- 
1) and 2) 
< 10 m 
R3 – 1 cm hole 
Puddle Ø: 7,9 m.  
KOPT: After a 3 
hours release from 
the puddle, the 
pollutant arrives 
around 3 m. 
underground. It 
can reach the 
water-table only 
with a release of 
12 h. from the 
puddle.  
OILENS = around 
10 m. in 25 days, 
30 m. in 200 days 
R3 
30 mm 
- 
12 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 24 
m) 
- 
1) 12 m 
2) 12 m 
- 
1) and 2) 
< 10 m. 
R2 
225 mm 
- 
21 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 42 
m) 
- 
1) 21 m. 
2) 21 m. 
- 
1) 41 m  
2) 56 m 
3) 66 m 
Cyclohexano
ne  
DA1001, 
2000 m3 
Containment 
basin Ø = 36 
m.   
R3 
10 mm 
< 10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 12,9 
m) 
< 10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 7,9 
m) 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m. 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m. 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m. 
1) and 2) 
< 10 m. 
R3 
30 mm 
19 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 39 
m) 
12 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 24 
m) 
1) 19 m 
2) 19 m 
1) 12 m 
2) 12 m 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
3) 11 m 
1) and 2) 
< 10 m. 
R2 
150 mm 
98 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 196 
m) 
18 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 36 
m) 
1) 98 m 
2) 98 m 
1) 18 m 
2) 18 m 
1) 26 m  
2) 36 m 
3) 43 m 
1) 27 m  
2) 37 m 
3) 45 m 
Toluene  
DA417, 2000 
m3 
 
Containment 
basin Ø = 36 
m 
R3 
10 mm 
 - 
< 10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø=7,4 
m) 
 - 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
 - 
1) and 2) 
< 10 m 
R3 – 1 cm hole 
Puddle Ø:  median 
measure between 
those obtained for 
benzene / 
ethylbenzene 
/cumene / toluene / 
styrene = Ø 7,6 m, 
r = 3,8 m.  
KOPT: After a 3 
hours release from 
the puddle, the 
pollutant can reach 
the underground 
water depth (6 m.) 
in 5 days. In half 
R3 
30 mm 
- 
53 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 22 
m) 
- 
2) level 
of 
concern 
never 
exceede
d 
- 
1)<10 m 
2)<10 m 
R2 
150 mm 
- 
79 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 36 
m) 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
- 
1) 28 m 
2) 40 m 
3) 47 m 
Toluene  
DA428 
R3 
10 mm 
- 
< 10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø=7,4 
m) 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
- 
1) and 2) 
< 10 m 
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VERSALIS 
Substance & 
item 
Damag
e state 
Damage areas 
Environmental 
pollution 
Toxic release 
(IDLH) 
Flash-fire 
1) LFL  
2) 60%LFL) 
Pool-fire 
1)  12,5 Kw/m2 
2) 7 Kw/m2 
3) 5 Kw/m2  
F S  F S  F S 
1000 m3 
Containment 
basin Ø =.33 
m 
R3 
30 mm 
- 
53 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 22 
m) 
- 
2) level 
of 
concern 
never 
exceede
d 
- 
1) and 2) 
< 10 m 
day, it overcomes 
3 m. 
OILENS = around 
10 m. in 25 days, 
25 m. in 200 days 
R2 
150 mm 
- 
71 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 33 
m) 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
- 
1) 28 m  
2) 40 m 
3) 47 m 
Toluene 
DA450 & 
DA451, 2000 
m3 
Containment 
basin Ø = 31 
m 
R3 
10 mm 
< 10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 9,4 
m)  
< 10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 7,4 
m) 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m. 
1) and 2) 
< 10 m 
R3 
30 mm 
25 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 29 
m) 
53 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 22 
m) 
1) 14 m 
2) 14 m 
2) level 
of 
concern 
never 
exceede
d 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m  
3) 12 m 
1) and 2) 
< 10 m 
R2 
150 mm 
122 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 152 
m) 
66 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 31 
m) 
2) level 
of 
concern 
never 
exceede
d 
2) level 
of 
concern 
never 
exceede
d 
1) 28 m  
2) 39 m 
3) 46 m 
1) 28 m  
2) 40 m 
3) 47 m 
Styrene 
DA1007,100
0 m3 
Containment 
basin Ø = 18 
m 
R3 
10 mm 
< 10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 12,4 
m) 
< 10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 7,9 
m) 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m. 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
1) and 2) 
< 10 m 
R3 – 1 cm hole 
Puddle Ø:  
median measure 
between those 
obtained for 
benzene / 
ethylbenzene 
/cumene / toluene 
/ styrene = Ø 7,6 
m, r = 3,8 m.  
KOPT: After a 3 
hours release from 
the puddle, the 
pollutant can 
reach the 
underground 
water depth (6 m.) 
in 5 days. In half 
day, it overcomes 
3 m. 
OILENS = around 
10 m. in 25 days, 
25 m. in 200 days 
R3 
30 mm 
19 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 38 
m) 
< 10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 18 
m) 
1) 19 m 
2) 19 m 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m  
3) 12 m 
1) and 2) 
< 10 m 
R2 
150 mm 
95 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 190 
m) 
< 10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø =18 
m) 
1) 95 m 
2) 95 m 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
1) 28 m  
2) 39 m 
3) 47 m 
1) 29 m  
2) 40 m 
3) 48 m 
Styrene 
DA1013 & 
DA1014, 
2000 m3 
Containment 
basin Ø = 36 
m 
R3 
10 mm 
< 10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 12,4 
m) 
< 10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 7,9 
m)  
1) and 
2) < 10 
m. 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m. 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m. 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m. 
R3 
30 mm 
19 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 38 
m) 
12 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 24 
m) 
1) 19 m 
2) 19 m 
1) 12 m 
2) 12 m 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m  
3) 12 m 
1) and 2) 
< 10 m. 
R2 
150 mm 
95 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 190 
m) 
18 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 36 
m) 
1) 95 m 
2) 95 m 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m. 
1) 28 m  
2) 39 m 
3) 47 m 
1) 29 m  
2) 40 m 
3) 48 m 
Benzene R3 
10 mm 
- 
< 10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 6,6 
m) 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
Not executed (see 
results for the 
benzene tanks) 
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VERSALIS 
Substance & 
item 
Damag
e state 
Damage areas 
Environmental 
pollution 
Toxic release 
(IDLH) 
Flash-fire 
1) LFL  
2) 60%LFL) 
Pool-fire 
1)  12,5 Kw/m2 
2) 7 Kw/m2 
3) 5 Kw/m2  
F S  F S  F S 
Rail tanker18  
R3 
30 mm 
- 
67 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 20 
m) 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
Acrylonitrile 
Rail tanker 
R3 
10 mm 
- 
33 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 7 m) 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
R3 
30 mm 
- 
220 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 21 
m)  
- 
1) and 
2) LOC 
never 
exceede
d 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
Phenol  
FB1319, 
1000 m3 
Containment 
basin Ø = 22 
R3 
10 mm 
- 
< 10 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 14,7 
m) 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
- 
1) and 2) 
< 10 m 
Not executed 
(DNAPL) 
R3 
30 mm 
- 
11 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 22 
m) 
- 
1) 11 m 
2) 11 m 
- 
1) 11 m 
2) 11 m 
R2 
150 mm 
- 
P11 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 22 
m) 
- 
1) 15 m 
2) 29 m 
- 
1) 43 m  
2) 59 m 
3) 71 m 
Table 75: ALOHA and HSSM results for IES 
IES 
Substance & 
item 
Damag
e state 
Damage areas 
Environmental 
pollution 
Toxic release 
(IDLH) 
Flash-fire 
1) LFL  
2) 60%LFL) 
Pool-fire 
1)  12,5 Kw/m2 
2) 7 Kw/m2 
3) 5 Kw/m2  
F S  F S  F S 
Diesel fuel 
111, 60000 
m3 
Containment 
basin Ø = 100 
m. 
R3 
10 mm 
Not 
toxic 
Not 
toxic 
The 
chemica
l sinks 
in the 
water 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 19,5 
m) 
 - 
1)<10 m  
2)<10 m  
3) 10 m. 
R3 – 1 cm hole 
Puddle Ø: 19, 5 m.  
KOPT: After a 3 
hours release from 
the puddle, the 
pollutant reaches 2 
m. underground. It 
arrives to the water 
                                                 
18 For the rail tankers simulations, generic dimension typical of the rail tankers for hydrocarbon products were 
employed: length 10,8 m., width 2,87 m., height 4,6 m, internal volume 73 m3. The rail tankers are usually 
employed by Versalis for the transportation of its raw materials; benzene and acrylonitrile were chosen because 
they are among the most dangerous substances detained. The point of release was settled nearby the Lunetta 
Frassine station, in order to verify the risk for the urban functions around the railways. No limits for the puddle 
were imposed. 
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IES 
Substance & 
item 
Damag
e state 
Damage areas 
Environmental 
pollution 
Toxic release 
(IDLH) 
Flash-fire 
1) LFL  
2) 60%LFL) 
Pool-fire 
1)  12,5 Kw/m2 
2) 7 Kw/m2 
3) 5 Kw/m2  
F S  F S  F S 
R3 
30 mm 
Not 
toxic 
Not 
toxic 
1) 29 m 
2) 29 m 
(Puddle 
Ø 58 m) 
 - 
1) 19 m  
2) 26 m 
3) 30 m 
depth (6 m.) in 5 
days after 14 hours 
of release.  
OILENS = around 
30 m. in 25 days, 
65 m. in 200 days 
R2 
300 mm 
Not 
toxic 
Not 
toxic 
1) 50 m 
2) 50 m 
(Puddle 
Ø 100 
m) 
 - 
1) 148 m 
2) 193 m 
3) 224 m 
Gasoline 
 
109, 40000 
m3 
 
Containment 
basin Ø = 80 
m 
R3 
10 mm 
 Not 
toxic 
Not 
toxic 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 
11,6 m) 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 
10,2 m) 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m  
1) and 
2) < 10 
m  
R3 – 1 cm hole 
Puddle Ø: 10,2 m.  
KOPT: After a 3 
hours release from 
the puddle, the 
pollutant can reach 
the underground 
water depth (6 m.) 
in 5 days. In half 
day it overcomes 3 
m. 
OILENS = around 
15 m. in 25 days, 
40 m. in 200 days 
R3 
30 mm 
 Not 
toxic 
Not 
toxic 
 
1) 18 m 
2) 18 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 36 
m) 
1) 15 m. 
2) 16 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 31 
m) 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m  
1) and 
2) < 10 
m  
R2 
300 mm 
 Not 
toxic 
Not 
toxic 
Puddle 
Ø = 390 
m 
 level of 
concern 
never 
exceede
d 
Puddle 
Ø = 80 
m 
 level of 
concern 
never 
exceede
d 
1) 42 m  
2) 57 m 
3) 67 m 
1) 144 
m 
2)190 m 
3) 222 
m 
Gasoline 
 9, 28000 m3 
 
Containment 
basin Ø = 54 
m 
R3  
10 mm 
 Not 
toxic 
Not 
toxic 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 
11,8 m) 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 
10,4m) 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m  
1) and 
2) < 10 
m  
Not executed 
R3  
30 mm 
 Not 
toxic 
Not 
toxic 
1) 18 m. 
2) 18 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 36 
m) 
1) 16 m. 
2) 16 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 31 
m)  
1) and 
2) < 10 
m  
1) and 
2) < 10 
m  
R2 
300 mm 
 Not 
toxic 
Not 
toxic 
LOC 
never 
exceede
d 
(Puddle 
Ø = 390 
m) 
LOC 
never 
exceede
d 
(Puddle 
Ø = 54 
m) 
1) 42 m. 
2) 57 m. 
3) 67 m 
1) 43 m  
2) 58 m 
3) 69 m 
R2 
1000 
mm 
 Not 
toxic 
Not 
toxic 
 
1) 18 m 
2) 18 m 
Puddle 
Ø = 36 
m 
1) 16 m. 
2) 16 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 31 
m) 
1) 173 
m  
2) 227 
m 
3) 225 
m 
1) 98 m  
2) 130 
m 
3) 153 
m 
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IES 
Substance & 
item 
Damag
e state 
Damage areas 
Environmental 
pollution 
Toxic release 
(IDLH) 
Flash-fire 
1) LFL  
2) 60%LFL) 
Pool-fire 
1)  12,5 Kw/m2 
2) 7 Kw/m2 
3) 5 Kw/m2  
F S  F S  F S 
MTBE/ETB
E 
14, 2000 m3 
Containment 
basin Ø = 28 
m. 
R3  
10 mm 
 Not 
toxic 
Not 
toxic 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 4,9 
m) 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m  
R3 – 1cm hole 
Puddle Ø: 4,9 m.  
KOPT: After a 2 
hours release from 
the puddle, the 
pollutant can 
reach the 
underground 
water depth (6 m.) 
in 1 day. In half 
day it overcomes 
3 m. 
OILENS = around 
23 m. in 25 days, 
40 m. in 200 days 
R3 
30 mm 
 Not 
toxic 
Not 
toxic 
- 
1) 12 m 
2) 19 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 
15,2 m) 
- 
1) and 
2) < 10 
m  
R2  
150 mm 
 Not 
toxic 
Not 
toxic 
- 
 
 1) 31 m 
2) 41 m 
(Puddle 
Ø = 28 
m) 
- 
1) 52 m  
2) 72 m 
3) 86 M 
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Annex III: Territorial and environmental 
vulnerabilities in Mantua 
Table 76: Territorial vulnerable elements in Mantua (AREAL) 
Mantua City Plan (P.G.T.) – urban zones DM 09/05/2001 category 
Article Definition 
Building 
ratio 
index 
Category 
assigned 
Notes 
D14 
“Civitas vetus”, area included in the 
first town-walls 
Not 
specified 
A 
The category assigned for these functions 
was A, because of their dense urban pattern 
and high frequentation 
D15 
Area include in the second town-
walls 
Not 
specified 
D16 
More recent areas, with values 
analogous to those of the historical 
centre 
Not 
specified 
D17 Ancient Borgo Angeli 
Not 
specified 
B 
The category for this little village outside 
walls was chosen according to its 
architectural characteristics and to the 
category of the surrounding residential 
areas 
D18 
Residential areas Valletta Paiolo, 
Viale Risorgimento, Valletta 
Valsecchi 
1,05 
m2/m2 
B - 
D19 Residential areas 
0,75 
m2/m2 
B - 
D20 Areas for economic activities 
1,10 
m2/m2 
B C E 
The article D20 include areas with very 
different functions, both commercial and 
productive. Therefore, the areas were 
explored one by one in order to assign the 
right category: the industrial areas were 
classified as E, the biggest shopping centres 
obtained a category B, while other selling 
activities were classified as C   
D21 
Areas for productive and industrial 
activities 
Not 
relevant 
E - 
D22  
D23 
D24 
Areas subjected to transformations 
into residential or productive 
functions 
Variable Variable 
The Building ratio index is defined by the 
PGT for each area; they were classified in 
accordance to their future function 
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Table 77: Territorial vulnerable elements in Mantua (PUNCTUAL) 
Function Element 
DM 
09/05/2001 
category 
Schools 
Scuola dell'Infanzia CALVI; Scuola primaria Allende; Scuola dell'infanzia Berni; Scuola 
primaria Tazzoli; Scuola dell'infanzia Pacchioni; Scuola secondaria I grado  Leon Battista 
Alberti; Scuole Mons. Martini e Istituto casa Pace; Liceo Ginnasio Virgilio; Istituto privato 
Redentore; Liceo Scienze Umane I. D'Este + primaria Nievo; For.ma CFP + primaria Ardigò 
+ media Sacchi; Scuola dell'infanzia "Casa dei Bambini"; Istituti Santa Paola; Scuola 
dell'Infanzia V. Da Feltre; Asilo nido Charlie Chaplin; Scuola Inf. Ferrari + secondaria 
Bertazzoli; Scuola Infanzia Strozzi Valenti; Scuola infanzia Montessori; 
Scuola infanzia Visentini; Scuola Infanzia Rodari; Istituto superiore Mazzolari; Scuola 
Infanzia A.Frank; Scuola primaria Don Mazzolari; Scuola infanzia Collodi; Scuola primaria  
De Amicis; Scuola Infanzia Sawyer, primaria  Don Leoni; Scuola inf. Campogalliani, primaria 
Martiri di B.; Scuola infanzia Ricordo c. + primaria D. Minzoni; Asilo nido Kelder 
Asilo nido Soncini; Scuola primaria Pomponazzo; Succursale liceo Belfiore 
A 
Cultural/cult and 
sport centers 
Museo archeologico, Palazzo ducale, S. Barbara 
Social assistance 
centers 
Casa di riposo Sereno Soggiorno; Casa di riposo Isabella d'este; Casa di cura San Clemente; 
Azienda sanitaria locale Mantova; Istituti Geriatrici Mazzali; Poliambulatorio 
Schools 
ITG "D'Arco" e ITC "Pitentino"; Istituto tecnico A. Mantegna; Istituto tecnico A. Mantegna 
– succursale; Conservatorio; Istituti industriali FERMI e DA VINCI; Istituto tecnico agrario; 
Fondazione Università di Mantova; POLIMI - polo Mantova; Istituto d'Arte Romano; Liceo 
scientifico Belfiore 
B Cultural/cult and 
sport centers 
Sala concerti e centro polifunzionale PalaBam; Società Canottieri del Mincio; Duomo di 
Mantova e Seminario vescovile 
Social assistance 
centers 
Villaggio SOS; SERT Lombardia; Azienda ospedaliera Poma - centro Salute Mentale; Casa di 
cura Villa al Lago 
Others Campo nomadi; stazione centrale 
Cultural/cult 
and sport 
centers 
Palazzo Tè; Biblioteca colle Aperto e Circoscrizione Nord; Museo diocesano; Teatro 
scientifico Bibiena e accademia virgiliana; Biblioteca comunale; Biblioteca - mediateca 
Baracca; Teatro Minimo; Centro sociale Valletta Valsecchi; Museo di Palazzo d'Arco; Teatro 
sociale Mantova; Palazzo Cantoni Marca; Palazzo Museo della Città; Palazzo S. Sebastiano 
del Mago; Casa del Mantegna; Circolo ARCI; Parrocchia B.V. Maria e S. Urbano; Parrocchia 
di s. Maria dei miracoli; Congregazione Suore di Gesù Buon pastore; Parrocchia di S. Ruffino 
e Beato G. Bono; Parrocchia di San Michele Arcangelo; Basilica di Sant'Andrea; Rotonda di 
san Lorenzo; Parrocchia di Santa Maria della carità; Parrocchia di San Barnaba; Chiesa Santa 
Teresa e convento Carmelitani; Parrocchia di Sant'Egidio; Parrocchia di Santa Caterina; 
Parrocchia di Santa Maria del Gradaro; Chiesa SS. Simone e Giuda; Parrocchia di S.Pio V e 
pertinenze; Parrocchia s. Giuseppe Artigiano; Parrocchia s.Filippo Neri; Chiesa SS. Gervasio 
e Protazio; Chiesa di San Francesco; Chiesa di Sant'Orsola; Chiesa di San Maurizio; Chiesa 
San Luigi Gonzaga; Sala del Regno testimoni di Geova; Chiesa di Sant'Apollonia; Chiesa s. 
Maria degli Angeli; chiesa di San Leonardo; Chiesa di San Sebastiano; Chiesa di S. Spirito; 
Campi da calcio Filippi; Ippodromo e stadio comunale; Centro sportivo comunale Neolù; 
Tennis club Poggio Reale; Campi da calcio; Campo da basket; Pista atletica e campo basket; 
Tennis club Mantova; Campi da calcio Cugola; Centro sportivo Migliaretto e U.S. Rugby; 
Circuito motocross; Piscina comunale Dugoni;  Area sosta camper di Sparafucile; 
Centro polisportivo San Lazzaro; La Spiaggetta; Aree verdi attrezzate Piazza Virgiliana; Aree 
verdi attrezzate Piazza dei Mille; Aree verdi attrezzate Giardini valentini; Giardini Tazio 
Nuvolari 
C 
Offices and 
public services 
Centro direttivo TEA s.p.a.; Camera di commercio; Consorzio di bonifica Territori del Mincio; 
CISL sindacato; Istituto zooprofilattico; Provveditorato agli studi; Comune Settore Lavori 
pubblici; ENAIP Lombardia e Centro per l'impiego; Polizia postale e telecomunicazioni; API 
associazione piccole e medie industrie; INPS; Poliambulatorio veterinario 
Others Stazione Borgochiesanuova; Stazione Frassine 
Others 
Cimitero di Formigosa; Cimitero di Frassine; Cimitero di San Giorgio; Bosco Virgliano e 
Parcobaleno; Cimitero monumentale 
D 
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Table 78: Territorial vulnerable elements in Mantua (OTHERS) 
LINEAR ELEMENTS 
Power line 
Methan pipeline 
Services pipelines for the plants Versalis and IES 
Main road: E45 Brennero highway, Mantua orbital road 
STRATEGIC ELEMENTS 
Civil protection areas 
Area di ricovero R1; Area di ricovero R2; Area di attesa A; Area di ricovero R3; Area 
stoccaggio mezzi/materiali S1; Area stoccaggio mezzi/materiali S2 
Strategic 
infrastructures19 
Impianto idrovoro Valsecchi; Depuratore; Impianto idrovoro Paiolo Basso; Impianto idrovoro 
Ponte Arlotto; TEA cabina metano; Centrale elettrica; Impianto di sollevamento Quattro venti 
Strategic buildings 
Polizia di stato e polizia stradale; Questura; Corpo forestale dello stato; Comune di Mantova; 
Prefettura; Tribunale di Mantova; Casa circondariale Mantova; Palazzo Soardi - uffici 
comunali; Guardia di Finanza; Polizia locale; Ospedale Carlo Poma; Caserma militare San 
Martino; Caserma polizia di Stato; Regione Lombardia – STER; Carabinieri; VVF Mantova 
Table 79: Environmental vulnerable elements in Mantua 
EXTREME VULNERABILITY DOCUMENT SOURCE Presence in Mantua 
1. Protected natural areas (national, 
regional, provincial)   
Comune di Mantova, Piano di Governo del 
Territorio, Rapporto Ambientale, Carta delle 
Sensibilità, nov. 2012 
YES 
Mincio natural park 
2. Natura 2000 ex Directive 
92/43/CEE “Habitat” areas 
Comune di Mantova, Piano di Governo del 
Territorio, Rapporto Ambientale, Carta delle 
Sensibilità, nov. 2012 
YES 
SIC IT20B0017 Ansa e Valli 
del Mincio 
SIC IT20B0010 Vallazza 
3. Landscapes protected by 
D.Lgs.42/2004 s.m.i. art. 142, letters: 
b, (300 m. areas around the lakes), d 
(mountains higher than 1600 m), m 
(archaeological areas) 
Comune di Mantova, Piano di Governo del 
Territorio, Rapporto Ambientale, Carta delle 
Sensibilità, nov. 2012 
YES 
Area 300 m. around Mincio 
lakes 
Archaeological site in the 
city centre 
4. A and B zones from PAI plan, areas 
with very high or high 
hydrogeological instability  
Comune di Mantova, Piano di Governo del 
Territorio, Rapporto Ambientale, Carta delle 
Criticità, nov. 2012 
YES 
A and B zones Mincio river 
5. Landslides  
Comune di Mantova, Piano di Governo del 
Territorio, Rapporto Ambientale, Carta delle 
Criticità, nov. 2012 
NO 
6. Residential areas to be transferred 
or consolidated according to legge 9 
luglio 1908 n. 445 e s.m.i. 
Comune di Mantova, Piano di Governo del 
Territorio, Rapporto Ambientale, Carta delle 
Criticità, nov. 2012 
NO 
  
                                                 
19 not listed as Protection Measures for the hazards 
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RELEVANT VULNERABILITY DOCUMENT SOURCE Presence in Mantua 
1. Historical monuments, protected 
landscape / environmental 
archaeological areas  
Comune di Mantova, Piano di Governo del 
Territorio, Rapporto Ambientale, Carta delle 
Sensibilità, nov. 2012 
YES 
Historical monuments L. 
1089/1939; Landscape areas 
protected by L. 1497/1939: 
Mantova e Cittadella, Lago 
Mezzo e Inferiore, Fiume 
Mincio; area subjected to 
Hydrogeological protection by 
the PTC Plan for Mincio park 
2. geositi 
Comune di Mantova, Piano di Governo del 
Territorio, Rapporto Ambientale, Carta delle 
Sensibilità, nov. 2012 
NO 
3. Landscapes protected by 
D.Lgs.42/2004 s.m.i. art. 142, letter g: 
(wood areas) 
Comune di Mantova, Piano di Governo del 
Territorio, Rapporto Ambientale, Carta delle 
Sensibilità, nov. 2012 
YES 
4. Area subjected to hydrogeological 
restrictions ex l.r. 45/1989. 
Geoportale Regione Lomabardia, Aree vincolo 
idrogeologico 2013 
NO 
5. Landscapes protected by 
D.Lgs.42/2004 s.m.i. art. 142, letter c, 
(150 m. areas around rivers and public 
creeks) 
Comune di Mantova, Piano di Governo del 
Territorio, Rapporto Ambientale, Carta delle 
Sensibilità, nov. 2012 
YES 
6. Environmental passageways Geoportale Regione Lombardia. Rete 
Ecologica Regionale, 2011 
YES 
7. Land use capacity categories 1 and 
2 
Geoportale Regione Lombardia, Basi 
informative dei suoli, 2013. 
YES 
8. Typical / specialized agriculture 
Geoportale Regione Lombardia. Aree di 
pregio vitivinicole 
NO 
9. C zones from PAI plan, areas with 
moderate hydrogeological instability 
Comune di Mantova, Piano di Governo del 
Territorio, Rapporto Ambientale, Carta delle 
Criticità, nov. 2012 
YES 
C zones Mincio river 
10. fasce di rispetto fluviali a media 
probabilità di inondazione, indicate da 
studi della Provincia 
- - 
11. Underground water with very high 
or high vulnerability 
Geoportale Regione Lombardia. PTUA – 
Piano di Tutela e Uso delle Acque, 2013 
YES 
The entire Mantua territory is 
characterized by a 
vulnerability high or very high 
12. Aquifer recharge areas 
Geoportale Regione Lombardia. PTUA – 
Piano di Tutela e Uso delle Acque, 2013 
NO 
13. Underground water depth > 3 m. 
Comune di Mantova, PGT - Studio Geologico-
Tecnico, Parte Prima – Relazione Geologica 
Generale, 2012 
Comune di Mantova, PGT - Studio Geologico-
Tecnico, Tavola 4.1 Carta Idrogeologica e 
della Vulnerabilità, 2012 
YES 
The available documents do 
not allow to draw a complete 
mapping on ArcGis; however, 
in many parts of Mantua the 
underground water depth is 
very scarce. 
The specific depth below the 
Seveso plants could is 
between 4 and 20 meters. 
14. Underground water depth from 3 
m. to 10 m., sandy or loamy soils 
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Annex IV: Case-study 2, territorial and 
environmental vulnerabilities  
Table 80: Territorial vulnerable elements (AREAL) 
City Plan (P.R.G.) – urban zones DM 09/05/2001 category 
Code Definition 
Building 
ratio 
index 
Category 
assigned 
Notes 
R1/1 
Historical city center and hamlets 
Not 
specified 
C 
The building ratio index is usually not 
provided for historical areas; the category 
was established in cooperation with the 
Municipal technicians on the basis of the 
type of buildings and attendance of the 
zone.   
R 1/2 
Not 
specified 
R 1/3 
Not 
specified 
R 1/4 
Not 
specified 
R 2/1 
Consolidated residential areas 
0.35 
m2/m2 
C 
 
R 2/2 
0.35 
m2/m2 
R 3/1 
Areas for urban completion 
(residential use) 
0.30 
m2/m2 
D 
R 3/2 
0.20 
m2/m2 
R 3/3 
0.45 
m3/m2 
C 
R 3/4 
0.45 
m2/m2 
R 4 
Area for urban completion in 
agricultural context 
0.10 
m2/m2 
E 
R 5 
Areas subjected to transformation 
with residential purposes 
0,50 
m2/m2 
B 
 
 
R 5/1 
0,50 
m2/m2 
 
R 5/2 
0,50 
m2/m2 
 
R 6/2 
0,60 
m2/m2 
 
R 6/3 
0,50 
m2/m2 
 
P 1/1 
Existing Productive areas 
Not 
relevant 
E 
 
P 1/2 
Not 
relevant 
 
P 1/3 
Existing productive areas, 
potentially subjected to 
transformation for commercial or 
tertiary purposes 
Not 
relevant 
C 
A precautionary “C” value was assigned 
because of the future transformations. The 
interventions shall be monitored, and the 
category will be modified in accordance to 
the future settlements.  
P 1/4  
Saturated productive areas 
Not 
relevant 
E  P 1/5 
Not 
relevant 
P 1/6 
Not 
relevant 
P 2 
Not 
relevant 
C 
A precautionary “C” value was assigned 
because of the future transformations. The 
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City Plan (P.R.G.) – urban zones DM 09/05/2001 category 
Code Definition 
Building 
ratio 
index 
Category 
assigned 
Notes 
P 2/1  Productive areas for completion and 
new installations, also for tertiary 
use 
Not 
relevant 
interventions shall be monitored, and the 
category will be modified in accordance to 
the future settlements.  
P 3/1 
Not 
relevant 
P 4 
Productive areas for completion and 
new installations 
Not 
relevant 
E  
P 5 
Not 
relevant 
T 1/1 
Existing commercial / tertiary areas 
Not 
relevant 
C 
A precautionary “C” value was assigned; 
however, each area was punctually 
investigated to identify possible Punctual 
vulnerable element.   
 
T 1/2 
Not 
relevant 
Table 81: Territorial vulnerable elements (PUNCTUAL) 
N Element Address 
Maximum 
capacity 
Attendance 
Inside/outside 
exposure 
Category 
INSTRUCTION SERVICES 
 A Nursery  60 pupils Daily Inside / outside B.2 
 Nursery  24 pupils Daily Inside / outside B.2 
 Nursery  25 pupils Daily Inside / outside B.2 
 Nursery  20 pupils Daily Inside / outside B.2 
 Nursery   12 pupils Daily Inside / outside B.2 
 Nursery  100 pupils Daily Inside / outside A.2 
 preschool  50 pupils Daily Inside / outside B.2 
 preschool  125 pupils Daily Inside / outside A.2 
 preschool  26 pupils Daily Inside / outside B.2 
 preschool  136 pupils Daily Inside / outside A.2 
 2 preschool  46 pupils Daily Inside / outside B.2 
 primary school  550 students Daily Inside / outside A.2 
 primary school  108 students Daily Inside / outside A.2 
 secondary school  397 students Daily Inside / outside A.2 
 University of the third age  480 students Daily Inside C.2 
 training centre  20 students Weekly Inside C.2 
 Tsecondary private school  20 students /year Daily Inside / outside C.2 
HEALTHCARE AND SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES 
18 
Free clinic and other 
healthcare and assistance 
services 
 Max 800 users Daily Inside B.4 
19 nursing house  45 places Daily Inside A.2 
20 nursing house  12 places Daily Inside B.2 
21 Physiotherapy center  10 places Daily Inside C.3 
22 social assistance center  12 places Daily Inside / outside B.2 
23 SER.T ASL   12 places Daily Inside / outside B.2 
 
24 Library and multimedia center  40 places Weekly Inside C.3 
25 Municipal senior center  55 places Daily Inside C.3 
26 Parish Cinema - Auditorium   203 seats Weekly Inside C.3 
27 Oratory  80 places Daily Inside / outside B.2 
28 Sporty center   90 users Daily Outside C.3 
29 Sport city  4500 users Daily Inside / outside B.4 
30 Jehovah's Witnesses center  
2000 places inside, 
4000 outside 
Weekly Inside / outside B.5 
31 bowls club  Max 90 users Weekly Inside / outside C.3 
32 parish  Max 320 users Weekly Inside C.3 
33 church   Max 75 users Weekly Inside C.3 
34 church  Max 120 users Weekly Inside C.3 
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N Element Address 
Maximum 
capacity 
Attendance 
Inside/outside 
exposure 
Category 
35 church  Max 50 users Occasional Inside D.2 
36 church  Max 620 users Weekly Inside C.3 
37 sanctuary  Max 50 users Occasional Inside D.2 
COMMERCIAL CENTRES, HOTELS 
38 Supermarket   Max 340 users Daily Inside C.2 
39 Commercial mall   Max 220+140 users Daily Inside C.2 
40 Commercial mall  Max 870 users Daily Inside B.4 
41 shop  Max 180 users Daily Inside C.2 
42 Supermarket   Max 190 users Daily Inside C.2 
43 Supermarket   Max 150 users Daily Inside C.2 
44 Supermarket   Max 170 users Daily Inside C.2 
45 Shop   Max 300 user Daily Inside C.2 
46 Bowling + dancing hall  Max 1400 users Daily Inside B.5 
47 discotheque  Max 1800 users Daily Inside B.5 
48 dancing hall  Max 740 users Daily Inside C.3 
49 fishers’ club  - Weekly Outside C.3 
50 Hotel  130 beds Daily Inside C.2 
51 Agritourism   40 beds Daily Inside C.2 
52 Agritourism   35 beds Daily Inside C.2 
53 restaurant  21 beds Daily Inside C.2 
54 Hotel    14 beds Daily Inside C.2 
55 B&b  68 beds Daily Inside C.2 
 
56 Public Market  1000 users Weekly Outside B.5 
57 Cemetery  40/50  Daily Outside D.2 
58 museum  90 Daily Inside C.2 
59 Postal office  90 Daily Inside C.2 
60 Municipality  36-90 Daily Inside C.2 
 
Table 82: Territorial vulnerable elements (OTHERS) 
LINEAR ELEMENTS 
Highway 
Provincial roads  
Power lines 
Methane gas line 
STRATEGIC ELEMENTS 
Strategic infrastructures Electric power plant  
Strategic buildings Caserma carabinieri, Polizia Municipale  
Table 83: Environmental vulnerable elements  
EXTREME VULNERABILITY DOCUMENT SOURCE Presence  
1. Protected natural areas (national, 
regional, provincial)   
Provincia di Torino, P.T.C. 2 – Tavola 3.1 
Sistema del Verde e delle Aree libere, 2011 
Provincia di Torino, P.T.C. 2 – Allegato 3: 
Quaderno Sistema del verde e delle aree 
libere. Core areas, 2011   
Provincia di Torino, P.T.C. 2 – Allegato 3: 
Quaderno Sistema del verde e delle aree 
libere. Buffer zones, 2011   
Provincia di Torino, P.T.C. 2 – Schede 
comunali 
NO 
2. Natura 2000 ex Directive 
92/43/CEE “Habitat” areas 
NO 
 
3. Landscapes protected by 
D.Lgs.42/2004 s.m.i. art. 142, letters: 
b, (300 m. areas around the lakes), d 
Provincia di Torino, P.T.C. 2 – Tavola 3.1 
Sistema del Verde e delle Aree libere, 2011 
Comune di xxxx, Piano Regolatore Generale, 
2000 
NO 
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(mountains higher than 1600 m), m 
(archaeological areas) 
4. A and B zones from PAI plan, areas 
with very high or high 
hydrogeological instability  
Provincia di Torino, P.T.C. 2 – Tavola 5.1 
Quadro del dissesto idrogeologico, dei 
Comuni classificati sismici e degli abitati da 
trasferire e consolidare, 2011 
Provincia di Torino, P.T.C. 2 – Allegati 
cartografici del Servizio Difesa del Suolo e 
Attività Estrattiva, Area Risorse Idriche e 
qualità dell’Aria: Tavola DS2a, Carta dei 
Dissesti – Ambito Nord 4, Riquadro 2, 2011  
Provincia di Torino - Messa in sicurezza del 
reticolo idrografico del territorio posto tra il 
T. …. e il T. …..: Studio di fattibilità. Tav. 
GEO-2E, Carta geomorfologica e delle opere 
di difesa idrauliche censite, 2009 
YES 
 
5. Landslides  Provincia di Torino, P.T.C. 2 – Tavola 5.1 
Quadro del dissesto idrogeologico, dei 
Comuni classificati sismici e degli abitati da 
trasferire e consolidare, 2011 
NO 
6. Residential areas to be transferred 
or consolidated according to legge 9 
luglio 1908 n. 445 e s.m.i. 
NO 
RELEVANT VULNERABILITY DOCUMENT SOURCE Presence  
1. Historical monuments, protected 
landscape / environmental 
archaeological areas  
Comune di xxxx, Piano regolatore generale, 
2000 
YES 
Proposed by Turin province a 
new protected area. 
Monumental heritage 
buildings: 5 
2. geositi 
Regione Piemonte, Piano Paesaggistico 
regionale, Elenchi delle componenti e delle 
unità di paesaggio, 18 maggio 2015 (adozione) 
NO 
3. Landscapes protected by 
D.Lgs.42/2004 s.m.i. art. 142, letter g: 
(wood areas) 
Provincia di Torino, P.T.C. 2 – Tavola 3.1 
Sistema del Verde e delle Aree libere, 2011 
Provincia di Torino, P.T.C. 2 – Schede 
comunali, agosto 2013 
NO 
4. Area subjected to hydrogeological 
restrictions ex l.r. 45/1989. 
Provincia di Torino - Difesa del Suolo e 
Attività estrattiva, cartografia in formato 
webgis disponibile all’indirizzo 
http://gis.csi.it/vidrwbw/ 
NO 
5. Landscapes protected by 
D.Lgs.42/2004 s.m.i. art. 142, letter c, 
(150 m. areas around rivers and public 
creeks) 
Comune di xxxx, Piano regolatore generale, 
2000 
YES 
6. Environmental passageways 
Provincia di Torino, P.T.C. 2 – Allegato 3: 
Quaderno Sistema del verde e delle aree libere. 
Corridors, 2011   
NO 
7. Land use capacity categories 1 and 
2 
Provincia di Torino, P.T.C. 2 – Tavola 3.1 
Sistema del Verde e delle Aree libere, 2011 
Provincia di Torino, P.T.C. 2 – Schede 
comunali, agosto 2013 
YES 
8. Typical / specialized agriculture 
Comune di xxxx, Piano regolatore generale, 
2000 
NO 
9. C zones from PAI plan, areas with 
moderate hydrogeological instability 
Provincia di Torino, P.T.C. 2 – Allegati 
cartografici del Servizio Difesa del Suolo e 
Attività Estrattiva, Area Risorse Idriche e 
qualità dell’Aria: Tavola DS2a, Carta dei 
Dissesti – Ambito Nord 4, Riquadro 2, 2011 
YES 
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A.I.P.O., Regione Piemonte, ARPA – Carta 
della pericolosità da alluvione, Tavola 135SW, 
Giugno 2014 
A.I.P.O., Regione Piemonte, ARPA – Carta 
della pericolosità da alluvione, Tavola 
156NW, Giugno 2014 
Provincia di Torino - Messa in sicurezza del 
reticolo idrografico del territorio posto tra il T. 
… e il T. ….: Studio di fattibilità. Tav. GEO-
2E, Carta geomorfologica e delle opere di 
difesa idrauliche censite, 2009 
10. fasce di rispetto fluviali a media 
probabilità di inondazione, indicate da 
studi della Provincia 
PROVINCIA DI TORINO, P.T.C. 2 – Tavola 
5.1 Quadro del dissesto idrogeologico, dei 
Comuni classificati sismici e degli abitati da 
trasferire e consolidare, 2011 
NO 
11. Underground water with very high 
or high vulnerability 
Regione Piemonte, Piano di Tutela delle 
Acque, MS06 Pianura torinese – Macroarea 
idrologica di riferimento acquiferi superficiali, 
Tav. 3 Elementi di assetto idrogeologico 
Comune di xxxx – 14° Variante non strutturale 
al PRG, Relazione di compatibilità geologica, 
2011 
Provincia di Torino - Messa in sicurezza del 
reticolo idrografico del territorio posto tra il T. 
….. e il T. …..: Studio di fattibilità. Tav. GEO-
2E, Carta geomorfologica e delle opere di 
difesa idrauliche censite, 2009 
YES 
12. Aquifer recharge areas 
Regione Piemonte, Piano di Tutela delle 
Acque, Allegato D: Tavole di Piano, 8, Zone di 
protezione delle acque destinate al consumo 
umano, 2007 
NO 
13. Underground water depth > 3 m. 
REGIONE PIEMONTE, Piano di Tutela delle 
Acque, MS06 Pianura torinese – Macroarea 
idrologica di riferimento acquiferi superficiali, 
Tav. 3 Elementi di assetto idrogeologico 
COMUNE DI xxxx – 14° Variante non 
strutturale al PRG, Relazione di compatibilità 
geologica, 2011 
PROVINCIA DI TORINO - Messa in 
sicurezza del reticolo idrografico del territorio 
posto tra il T. … e il T. ….: Studio di fattibilità. 
Tav. GEO-2E, Carta geomorfologica e delle 
opere di difesa idrauliche censite, 2009 
YES 
14. Underground water depth from 3 
m. to 10 m., sandy or loamy soils 
 
